

# A Stocktaking of Norwegian Engagement in Security Sector Reform

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Department of Security and Conflict Management

Security in Practice 11 · 2011

[NUPI Report]

Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs  
Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2011  
ISBN: 978-82-7002-309-7

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## Acknowledgements

We would like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We would especially like to thank Elisabeth Drøyer, Senior Advisor in the Section for Security Policy and North America, who generously shared her expertise and insights during the preparation of this study.

We would like to thank our colleagues in the Department of Security and Conflict Management at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and in particular Helge Lurås and John Karlsrud, who provided helpful comments and supporting information.

Finally, we would like to thank all those who took time out of their busy schedules to speak with us, often at length, about their work and their involvement in SSR-related activities.

## List of Acronyms

<b>AFDEM</b>	African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>ARTF</b>	Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
<b>BiH</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>BSSS</b>	Belgrade School for Security Studies
<b>CIVPOL</b>	Norwegian deployable police
<b>CJTF</b>	Criminal Justice Task Force (Afghanistan)
<b>CNPA</b>	Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan
<b>CPA</b>	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
<b>CPJP</b>	City Police Justice Programme (EUPOL, Afghanistan)
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DCAF</b>	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
<b>DIAG</b>	disbandment of illegal armed groups
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development (UK)
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>DSSR</b>	Defence-related security sector reform
<b>ECHO</b>	European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EULEX</b>	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
<b>EUPOL</b>	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
<b>FFI</b>	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt)
<b>GSSR</b>	Gender and security sector reform
<b>HJPC</b>	High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (Bosnia)
<b>ICLA</b>	Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (NRC)
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IMG</b>	International Management Group
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>ISSAT</b>	International Security Sector Assistance Team
<b>JDO</b>	Joint Donor Office
<b>JMT</b>	Joint Monitoring Team
<b>JPT</b>	Joint Protection Team
<b>JuNo</b>	Yugoslavia-Norway bilateral police reform programme
<b>LNP</b>	Liberian National Police
<b>LOTFA</b>	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MINUSTAH</b>	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
<b>MOD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MOJ</b>	Ministry of Justice



<b>MONUC</b>	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo)
<b>MONUSCO</b>	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo)
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NCDDRR</b>	National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (Liberia)
<b>NDUC</b>	Norwegian Defence University College
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NODEFIC</b>	Norwegian Defence International Centre
<b>NOK</b>	Norwegian krone
<b>NORAD</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
<b>NORAF</b>	Norway-Afghanistan bilateral police project
<b>NORCAP</b>	Norwegian Capacity emergency standby roster
<b>NORDEM</b>	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
<b>NORLAG</b>	Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisors to Georgia
<b>NORPOOL</b>	Norwegian Crises Response Pool
<b>NOU</b>	Norwegian Official Reports
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>NSM</b>	Norwegian National Security Authority
<b>NTF</b>	NATO Trust Fund
<b>NUPI</b>	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>OHR</b>	Office of the High Representative (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
<b>OMLT</b>	Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (ISAF, Afghanistan)
<b>OSA</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence–Security Agency
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>PfP</b>	Partnership for Peace
<b>PNC</b>	Police Nationale Congolaise
<b>POD</b>	National Police Directorate of Norway
<b>POMLT</b>	Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
<b>PRIO</b>	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
<b>PRT</b>	Provincial Reconstruction Team
<b>RACVIAC</b>	Centre for Security Cooperation
<b>ROLS</b>	Rule of Law and Security Programme (UNDP, Somalia)
<b>SAC</b>	Safety Awareness Course
<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>SAP</b>	Stabilization and Association Process (EU)
<b>SAPS</b>	South African Police Service
<b>SCR</b>	Security Council Resolution
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and gender-based violence
<b>SPAG</b>	Senior Police Advisor Group
<b>SPLA</b>	Sudan People's Liberation Army
<b>SSD</b>	Security sector development
<b>SSPS</b>	South Sudan Police Service
<b>SSR</b>	Security sector reform
<b>SRSR</b>	Special Representative to the Secretary General

<b>STAREC</b>	Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflits Armés (DRC)
<b>Styrkebrønnen</b>	Rule of Law Pool of Experts
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
<b>TOT</b>	Training-of-trainers
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMA</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNMIK</b>	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>UNPOS</b>	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>WACPU</b>	Women and Children's Protection Unit (Liberia)

## Executive Summary

Security sector reform is a framework for supporting the development of effective, legitimate and accountable security and justice institutions that are consistent with democratic norms, good governance and the rule of law. SSR has become accepted as an integral component of peacebuilding for international and regional organizations and the donor community. Key elements in SSR include an integrated, holistic approach that recognizes the links that exist between functional sectors, such as between policing and justice. It also recognizes the role of customary or traditional justice and security providers in many parts of the world. Donors are recommended to adopt joined-up approaches and to harmonize and coordinate with other donors. And a recent development has been the shift towards a more pragmatic and flexible approach of seeking ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’.

Norway is internationally recognized as a major donor in SSR, yet there have been few attempts to map how Norwegian actors perceive SSR, how much assistance is provided, and the ways in which support is framed and channelled. This report provides an overview of the types of support and assistance that Norway has provided to SSR, focusing primarily on the period 2008-2010. It examines how Norway has provided support across the various functional sectors (defence, police, intelligence, and justice) and examples of bilateral and multilateral projects funded in various countries. Although not comprehensive, the report’s coverage of selected activities and countries is, we believe, illustrative of the Norwegian approach.

Norway supports SSR projects and processes through multiple institutional vectors at the governmental level, funded through a complex mix of budget streams, over which the MFA maintains a central position. Norway provides high levels of funding to multilateral actors involved in SSR-relevant activities and has been a strong supporter of strengthening the capacities of the UN in SSR. It further funds a diverse range of bilateral assistance projects across the spectrum of SSR.

Norway’s current approach to SSR tends to be decentralized, which appears to account for some problems in coherence, coordination and information-sharing, and low visibility nationally of Norwegian support in this domain. There is no overarching strategic policy framework or guidelines on SSR, although an important initiative in institutionalizing coordination between the MFA and MOD has recently occurred concerning SSR support for the defence sphere in the Western Balkans. The lack of a common framework towards SSR further explained uncertainty about the concept among Norwegian actors in Oslo and its embassies about whether specific activities constituted SSR. This ambiguity also accounts for the challenges in identifying overall levels of funding for SSR, since projects may be categorized under various overlapping headings.

We encountered numerous examples of good practice in Norway's support to SSR, such as attention to local ownership, good governance and accountability, as well as a strong sense of commitment among those responsible for implementing support to SSR. Due to the high level of professional standards across the armed forces, police, and justice sectors, Norway can offer a wide range of support and assistance across the functional sectors. A few 'niche areas' of Norwegian functional expertise include training and mentoring by military and police, including the Coast Guard, defence management, and assistance by justice personnel especially in Western-type legal systems. Gender-sensitive approaches to SSR is also a clear Norwegian niche area.

Compared with some other major donors, there is a high degree of transparency and access to information on Norwegian governmental contributions to SSR. There also appears to be a strong and consistent commitment to multilateral approaches and donor coordination. Norway's flexibility as a donor was also widely perceived as a distinct advantage.

Defence-related security sector reform (DSSR) assistance is currently provided primarily to countries in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan, although Norway is beginning to focus increasingly on the West Caucasus region and Africa. DSSR is provided to strengthen democratic control of armed forces, and build up the capacity and interoperability of armed forces to engage in international peacekeeping operations. It is seen as an important means of exporting values, including the principles of democratic control, transparency and accountability, and an affordable means of strengthening governance, transferring norms and exerting influence in transitional environments. While this is appreciated in recipient countries and among Norway's allies, it is less apparent that the Norwegian public is well informed about what Norway is doing in SSR. Support to DSSR constitutes an instrument for Norwegian foreign policy at a time when demands outstrip its human and material resource capacities for military deployments in support of peacekeeping operations.

DSSR is delivered through two funding channels: that which is eligible to be considered official development assistance, which is provided by the MFA, and that which is not ODA-eligible, which is funded from the MOD budget. The majority of the 2010 MOD budget for SSR, 45 million NOK, was ODA-eligible. DSSR has been institutionalized through certain structures and processes, including a DSSR unit created at Norwegian Defence University College, which coordinates DSSR efforts and functions as a think tank.

Norway supports police reform in SSR through the deployment of police in international peacekeeping missions, bilateral programmes, and through the development of UN capacities for police reform at strategic level. Between 80-90 police personnel are available at any one time, based on the general guideline that one percent of Norway's operational police force can be deployed abroad. In 2008-2010, the MFA provided approx. NOK 284.8 million to police reform efforts implemented by the Police Directorate (POD). Deployment of Norwegian police abroad prioritizes multilateral operations, and Norway has participated in 38 missions since 1989. The Police Directorate maintains a rigorous selection procedure and seeks to send abroad officers only where it is expected they have something to

contribute. POD also prioritizes gender equality and efforts to fight SGBV, and emphasizes its efforts to recruit female police for international peace operations. Effort is made to match skills and expertise to local needs in terms of police reform

Styrkebrønnen (Rule of Law Pool of Advisors), administered by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice, is a primary mechanism for implementing justice sector reform assistance. In 2008-2010, the MFA provided NOK 81 million to fund the activities of Styrkebrønnen, which today consists of around 100 experienced, pre-selected judges, public prosecutors, military prosecutors, police prosecutors, defence attorneys and prison and probation advisers. The strength of this approach is the availability of expert teams for rapid deployment to provide advice and assistance in reforming almost every link in the 'chain of justice', and is particularly suited for bilateral assistance programmes. The use of Styrkebrønnen is limited by certain factors, however, including the high cost of team deployments and the lack of expertise in Islamic and traditional justice systems.

The intelligence system tends to be one of the most neglected components in SSR. An important exception was Norway's support for reform of the federal-level Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA), which received over NOK 9 million from 2008-2010. The programme was administered and coordinated by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, in close cooperation with the OSCE and Office of the High Representative. The program sought to build capacity, competence, improve technical infrastructure of the new state institution, while developing a sense of institutional team identity among representatives of different ethnic groups. Through DCAF, Norway has also supported intelligence oversight capacity building in the Kosovo assembly, and has supported the training of parliamentary staffers in security, defence and intelligence affairs throughout the Western Balkans.

Norway's development community does not appear to have engaged widely with SSR. This may be linked to lack of familiarity with the approach and, in the context of Afghanistan, with a concern about the blurring of lines between humanitarian and development issues and the military on the other. It was also suggested that the politicization of SSR in certain cases such as Afghanistan results in assistance programmes that are developed without the involvement of developmental actors and approaches.

Although lacking specific policy guidance on gender and SSR, Norway has a 2006 national action implementation plan for UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which was updated with a new strategic plan on women, peace and security in 2011. These constitute the overall framework for integrating gender perspectives into Norwegian policy on peace and security. The MFA has funded DCAF for the development of concepts and training tools, conducting basic research, and implementing projects on gender and SSR. Police reform assistance projects have also paid attention to the particular needs of women in conflict or transitional settings.

Other actors, including non-governmental organizations and foundations, consultancy firms and private security companies, are increasingly being used by donors to develop and implement SSR assistance projects. Between

2008-2010, Norway provided NOK 28.6 million to DCAF, including core contributions to its International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). Funded projects for DCAF focused mainly on the development of gender-sensitive approaches to SSR, capacity building in parliamentary oversight of the security sector in Kosovo and the Western Balkans. ISSAT develops strategic-level guidance and support for donors in SSR. The International Management Group has received NOK 55.7 million over the past three years to implement projects in the law enforcement and justice sectors in the Western Balkans. The Norwegian Refugee Council received NOK 58.6 million over three years for its legal aid programmes for internally displaced persons. Independent evaluations were only available for ISSAT and NRC.

The survey of Norway's areas of engagement with SSR begins by examining selected projects in three countries of the Western Balkans, a key region for Norway's SSR efforts. The nature of assistance has progressed from humanitarian assistance to support for democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration, and spans all functional areas of the security sector. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the Norwegian MOD has been involved in capacity-building for long-term defence planning within the Bosnian MOD. Norway has also supported the establishment and capacity-building of the federal-level Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA). Norway is lead nation of the NATO Trust Fund for resettlement and retraining of military personnel, which in 2010 received close to NOK 4 million in contributions from Norway. Several projects have moreover assisted the national authorities in developing an effective, independent and efficient judiciary at the state level.

Norwegian SSR efforts in Montenegro have been predominantly focused on enhancing democratic civilian oversight over the armed forces contributing to the building of the new Ministry of Defence, a project funded to the tune of NOK 4.8 million between 2008-2010. There is also a substantial bilateral assistance effort ongoing in the justice sector through IMG, which has received NOK 9.4 million over the last two years to help reform the misdemeanor system in Montenegro and implement an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Strategy for the Judiciary. There is an on-going discussion with Montenegro regarding a bilateral cooperation involving the coastguard since 2008.

Serbia remains the key focal point of Norwegian SSR engagement in the region, reflecting a special relationship and historically close ties dating back to World War II. The defence sector has been subjected to the most structured efforts of cooperation. Norway is lead nation for the NATO Trust Fund for resettlement and retraining of redundant military personnel. Norway also contributes substantially to both military educational reform as well as capacity building within the Serbian MOD on defence planning and strategy. The increasing internationalization of the Serbian defence sector is reflected in the area of military-medical cooperation and Serbia's contribution to the Norwegian field hospital in the UN peace operation MINURCAT in Chad. Norway has since 2001 been involved in a long-running and broad ranging bilateral police reform project, JuNo, with the Police Directorate as the main implementing agent. Since 2007, Norway has also, to a relatively lesser degree, been involved in justice sector reform through the project 'Improving the delivery of justice in the courts in Serbia', implemented by IMG.

In the Caucasus region, Norwegian assistance to Georgia has mainly been focused around capacity-building in the legal sector through the deployment of the Norwegian Rule of Law Pool (Styrkebrønnen). Approximately NOK 20 million was allocated for this purpose over the period 2008-2010. Since 2004 the Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisors (NORLAG) has contributed to the development of a strategic plan for Georgia's criminal justice system, with an emphasis on making the penal system more humane. The Norwegian Refugee Council's ICLA project contributes to the efforts in the justice sector, and has received around NOK 5.25 million within the same timeframe. The military component of Norwegian support is channeled through the NATO Professional Development Program, where Norway is lead nation on human resource management.

In Africa, the survey examines Norwegian contributions to SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Norway's engagement with SSR in DRC has consisted of a military secondment to a strategic-level position at MONUSCO on SSR, and the secondment of several civilian observers (a specialist in sexual violence, a field coordinator, and an expert in witness protection) to MONUSCO. Norway is also engaged in justice sector reform and the fight against impunity, focusing on building the skills and capacities required to process cases of sexual violence.

Norway's support to SSR programmes in Liberia demonstrates flexibility and sensitivity to local context and needs. Norway contributes with capacity building, training and infrastructure, and has also provided funding for the restructuring and training of the Liberian National Police (including in the managing of reported rapes and SGBV). Up to eleven Norwegian police officers serve in UNMIL to act as advisers and to cooperate with their Liberian counterparts. Norway further supports the UN's Joint Programme for combating SGBV. Norway has also contributed to a rehabilitation and reintegration programme former combatants. Finally, Norway through the NRC supports efforts to facilitate access to justice and resolve land disputes for Liberia's many returnees.

Capacity and institution building in the security and justice sectors have been areas of focus for Norwegian assistance to Somalia. Assistance is concentrated in four key areas: peace and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, vocational training and education, and institution-building/capacity-building (including SSR). In 2010 Norway allocated money to the Somali security sector through the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) project, which includes a training program for police officers. SSR in the Somali context, however, has proven to be a complex matter. Lacking adequate controls and follow up, the outcome of assistance cannot be reliably predicted.

Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and capacity building in South Sudan have constituted the main pillars of Norwegian engagement in Sudan. Norway supports UNDP's Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) programme, and provides support to the justice sector through several UNDP programs and through the Norwegian Refugee Council. Norway is a substantial contributor to police reform, predominantly in South Sudan. Several Norwegian police officers

are currently seconded to UNMIS, and a trilateral police-training program is undertaken with South Africa as the implementing actor. Norway has supported a number of programmes for local peacebuilding, democratic institutions, and for security and justice, including police training.

Finally, Afghanistan is one of the priority countries for Norwegian SSR engagement. Norway currently has 500 military deployed to ISAF and several dozen civilians, including 23 police advisers, 7 in Kabul and 16 in Meymaneh, Faryab. Norway's military component is responsible for providing security and facilitating development and reconstruction. It is also increasingly involved in partnering and training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The civilian component generally consists of several elements, including development, police officers, prison officers, and civilian advisers who monitor and collect information and report on the political and development situation.

Training of the ANA is explicitly linked to its participation in the NATO-led International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) through the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) that advises an Afghan brigade in Mazar-e-Sharif and the OMLT Kandak based in Faryab province. Gradually the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab has become more involved in capacity building with the Afghan National Security Forces. Norway contributes police officers across three different organizations: the UN Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA); the EU Police in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A); and the bilateral police project Norway-Afghanistan (NORAF). The latter has focused on recruiting and training female police officers through the "Female project". On the judicial side, Norway has had prison advisers based in Faryab, and has provided funds to build a new prison in the provincial capital Meymaneh. From 2005-2008 legal and justice sector advisers from Stykebrønnen were deployed to Kabul, where they functioned as mentors for the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), with a special emphasis on counter-narcotics prosecution service and court. Norway moreover supports the UN-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), as well as the National Justice Programme administered by the World Bank multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).

Afghanistan has been a large engagement for Norway. However, its engagement has been criticized as being "supply-driven" rather than demand-driven. Also its SSR assistance has been described by one respondent as based on a "political decision" to engage rather than on the usual assessment and planning procedures. The lack of planning was generally seen as a major cause of problems. Several of our respondents questioned whether SSR is part of the coalition strategy for engagement.

### **Key findings and recommendations**

SSR constitutes an important instrument for furthering some of Norway's key foreign policy objectives and national values. Norway's comparative advantages include its international profile as a consistently generous donor; its commitment to multilateralism; its transparency and international image as an honest broker; its commitment to the values of good governance,



democratic control and accountability, and local ownership that lie at the heart of security sector reform; and its nimbleness – the flexibility of its funding and its capacity to react quickly to changing requirements.

Yet, although Norway is a member of the primary group of international donors supporting SSR, it has a decentralized and rather fragmented approach which does not fully optimize the potential impact and effectiveness of its contributions. We identify a need to develop a more coherent approach to SSR, possibly through the development of a strategic policy framework and further institutionalization of coordination mechanisms. While developing a more coherent approach through a cross-government coordinating mechanism may reduce some of the flexibility that departments currently enjoy in supporting SSR projects, it would likely result in a more effective impact of projects for the beneficiaries and more efficient use of resources. We also suggest implementation of more consistent assessment, monitoring and evaluation of SSR projects. We recommend increasing awareness of Norway's SSR engagements within government and in the wider public sphere. Further development of justice sector assistance is also recommended, as is further efforts to coordinate this with related assistance in police reform projects. Finally we suggest developing a framework for evaluating decisions to outsource SSR assistance.

Developing a strategic policy framework could help further a common understanding of the broad goals of SSR, the interconnectedness of the security and justice systems, and foster a more coherent approach across the various Norwegian governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the many aspects of supporting SSR processes.

We believe that there is also need for more consistent use of pre-project assessments as well as of monitoring and evaluation of major or long-running projects supporting SSR. This applies to multilateral projects and outsourced support to international as well as those implemented by Norwegian non-governmental organizations.

# 1. International context and trends in SSR

## 1.1 Definition and evolution of security sector reform

Security sector reform (SSR)<sup>1</sup> first emerged in the late 1990s as a policy framework articulated by Clare Short, the Secretary of State for the UK's Department for International Development (DFID).<sup>2</sup> Through SSR, DFID sought to support the transformation of safety, security and justice institutions in transitional, post-conflict and post-authoritarian environments. SSR seeks to enhance the ability of states to meet the range of security and justice needs that their societies face, in a manner consistent with democratic norms, sound principles of governance and the rule of law.<sup>3</sup> It emphasizes principles of transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and responsiveness to the needs of the populations that security and justice institutions are mandated to serve. SSR notably links the establishment of more effective citizen security and equitable justice to better enabling development efforts and poverty alleviation to take place.

As the popularity of the concept spread, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) furthered the development of SSR through the establishment of a policy statement and paper on SSR which was endorsed by member states at its 2004 high-level ministerial meeting and subsequently published as a DAC reference document.<sup>4</sup> The OECD subsequently embarked on a two-year consultative process to close the gap between policy and practice, resulting in a handbook on SSR that provides guidance for the implementation of SSR policy.<sup>5</sup> SSR has been integrated into the peacebuilding approaches of the United Nations and various regional organizations. Most major donors have based their approaches to SSR on the OECD DAC handbook.

According to the OECD, the security sector generally comprises the following groups of actors:<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Alternative terms that have emerged that capture the essence of SSR but with slight differences in meaning include *security sector transformation*, *security system reform*, *security sector development*, and *security sector assistance*. The term security sector reform will be used in this report, as this term occurs most frequently in documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental actors in Norway.

<sup>2</sup> Clare Short, *Security, Development and Conflict Prevention*, Speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, 13 May 1998; Clare Short, *Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty*, Speech at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, 9 March 1999; and Clare Short, *Developing the Security Sector Reform Agenda*, Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 4 February 2002.

<sup>3</sup> OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005), p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> OECD (2005).

<sup>5</sup> OECD *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> OECD (2005), pp. 20-21.

- Core security actors: armed forces, police, gendarmerie, intelligence and security services, paramilitary forces, presidential guard, coast guard, border guard, customs authorities, reserve or local security forces (civil defence forces, national guards, militias);
- Security management and oversight bodies: Executive, national security bodies, parliament and parliamentary committees, ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units), and civil society organizations (civilian review boards, public complaints commissions);
- Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, customary and traditional justice systems;
- Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body guard units, private security companies, political party militias.

While the OECD DAC approach predominates, there is some variation in how international actors define the precise parameters of the domain encompassed by the term ‘security sector’. A key area of disagreement concerns the inclusion of the justice system within a comprehensive understanding of security sector. Opponents of the comprehensive approach acknowledge that justice and security systems are complementary and require common approaches, but point to important differences in their aims and means, and the risks entailed by overextending the definition of security.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, most international actors active in supporting SSR, recognising important inter-related aspects of security and justice, have incorporated some aspect of the justice system into their understanding and approach to security sector reform. The United Nations, for example, includes the criminal justice system in its definition of the security sector, defining it as ‘the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country’, including institutions concerned with defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence, border management, customs, and civil emergencies, as well as ‘elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force’.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Coherent and integrated approach*

According to OECD DAC, the focus for international actors in supporting SSR should be to support partner countries in achieving four overarching objectives:

- i) Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system.
- ii) Improved delivery of security and justice services.
- iii) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.

<sup>7</sup> For example, see Anthony C. Howlett-Bolton, ‘Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007: Aiming for Holistic Approaches to Justice Sector Development’, GFN-SSR Working Paper No. 7 (October 2008), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> United National General Assembly and Security Council, *Security, peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, 23 January 2008, para. 14.

iv) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.<sup>9</sup>

SSR emphasizes holistic, coherent and coordinated processes for reforming the often closely inter-related components of the security and justice systems. SSR seeks to avoid the ‘stove-piped’ approach, in which decision-making on reforms in one functional domain, such as policing, take place in an insulated manner, with little or no consultation or coordination with other parts of the security sector, such as the criminal justice system. Too often in the past even clearly interdependent functional domains have been seen in isolation from one another, resulting in a lack of coordination between their respective reform processes, and resulting frequently in the failure to achieve intended results. SSR encourages a system-wide perspective to identify areas where coordination of sectoral reforms is important. The close links between policing, the judiciary and corrections in any state system demonstrates the necessity of coordinating reforms between these functional domains. Receiving far less attention, the intelligence sector constitutes a core element of a state’s national security and internal security systems, yet typically remains one of the least addressed components in security sector reform.

A holistic approach to SSR also recognises that in many developing countries, people turn to informal or traditional authorities for the provision of security and the resolution of disputes and dispensation of justice. SSR then must take into account that formal state institutions are not necessarily the only, or the most effective or trusted, sources of security and justice for many citizens.

From the donor side, emergent ‘good practice’ recommends that SSR programming result from a ‘joined-up’ or whole-of-government approach (WGA) in which agencies and ministries within a government work more coherently together to develop a comprehensive response to a fragile or developing state. SSR processes are recognised to be complex, involving a potentially wide diversity of activities, institutions, expertise and skills. A number of departments within a donor government may be involved in developing bilateral SSR programmes, and it may be difficult to ensure that all actors, while fulfilling their individual mandates, speak with a coherent voice and follow a joint strategy. Development of a whole-of-government approach in several donor countries has involved establishment of cross-government working groups or units that deal with post-conflict peacebuilding, security and justice reform issues. The cross-government composition of the unit helps to break down institutional culture barriers between departments, while advancing a shared understanding of the different departmental mandates, perspectives and objectives.<sup>10</sup> As security and justice, governance and development are recognised to be closely linked in SSR, there has been a corresponding effort to promote more integrated and coherent approaches among the agencies and departments responsible for those areas of assistance, with the aim of improving the planning and implementation and outcomes of a donor country’s international SSR assistance.

A key means of achieving a more coherent donor approach to SSR is through the articulation of a clear policy or guidance note on SSR that

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<sup>9</sup> OECD (2008), p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> OECD DAC (2008), p. 237.

applies to all departments or agencies contributing to SSR assistance. Beyond the overall SSR policy document, country-specific integrated SSR policies may also set out for a particular country.<sup>11</sup> A whole-of-government approach (WGA) prescribes mechanisms and instruments for coordination and creating coherence, such as joint assessments, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and sometimes common pools of funding for SSR activities involving both ODA and non-ODA funds for use by the main ministries and departmental actors engaged in SSR programmes and flexible decision-making procedures. Through joint assessments and planning, a WGA seeks to better align and integrate a donor government's contributions to SSR in a particular country with its broader country strategy. While responsibility for coordination of this political area of engagement naturally falls to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain donors have alternatively created dedicated units for inter-agency or interdepartmental coordination.<sup>12</sup>

Beyond improved internal donor coherence, good practice also recommends international harmonization of the approaches of donors to SSR. The idea of 'whole-of-system' approaches encapsulates the idea of international and regional organizations and other international actors can better develop policy coherence and a comprehensive international response to fragile states. Nevertheless, achieving better internal coordination among actors in a donor capital may come at the cost of external harmonization. Alternatively, improving harmonization of approaches in the same thematic domain among different donor countries, such as of defence ministries, may reduce integration with other departments and ministries or even with local stakeholders.<sup>13</sup>

An important contribution to improving SSR was advanced in the *World Development Report 2011*, which focused on helping developing states to improve citizen security, justice and jobs, underscoring the link between security and development and encouraging closer cooperation between agencies involved in development and security and justice reform. The *WDR 2011* advanced an approach to transforming societal and state institutions responsible for security and justice that focused especially on building their legitimacy and finding solutions that are based not on 'best practice' but on 'best fit' – that is, not technically perfect solutions that are often based on Western models and experiences, but pragmatic solutions that are adapted to local political, social and economic conditions, as well as the capacity of local institutions.<sup>14</sup> Finding 'best fit' solutions hinges on conducting adequate assessments as part of the planning of reform programmes, as well as monitoring during implementation to enable learning, and rigorous evaluation of results, in other words, mechanisms for continuous feedback and learning.<sup>15</sup> Best fit approaches also rely on pragmatism and flexibility in

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<sup>11</sup> Conflict Research Unit, 'Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform', Background Paper, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', prepared for the conference *Whole-of-Government Approaches to Security Sector Reform*, The Hague, 9-10 April 2008, para. 6.

<sup>12</sup> 'Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform' (2008), para. 12.

<sup>13</sup> 'Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform' (2008), paras. 60-61.

<sup>14</sup> World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank: Washington, DC, 2011), p. 107.

<sup>15</sup> WDR (2011), pp. 22-23, 171.

the way that reformers, and the donors who support them, seek to accomplish their goals.<sup>16</sup>

## **1.2 Methodology and outline of the report**

This report seeks to provide an assessment of Norway's support to international SSR efforts to date, focusing primarily on the patterns of its engagement over the past three years. It seeks to identify existing capacities, the nature and scope of projects supported, and their perceived impact where possible. It concludes with recommendations based on the findings and on Norway's identified comparative advantages in supporting SSR.

In describing the range and scope of Norway's contributions to SSR, the report will examine activities undertaken by each of the main governmental departments or institutional actors funded by Norway that engage in SSR. Although the study includes many of the countries in which Norway supports SSR projects, it is not a comprehensive study that includes all of the countries of engagement. Similarly, the study does not examine all of the SSR projects supported by Norway within those countries, but rather surveys a variety of projects based on a mix of objective and subjective criteria including functional area or institutional target of assistance, implementing agency, and perceived significance.

The study also sought to outline the parameters of Norwegian spending in support of SSR. However, due to the decentralized nature of support to such projects across several government departments and funding streams, as well as ambiguities that resulted both from lack of clarity of some Norwegian actors regarding whether the projects constituted SSR, as well as from the way that projects were tagged in the MFA registry according to OECD DAC categories, it proved difficult to arrive at a conclusive overall figure of spending. We have included funding amounts towards certain key projects and country levels of spending generally to illustrate the scope of spending on SSR-related projects.

Where possible, the study seeks to identify the impact and effectiveness of SSR projects. However, one limitation of the study is that, due to the limited time, resources and personnel, we were unable to directly survey the perceptions of the intended beneficiaries of most projects. Insights regarding assessments have consequently been drawn largely from pre-existing independent external reviews where these exist, along with the views of those who have been involved in authorising, implementing or overseeing SSR projects.

The methodology of the study involved desk review of published research, government policy documents and other official statements as well as documentation on implementing bodies and funded by Norway. Specific project information and project evaluations, where available, were also reviewed. Semi-structured interviews were held with personnel from the MFA, MOD, POD, MOJ, and NORAD, with representatives from the United Nations in Geneva and New York, and with representatives of certain non-

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<sup>16</sup> WDR (2011), p. 171.

governmental institutions that receive funding from Norway to implement SSR programmes.

Finally, this study should not be construed as an evaluation of any of the SSR projects specifically mentioned. The interviews and project document reviews offered only a limited glimpse of each project and its context. A key objective of looking at various projects and settings was to derive lessons from these engagements for Norway's general approach in supporting SSR initiatives.

## 2. Survey of Norwegian Support to SSR

### 2.1 Norwegian policy on SSR

Although there is no single overarching Norwegian government statement explaining its definition of SSR or its objectives in supporting SSR, several relatively brief references to SSR have appeared in official documents and statements by Norwegian officials, which provide indications as to Norway's approach. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement affecting Norway's position on SSR appeared in Parliamentary Report Number 9 (2007–2008).<sup>17</sup> The report explains that SSR involves 'a wide range of measures aimed at strengthening the security sector's legitimacy and effectiveness'. SSR is 'important both to strengthen and modernize the security sector as part of a democratization process, and as an element in the reconstruction of countries after a conflict has ended.' Further, Norway considers that 'SSR is a prerequisite for stabilization and normalization. It is crucial for preventing gender-based violence.' The report goes on to note that ill-functioning security sectors undermine the legitimacy of state institutions, the possibility for peace and reconciliation, and economic and social development. Further, the Norwegian Government considers international assistance for security sector reform an important contribution to the prevention of conflict and complex humanitarian disasters.

The Official Norwegian Report *Coherent for Development* underscores that Norway's approach to security sector reform mirrors that advanced by the OECD DAC, with the security sector broadly conceived as encompassing all key security institutions, the justice system, and the relevant security and justice management and oversight bodies (including formal state institutions and civil society organizations and the media). Further, Norway acknowledges that the security sector may also include informal (non-state) and traditional providers of security and justice.<sup>18</sup>

Norway has prioritized SSR in its own priorities and through its support of international organizations.<sup>19</sup> According to Parliamentary Report Number 9, Norway contributes to security sector reform both through bilateral projects and multilaterally. This may take the form of contributing funding, seconding staff, and cooperating with national authorities, and international and regional organizations like the UN, African Union, NATO, OSCE and EU.

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<sup>17</sup> Stortingsmelding nr.9. *Norsk politikk for forebygging av humanitære katastrofer* (Parliamentary Report Number 9. *Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian Disasters*). Available at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2007-2008/Stmeld-nr-9-2007-2008-5.html?id=493424>

<sup>18</sup> Norway, *Coherent for development? How coherent Norwegian policies can assist development in poor countries*, NOU, Official Norwegian Reports, 2008, No. 14, p. 163.

<sup>19</sup> *Coherent for development?* (2008), p. 163.



A core aspect of the Norwegian approach to SSR is the strong emphasis it places on supporting multilateral channels for assistance in SSR and in promoting international peace and security more generally: ‘Norway has sought to anchor its international engagement through an active membership role in international organizations, and by maintaining a broad international engagement to influence development of both policy and practice within the peace and security sector.’<sup>20</sup> This stems from its limited capacity as a small country and thus its fundamental interest in a strong rule-based international order.<sup>21</sup> The prioritization of the multilateral approach was reasserted in the recent White Paper on foreign policy, according to which Norway supports the United Nations through its participation with personnel in peacekeeping operations, but also through its active support of efforts to strengthen the UN’s ability to plan and conduct complex operations. In the multilateral setting, Norwegian support for SSR includes efforts to strengthen the capacity of international organizations for civilian crisis management, and in the case of the UN, integrated peace operations, which involve the coordination and cooperation of political, military, humanitarian and development actors. Security sector reform is a key area of Norwegian support to building UN operational capacities, in addition to strengthening African peace operation capacities and promoting the integration of a gender-sensitive perspective and efforts to combat sexual violence.<sup>22</sup>

Norway’s prioritization of multilateral engagements is reflected especially in the high level of support it provides to the United Nations, including the eleven agencies which are members of its inter-agency task force on SSR.<sup>23</sup> DPKO (specifically the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions), UNDP (Crisis Prevention Bureau), DPA, and UNIFEM are the four lead agencies in SSR, and their SSR-relevant activities are supported by Norway by various means. By way of illustration, Norway is one of the largest contributors to the UNDP, and provided NOK 770 million towards its core budget in 2008. In addition to core budget support, it provided NOK 60 million towards its thematic fund for democratic governance and NOK 20 million for its thematic fund for crisis prevention and recovery.<sup>24</sup> It also funded the UNDP’s Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations with NOK 5 million in each of 2008 and 2009.<sup>25</sup> In addition to the support it provides to global programmes such as the UNDP’s Rule of Law Programme, Norwegian embassies provide funding to UNDP country programmes.

An important aspect of its strategic approach to SSR is the support Norway provides for the development of the UN’s currently very limited institutional capacity to plan and implement SSR. Norway is one of four donors who has supported a project to develop a system-wide UN approach to SSR, a multi-dimensional project that includes sensitization briefings across the UN to encourage the UN approach to SSR, the development of technical guidance

<sup>20</sup> *Coherent for development?* (2008), p. 158.

<sup>21</sup> *Coherent for development?* (2008), p. 161.

<sup>22</sup> Norway, *Interests, responsibilities and opportunities: central aspects of Norwegian foreign policy*, Report to the Storting Number 15, 2008-2009, Recommendation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adopted by government on 13 March 2009, Part 2, Section 12.

<sup>23</sup> The Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force includes the following UN agencies: DPKO, DPA, ODA, OHCHR, OSAA, PBSO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNIFEM and UNODC. The task force is chaired by DPKO.

<sup>24</sup> ‘UNDP og Norge’, available at: <http://www.undp.no/undp-og-norge/>

<sup>25</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs registry.

notes on SSR, support to regional actors and regional consultations on SSR, development of a roster of international senior experts, plus the development of SSR knowledge and expertise of UN personnel through trainings and workshops, a knowledge management system, and the identification of lessons learned and best practices in SSR.<sup>26</sup> Similarly Norway contributed to related initiatives to develop guidance for SSR-related activities such as the inter-agency 'Rule-of-Law Indicators Project'.<sup>27</sup> Norway is also supporting the development of a strategic doctrinal framework and training activities for international police peacekeeping, including the contribution of police components to police reform and restructuring, as well as mentoring and monitoring.

As a further element of its strategic approach to supporting the capacity of the UN and other multilateral actors in SSR, Norway funds NGOs and other organizations that assist the development of the UN, regional organizations, as well as the international donor community in SSR. One example is the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), which has provided assistance to the UN SSR task force members in the drafting of SSR guidance notes and field-based research, and which aims to facilitate donor approaches and harmonization in SSR.

Norway also contributes to UN capacity through its funding of Junior Professional Officer (JPO) positions in the various UN agencies, including notably in the area of security sector reform.

While the multilateral-focused approach outlined above comprises Norway's strategic engagement on SSR, Norway also provides SSR assistance on a bilateral basis. Where possible, Norway seeks to have its smaller bilateral contributions support its multilateral engagements. The country surveys in Section 3 of this report illustrate the wide range of activities that are supported on a bilateral basis.

Beyond the direct provision of monetary contributions, channels for Norwegian assistance to SSR may include sending Norwegian personnel from the armed forces, defence ministry, justice sector and police to train and mentor foreign counterparts, whether in multilateral or bilateral settings. Norway also has several rosters for civilian experts in democracy building and human rights (NORDEM) and crisis response (NORCAP) who can be deployed abroad for SSR positions or projects (see below). Finally, Norwegian assistance may take the form of funding SSR-relevant projects developed by non-governmental actors without deploying personnel from Norwegian ministries or government agencies. Such projects include both those implemented by Norwegian and non-Norwegian NGOs and research institutions.

Norway thus promotes SSR efforts in a variety of contexts and through diverse channels in support of democratization, stabilization, post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention. While various documents and policies provide general descriptions and explanations of policy aims, they

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<sup>26</sup> DPKO, 'Developing a System-Wide United Nations Approach to Security Sector Reform: Phase One – Capacity-Building', Interim Report to Donors (May 2009-June 2010).

<sup>27</sup> See DPKO and OHCHR, *The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project Tools, First Edition* (United Nations, 2011).

do not provide more planning guidance for SSR programming. To our knowledge, a specific set of guidelines for SSR-related programming has been produced only twice to date in Norway: in 2006 for defence sector reform programming in Serbia; and in 2010 when the jointly agreed MFA-MOD guidelines were introduced for the Western Balkans region effective beginning 2011.

Some grey areas appear to exist in how SSR is understood by Norwegian actors, including whether or not the activities they engage in constitute SSR, or simply police, justice or defence reform. For example, the term ‘defence-related security sector reform’ (DSSR) is commonly used in Norway, particularly among actors within the Norwegian defence sector. Some official documents and statements use the terms SSR and DSSR synonymously.<sup>28</sup> In contrast, we found that police and justice system actors rarely referred to or framed support to police or justice system reform as SSR. Development actors tended to be more uncertain about what constitutes SSR, but typically took the position that their institution was generally not involved in SSR.

## **2.2 Norwegian governmental context of SSR engagement**

Security sector reform covers several functional sectors, requiring a multi-disciplinary approach. The division of roles and responsibilities among various departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and between at least four main institutional actors (MFA, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, and the Police Directorate) influences how SSR engagement takes place by Norway. The MFA occupies a key role in terms of setting the main lines of policy, budgeting, and coordinating. Programming to support SSR in a post-conflict country, for example, is served by at least four key departments or desks in the MFA, including the relevant regional programme plus the country desk, the UN desk, and the Department for International Security Policy. Funding for SSR-related projects in specific countries is provided through a number of grants managed by different units. The MFA, NORAD and the embassies manage budget lines. The MOD has a small budget line for DSSR, but also receives MFA funding for DSSR projects which are ODA-eligible. The MOJ does not have a separate budget line, but is a recipient of MFA funding for conducting SSR projects. In other words Norway is involved through multiple institutional vectors funded through a complex mix of budget stream, over which the MFA maintains a central position.

Norway maintains several pools of civilian experts who can be deployed on a range of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding missions, channelled via the UN, EU, OSCE, as well as on a bilateral basis. Norway employs these pools to fill personnel needs in the areas of police and judicial reform, defence management, as well as other areas such as elections monitoring, human rights monitoring, rule of law strengthening, humanitarian relief, etc. These pools include several located within the executive branch: CIVPOL with the Norwegian Police; the Ministry of Justice’s Rule of Law Pool of Experts (Styrkebrønnen); and the defence SSR pool in the Ministry of Defence. Other rosters include NORDEM (the

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<sup>28</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, ‘Serbia. Support to SSR’.

Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights), hosted at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights in the Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, which fields experts in human rights and democratization, electoral observers; and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity), a roster for humanitarian disaster response personnel run by the Norwegian Refugee Council. All of these pools are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but through different budget lines. While Norway has actively employed its civilian pools to contribute to international crisis management and peacebuilding tasks including SSR, those pools drawn from government institutions (POD, Styrkebrønnen, MOD) face an inherent tension in priorities because the primary responsibility for those civilian experts is to conduct tasks in the domestic context. Police officers, judges, civilian personnel who work in defence ministries and other civil service institutions are primarily employed for domestic needs, and deployment of personnel on international missions, especially of senior and highly specialised staff, may create shortages back at the ministry. In contrast, conducting international operations is inherent to the military. Nevertheless, the armed forces may encounter its own set of difficulties due to overstretched capacities and budgetary constraints due to the costs of sustained deployment.

As will be discussed below, the extent of Norwegian involvement in SSR – both in terms of funding that Norway has been willing to provide for SSR-related projects and the range of personnel it has provided to train, mentor and advise counterparts in countries undergoing SSR – reveals Norway as a generous and consistent donor that has made significant contributions to SSR efforts in various countries. On the other hand, Norway's strength as a donor is mitigated somewhat by the extent to which the development and implementation of SSR projects are decentralised. Decentralization appears to account for some problems in coordination and in keeping different actors informed about the various initiatives Norway supports. This decentralization also makes it difficult to arrive at a total overview of Norway's SSR-related engagements, impeding the visibility of its support to SSR. This duality, in which Norway is an important actor in various areas where SSR is taking place, but tends to lack a clear or central focus and little visible coordination between contributions to functional sectors, is a characteristic of the Norwegian engagement with SSR to date.

Several people we interviewed mentioned incidentally discovering information about other SSR projects funded by Norway that were taking place in the same country, whether in another functional area of the security sector, or occasionally within the same sector that s/he was working. This was attributed by some to the decentralised system and sometimes to the lack of transparency of the system by which SSR projects are developed and supported. Some improvements had been noted, but there was still need for a more systematised process of information-sharing on SSR.

While the decentralised nature of SSR engagement could be mitigated to some extent by good information flows between relevant actors, we found that this is not always the case. Although the Norwegian departments involved in funding or implementing SSR activities are relatively small and this was seen by several respondents as an advantage in facilitating informal communication and information-exchange, we heard of several breakdowns in communication. For example, one MFA regional department was unaware

of certain SSR programmes being run by the MOD in the region concerned. MOD staff involved in training or mentoring programmes who were unaware of other SSR projects being funded or run by Norway in the country, or policing projects that were approved and funded by the MFA without first consulting with POD.

Anecdotally we heard that on the ground, Norwegians working on different SSR projects often encounter their peers inadvertently and exchange information on an informal basis. While emerging good practice for donors argues for coordination and inter-agency cooperation in the development of effective SSR support, this does not appear to be occurring consistently with Norwegian assistance provided by various actors to SSR within the same country. This suggests that there is a need for a more systematised approach to exchanging information on SSR projects being undertaken by Norwegian government actors in different functional sectors.

Beyond problems in communication, it could be argued that the rather fragmented Norwegian approach stems from the lack of a centralised, cross-governmental coordinating mechanism on SSR. This appears to sustain a 'silo' effect in which initiatives are developed within each functional sector, but with little effort to better understand and, where possible, link initiatives across related sectors. Developing a more coherent approach would possibly reduce the flexibility which currently characterises the Norwegian approach. However, it would likely improve the benefits to the recipient country since initiatives would be based on a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges encountered in the security and justice systems and more efficient use of resources that Norway could bring to bear in supporting their reform.

### **2.3 Geographical pattern of Norwegian engagement in SSR**

Norway is widely engaged in SSR, particularly in regions and countries where it has strong foreign policy interests. In defence-related SSR, Norwegian engagement in the Western Balkans is strongly anchored in its identity as a member of NATO and in defence cooperation under the NATO umbrella. Thus, for defence-related SSR, the Western Balkans, especially Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro, have constituted a primary region of focus for several years, and this is expected to continue for several more. A second region in focus for Norway is the West Caucasus, firstly Georgia, but increasingly also Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to interviewees, the focus on the Western Balkans and West Caucasus is linked to the fact that these are not presently NATO members, but are countries in which NATO takes an interest and with which NATO has developed institutionalised relationships accompanied by the prospect of eventual membership. Norway's oil interests may also underpin foreign policy interest in the West Caucasus. Beyond Europe the other area of foreign policy interest where SSR engagement can similarly be argued to be NATO-related is the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan. (See the section 'Afghanistan' below.) Several respondents predicted that in the future Norway will engage more in Africa over the long-term, likely concentrating initially on Anglophone African countries including Southern Sudan among others.

Police assignment to international assignments is more dispersed and tends to reflect Norway's support for multilateral peacekeeping operations and Afghanistan. Norway also supports bilateral police projects in countries where it has foreign policy interests.

Formal judicial sector reform initiatives have been supported by deployment of Rule of Law Pool experts to European contexts – notably through team deployments to Georgia and Moldova, but also individuals deployed in multilateral and bilateral contexts. Beyond Europe, individual prison advisors have been deployed to Liberia. A team of advisors were deployed to Kabul to support the counter-narcotics prosecution and court, while prison advisors were deployed to Meymaneh (see below 'Afghanistan').

While the link between SSR support and foreign policy is especially clear in countries that are focal points for Norway, engagement in SSR elsewhere has something of an ad hoc character and tends to be in 'bits and pieces' in places where it does engage. This may be a result of the widely noted flexibility and desire to be responsive to opportunities and conditions on the ground. However it may also result from the decentralised and sectorally-driven patterns of engagement, weak or informal coordinating mechanisms, and the absence of a strong holistically focused understanding and approach to SSR.

The big budgets within the MFA, including for SSR-related projects, are administered by the regional programmes in the MFA, and on the ground by the Norwegian Embassy. Collecting data on funding for SSR-related projects by country encountered numerous problems relating to the way in which the project was classified in MFA reporting and registry database entry, a system that is based on OECD DAC project codes. Under the general category 152, entitled 'conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security', are several subcategories relevant to SSR. A specific sub-category (15210) exists for 'security system management and reform', while others include 'civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution' (15220), 'participation in international peacekeeping operations' (15230), 'reintegration and SALW control' (15240), 'removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war' (15250), and 'Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization)' (15260). However, while some may be relevant to SSR, not all projects listed under the 152 category necessarily constitute SSR. Further, activities that fall under general category 151, for 'government and civil society', may constitute SSR, such as activities in the sub-category 'legal and judicial development'. However, those using DAC codes are advised to use the 152xx codes for 151 category activities 'that are primarily aimed at supporting security system reform or undertaken in connection with post-conflict and peacebuilding activities'.<sup>29</sup> This system of project coding introduces inconsistency and ambiguity, and it is not evident from the database outputs that all SSR-relevant activities were coded as such. Some DAC categories involve SSR, but are not listed as SSR, making it challenging to extract reliable data on SSR projects and funding on the basis of codes alone. In practical terms, since the MFA database which contains records on funded projects and programmes does not include a specific tab that would cover all dimensions of security sector reform, efforts to generate

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<sup>29</sup> OECD Defence Cooperation Directorate, 'CRS Purpose Codes, taking effect in 2011 reporting on 2010 flows', p. 7.

data about SSR-related projects must rely on multiple overlapping searches conducted using search terms that cover various possible types of projects, such as ‘security’, ‘reconciliation’ or ‘armed’.

Furthermore, we heard that in the past, some embassies tended not to view the projects they have administered as SSR, even though these involved projects in DDR, police reform, justice sector reform, etc. This suggests that divergent understandings and definitions of SSR emerged in the absence of a guidance note or policy on SSR. Additionally, some multi-donor trust funds were apparently too broad to be captured by the database as SSR, although they provided significant support to SSR-relevant activities.

#### **2.4 Norway’s approach to projects and programming in SSR**

The absence of programming guidance or strategy on SSR, with the exception of the recent strategic guidelines for the Western Balkans, appears to have had several effects. Embassies and MFA country desk officers support projects directly through funding and maintain a broad overview of engagement. Actors within each functional sector – i.e. within the defence, police, and justice sectors largely determine how SSR projects have tended to be initiated, developed and implemented. Actors tend to enjoy a significant degree of flexibility regarding which SSR projects to advance or support and how they support them. The ability to react quickly to needs and developments on the ground was repeatedly held up as an advantage for Norway, particularly when compared to other donors who faced more rigid planning and project development requirements.

However a high degree of flexibility may not work in the interest of beneficiaries over the long-term. While flexibility enables Norway to respond quickly to requests, it also implies looser planning and coordination. A more coordinated, strategic approach would likely reduce flexibility to some extent, but would also enable better use of resources through planned synergies and ultimately a stronger impact. Such an approach would require more leadership within the MFA and especially from regional departments.

Nevertheless, Norwegian support to SSR reflects other elements of good practice, and with a few exceptions, appears to have demonstrated relevance, impact and effectiveness. Norway prioritizes involvement in multilateral projects which enable having a bigger impact. This has been achieved, for example, in successful projects such as the NATO Trust Fund for the reintegration of demobilised military personnel in Bosnia.<sup>30</sup> Norway also supports Nordic and Nordic-Baltic initiatives, and seeks to use these initiatives to demonstrate the value of developing regional approaches to beneficiary countries in the Western Balkans region, although we found less evidence of Nordic and Baltic initiatives in SSR than expected.

Norway also provides much development assistance generally through a modality called the ‘Norwegian model’, which entails channelling funding and project implementation through Norwegian non-governmental organizations, private and public sector actors. This is efficient insofar as

<sup>30</sup> Prism Research, ‘Independent Final Evaluation of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund (NTF) Programme for Assistance to Redundant Military Personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, October 2009.

these are familiar and trusted partners whose use entails a lower risk of corruption. However the model raises questions about local ownership, capacity building and sustainability over the long-term in the absence of a strategy to progressively hand off responsibility for implementation to local actors.

Similarly, certain non-Norwegian actors are heavily relied upon by Oslo to develop and implement projects in certain areas and regions. These include International Management Group (IMG), an entity that has the status of an international organization yet which works on a consultancy basis. Similarly, Norway funds numerous projects of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which has a hybrid structure encompassing an identity as an intergovernmental organization with member states including Norway participating in a governing structure called the Foundation Council, and as a non-governmental organization which also takes on consultancies. Both IMG and DCAF are perceived as trusted and competent partners, and receive significant amounts of funding from Norway to implement SSR-relevant projects.

This reliance on implementing partners such as IMG and DCAF has been justified by some respondents within the Norwegian MFA on the grounds that they are easy to work with and generally can be trusted to do good work. Departments that have relatively few staff for handling many countries or that are responsible for a broad brief appear to be particularly prone to relying on such implementing partners. Such partners do the heavy lifting of conceptualising projects, implementing or administering them, and reporting on the outcomes. Norway provides funding, and is able in the end to attach its name to the outcome or output.



### 3. Norway's approach to SSR by functional sector

This section examines Norwegian contributions to SSR by functional sector – i.e., in the defence, policing and justice sectors. These typically constitute a mix of multilateral and bilateral projects, although the latter tend to be emphasized in this section. This is due to our reliance on information gleaned from interviews conducted with mostly Oslo-based subjects.

#### 3.1 Defence-related security sector reform ('DSSR')

For the purpose of this report, the defence sector is defined as the uniformed military, and the military and civilian management, accountability and oversight systems that sustain it. The term defence-related security sector reform (DSSR) is commonly used in the MOD to refer to SSR-related projects that involve the armed forces, defence management, and the development and implementation of defence policy, and this report will follow that practice. DSSR projects are carried out in multilateral and bilateral frameworks. In the Western Balkans, which constitutes a primary region of Norwegian DSSR efforts, contributions to multilateral settings have entailed, for example, financial contributions to NATO trust funds for reintegration and resettlement of redundant military personnel, provision of military training or mentoring to Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, and financial support to regional organizations dealing with politico-military issues such as the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC). Bilateral DSSR projects are implemented mainly by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Norwegian Defence Academy (NDUC), and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The strategic purpose of Norwegian engagement with DSSR is to support Norwegian security and foreign policy objectives. According to the MOD, DSSR has been undertaken to help strengthen the democratic control of armed forces of fragile and post-conflict states, and to help build interoperability and thus the capacity of such states to participate in international peacekeeping operations.<sup>31</sup>

Since 2007, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has maintained a pool of experienced MOD personnel who are prepared to offer advice on capacity building, democratic and civilian control of armed forces, defence ministry administration, security policy formulation, operations and long-term planning, budgeting and policy implementation. Members of the pool have been trained in basic SSR principles and best practices.<sup>32</sup> In 2009 up to 75

<sup>31</sup> St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009) *Interesser, ansvar og muligheter Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk* (Report to Parliament Number 15, 2008-2009, *Interests, responsibilities and opportunities: the main lines of Norwegian foreign policy*), p. 102. Available at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2008-2009/stmeld-nr-15-2008-2009-.html?id=548673>.

<sup>32</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Norway's deployable civilian crisis management capacities', September 2009 (EDS-GSA).

personnel were available for assignments, whether in bilateral or multilateral contexts such as the UN or NATO.<sup>33</sup>

Norway supports defence sector reform through two funding channels: those activities and projects that are eligible to be classified as official development assistance (ODA), and those activities that are ineligible to be considered ODA. The guidelines for which types of activities are clearly set out by OECD DAC, and are generally based on whether or not the activity concerned is intended to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.<sup>34</sup>

Activities that count as ODA include support to security system management and reform, such as technical cooperation to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of security sector institutions, and oversight of military budgets.<sup>35</sup> Certain other peacebuilding and security-related activities also qualify as ODA, such as the repatriation and demobilization of armed factions and disposal of their weapons, the reintegration of demobilized military personnel into the economy, mine clearance, and technical cooperation to control, prevent or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW).<sup>36</sup>

The financing of military equipment and services, including the training of military personnel, even in non-military areas such as civil engineering or human rights law, generally does not qualify as ODA.<sup>37</sup> These types of military assistance activities are funded directly from the MOD budget.

In 2010 the Norwegian Ministry of Defence's budget for SSR activities was approximately 45 million NOK. The majority of that amount was provided by the MFA because, although the MOD was implementing the relevant projects, most of those projects were deemed ODA-eligible. About 18.3 million NOK for DSSR came from the MOD's own budget in 2010.

A significant development in the coordination of Norway's approach to SSR was the elaboration of the DSSR Common Strategy 2010-14 for the Western Balkans. In this document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence set out their common understanding of the broader objectives, the need for clearer geographical and functional priorities, the need for close coordination to ensure consistent objectives and complementary measures, and agreement on the basis for cost-sharing between the MOD and MFA regarding DSSR projects in the Western Balkans. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were agreed to be given special priority, as well as regional initiatives – i.e. those involving the cooperation of two or more of the countries in the region. Priority functional areas were identified to be, first, strengthening democratic governance and civilian control of the armed forces, including strengthening administrative capacity in ministries of defence, parliamentary oversight, civil society expertise and capacity to scrutinize the defence sector, and integrating gender perspectives into the governance of defence and security. Engagement in these activities would be

<sup>33</sup> 'Norwegian Crisis Response Pool (NORPOOL) – Training', October 09.

<sup>34</sup> OECD DAC, *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives*, DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1, 12 November 2010, para 37.

<sup>35</sup> *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives* (2010), p. 13.

<sup>36</sup> *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives* (2010), p. 14.

<sup>37</sup> *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives* (2010), para. 42.

largely financed from the MFA's budget. Second, the common strategy identifies the priority of military cooperation, including training military personnel and support to reforming military education to facilitate proper exercise of authority and participation in international peace operations, to be financed largely by the MOD. And third, the common strategy recognizes as a priority area of engagement activities which integrate SSR in peacebuilding in the region. Such activities may include support for retraining and reintegrating redundant military personnel, small arms control, and support for the implementation of conventions banning mines and cluster munitions. These activities would be financed largely through the MFA.

A DSSR unit was established in January 2010 at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) as part of the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC). With a staff of three, the DSSR unit is the executing and supporting unit of Norway's support for DSSR projects abroad.<sup>38</sup> It is responsible for coordinating all operational-level DSSR activity and also operates as a think tank in developing ideas for new projects in defence-related SSR at the operational level.

Examples of capacity-building projects in defence governance supported by Norway include mentoring and assistance provided to Montenegro to establish a defence ministry for the newly independent state, and in Serbia training and mentoring civilian defence ministry personnel in defence planning and budgeting. Defence sector assistance may also be aimed at integrating the security sector into post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. These efforts may include restructuring of the defence sector, retraining and resettlement of redundant military personnel, and demining, and are generally ODA-eligible. In this vein, Norway has supported retraining and resettlement of demobilised soldiers in Serbia and Bosnia through contributions to multilateral trust funds.

In addition to strengthening defence governance capacities, Norway's defence sector assistance may be aimed at building military capacities and enhancing military cooperation – i.e., increasing the recipient country's ability to participate in international operations through training, education of personnel, and support to developing key security institutions including the armed forces and the coast guard. To this end, Norway has, for example, contributed field hospitals to the Serbian armed forces, and is currently contributing the same to Macedonia, facilitating military medical cooperation between Norway and these countries in the context of international missions. Norway has also promoted regional cooperation in the development of coast guard capacities in the Adriatic Sea. Military cooperation-focused activities are predominantly funded and implemented by the MOD.

Finally, support to defence sector reform may include the training and mentoring of military forces, such as is being done in Afghanistan by Norwegian armed forces personnel (see Parliamentary Report Number 9, and 'Afghanistan' below). These types of activities do not qualify as ODA, and are funded exclusively by the MOD.

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<sup>38</sup> <http://hogskolene.forsvaret.no/english/nodefic/history/Pages/default.aspx>

Several respondents noted that under the current circumstances Norway does not have sufficient military resources to contribute to peace operations, and hence the forms of assistance listed above have become important alternative means of supporting international peacebuilding. For Norway, as a small state, providing SSR assistance is also less costly than military participation in international peacekeeping missions. As Norwegian armed forces have been under strain in recent years as a result of deployment to international peacekeeping operations and multilateral interventions in Afghanistan and most recently Libya, there is likely to be an increased focus on defence-related security sector reform as a means for Norway to contribute to peacebuilding and international security without further deploying troops.

DSSR projects were described in interviews as ‘demand-driven’, i.e. generated by local needs, often as relayed by Norwegian defence attachés. DSSR is facilitated by strong traditions of international military cooperation, while the range of actors who are brought into it and play various roles, include active service military personnel, defence ministry staff, and researchers at NDUC and FFI.

The geographic focus of Norwegian DSSR assistance has shifted, reflecting progress made in democratization and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In the 1990s the Baltic countries were a priority region, followed subsequently by the Western Balkans as the primary geographical focus of Norwegian assistance to DSSR. In recent years Norway has discontinued its DSSR assistance to new NATO member states Croatia and Albania, while Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo will continue to receive Norwegian DSSR assistance for several years. As noted to be the case with Norway’s support to SSR generally, attention in DSSR is shifting towards the West Caucasus, and engagement in Africa is expected to increase over the long-term.

Norway’s prioritization of multilateralism is reflected in its support for regional approaches through Nordic and Nordic-Baltic cooperation. Cooperation with partners is a repeated theme in Norwegian foreign policy and issues relevant to SSR, and cooperation on Western Balkan defence reform assistance projects was agreed in 2004 by Nordic defence ministers. The Nordic-Baltic initiative has been a framework for DSSR projects in Ukraine, Georgia and the Western Balkans. Nordic cooperation has been valued for demonstrating how effective cooperation can be forged in a region among countries with different affiliations, as illustrated by the Nordic and Baltic states’ different patterns of membership in NATO and the EU – Norway being a member of NATO but not the EU, while Sweden is a member of the EU but not NATO, Denmark being a member of both organizations, etc. This emphasis on regional cooperation is particularly relevant for states in the Western Balkans, who similarly have different patterns of membership in NATO and are at different stages of progress towards membership of the EU.

However, respondents have suggested that while there are some success stories, cooperation is often difficult to achieve in practice. Nordic cooperation is not always easily achieved due to structural factors such as different organizational arrangements, military assistance procedures and funding systems by which military assistance is delivered. For example,

Norway's embassies are allotted discretionary funds which, while relatively modest, enable them to react flexibly and quickly to new requirements and initiatives. In contrast, certain other Nordic states have strongly centralized systems which involve time-consuming processes requiring inter-departmental consultations and the participation of top-level decision-makers. Nordic states may also have different national interests or shifting priorities for engagement, including withdrawing support from certain geographic regions in which Norway remains engaged. Denmark, for instance, is reportedly shifting more attention towards East Africa, while Norway will remain focused on the Western Balkans for the next few years.

For some interview subjects, the defence sector was seen as particularly amenable to the type of training, mentoring and knowledge transfer embodied by SSR projects. These respondents also acknowledged that while the training and planning tools are, on one level, simply technical instruments, the processes in which they are embedded, such as defence planning and budgeting, ultimately have political consequences. Thus, potential political implications are often the main obstacles to implementing difficult decisions in defence reform. For example, unsustainably high defence costs would often entail making difficult decisions that would reduce defence structures, close bases and result in higher unemployment over the short term. Nevertheless, cooperating on a seemingly technical level was also viewed as an effective means of socialization or imbuing of norms, such as principles of democratic civilian control and oversight, transparency, accountability, etc. Effecting value change was acknowledged to be a long-term process, and technical cooperation through a sustained teaching and mentoring process was seen as more effective in changing values over the long term than lecturing on democratic norms and values or providing equipment and other material resources.

There also emerged from our interviews the perception that the Norwegian public is generally not well aware of what Norway is doing in terms of SSR. The public relations aspect of Norwegian involvement in SSR has been weak in terms of informing the domestic public about what is being done and why. It also emerged that there are differences within the military itself regarding SSR. One observer noted a lack of understanding among some of the uniformed military about SSR, including the view especially among Afghanistan experienced officers that SSR is not what the military should be doing. Nevertheless, a view commonly expounded among those interviewed, and particularly those from the defence sector, was that in the future Norwegian contributions to international peace and security in contexts such as Afghanistan are less and less likely to take the form of costly combat units, and are more likely to take alternative forms such as contributions to SSR processes. For a small state such as Norway, SSR is a less expensive way to provide defence and security assistance, and is a more effective means of exporting 'soft power', i.e., promoting Norway's values, culture, institutions and policies.

According to several interview subjects, Norwegian assistance to DSSR processes has two primary audiences: the direct beneficiaries of DSSR projects and Norway's allies. First, and most self-evidently, DSSR projects support the transitional and democratization processes in receiving countries in the specific area of defence and security institutions and processes. Such

activities are of clear benefit to recipient countries. But Norwegian DSSR support is also undertaken with other partners in mind, in particular NATO member states. While considered as having low public visibility among the domestic public, several respondents felt that Norway's DSSR activities are appreciated by Norway's allies, and particularly its larger allies. Through support to DSSR including the strengthening of military-to-military relationships, Norway helps to export values such as democratic control and accountability, encourages professionalization, fill in gaps of assistance provided to countries, and helps to normalize relations involving transitional countries.

Thus, while Norwegian support to defence-related SSR does not appear to be well understood or appreciated by the domestic public, many of those involved in developing such programmes in Norway and in partner countries consider them as contributing to democratization and peacebuilding processes in transitional states. Improving defence and security governance capacities is a major focus of Norwegian DSSR support, but benefit is also derived from supporting professionalization and capacity-building of states to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. Support to defence-related security sector reform further constitutes an instrument for Norwegian foreign policy at a time when demands outstrip its personnel and resource capacities for military deployments in support of peacekeeping operations. The tradition of military-to-military cooperation, the peacebuilding and democracy building objectives served by DSSR, and its foreign policy benefits suggest that DSSR will continue to be a valued instrument in Norwegian foreign policy. This is facilitated by the institutionalization of DSSR through certain structures and processes, namely the DSSR unit at NDUC and the elaboration of a joint MFA-MOD strategy for DSSR in the Western Balkans.

### 3.2 Police

The Norwegian position on support for SSR through contributions to police reform is defined by various documents, including the 'Political platform as basis for the Government's work' (*Soria Moria Declaration*), the Government declaration, the national budget, reports to the Storting, declarations, speeches and articles from the ministers of the MFA and NORAD.

According to Parliamentary Report Number 9 (2007–2008), Norwegian assistance to police reform occurs primarily, although not exclusively, through the deployment of Norwegian police in international peacekeeping missions. Support to police reform is also provided via bilateral programmes and through Norway's strategic-level support to the development of the UN's capacities in SSR, including its police reform component.

Between 2008-2010 the MFA granted approximately NOK 284.8 million to police reform efforts implemented by the Police Directorate (POD). There is a close link between the Foreign Ministry and the Police Directorate, and the MFA finances all of the Norwegian police contributions to SSR. Support for police training in routine civil policing functions qualifies as ODA.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> DAC Statistical Reporting Directives, para. 43.

Similarly, peacekeeping expenditures within a UN context for activities such as monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces, or training in customs and border control procedures, are ODA eligible.<sup>40</sup>

Since 1989 the Norwegian police have participated in 38 missions in 24 different countries. UN operations are priority for Norway, which over the last few years has been involved in missions such as UNMIK (Kosovo), MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMIL (Liberia), MINURCAT (Chad), UNMIS (Sudan) and UNAMID (Darfur). Norwegian police also participate in other multilateral operations, such as those run by the EU and OSCE, primarily in the Western Balkans. The established limit of police personnel who can be deployed internationally is one percent of the operational Norwegian police force. Currently, about 80-90 personnel in Norway's 'CIVPOL' pool, or police available for deployment on UN missions and international assignments, can be deployed at any one time.

The use of Norwegian police abroad today follows a strategy that prioritizes supporting UN operations and frameworks. Norway also has a strongly proclaimed policy to fight gender-based violence, protect women and children and increase female voice and participation in security structures and governance. To that end, Norway developed in 2006 a strategic plan for implementing UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325, which was updated in 2011 to incorporate SCR1820 for its engagement in conflict-affected regions, with the document *Women, peace and security (Kvinner, fred og sikkerhet 2011-2013)*.

Norway, like other countries, is unable to request specific positions in the multilateral operations in which it participates. The Police Directorate (POD) has consequently developed its own strategy for how best to make an impact and to exert Norwegian influence. By international standards Norwegian police officers are well educated and have significant expertise. The POD maintains a thorough selection process for international deployments and will only send highly and appropriately qualified police officers abroad. According to the former Chief of Police in Norway, Ingelin Killingren,<sup>41</sup> in cooperating with the MFA, the Norwegian police will only send officers to places where it is expected that they will have something to contribute.

The Police Directorate seeks to follow the strategic plan *Women, peace and security*, and strive to send a fairly high number of female police officers. The Police Directorate thus also puts considerable effort into recruiting female police officers for international peace operations.

The duties of police on deployment varies according to each operation and the mandate that it is implementing, but deployed police generally engage in three types of activities: advice/mentoring, education and training, and operational police work. The Police Directorate notes that while there is still a need for generalists, the increasing complexity of international operations is resulting in the growing need for expertise in a variety of areas such as governance, education, investigations, project work, drugs, organized crime,

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<sup>40</sup> *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives*, p. 14.

<sup>41</sup> Mini-seminar, Police Directorate, Oslo, 24 March 2011.

criminal intelligence, financial crime, institution building and police reform, terrorism, etc.<sup>42</sup>

For example, the qualifications that are needed for police deployed in Liberia currently include expertise in police management and investigation of cases of sexual abuse; in Kosovo expertise in intelligence, war crimes, financial crime, and forensics is needed; in Serbia expertise in senior management, counter-narcotics and police training is required; and for Afghanistan expertise in management and human rights training, coaching women's strategic leadership, operational policing and counter-narcotics have been identified as key themes. Whether in multilateral or bilateral contexts, POD attempts to meet the local needs with appropriately experienced police. The most recent operation that Norway has participated in is MINUSTAH in Haiti. As it is a French speaking operation, Norway is providing French language lessons to its personnel in order to facilitate their participation.

While the police contribution to multilateral peace operations is the most visible way that the Norwegian police contribute to SSR, the Norwegian government also contributes to police reform in other areas in which it funds programmes. Support to police reform through bilateral programmes has been especially notable in Serbia, where the JuNo series of assistance projects managed by POD has since 2002 supported activities such as the equipping of criminal labs and the development of problem-oriented community policing. Additionally, MFA funding through OSCE has supported a range of projects including enhancing the Serbian MOI's war crimes investigation capacity, strengthening its crime scene and forensic investigations capacity, and strengthening community policing in South Serbia, and MFA funding through International Management Group has supported the development of a basic police training centre in Sremska Kamenica. (see 'Serbia' below for more details).

Finally, Norway offers strategic support for the police component of SSR through the advice and inputs of its police adviser at the UN mission and the support it provides to the SSR Unit and the development of a UN-wide approach to SSR. As SSR has become a common component in UN Security Council peacekeeping mission mandates, Norway's financial support for activities such as the development of a strategic doctrinal framework for international police peacekeeping has far-reaching potential impact for host countries and countries, like Norway, that contribute police to peacekeeping operations.

### 3.3 Justice sector

The Judicial Crisis Response Pool, also known as the Rule of Law Pool of Advisors (Styrkebrønnen) has existed since late 2003 as one of the main mechanisms for Norway to implement justice sector reform. The Rule of Law Pool is maintained and coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, and is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the period 2008-2010, this funding amounted to approximately NOK 81 million.<sup>43</sup> By 2011 the Pool

<sup>42</sup> [https://www.politi.no/om\\_politiet/internasjonalt\\_samarbeid/internasjonale\\_operasjoner/](https://www.politi.no/om_politiet/internasjonalt_samarbeid/internasjonale_operasjoner/)

<sup>43</sup> Numbers reflect grants for projects under sector 152 – 'conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security', and 151 – 'good governance'.



consisted of some 100 experienced, pre-selected judges, public prosecutors, military prosecutors, police prosecutors, defence attorneys and prison and probation advisers who are available for rapid deployment, whether in international civil crisis management operations or in bilateral cooperation and assistance programmes to support justice sector reform.<sup>44</sup> According to the Justice Ministry, the Rule of Law Pool, together with the deployment of Norwegian civilian police, provides Norway with the capacity to field expert advice and assistance on rebuilding or reforming every aspect of the criminal justice system in countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule. Past deployments have provided advisors specifically on developing an independent judiciary, training in and application of international human rights law, and the administration of justice in areas under administration by the international community.

Members of the Rule of Law Pool agree to a two-year commitment during which they may be sent, with prior approval of Norwegian authorities, on an individual assignment or as members of a team in part of a larger programme. At any point, up to one-half of the pool may be deployed on assignment.

Styrkebrønnen was originally conceived by the MFA and MOJ for deployment in multilateral settings. However the UN and other multilateral organizations typically are not used to having teams deployed and usually accept only individual deployments from member states due to the political sensitivities about the distribution of posts among member states: team deployments in multilateral contexts would suggest an overconcentration of influence from a single country. Accordingly, bilateral cooperation projects became the context of choice for Styrkebrønnen because of their greater feasibility for deploying a team of advisers who could cover most of the links in the ‘chain of justice’ – i.e., the various inter-related components of the criminal justice system. While individual secondments to multilateral settings can and do take place, the strength of the Rule of Law Pool is, in their view, the holistic approach they offer for addressing almost every part of the ‘chain of justice’ through the deployment of teams in bilateral contexts. Norway is believed to be the only country that maintains such a capability.

In theory, the capacity of the Rule of Law Pool to address the ‘chain of justice’ in a holistic manner owes in part to the fact that both justice and police are located under one ministry in Norway. In contrast, many other countries have both a justice ministry and ministry of the interior, which may explain the tendency to focus mostly on police and less on other parts of the criminal justice system, and especially neglecting correctional services. Another advantage attributed to the Rule of Law Pool is that the people they deploy are not generalists with international experience but usually practitioners who have had long experience in their specific field of expertise in Norway and are considered to be at the top of their profession. They recruit staff with the direct assistance of the bodies responsible for those staff, such as the Department of Corrections for correctional staff, the court administration for judges, etc., and they help to identify the qualities they are looking for in their Pool staff. This ability of the Rule of Law Pool to recruit

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<sup>44</sup> Update or confirm figure. ‘The Norwegian Pool of Rule of Law Advisers’, fact sheet, undated.

senior Norwegian justice practitioners and bring them directly into contact with their counterparts was considered by some respondents to be one of the key reasons accounting for its impact and effectiveness. And as recruitment to the Pool is internal to the Ministry of Justice, international service has been made part of the career path at the Ministry of Justice, creating strong incentives for staff to participate.

There are, however, external limitations to the model of deploying a Rule of Law Pool team bilaterally. Specifically, if the government of the receiving country does not actually want to implement systemic change in the justice sector, a Rule of Law Pool team deployment can be expected to have little impact. In such contexts, strong multilateral initiatives may carry more weight and leverage to deal with lack of political will for reform. Further, as the Rule of Law Pool is currently configured for a holistic approach, it is most appropriately deployed to a context in which there is a fairly strong and stable central authority that will be able to provide top-down support for its activities. The size of the prospective country of deployment also matters: a large country may overwhelm the Rule of Law team personnel resources and a single team would not be likely to have a significant influence at the strategic level, although they could provide assistance at local level – for example, in assisting in the reform of a specific prison. Another idea which has been mooted for deployments to large countries would have the Rule of Law Pool deploy in coordination with personnel from another like-minded donor, such as one of the Nordic countries. In view of declared interests in Nordic cooperation and donor harmonization, potential collaborative exercises such as this merit further consideration. However, the prospects for developing successful and sustainable joint initiatives may depend on partner countries also making international deployments part of the career path of justice sector personnel.

There are also several domestic limitations pertaining to the Rule of Law Pool. Although it purports to cover the ‘chain of justice’, one important element has remained missing from the Rule of Law Pool of Advisers: a police component. As laws are reformed, not only prosecutors and judges are affected; the police too must be trained in how to work within the new legal frameworks. Although individual police officers have been brought in on occasion by deployed Rule of Law Pool teams to give briefings on specific topics, police officers have not been deployed as regular team members in Rule of Law pool deployments. Norwegian police deployments take place within the framework of CIVPOL, the pool of police available for deployment maintained by the Police Directorate. The lack of systemic cooperation and coordination between police and the Rule of Law Pool weakens Norway’s approach to strengthening the rule of law and security sector reform.

Another domestic limitation appears to be linked to the cost of the Rule of Law Pool. Although initially developed for multilateral contexts, intergovernmental organizations generally do not welcome group deployments as they may concentrate the influence of a particular country, and opt instead for individual deployments. Team deployments from the Rule of Law Pool, which are preferred by those responsible for the Pool, consequently tend to take place in the context of bilateral assistance projects with smaller countries. While team deployments may have a significant

impact, they entail high costs for Norway, involving engagements of senior experts on high Norwegian salaries that may extend over several years. Team deployments from the Rule of Law Pool, in other words, can be an expensive means of providing assistance. Despite willingness to of the Rule of Law Pool to deploy in teams, the potential cost has posed an obstacle, and Norway has sometimes opted to send individuals from the Justice Department in lieu of a team. Ultimately the decision to deploy a Rule of Law team is also a political decision, and must be in harmony with Norwegian foreign policy priorities and funding constraints.

While *Styrkebrønnen* appears to be well-suited to certain contexts (developed countries with a civil law system), concerns have been raised that it may be less well-suited to post-conflict contexts, and especially those having Islamic law (sharia) and/or traditional justice systems. The team was deployed to Georgia in 2004 (see below) and Moldova in 2007. The Georgia team recognized that having a police element was important for addressing the reform challenges in the complex system of criminal justice, and in this cases got around the absence of a police member of team by flying in a Norwegian police officer to lecture on certain topics. The Rule of Law Pool group deployments to Georgia and Moldova were assessed in positive terms. Factors of success included the size, composition and methods employed by the team.<sup>45</sup> More recently, experts from the Rule of Law Pool were deployed to Afghanistan, with one group involved in the development of counter-narcotics courts. The evaluation of the Afghanistan deployment was less positive than the Georgia and Moldova deployments, in part because the team eventually became detached from the priorities of Norwegian development assistance in the country (see below on Afghanistan).

Also, although the senior-level staff who tend to comprise the Rule of Law Pool are seen as bringing distinct benefits to justice sector reform projects, some respondents suggested that the selection process is problematic; rather than recruiting on the basis of seniority in the legal and judicial profession, it was suggested that recruitment should be more tailored to local requirements in the area of deployment.

In addition to the Rule of Law Pool, Norway has supported rule of law development and justice sector reform through the use of an implementing agent, the International Management Group (IMG) in the Western Balkans, specifically in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro (see below).

### 3.4 Intelligence sector

Intelligence reform is one of the most consistently neglected areas of security sector reform assistance. This may stem from perceived sensitivities of transitional states and the observation that the intelligence services of major powers often cultivate relations with the services in areas and countries of strategic interest, with a focus on cooperation and information-sharing. It may also result from the feeling among some in donor capitals that intelligence is somehow not a proper focus for normal assistance programmes. Despite the key role of intelligence agencies in internal and

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<sup>45</sup> See Scanteam, *Review of The Norwegian Mission of Rule of Law Advisers to Georgia (NORLAG) and The Norwegian Mission of Rule of Law Advisers to Moldova (NORLAM)*, Oslo, June 2009.

external security, and the importance of developing governmental, legislative and even non-governmental capacities in the effective management and oversight of the intelligence sector, intelligence governance remains an underdeveloped and under-resourced area for security sector reform assistance. While major intelligence services often develop and maintain cooperative relations with counterparts in transitional contexts, it is far less common to find explicitly SSR-framed intelligence reform initiatives.

It is notable then that Norway has provided sustained support to intelligence reform, in a context in which the stakes of reform have been particularly high. Norway has funded a multi-year programme in support of developing the federal-level Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence–Security Agency (OSA). Administered by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and in close cooperation with the OSCE and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the programme has focused on restructuring, capacity-building and professionalization (see ‘Bosnia’ below).

Norway has additionally provided support to DCAF for a project developing security and intelligence oversight mechanisms and capacity for the Kosovo parliamentary assembly and members of relevant parliamentary committees. Also in terms of developing legislative oversight capacity, Norway has supported a DCAF regional programme to initially fund and train ten parliamentary staff advisers in security and defence affairs, including intelligence, in the seven Western Balkan countries.

### **3.5 Development sector (NORAD) and SSR**

Norway’s development agency, NORAD, is a directorate under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the concept of SSR emerged from the UK Department for International Development and other international development agencies have integrated to varying degrees integrated SSR into their work, the development community in Norway appears to have not systematically engaged with SSR. While conducting this study, we found few individuals working specifically on security sector reform at NORAD, and more questions than understanding of SSR in the development community more broadly. Development actors did not tend to perceive support to security sector reform, and particularly support to defence reform or police reform, as development assistance. The development agency does support capacity building in governance and efforts to combat gender-based violence, but appears to perceive SSR as more concerned with security, and not falling within the usual domain of development assistance.

Several factors may explain this absence of the development community from SSR. One explanation maintains that SSR is a relatively new concept and framework; while the development community has in the past engaged in specific sectors, such as the re-establishment of order in a post-conflict setting, legal reform, courts and prisons, the SSR approach, which emphasizes the interconnected nature of the security and justice sectors and the need for an integrated, holistic approach, is a relatively recent development which the development community may not have had the time to understand.

Another possible reason for the failure of the development community to engage with SSR is exemplified by the Afghan case, in which the development community has become increasingly concerned about the character of development assistance and engagement in conflict areas and areas emerging out of conflict, in particular the blurring of lines between humanitarian and development activities on the one hand, and the military on the other. The deliberate blurring of lines between civilian and military undertakings in settings where Norway is engaged in counter-insurgency efforts has strengthened reluctance of development actors to engage with the SSR agenda.

Finally, a third reason advanced by a respondent from the development community is linked to the perception that especially in certain high-profile cases, such as Afghanistan, SSR tends to be treated by the Norwegian government as a political issue; once a political decision is made that Norway should contribute in some way to security sector reform, it funds and implements projects without the usual planning and assessment that is more typical of development assistance programming. This more political approach to SSR engagement tends to leave out development methods and actors.

### 3.6 Gender and SSR

While Norway does not have a specific set of guidelines or strategy for promoting gender equality and sensitivity specifically within SSR, this remains a key cross-cutting issue, and its efforts in this domain can be seen within the wider context of its efforts to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) of 2000. In 2006 Norway was one of the first states to develop a national action plan for implementation SCR 1325. In response to four further SCR resolutions on women, peace and security (SCR 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960), Norway's national action plan was enhanced and updated in early 2011, with the publication of a new strategic plan on women, peace and security to cover the period 2011-2013, which aims mainly to strengthen the participation of women in peace and security efforts.<sup>46</sup> The government also aims to reinforce its efforts to combat sexual violence in conflict, emphasising protection, prosecution and rehabilitation.<sup>47</sup> This 2011 document in addition to Norway's 2006 Action Plan for SCR 1325 constitute the overall framework for integrating the gender perspective into Norwegian policy on peace and security.

Lacking specific guidance for its approach to gender and SSR, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in practice turns to DCAF as its main partner for conceptualizing, developing and implementing projects in this domain. Through DCAF's Gender and Special Projects Division, Norway supported the development of the Gender and Security Sector Reform (GSSR) Toolkit, the DCAF Gender Unit's flagship publication, which has also led to the development of a GSSR Training Resource Package.<sup>48</sup> The

<sup>46</sup> Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Women, Peace and Security: Norway's strategic plan 2011-13* (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2011, p. 4.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>48</sup> DCAF, Gender and Security Sector Reform Training Resource Website, available at: <http://www.gssrtraining.ch/>

toolkit is used by some Norwegian officials responsible for women, peace and security in discussions with security sector actors.

In West Africa Norway funds a DCAF project to collect basic information on the security sector in 15 state members of ECOWAS. This is the first effort to map security sectors in the region, and the project is expected to open up new areas for research and evidence-based issues for reform. Norway has also funded a global project which will work closely with several institutions active in training in SSR to mainstream gender into their curriculum and conduct a series of training-of-trainers (TOT) workshops.

Norway also integrates a gender perspective into many of the bilateral assistance projects initiated, supported or implemented by the Police Directorate. One example is provided by its involvement in Liberia, including among other initiatives, the establishment of separate reception facilities in Liberia for women and children victims of abuse Women and Children's Protection Units (see below 'Liberia'). Another important example is its initiative to mentor a senior female police chief in Afghanistan, and provide self-defence training as well as coaching in leadership for female police officers (see below 'Afghanistan').

Through Norway's support of women's equality and gender issues, it has contributed to gender becoming an indisputable core, cross-cutting issue in the SSR policy discourse, and increasingly, in practice. Gender projects it funds have resulted in the development of conceptual 'tools', basic training material and instruments, as well as the documentation of basic features of security sectors and security sector governance in the Western Balkans and West Africa. Beyond contributing to the development of a gender and SSR lens at a conceptual level and supporting projects that open up new areas for research, it is perhaps even more significant that a gender perspective has been integrated into Norwegian bilateral policing and justice reform programmes. It is in this commitment to supporting women's equality and gender sensitivity in the day-to-day practices of security and justice systems that Norway can take a leading role.

### **3.7 Other actors**

An emerging trend in SSR is the outsourcing of bilateral assistance activities to third parties such as non-governmental organizations, consultancy firms or consortia, and private security companies. In this section we briefly examine three of the largest recipients of Norwegian government funding to support SSR-related activities.

#### **The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the International Security Sector Advisory Team**

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation that specializes in security sector reform (SSR). Created in 2000, the Centre has over 100 staff from more than 30 countries. DCAF is based in Geneva, Switzerland, and has permanent offices in Beirut, Brussels, Ljubljana and Ramallah. The DCAF Foundation Council currently comprises 58 Member States. Norway has been a member of the Foundation Council since 2002.

DCAF provides assessments, program design, in-country advisory support, practical assistance programmes, capacity-building and training, monitoring and evaluation. It furthermore develops guidance tools, produces knowledge services and publications. DCAF's budget in 2010 reached 30.3 million Swiss francs, or about 198 million NOK. The Swiss government remains the largest contributor to DCAF's budget, but the share of funding provided by other governments is increasing. In 2010, other member states and international organizations contributed 7 million Swiss francs, or 26 percent of the total budget. Out of this, Norway alone contributed 2.3 million Swiss francs (approximately NOK 14 million), whereas the next biggest donor, Sweden, contributed 1.4 million Swiss francs (see *DCAF Annual Report 2010*).

The OECD recognizes contributions to DCAF as Official Development Assistance (ODA) under DAC guidelines. DCAF projects that receive Norwegian funding are predominantly implemented in the Western Balkans, but as mentioned above, several gender-focused SSR projects are also being carried out in Africa. Additionally, Norway has provided funding for an SSR project in Nepal, as well as for an African Union – United Nations seminar series on SSR. Norway has contributed substantially to projects such as *Building an ethical police service - Toolkit on police ethics and anti-corruption*, and has done so also for the *Gender and SSR toolkit*. According to the MFA project registry, over the three years 2008, 2009 and 2010, Norway provided NOK 22.6 million to DCAF programming, coming to a total of NOK 28.6 million including core contributions to the ISSAT division, discussed below.

We found no publicly available independent evaluations of DCAF, or of the programmes funded by Norway.

### **International Security Sector Advisory Team**

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) was established in 2008 as a division of DCAF. It seeks to enhance the effectiveness and quality of individual member states' SSR efforts, as well as facilitate the coordination and coherence of their international assistance. ISSAT benefits from core funding from DCAF's central budget, DCAF's administrative support, and has access to DCAF's personnel, expertise and research capability.<sup>49</sup> ISSAT's strengths are its operational expertise and experience, and good practice in gathering, and training capacity.

ISSAT seeks to standardize training in SSR by developing training modules on SSR principles, practices, approaches and methodologies; SSR programme management; governance and democratic control of the security system; designing and undertaking SSR assessments; and monitoring, review and evaluation of SSR activities.<sup>50</sup> ISSAT furthermore offers various courses to its donor members, such as training of trainers, SSR training for peace support operations, and pre-deployment briefings for senior personnel.

<sup>49</sup> <http://issat.dcaf.ch/ISSAT-Public-Home/About-ISSAT/DCAF>

<sup>50</sup> [www.asset-ssr.org/organisations/dcaf](http://www.asset-ssr.org/organisations/dcaf)

Over the last three years, Norway has provided NOK 6 million towards the establishment and core funding of ISSAT. ISSAT is valued by Norwegian interlocutors particularly as a forum in which donors can discuss common concerns and approaches to SSR.

A recent UK-Dutch evaluation of ISSAT's activities since its establishment in 2008 found ISSAT performing field advisory support and training well in the face of rapidly growing demand for these services. The report nevertheless suggested that ISSAT develop means of measuring its impact, including measuring donor performance on SSR and testing assumptions of what constitutes 'best practice' in SSR. The evaluation affirms the value that donors derive from ISSAT as an instrument to improve their own performance and that of other international actors in SSR. Since the UK-Dutch evaluation focused on 'whether ISSAT is doing the right things rather than whether it is doing them right', the latter qualitative element should be addressed in a follow-on review.

### **International Management Group**

When International Management Group (IMG) was established in 1994 at the initiative of UNHCR, it was intended to function as an ad-hoc technical group to address the specific technical and infrastructure problems faced in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a working-level meeting of the Humanitarian Issues Working Group (HIWG), IMG was granted a legal status and was empowered to function as an independent body. Subsequent meetings defined the IMG Statute, which still regulates its status and operation. Since then, IMG has grown considerably and is now operating in almost twenty countries worldwide. IMG is governed by a Steering Committee composed of donor governments as well as international and regional organizations that cooperate with IMG as contributors and implementing partners.

Norway has used IMG as an executing agent for a range of projects in the law enforcement and justice sectors in the Western Balkans, including a project to improve the delivery of justice in the courts in Serbia, development of basic police training centre in Sremska Kamenica, Serbia, capacity building of the Customs administration of Serbia, creation of a document management system for the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reform of public expenditure management within the Serbian Ministry of Interior, reform of the misdemeanour system in Montenegro, and development of an independent judiciary in Montenegro. Ten bilateral projects are currently being carried out by the IMG on Norway's behalf, whereas 42 projects have been completed.

According to the Norwegian MFA's registers, IMG has received almost NOK 55.7 million over the last three years. This makes Norway IMG's second biggest funding source currently, after the European Commission. For on-going projects, Norwegian funding makes up 26.2 percent of IMG's total funding.

According to information displayed on IMG's webpages, Norway has, in total, channeled almost € 40 million or approximately NOK 311.8 million bilaterally to IMG. This sum excludes additional funding for projects



conducted in collaboration with UNDP and OSCE, which amounts to € 685.328 and € 2.5 million respectively.<sup>51</sup>

No evaluations have recently been undertaken, despite IMG constituting one of Norway's main implementing agents for justice and security reform projects. IMG however received unanimously positive reviews from interviewees who had interacted with IMG regarding efficiency, management and project outcomes, as well as reporting and documenting their results. In this regard, an evaluation would be useful not only because of the level of funding involved, but also to gain a clearer understanding of the factors that contribute to IMG's success as an implementing agent in SSR.

### **Norwegian Refugee Council**

A perhaps less-known instrument of justice reform (specifically by improving access to justice) is the role played by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in legal counselling and capacity-building for the resolution of housing, land and property disputes for refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees in post-conflict situations.

Land disputes are extremely common during and after conflict, with many disputes over land but few if any channels to address them. The weakness of land law and of the formal justice system as a means of resolving disputes often result in land disputes that linger for many years without resolution. Unresolved land disputes are often a cause of further intra- and inter-communal conflict and violence. Women are moreover often victims in land disputes, a result of prejudicial legal frameworks and inadequate access to justice mechanisms, and frequently resulting in physical and sexual assault of women claimants. NRC's Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programme works to raise awareness about the spectrum of mechanisms that exist, often in contexts where the formal justice system is largely non-functioning or non-accessible for the most vulnerable populations, and where customary justice systems often suffer from many problems, including discrimination against women. While counselling is a service provided to beneficiaries, i.e. to individuals involved in land disputes, ICLA also is involved in training lawyers, judges and community elders and other customary leaders in property law, as well as identifying legal gaps and other structural problems and flagging these to local or central governments. Additionally, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are emerging as additional means of accessing justice.

This programme underscores that the justice sector not only encompasses the courts and other formal state institutions, but, particularly in many post-conflict countries, often includes customary authorities as the primary justice system to which most people turn. Although not explicitly labelled an SSR programme, ICLA nevertheless encompasses the types of issues and objectives characteristic of security sector reform. It is holistic in the sense that it addresses both the formal justice system and customary justice mechanisms, targets structural reform and making government more

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<sup>51</sup> IMG website, [www.img-int.org/Central/Public08/Projects.aspx?by=Donor](http://www.img-int.org/Central/Public08/Projects.aspx?by=Donor)

responsive to the needs of citizens, while empowering vulnerable groups in society.

Over three years, from 2008-2010, NRC received around NOK 58.6 million for its legal aid support programmes for internally displaced persons in Georgia, Liberia, the Palestinian Administered Areas, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

Independent evaluations of ICLA projects have been conducted and are publicly available on the NRC website.

In summary, Norway is involved in various aspects of SSR through DCAF/ISSAT, IMG and NRC. ISSAT provides a forum for more strategic-level guidance and dialogue within the donor community, whereas DCAF, IMG, and NRC offer project development and implementation in specific functional sectors and national or regional settings. Such actors provide technical expertise and can fill gaps in Norwegian programming, increasing the range and flexibility of Norwegian engagement with SSR. Nevertheless, more consideration should be given to the implications of outsourcing SSR projects and to identifying the key conditions and factors on which to base decisions to outsource. The outsourcing of SSR projects is generally likely to increase given the current economic environment for most donor governments. However, outsourcing SSR assistance also brings with it the risk of depoliticising a donor's engagement with SSR, as well as possibly increasing reliance on 'prescriptive and technical approaches' that 'constrain local initiative'.<sup>52</sup> Given the level of funding provided by Norway to select actors to implement SSR assistance, a more systematic approach towards selecting, overseeing and evaluating outsourced SSR projects and ensuring that they are in harmony with wider Norwegian objectives and reflect good practice is recommended. Conditions for outsourcing SSR assistance could be included as a component of a broader strategic policy framework for Norwegian engagement in SSR.

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<sup>52</sup> Dylan Hendrickson, 'Challenges Confronting Bilateral Donors' in *Security Sector Transformation in Africa*, edited by Alan Bryden and 'Funmi Olonisakin (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), p. 214.

## 4. Country surveys

One of the key regions in which Norway has provided support to the reform of the security sector is the Western Balkans. The nature of this assistance has shifted over time as conditions on the ground have shifted, typically progressing in each country from provision of humanitarian assistance to support for democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration. Norwegian involvement has generally evolved as the countries in the region have progressively and at different rates become more stabilised and democratic, and more engaged with NATO PfP and membership, the EU Stabilization and Association Process (SaP), and in some cases the accession process. Within the Western Balkans, Serbia has been the key focal point for Norway, owing to historical ties and a special defence relationship that has been particularly well-structured for reasons discussed below. In 2010 the three priority countries in the Western Balkan region receiving defence and security sector reform assistance from Norway were Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia. Projects conducted in the first two of these countries will primarily be discussed in this section, in addition to a slightly earlier project, the support provided to Montenegro upon its independence for the creation of its Ministry of Defence.

The Western Balkans is a region that faced a dual transition, emerging first from state socialism and most recently from ethnic and interstate conflict. From the donor perspective, the region has several advantages for SSR efforts. As developed European states, the populations of Western Balkan countries generally have high skills and education levels which facilitate the transfer of know-how. Some states, such as Serbia, already have strong central state apparatuses. New states, such as Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, face complex challenges of state building. However in most cases, these challenges are mitigated to some degree by strong political will for Euro-Atlantic integration. The objective of drawing closer to NATO and the EU, and for most countries the prospect of eventually becoming members, constitutes a strong incentive for domestic elites to introduce reforms. Challenges nevertheless remain, though, as Serbia remains opposed to NATO membership and ethnic divisions in Bosnia continue to undermine efforts to build a centralised state. Nevertheless, in the Western Balkans, Norway's SSR efforts have complemented and reinforced the movement of the countries towards membership of NATO and the EU.

Norway has a rather unique arrangement with regard to the Western Balkans, in that it is the only region for which development assistance is run by the MFA rather than by NORAD. In the 1990s Norwegian engagement began as a humanitarian response, and subsequently became more politically oriented, especially from 1996-7. In 2010, the Norwegian MFA and MOD developed their first regional SSR strategy for the Western Balkans.

#### 4.1 Bosnia

Norwegian SSR efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina are broad ranging. In 2010 the Norwegian MOD spent € 120,000 on efforts to build capacity for long term defence planning within the Bosnian MOD.<sup>53</sup> Reform is also being carried out to increase the effectiveness of the federal-level BiH Intelligence-Security Agency, which received NOK 9 million over the last three years. Norway is moreover lead nation of the NATO Trust Fund for resettlement and retraining of military personnel made redundant as a result of defence reform. In 2010, the NATO Trust Fund received close to NOK 4 million in contributions from Norway.

Support to the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes the main element of Norwegian support to judicial reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has received approximately NOK 27 million over the past three years. Several projects also focus on the Registry for War Crimes to assist the national authorities in developing an effective, independent and efficient judiciary at the state level.

Two important Norwegian SSR projects in Bosnia are focused on strengthening federal-level integrated institutions. One DSSR project involved the transfer of knowledge and building of competence in the Bosnian MOD. The Bosnian Army and Ministry of Defence were created as a result of the 2005 Law on Defence. The Army is one of the few integrated institutions in the country – although the army is composed of three brigades that retain some distinct ethnic features, the command structure has been integrated. Prior to the integration in 2005, there were two MODs (one each in Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Norwegian assistance has focused in DSSR on building competence in the integrated MOD structure. Norway provided technical advice on how to conduct long-term defence planning, by providing experts in Norwegian defence planning -- economists, operational analysts and scenario experts (political scientists). The objective was to help BiH develop an affordable defence plan for its structure for the next 20 years. Producing the plan was important, but the real long-term objective was to increase the capacity in the Bosnian MOD to conduct defence planning.

The second SSR project Norway has supported in Bosnia is to support the establishment and capacity-building of the federal-level Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA). Intelligence reform is part of SSR according to OECD DAC but often remains outside the scope of activity of regular international actors. Reform activities are often handled by western intelligence agencies with little or no scrutiny or coordination with other parts of the security systems. In Bosnia, the High Representative sought to regularize this sphere of reform as part of the overall efforts of centralization and reform of the security sector. But there was no apparent international institutional actor to take a lead role or provide the necessary funding. In this instance, Norway's flexibility as an SSR actor ensured that an important gap was filled with a program that had a pilot project in 2005 and started out as a multiyear program in cooperation with the OSCE from 2006. The intelligence reform program emerged in a coincidental manner as a result of a Norwegian national who had been funded by the MFA and seconded through NORDEM to the OHR, where he held the intelligence

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<sup>53</sup> Ministry of Defence, 'Defence and security sector reform 2010', activity catalogue.

portfolio. This individual involved NUPI as the implementing agent that provided both professional knowledge and administered the funds on behalf of the MFA. Intelligence is a sensitive and politicized part of SSR but Norway had a distinct advantage in being a small power and one with no obvious national agenda or interests to further in the region. This enabled it to gain the trust within Bosnia and among the major states involved in its reconstruction. The project was greatly facilitated by having a key ‘dual-hatted’ implementer who was very familiar with local conditions, relevant local and international actors, and with good connections to the relevant ministries in Oslo.

Benchmarking in this case was challenging because of the many intangible elements involved in creating such an agency in an extremely sensitive political situation. While quantitative figures for the project exist, such as numbers trained, courses held, etc, the more intangible elements of team-building and trust-building among the multi-ethnic personnel within the institution were much more difficult to measure. Initially a three-year project, and extended for several more years, the project supported the development of capacity and competencies through training-of-trainers, advanced academic training, use of open sources, library services, introduction to NATO intelligence concepts, and in-service courses to improve the level of knowledge and effectiveness of staff and of the institution more broadly. Support was also provided to the parliamentary oversight committee. After the initial period establishing the programme, effort was made to minimize the use of foreign consultants and instead emphasized ‘buying locally’ in terms of using Bosnia-based enterprises to provide management training and language courses. Relevant Norwegian institutions like the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM), the Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee, the MoD and the MoJ have provided assistance to the intelligence reform project in Bosnia.

In addition to the strengthening of security sector institutions in Bosnia, Norway is supporting the resettlement and retraining of redundant military personnel. Norway is co-lead, along with the Netherlands and Slovenia, of the NATO Trust Fund. With the International Organization for Migration (IOM) acting as the executing agent, the Bosnia reintegration project aims to provide new skills and opportunities for redundant soldiers.<sup>54</sup> Following the successful five-year programme that was carried out in Serbia to help with reintegration, the Bosnian project is expected to follow the same path and run for three years. As noted in this report’s section on Serbia, Norway’s approach to reintegration has emphasized training-the-trainers, building up local capacity and ensuring local ownership.

Bosnia, where unemployment is now unofficially over 40 percent, needs to replace some 3000 professional soldiers. Most have spent six years in the army, are between 35-38 years old, and are too old to be infantry soldiers and too young yet to be pensioned. Taking their weapon and discharging them isn’t sufficient; it is recognised that there is a need to support them, or face a very real risk that these men, who are very likely to be unemployed given the current state of the economy, will drift into crime or organized

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<sup>54</sup> The United States contributes USD \$2 million through USAID to reintegration in BiH. They are the biggest contributor to the process, but the money is not channelled through the NATO Trust Fund due to American legislation.

crime. The NATO Trust Fund supports this process. The project involves the establishment by the Bosnian MOD of a transition organization, a central office based in Sarajevo, which maintains close contact with the DDR expert at NDUC, and four different resettlement centres around the country. There are 2-3 civilian and military advisers at each centre. The centres provide counselling, education, training and networks with labour departments, universities, agriculture, etc. and new opportunities for former soldiers, encouraging small business generation. The reintegration programme also provides a fund that provides a modest amount of start-up funding for small businesses of the redundant soldiers, upon approval of a business plan. The contribution towards retraining and reintegration by the NTF counts as ODA, and as such this contribution to DSSR is funded by the Norwegian MFA.

#### **4.2 Montenegro**

Norwegian SSR efforts in Montenegro are mainly focused on enhancing democratic civilian oversight over the armed forces by building capacity in the Ministry of Defence. According to their own figures, the Norwegian MFA allocated NOK 4.8 million for this project via the MOD between 2008-2010. There is also a substantial bilateral effort ongoing in the justice sector. Most notably, IMG has received NOK 9.4 million over the last two years to help reform the misdemeanor system in Montenegro and implement an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Strategy for the Judiciary.

Norway's primary form of support to Montenegro's SSR involved Norwegian MOD assistance to building up the Montenegrin defence ministry. It is an interesting example because it was considered a test case of the methodology of MOD assistance to civilian institutions. Although Montenegro at the time was not a priority country for Norwegian engagement in the region, the opportunity to become involved came along when Montenegro declared its independence in 2006, dissolving the union of Serbia and Montenegro. When Montenegro asked all NATO countries for statebuilding assistance, Norway was able to become involved at a relatively modest cost.

Moreover, Montenegro is considered by Norwegian defence officials as an interesting test case for an SSR project. In part this is because, as a developed European country, it constituted a receptive environment for Norwegian assistance. Further, harmonization with NATO and EU standards was a high priority for the government of the newly independent state, which translated into political will to implement the needed reforms.

Norway's SSR assistance to building the Montenegrin defence ministry was in the area of democratic civilian control of the military, and as such was entirely ODA-eligible. Norwegian assistance directly involved training some 50-60 people, mostly civilians and some military. The participation of MOD personnel was considered desirable because traditional development actors do not 'do' civilian control of the security sector, which requires knowledge and experience of working within a civilian ministry of defence. Through a process of bilateral dialogue, the priorities and needs were mapped, with four specific entry points identified: human resources, security policy

formulation, defence budgeting, and planning (i.e. acquisition of complex defence systems). The participation of MOD personnel in mentoring and training of defence ministry staff in Montenegro required good will on the part of the various departments of Norway's MOD. This is because Norway has a relatively small MOD that counts about 300 employees. Consequently, the absence of the 5-10 individuals used as mentors on the Montenegro programme was felt when they spent a week every 3 months in Montenegro.

In 2008 Norway initiated a bilateral cooperation with Montenegro involving the coastguard. Norwegian assistance has been requested for undertaking risk assessments, but so far the Montenegrin authorities has not decided on how to organize their coastal surveillance and coastguard. Norway has however, marketed its competence within coastguard issues as a basis for a potential regional cooperation, and regional conferences has been conducted with participation from Montenegro, Albania, BiH, Slovenia and Croatia. The Norwegian Coast Guard is the main donor both technical and financial, but Italy and Greece increasingly hold observatory statuses.

### 4.3 Serbia

Serbia remains the key focal point of Norwegian SSR engagement within the Western Balkans. The defense sector has been subjected to the most structured efforts of cooperation. Firstly, Norway is lead nation for the NATO Trust Fund for resettlement and retraining of redundant military personnel, which received €420,000 from Norway last year.<sup>55</sup> Secondly, Norway contributes substantially to both military educational reform (€400,000 in 2010) as well as capacity building within the Serbian MOD on defence planning and strategy (€325,000 in 2010).<sup>56</sup> The increasing internationalization of the Serbian defence sector is reflected in the military-medical cooperation and contribution to the Norwegian field hospital in the UN peace operation in Chad.

Norway has been involved bilaterally in justice sector reform since 2007 through the project *Improving the delivery of justice in the courts in Serbia*. The project is being implemented by IMG. In 2010 Norway decided to allocate NOK 33 million in further contributions to the justice reform project.<sup>57</sup> Norway has moreover conducted a long-running bilateral police project, JuNo, with the Police Directorate as the main implementing actor.

Norway's active engagement in Serbia reflects the special relationship and historically close ties between the two countries that dates back to World War II.<sup>58</sup> These ties contributed to the perception of Norway as an honest broker in Serb relations with NATO and OSCE, and its role in facilitating Serbian membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, requested in 2003 and which occurred in 2006. Over the period 2000-2008, Norway provided

<sup>55</sup> 'Defence and security sector reform 2010' activity catalogue.

<sup>56</sup> 'Defence and security sector reform 2010' activity catalogue.

<sup>57</sup> <http://template.imgyu.com/Central/Public08/Countries.aspx?CountryRegionId=e003db54-5fce-41bb-8d08-1cd6ce22f7e7&ProjectId=c5914653-464f-437b-b144-897788179a32>

<sup>58</sup> 'Why is Security Sector Reform Important? A Global Perspective and the Case of Serbia', Opening Speech by Ambassador Kim Traavik, Permanent Representative of Norway on the North Atlantic Council, International and Security Affairs Centre, 9<sup>th</sup> School of Security Sector Reform, Belgrade, 23 April 2007. Available at website of the Norwegian Delegation to NATO, accessed 27 March 2011.

NOK 1.5 billion to Serbia, although the actual amount is likely higher as the figure does not take into account projects classified as regional but which took place mostly in Serbia.<sup>59</sup> Its programming has shifted to reflect changes on the ground. A recent evaluation of Norwegian assistance to the Western Balkans identified three phases in Norwegian support to Serbia: from 1993-2000 it took the form of humanitarian assistance to assist the influx of refugees into Serbia, and support of the democratic opposition, which was subject to harassment. With the fall of the Milosevic regime and the establishment of a new government in 2000 until 2003, Norwegian assistance shifted towards stabilising the new democratic regime and consolidating its democratic institutions. From 2003, Norwegian assistance has focused on supporting Serbia's democratization and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Support to security sector reform has been a key feature of Norwegian assistance to Serbia since the fall of the Milosevic regime and its replacement with a democratic regime. Norwegian SSR support to Serbia has been strong, relatively systematic and sustained, with substantial involvement in each of the defence, police and justice sectors. However cooperation in the defence sector has been especially strong and structured. In particular, this is because an operational dimension was added through the co-deployment of a Serbian military contingent with Norway in Chad. This co-deployment was viewed by some as a driving force for much of the defence cooperation, the factor that kept a high level of political and professional attention on bilateral defence cooperation. Judicial and police reform have also been a focus in Serbia, but not as structured as defence cooperation. The three sectors will be discussed below.

As both a post-communist and post-conflict country, post-Milosevic Serbia possessed a bloated military apparatus that was obsolete, ill-suited to respond to the new security environment, and costly to maintain. Thus in the area of defence sector reform, Serbia faced the challenge of downsizing, restructuring and modernising its armed forces, and implementing effective democratic civilian control over its armed forces. The Serb armed forces have undergone significant reform over the past several years, and Norway has contributed in various ways.

In a 2006 strategy document the Norwegian MFA identified support for the reform of Serbia's security sector as being within the broader strategy of supporting Serbia as a democratic state based on the rule of law. The overarching goals of Norwegian support were to contribute a model of democratic civil-military relations, strengthen NATO's cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro (complimentary with NATO's conditional requirements for PfP membership), and through bilateral reform assistance contribute to promoting Norway as a credible and relevant actor within the field of SSR. To those ends, Norway identified three main priorities for SSR support to Serbia and Montenegro: training and reintegration of redundant military personnel; internationalization and enhancing institutional competence and capacity in relation to Peace Support Operations; and strengthening civilian oversight of the defence sector.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> NORAD, *Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans*, Report 7/2010 - Evaluation, Vol II, p. 64.

<sup>60</sup> *Serbia. Støtte til sikkerhetssektorreform*.



Within the Serbian defence sector, Norway's top priority project in 2010 was to help strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Defence to engage in long-term defence planning, budgeting and personnel management. As the Serbian Ministry of Defence was the inheritor of most of the MOD capacity from former Yugoslavia, it already had a relatively high level of competence. Norwegian assistance focused on helping Serbia to further develop its competencies and provide the tools and training that would enable the Serbian MOD to identify an affordable force structure and to plan for long-term defence restructuring. This involved defence economic analysis and the use of planning scenarios, identification of force goals and the calculation of capability requirements. Typically the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, or FFI), with funding from the MOD, sends a group of 3 or 4 people to Belgrade to conduct workshops, which are held 2-3 times per year. The trainers stay in contact with the members of groups who receive training throughout the year.

It was noted that one of the problems encountered was with the frequent reassignments and changes in Serbian personnel receiving training, creating discontinuity and delays in creating a cadre of Serbian trainers who could then train their colleagues. Another problem from the Norwegian side was the absence of the 'bigger picture', that is not seeing how the Norwegian trainers' efforts were contributing to democratization and transformation in the recipient countries, as a factor limiting enthusiasm and commitment over the longer term.

A high priority project has been in the area of military-medical cooperation, involving the donation of a military field hospital to Serbia and education and training. This has enabled Serbia to contribute with medical elements to international military and peace operations, important for building trust and improving Serbia's international image. Indeed, the Serb armed forces medical team was deployed in 2009-10 as part of the Norwegian contingent (field hospital) in MINURCAT, the UN peace operation in Chad. Additionally, through a parallel project with Macedonia, Norway has contributed to strengthening capacities of both for common deployment (as was seen in the co-deployment of Serbian military medics with Norwegian peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan) and for regional medical cooperation in the Western Balkans. It is important not to underestimate the impact of this project resulting in co-deployment of Norwegian and Serb elements. The operational element of this assistance project provided added value and transformed what could have been a mere technical assistance project into one that was more properly seen as cooperation sustaining high levels of political and professional interest and commitment.

Another priority DSSR project involved the establishment from late 2005 (July 2006) and continuing support to a NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund. Through NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Funds, individual alliance members and partners promote security and defence reform in partner countries by supporting demilitarization projects and defence reform projects. The NTF for Serbia was established to help reintegrate redundant personnel in the Serbian defence sector as it downsized and restructured its armed forces. Norway initiated the project, providing 30 percent of the Trust Fund's budget, and as it was joined by numerous other donor countries in contributing to the NATO/PfP TF for Serbia, Norway served as lead

nation.<sup>61</sup> It is worth noting that the NTF for Serbia was not a typical demobilization project, but became an innovative programme for developing small and medium-sized enterprises in Serbia. The fund supported the Serbian Ministry of Defence in managing the downsizing of armed forces personnel through the provision of vocational training, job placement and start-up capital for redundant military personnel in Serbia, thus contributing to their reintegration into civilian life and livelihoods. The executing agency was the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In addition Norway supported the establishment of a retraining centre for non-commissioned officers. Bilaterally funded, Denmark also contributes and serves as lead nation. The rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers counts as official development assistance, and hence these DSSR projects are funded in Norway by the MFA through the MOD.

Norway also provides support to the Belgrade School for Security Studies (formerly the Centre for Civil-Military Relations), which was recently acknowledged in an international survey as a leading think tank in the region. The BSSS constitutes a source of independent civilian expertise on security and defence affairs, produces high quality policy research and analysis, and has made a major contribution to enriching public discourse on security and defence affairs.

In terms of supporting police reform in Serbia, Norway has had a long-running bilateral police cooperation programme to assist police reforms and more broadly democratization. Initiated in 2001, the Yugoslavia-Norway (JuNo) programme is funded by the MFA and involves the Police Directorate (POD) as main implementing agent, using Norwegian police trainers and police professionals to build capacity of personnel through training and provision of equipment. JuNo projects have been developed in coordination with the OSCE, which is responsible for coordinating international police assistance for Serbian police reform. JuNo projects have also enjoyed support from the Serbian Interior Ministry, and a good reputation among the Serbian police. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the name was retained at request of Serbia because the programme had already gained familiarity among police.

JuNo has encompassed five successive projects which have focused on different substantive areas of reform, from forensic crime investigation labs to 'problem-oriented' community policing. The first JuNo project from 2001-2 was a model police project and provided training to all members of the police service in Vojvodina, Backa Palanka. Subjects included leadership, community policing, economic investigation, narcotics investigation, and crime scene investigation. Equipment was also provided (radio equipment, information technology, crime scene investigation equipment, traffic service equipment and upgrading of police station equipment).

JuNo 2 in 2004 established a regional crime laboratory in Novi Sad, which was responsible for the Vojvodina region, and upgraded forensic equipment. Crime lab personnel were extensively trained in the use of the equipment, as well as in the subjects covered in JuNo 1. At the initiative of the OSCE, the successful Novi Sad model was replicated for the creation of other regional

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<sup>61</sup> *Evaluation Western Balkans*, Vol II (2010), p. 88.

crime labs in Nis and Podgorica, Montenegro. Norway funded the OSCE project in Nis, and partially funded that in Podgorica, while training personnel in both locations.

JuNo 3 emerged in late 2004 at the initiative of the Serbian police, who developed a strategic plan for the introduction of community policing through the use of strategic management, operational crime analysis and problem-oriented policing (POP). The pilot project focused on the seven police districts covering the Vojvodina region in 2005, training police leaders and trainers, in a train-the-trainers approach.

JuNo 4 and 5 covering the period 2007-2009 were focused on facilitating the Serbian plan for national implementation of community policing through problem-oriented policing and operational crime analysis. Although this was understood as requiring several years to implement, and Norway's engagement through the process was also assumed, Norway was only able to agree to one year of project cooperation at a time. JuNo 4 focused on training at the senior and middle management levels, drawing on the Serbian trainers who had been trained in JuNo 3. JuNo 5 continued the work of the preceding project, introduced classrooms in the police districts for further training at the local level, and also involved local projects in POP in every police district.

The JuNo programme appears to have enjoyed strong local ownership, with consistent support both at the top levels of political leadership and among professional cadres in the Ministry of Interior. The Norwegian project management prioritized a thorough assessment and planning phase before the project started. The JuNo projects were also structured so that Serbia would take increasing responsibility for planning and implementation. JuNo 4 and 5 saw a gradual handing over of responsibility for project content and implementation from the Norwegians to the Serbian side, taking over 50 percent of the teaching. Further, the projects were planned with cooperation from OSCE in terms of identifying topics for courses and teaching methods. The JuNo projects are believed to have contributed to the improvement of relations and rebuilding of trust between police and local communities.

Norway has also supported police reform through the secondment of senior Norwegian police officers to key positions in the Law Enforcement Division of the OSCE Mission in Serbia. Norway has also supported the modernization of information management systems at the Ministry of Interior, a project implemented by International Management Group (IMG).

Norway has been relatively less engaged in legal and justice sector reform in Serbia than in defence or policing. One explanation for this was that as EU membership is a top Serbian priority, and the EU has a developed framework within its accession process for judicial reform, that this was better left to EU actors. Nevertheless, in 2010 Norway funded IMG to implement two justice sector reform programmes in Serbia.

Serbia is an example of strong engagement by Norway as a donor towards SSR. It is the case where there was a high level of political and professional commitment and sustained involvement, as evidenced by the extensive multi-component DSSR projects and the successive projects to support

police reform. Much of this is due to the special relationship between Serbia and Norway, and the role played by Norway in encouraging a rapprochement between Serbia and NATO and facilitating Serbia's membership of the Partnership for Peace.

Finally, Norway has also provided support to Serbian civil society organizations that contribute to research and analysis of the security sector in Serbia as well as its regional setting, enriching policy discourse and strengthening informal oversight. The Centre for Civil-Military Relations, subsequently renamed the Belgrade School of Security Studies, is a key civil society recipient of Norwegian funding, conducting high quality analysis on various issues relating to Euro-Atlantic integration, regional cooperation and SSR. For the period 2009-2012, the CCMR/BSSS has received NOK 4.4 million in support of developing knowledge-based governance of the security sector in Serbia and the Western Balkans.

#### **4.4 Georgia**

Norwegian assistance to Georgia has mainly been focused around capacity building in the legal sector through the deployment of the Norwegian Rule of Law Pool. Approximately NOK 20 million has been allocated for this purpose over the period 2008-2010. The Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisors (NORLAG) has contributed in the development of a strategic plan for Georgia's criminal justice system, with an emphasis on making the penal system more humane. The Norwegian Refugee Council's Information, Counseling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) project contributes to the efforts in the justice sector, and has received around NOK 5.25 million within the same timeframe.

The military component of Norwegian support is channeled through the NATO Professional Development Program, where Norway is lead nation on human resource management.

In October 2004 the Judicial Crisis Response Pool deployed for the first time, sending a team of advisers to Georgia. In NORLAG, the approach of the Crisis Response Pool experts has been to approach the host country's criminal justice system institutions – government, courts, prosecution service, prison system and probation service – at strategic level where policies and strategic decision making takes place, where they offer advice on strategic issues and how to implement reforms in practice. This top-down approach is complemented at the technical level where they offer awareness-raising and training to practitioners.<sup>62</sup>

The primary focus of the Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisers to Georgia (NORLAG) was to improve knowledge of new laws within the Georgian criminal justice system, encourage the development of appropriate mindsets, and help their Georgian counterparts to develop appropriate practices. To that end, NORLAG contributed in the formulation of the strategic plan for Georgia's criminal justice system in 2005. Other noted impacts include its contributions to making the Georgian penal system more humane, for

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<sup>62</sup> Scanteam, *Review of The Norwegian Mission of Rule of Law Advisers to Georgia (NORLAG) and The Norwegian Mission of Rule of Law Advisers to Moldova (NORLAM)*, Oslo, June 2009, p. 3.

example by ensuring that convicts have a right to perform meaningful activities while in jail, and widening the use and application of community-service sentencing. NORLAG has also sought to improve the fairness and efficiency of trials.<sup>63</sup>

#### **4.5 Democratic Republic of Congo**

Norway's programmatic funding in development aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is predominantly humanitarian. Secondments, the other form of Norwegian assistance, have fulfilled various roles in human rights monitoring, rule of law and SSR. The main focus areas are fight against sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), support of victims of SGBV and demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, including children.

Norway seconded several civilian observers to MONUSCO's Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs) and the Stabilization Support Unit, as well as a military secondment to a strategic-level position on SSR. Norway is moreover engaged in justice sector reform and the fight against impunity, focusing especially on building capacity to process cases of SGBV. Hence, in 2010 Norway supported the UNDP STAREC stabilization program to help victims of sexual violence with NOK 11.7 million.

Norway's engagement with SSR in DRC is composed of several elements. First it consists of a military secondment to a strategic-level position at MONUC on SSR. Following the visit of the Norwegian defence minister to DRC in January 2009, Norway responded to a United Nations request for personnel to support SSR efforts on the ground by funding from the summer of 2009 a Norwegian military officer in the position of Deputy Coordinator of the SSR Unit at MONUC (subsequently renamed United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or MONUSCO in July 2010). The position has so far been filled by two Air Force colonels, each deployed for a one year period, with a third deploying in the summer of 2011. The MONUSCO SSR unit (renamed the Security Sector Development or SSD Unit in September 2010) occupies a strategic position in the mission, which enables it to acquire a central overview of the various defence, police and justice sector reform initiatives, including measures against sexual and gender-based violence. DPKO's SSD Unit reports positively of this contribution, and the MFA has in turn benefited, gaining from experience and information about the mission, relations with Congolese authorities, and the situation in DRC in general. Despite its central position, the MONUSCO SSD Unit's coordinating potential has been hampered by several major challenges, not least the lack of political will among the national authorities and the absence of an inter-ministerial steering committee, resulting in very limited progress in SSD and a predominance of uncoordinated bilateral approaches and assistance programmes.

Second, Norway currently seconded several civilian observers, a specialist in sexual violence, a field coordinator, and an expert in witness protection to the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission in DRC. Norway is currently

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<sup>63</sup> Scanteam, *NORLAG and NORLAM Review*, p. 1.

providing funding for three civilian observers deployed through NORDEM (the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights) to MONUSCO's Joint Monitoring Teams (JMT), two in the field and one as liaison officer in Goma. The JMT are small teams consisting of two UN police and two and civilian human rights officers from MONUSCO. The JMT were originally created as an initiative of the Swedish Foreign Ministry to contribute to stabilization in the eastern Congo, in particular the restoration of state control and authority in conflict-affected areas previously held by armed factions. The JMTs were established to observe, guide and monitor the newly formed national police units of the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC), and also the judiciary and administrative authority to ensure their conduct is in line with international and national human rights norms and standards, and to serve as a liaison between national authorities and MONUC. Deployment of JMTs are considered important steps towards improving relations between police, local communities and armed groups, as well as strengthening efforts to combat human rights violations and SGBV. Although the implementation of the JMT mandate faced considerable challenges and obstacles in its first year, where the JMTs did succeed in being operational, they are credited with having an effect on the behaviour of the national police.<sup>64</sup> The civilian observers have contributed significantly to the JMTs, and there is mutual benefit to having police and civilian personnel working together. The JMT moreover is the only existing civilian monitoring mechanism linking the international community to state presence in the field.<sup>65</sup> Between February 2009 and June 2011, Norway has funded 3-4 civilian experts at a time, 10 in total, most with a strong human rights or observer background, who were recruited and deployed through the NORDEM, in some cases in cooperation with AFDEM, NRC and MONUSCO to the JMT in MONUC.<sup>66</sup> The JMT, unlike the Joint Protection Teams (JPT), are deployed permanently. The 12 positions of civilian observers in the JMTs have so far been funded by Sweden and Norway through secondment agreements, but the UN is currently considering how to integrate the positions in their own structure.

Via NORDEM, Norway also seconded a field coordinator to MONUSCO's Stabilization Support Unit in Goma, eastern Congo, which aims to strengthen governmental structures, in particular the police and judicial system, in areas where the state has been weak or non-existent. Another secondment to the same function in Bukavu is secured and the deployment is expected within a couple of months. NORDEM also seconded a Sexual Violence Coordination Officer, who assists national authorities in coordinating activities under the national strategy for combating sexual violence. This includes activities within the field of SSR. And from 30 May 2011, NORDEM has also seconded an expert in witness protection to the MONUSCO and OHCHR Joint Human Rights Office in Kinshasa, who will provide protection to witnesses in cases of crimes against humanity in coordination with national authorities and NGOs.

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<sup>64</sup> Jens Samuelsson Schjörlien and Hannes Berts, *Review of civilian observer component of the MONUC Joint Monitoring Teams in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo*, STHLM Policy Group, April 2010, para. 36.

<sup>65</sup> *Review civilian observer component MONUC*, para 46.

<sup>66</sup> Cedric de Coning, Walter Lotze and Mikkel Frøseg Pedersen, *Scoping Study. Norwegian Standby Roster for Civilian Observers (NOROBS): The Role and Position of NOROBS in the Context of Norway's Contribution to Civilian Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding*, NUPI Report (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), p. 44, n65.

Third, Norway is also engaged in justice sector reform and the fight against impunity, focusing on building the skills and capacities required to process cases of sexual violence. It does this by supporting the government of DRC's stabilization plan, the Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des conflits armés (STAREC). Norwegian support to STAREC is channelled through UNDP, and is earmarked 'sexual violence, which constitutes one of the main pillars of the programme. In 2010, Norwegian support to STAREC amounted to some 11.7 million NOK. Norway also provides funding for the American Bar Association's programmes to promote access to justice, and funds a Norwegian researcher at PRIO and consultant to the International Criminal Court, Morten Bergsmo, who has been invited by the DRC's Minister of Justice to identify areas for reform in the justice sector, particularly in terms of specialised training of judges.

Norway is thus engaged in a variety of statebuilding projects in DRC and supports protection of civilians and especially the fight against SGBV. Norway's support to SSR in DRC concentrates on the seconding of several military and civilian experts to positions that support stabilization and SSR efforts. The secondment of consecutive Norwegian military officers to the position of Deputy Coordinator in the MONUSCO SSD Unit provides an excellent vantage point for understanding the national needs for army, police and justice reform, the interplay of contributions from international actors, and the gaps in SSR donor assistance. Nevertheless, Norway's SSR engagement remains somewhat piecemeal although Norway's assistance to DRC is provided in line with the overall Congolese and international strategy for stabilization and statebuilding. At the current time there is little indication that Norway will strengthen its engagement in DRC in any or all of the core pillars of armed forces, police or justice sectors.

#### **4.6 Liberia**

Liberia is currently the largest single receiver of Norwegian bilateral assistance in West Africa, with efforts being focused on energy cooperation, rebuilding infrastructure, and reforming the security sector. As of June 2011, eleven Norwegian police officers are seconded to UNMIL. They work in various police units with their Liberian counterparts in Liberia National Police (LNP), and some teach at the Monrovia Police Academy. Norway has financed the construction of protection centers for women and children, attached to ten regional police stations, as well as one at the Women and Children Protection Unit (WACPU) Headquarters in Monrovia. In addition Norway has funded rehabilitation and expansion of the Police Academy buildings in Monrovia.

Following a devastating 14-year civil war which ended in 2003, Liberia remains a fragile country that struggles to deal with the legacies of the displacement of over one million people, destruction of the infrastructure, and high rates of SGBV and other violent crimes. In post-conflict societies, there is typically a marked increase in gender-based violence, and Liberia is no exception. The high level of violence against girls and women is exacerbated by lack of capacity of the formal judicial system to administer justice, and low levels of access to the formal justice system especially in rural areas. Customary law compensation often goes to the family of the

victim rather than to the victim herself, and stigmatization, ostracism and rejection of victims of SGBV by their families and communities are common.

Norway's support to SSR programmes in Liberia demonstrates flexibility and sensitivity to local context and needs. However, despite good intentions, some projects, in the early stages after the war, were introduced with little planning or assessment and produced some unintended consequences. Nevertheless, adjustments were made, indicating the ability to learn from experience.

Liberia was by 2009 the largest single recipient of Norwegian bilateral assistance in West Africa.<sup>67</sup> Total funding in 2009 was NOK 106.8 million and by 2010 had reached NOK 179 million. One of the main areas of commitment is stabilization of peace and the improvement of public safety. To that end Norway has contributed in several reinforcing ways to strengthening the Liberian National Police, particularly in its efforts to deal with the widespread problem of SGBV. Between 2008-2010, UNDP police projects received NOK 10.2 million.

Upon meeting with Norway's Minister of International Development, the newly inaugurated President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 requested Norwegian assistance in peacebuilding. One of the areas of need was indicated by the high rates of SGBV; Liberia has high rates of intimate partner violence and many cases of abused women and children, and Liberian authorities have acknowledged their inability to respond to this adequately. Norway has responded with capacity building, training and infrastructure. First, with UNDP as executing agent, Norway has supported the creation of eleven Women and Children's Protection Units (WACPU), ten county Police Headquarters with WACPU, and one WACPU attached to the LNP Headquarters in Monrovia. The WACPU are reception centres for abused women and children. Due to the lack of police station facilities, victims were previously often interviewed while the alleged perpetrator was in the same room. In addition to training the LNP on how to manage reported cases of rape and SGBV, Norway's provision of infrastructure in the form of the WACPU has helped to improve how women and children victims of abuse and violence are treated by the police.

One of the lessons learned with this project, however, was that if one going to create a new unit within the police, one must take into consideration how it can be established without interfering with the existing police authority structure. Creating wholly new and well-equipped WACPU must be done in harmony with existing police station structures. If not, it could be counter-productive. For example, the WACPU, which constitutes a division within the Criminal Investigation department, was physically as large, and sometimes larger than the rest of the police station, and both WACPU and the police headquarters received the same number and quality of equipment. This means that the WACPU was privileged in comparison to the rest of the police station. Donors instructed the police chief how to use the WACPU and did not allow him to make changes to it. This conditional assistance caused frustration by not allowing the police chief to fully exercise his

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<sup>67</sup> NORAD, *Annual Report on Norwegian Bilateral Development Cooperation 2009* (Oslo: NORAD for Norwegian MFA, 2009), p. 48.



authority with regard to the WACPU. The donors imposed these conditions in order to prevent misuse of the WACPU facility, but in practice an unintended consequence of the conditional assistance was to undermine the authority of the police chief.

Another problem encountered was poor planning and lack of assessments in terms of equipping the WACPU and the police stations. The equipment provided was mismatched to the actual needs and conditions in the country. In a country with almost no electricity or running water, it was not practical or useful to provide computers, advanced forensic equipment or even water-closets that functioned on the basis of electrically-driven wells. A planning assessment could have prevented this type of mistake and waste of resources.

With the emphasis on increasing female recruitment to the police, there was a need for more appropriate infrastructure at the Police Academy, including separate toilets, dormitories, etc. Norway built and upgraded infrastructure like classrooms and dormitories for the Liberian National Police Academy and Police Headquarters in Monrovia.

Norway has also provided funding for the restructuring and training of the Liberian National Police, including in the managing of reported rapes and SGBV. Up to eleven Norwegian police officers serve in UNMIL to act as advisers and to cooperate with their Liberian counterparts. Recently UNMIL with Norwegian participation has provided advice and assistance in the development of the LNP strategic plan.

Norway further supports the UN's Joint Programme for combating SGBV. It also funds the Norwegian Refugee Council's collaboration with the ministries for Women/Gender Issues and Development and the Ministry of Justice. This includes training of police recruits through role play at the Police Academy.

Norway further funds various projects tackling SGBV implemented by the Norwegian Refugee Council. These projects aim to fill gaps that exist between actors involved in tackling GBV, such as by raising awareness and community capacity to refer cases of GBV to the appropriate actors. They also train police officers in appropriate responses to SGBV and encourage coordinated responses with other actors, and train judges, prosecutors and defence counsel on medical implications of sexual assault.

Responding to a request by the SRSG, the UNDP Monrovia and Liberia's National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), Norway has also contributed to a rehabilitation and reintegration programme for the final batch of former combatants, implemented by UNDP and NCDDRR. Ex-combatants and other war affected persons received counselling, treatment for trauma and vocational guidance. Small amounts of start-up funding were also made available. As the programme has not been evaluated yet, it is unclear how successful the programme has been.

Finally, Norway supports efforts to facilitate access to justice and resolve land disputes for Liberia's many returnees. Around one million people were

displaced by the 1989-2003 civil war in Liberia. While most refugees and internally displaced people have now returned, many returnees face unresolved problems reclaiming their land and property. These unresolved land disputes are a cause of intra- and inter-communal tensions and violence, and prevent returnees from rebuilding their livelihoods. Through the Norwegian Refugee Council's ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance) programme, Norway supports efforts to resolve land conflicts. ICLA seeks to facilitate land dispute resolution within the prevailing legal and administrative framework, builds the capacity of individuals, communities and institutions to resolve land dispute. The ICLA programme is conducted in close co-operation with Liberia's Land Commission, both at national and local level, and received around NOK 28 million over the period 2008-2010.

#### **4.7 Somalia**

Capacity and institution building in the security and justice sectors have been key focus areas for Norwegian assistance to Somalia. Norway helps to strengthen the rule of law by supporting the development of police, courts and prisons. Because of the piracy issue, harbour security also has become an area of cooperation. Norway contributes substantially to the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) program, which includes training of civilian police officers.

Somalia is widely considered a 'failed state'. Although the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is internationally recognised as Somalia's legitimate government, it is weak and has not been able exercise control over substantial parts of the territory of the country. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has further contributed to the deterioration of the security situation. Of several smaller political entities controlling areas of territory, Somaliland in the north-west is one of the most stable regions in Somalia. It has embarked on building basic state institutions and seeks independence but has not been recognised internationally as a sovereign state. In the north-east, Puntland is weaker and also seeks to build state institutions, yet accepts the TFG.

Norway seeks to support stability in the Horn of Africa region. Most directly its interests in Somalia relate to international maritime shipping, which is affected by piracy, and Somali refugee flows, with an increasingly large diaspora present in Norway.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two-thirds of Norway's funding is dedicated to humanitarian assistance. Norwegian development assistance to Somalia has stood at around 250 million NOK each year since 2007. Of this, at least 45 million NOK is allocated for Somaliland and Puntland.<sup>68</sup> Norwegian assistance to Somalia has focused on four key areas: peace and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, vocational training and education, and institution-building/capacity-building (including SSR).

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<sup>68</sup> Exact numbers are hard to provide as humanitarian support is not earmarked, but humanitarian organizations as UNICEF estimates that approximately 50 percent is directed at the northern areas of Somalia

Norway has contributed towards SSR through several means. Norway helps to strengthen the rule of law by supporting the development of police, courts and prisons, including support for a central prison for long-term prisoners in Somaliland. NORAD has also contributed to the development of Somaliland's Berbera Harbour port security systems and upgrading to international maritime standards through a Norwegian private security consultancy company.

In 2010 Norway allocated 12.4 million NOK to the Somali security sector through the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) project, which includes a training program for police officers. The project has trained and certified some 4500 civilian police officers, who are then mainly based in Mogadishu. Training is conducted with support from UNPOS and AMISOM. The police officers do not receive their salary from the local authorities, but receive a donor-funded stipend from UNDP which is supposed to function as a salary. While the end goal is to make the Somali government take sole responsibility for paying its police officers, it is unclear when this transfer of responsibility will occur. The payment of stipends has been a controversial issue, and in July 2008, the European Commission and DFID withdrew authorization for payment to the police as a result of allegations of human rights abuses<sup>69</sup> and the local authorities' lack of capacity to follow up on this.

Evaluations undertaken by Human Rights Watch in 2008<sup>70</sup> and Adam Smith International<sup>71</sup> in 2009 have been very critical, with the latter stating that 'funding and spending are difficult to track. Donor money may be averted from the original objective' and 'the programme as a whole can only be considered to have delivered partially against its stated outcomes'. The Norwegian government is not unaware of the risks. According to a strategy paper for Norwegian assistance to Somalia, assistance in Somalia is warned to be a high-risk project that could fail to accomplish its objectives.<sup>72</sup>

SSR in the Somali context is a complex matter. Norway is simultaneously supporting SSR initiatives involving the central state and the self-declared independent territory Somaliland. Norway also supports counter-piracy efforts off the Somali coast. What is known about the ROLS project and concerns raised above suggests that without having adequate controls and follow up, the outcome cannot be predicted. Lacking sustainability, or a means for the Somali authorities to take over the payment of trained police salaries, it may, in the worst case, inadvertently result in unpaid trained police resorting to criminality or piracy. There is also a need to deal with the issue of non-UNDP certified police officers, who do not qualify for receiving stipends in the first place. Developing a strategy for engagement in SSR and peacebuilding in Somalia, based on a sound assessment, could help to clarify Norway's strategic objectives and develop more coherence in how it chooses to engage. There are obvious challenges to conduct adequate

<sup>69</sup> Rob Crilly, 'British taxpayer funds Somali police force for regime accused of war crimes', *The Times* (London), 2 June 2008, available at: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4046164.ece>

<sup>70</sup> Human Rights Watch. 'So Much to Fear': *War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia*, 2008.

<sup>71</sup> Adam Smith International, *Evaluation of the UNDP Strategic Partnership for Somalia*, 2009.

<sup>72</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Somalia. Strategi for Norsk bistand', Notat, 24.09.2010.

evaluations as access for foreign experts inside Somalia are fraught with security risks. However, if Norway wishes to support SSR in such a sensitive region, ongoing monitoring and evaluation are essential if one is to avoid potentially counterproductive results of assistance to SSR.

#### **4.8 Sudan and South Sudan**

Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and capacity building in South Sudan have constituted the main pillars of Norwegian engagement in Sudan and the new state of South Sudan. Norway provided NOK 65 million for UNDP's Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) programme in 2009-2010, and provides support to the justice sector through several UNDP programs and through the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Norway is a substantial contributor to police reform, predominantly in South Sudan. Several Norwegian police officers are currently seconded to UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan), and a trilateral police-training program is undertaken with South Africa as the implementing actor.

Since the 2005 CPA, Norway has played a prominent role in providing broad-ranging political and economic support to the parties to facilitate its implementation. It has also been providing humanitarian assistance. Sudan was in 2010 the third largest recipient of Norwegian development aid, receiving 732 million NOK in bilateral assistance, and this strong commitment is expected to continue. Most Norwegian contributions in terms of long-term assistance are channelled through Multi Donor Trust Funds, which are vehicles that seek to harmonise donors and improve the effectiveness of international aid, with a strong emphasis on national ownership. Norway is a member of the Joint Donor Office (JDO), established since 2006 in Juba, which seeks to coordinate development assistance between major donors, also including the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Canada. Over 50 percent of Norway's development assistance is channelled through multilateral organizations, including UN agencies, particularly UNDP, as well as UNICEF and UNHCR, the ICRC and World Bank. Norwegian NGOs are also major channels of Norway's development assistance, accounting for 30 percent in 2009 and 20 percent in 2010.

The main thematic areas of focus for Norwegian aid in 2010 were peacebuilding and democratic development, capacity building for all of Sudan and state-building for the South in particular, basic social services, and humanitarian assistance. Norway has supported a number of programmes for local peacebuilding, democratic institutions, and for security and justice, including police training. While security sector reform has not been a main priority for Norway in Sudan since 2005, it has been involved in a number of important initiatives, and the sheer volume of Norwegian development assistance to Sudan means that its contributions even to a non-priority area such as SSR have not been insignificant. There have been indications from the government that Norwegian support to what will become the new state of South Sudan will focus increasingly on SSR as a core dimension of state-building.

For several years Norway has been supporting a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for both North- and South-Sudan. This programme is nationally-led, but UNDP functions as Norway's partner and manages the reintegration dimension. In 2010 Norway provided 15 million NOK for DDR in Sudan, and provided a further 1.4 million NOK for gender technical assistance to the Southern Sudan DDR Commission. The UNDP DDR programme experienced significant problems, and at the prompting of major donors, a new DDR strategy has been developed. This programme is likely to undergo changes with the dividing of the state and upon a review of the programme.

Norway provides considerable funding for UNDP's Community Security & Arms Control (CSAC) Programme in Eastern Sudan, South Sudan and North Sudan. It has also supported UNDP's Governance and Rule of Law Programme with NOK 35 million in 2009-2010.

Norway has to date supported several SSR initiatives focused on capacity building of what is to become the new state of South Sudan, primarily in police reform.

Norway contributes to police reform in South Sudan through UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan) with 9 police officers deployed there, involved in training, community policing coordination, and protection of vulnerable groups. The number will increase until 2012 when South Sudan is declared an independent state.

Norway provided support to the South Sudan Police Service (SPSS) for 'training of trainers' preceding the April 2010 elections and the referendum in January 2011. This training was conducted in close collaboration with UNMIS Police. It should also be noted that Norway was able to respond quickly to urgent calls for funding to feed SPSS officers who were responsible for providing security in the run-up to the referendum. As the police were not being fed, some had already begun to return home due to the lack of food.

Norway has also financed strategic seminars for the top management of the SSPS. Conducted in close collaboration with UNMIS Police, these seminars resulted in the preparation of SPSS' strategic long-term plan.

Norway has also contributed to the building of infrastructure at the Dr. John Garang Unified Police Training Centre at Rejaf. Specifically this has included the building of dormitories for women.

Another police reform project is a police training programme for the police in North and South Sudan as well as in Darfur. This is a bilateral Norwegian project agreed jointly with South Africa in 2009. Norway's Embassy in Pretoria allocated 45 million NOK to the South African police for them to help build a functioning and democratic police in Sudan through police training. The South African Police Service (SAPS) is responsible for actual training, with around 30 percent of programme resources to be implemented in the North/Darfur and 70 percent in South Sudan. This programme has reportedly encountered major challenges which has resulted in a one year delay in implementation since the signing of the contract in 2009. UNMIS

has the overall mandate for police reform in South Sudan, but South African police coordination with UNMIS on the training component has been lacking. Due to the lack of progress, the Norwegian Police Directorate was asked by the MFA to monitor the project. POD now provides technical assistance in the form of personnel who travel regularly to Juba to follow up on the project. The program still faces challenges but has conducted three training sessions and developed an updated revolving training schedule for the rest of the programme period.

As noted above, Norway is considering increasing its contributions to SSR in Southern Sudan and has already supported numerous police training and reform initiatives. In view of being already involved with the SPSS, Norway should consider continuing to engage with police reform while exploring other potential areas of engagement. With careful planning, monitoring and coordination with local actor, problems such as those encountered in the cooperative project with South Africa can be mitigated in future. It should also consider continuing gaps in donor assistance to state-building and SSR Southern Sudan, such as oversight and accountability systems for both the SPSS and the SPLA, or development of the formal justice sector.

#### **4.9 Afghanistan**

Norway pledged 750 million NOK in combined humanitarian and development aid to Afghanistan for each year from 2008-2012. Development aid is focused on three sectors: good governance with particular emphasis on strengthening the police and justice sector; education; and livelihood. Humanitarian assistance includes health, mine clearance, refugees and human rights. Additionally, Norway has undertaken to intensify its commitment to UNSC 1325 (2000) in Afghanistan, in recognition of women's rights as a crosscutting priority in all Norwegian development activities in Afghanistan.

In 2009, some 32 percent of Norwegian assistance to Afghanistan was channelled through the World Bank multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Through ARTF Norway supported the National Justice Programme, which sought to improve the capacity of the Supreme Court, the courts of law, the prosecuting authority and the justice ministry.<sup>73</sup> In 2010 Norway committed to contribute a total of NOK 900 million to the ARTF over three years, including NOK 285 million for 2010 and 2011 and NOK 330 million for 2012. ARTF funding is not earmarked for specific projects, programmes or geographical areas. Norway also supports the UN-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) with NOK 85.1 million in 2009-2010, and the disarmament and disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG) with NOK 17 million.

According to the Parliamentary Report Number 9 (2007-8), Afghanistan is one of the priority countries in which Norway contributes to SSR, primarily through the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).<sup>74</sup> This contribution is linked explicitly to its participation in the NATO-led International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) through the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) that advises an Afghan brigade in

<sup>73</sup> NORAD, 'Afghanistan 2009', available at [www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no)

<sup>74</sup> *Stortingsmelding nr 9 (2007-8)*, Boks 4.13 'Sikkerhetssektorreform'.

Mazar-e-Sharif and the OMLT Kandak based in Faryab province. Gradually the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab has also become more intimately involved in capacity building with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). PRTs are part of ISAF's concept of operations, and their mission is 'to assist the Government of Afghanistan to extend its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment...and enable security sector reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.'<sup>75</sup> SSR has also been viewed by Norwegian officials as an essential means of 'Afghanization': assisting the Afghan government 'to build up its own police, courts, prosecutors, defence ministries and other public institutions in this area' and ensuring that 'all security forces should be subject to democratic civilian control.'<sup>76</sup>

According to the comprehensive 'strategy' for Faryab, the Norwegian military presence would gradually shift more and more to a mentoring, partnering and supporting role as the Afghan National Security Forces take over responsibility for security. As Afghan capacity increases, the Norwegian mentoring role will increase to both Afghan army and police units.<sup>77</sup> Recognising that the police and justice sectors were lagging behind building up of the armed forces, Norway also agreed to put in place a police mentoring team at provincial and district level for the Afghan National Police in Faryab. This mentoring team includes both civilian police advisers and military police. Norway also has had prison advisers based in Faryab, providing advice on prison construction and reform. Norway also has provided funds to build a new prison in the provincial capital Meymaneh.

The Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan has two components. The military component is responsible for providing security and facilitating development and reconstruction. It is also increasingly involved in partnering and training of the ANA. The civilian component generally consists of several elements, including development (through four NGOs, including Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Refugee Council); police officers who engage with the Afghan National Police and strengthen it through training, mentoring, and mapping equipment and resource needs; prison officers (2 corrections officers, who monitor the rule of law, including safety and human rights of prisoners, completed their mission in early 2011); and civilian advisers who monitor and collect information and report on the political and development situation (currently 3 individuals: one civilian coordinator, a development aid coordinator and a political adviser, who together constitute the Embassy office in Meymaneh). The military component of the PRT is under ISAF command, while civilians are under a different chain of command, whether EUPOL or national command. In practice, the coordination between military and civilian components was reported to be problematic.

Norway currently has 500 military deployed to ISAF and several dozen civilians, including the police advisers in Meymaneh, including 23 police

<sup>75</sup> PRT Mission Statement as cited in 'Norwegian led PRT in Faryab', Norwegian Embassy in Afghanistan website.

<sup>76</sup> Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen and Knut Storberget, 'Å afghanisere Afghanistan', Article by Former Minister of Defence Strøm-Erichsen and Justice Minister Storberget, 18 June 2007. Available at: <http://www.regjeringen.no>

<sup>77</sup> Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Police, 'A strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan', May 2009.

advisers, 7 in Kabul and 16 in Meymaneh, Faryab.<sup>78</sup> Norway will continue providing troops to the PRT at least until 2012, placing an increasing emphasis on training, mentoring and partnering with Afghan security forces to enable the overall transfer of security responsibility to them. Currently the military component is concentrating on enabling the Afghan National Security Forces to handle the security situation in Faryab, focusing on the Afghan National Army, 1st brigade, 209<sup>th</sup> Corps. Norway's special forces have also done mentoring and training of a special police unit in Kabul, which is now seen as one of the best units in the Afghan security forces. This training was done without the participation of the Norwegian police. The main focus of Norway's contribution to police reform is providing advice, training and expertise to building up the police in Faryab province via the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). From this year, Norway's police contributions are expected to be increasingly concentrated geographically in Faryab.

Norway contributes police officers in both bilateral and multilateral settings, across three different organizations: the UN Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA); the EU Police in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A); and the bilateral police project Norway-Afghanistan (NORAF). In an effort to avoid excessive fragmentation of the police contribution, Norway has attempted to concentrate more of its police reform assistance efforts in Faryab, where the majority are now located.

One reportedly successful element of NORAF Kabul has been the assignment of two police officers to the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), a department under the Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan (CNPA). CJTF consists of detectives, district attorneys and judges who work on investigations for major drug cases from all over the country. Within the formal Afghan justice system, counter-narcotics has its own 'chain of justice', with dedicated courts and a prison (for custody only). The CJTF are assessed to have achieved a high level of expertise and good quality police work. A number of cases have been successfully investigated, prosecuted and ended with convictions. The CJTF is viewed as a possible model for other specialised areas of investigation, such as the new anti-corruption unit. Counter-narcotics assistance is led by the UK. Norway's police contribution to the CJTF was perceived by some respondents as a niche bilateral contribution where Norway has been able to offer specific expertise in a context that has resulted in real impact. Norway also gains from such cooperation, as its police learn more about the heroin trade in the region and how it is transported to the West. (Norway also contributed two judges and two legal experts from the Attorney General's office to act as mentors on counter-narcotics justice processes to Afghan counterparts. See below).

Another important project under the bilateral NORAF Kabul is the 'Female Project', a Norwegian initiative that began in 2008 involving three police officers who provide professional support and coaching to the female general of police who has responsibility for gender, human rights and child abuse. The project also provides support to Afghan policewomen through a Safety Awareness Course (SAC), which trains female police officers in self-

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<sup>78</sup> Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre's address to the Storting on the situation in Afghanistan and Norway's civilian and military engagement', 26 April 2011, available at: <http://www.regjeringen.no>



defence. The project also provides strategic counselling to female police officers on professional interaction with male colleagues and leadership skills. This project has been viewed with interest by international observers and key donors are looking to establish similar projects.

Norway's contribution to UNAMA consists of a police officer as police adviser. The police adviser works as adviser to the SRSG regarding police matters, and with him takes part in the Senior Police Adviser Group (SPAG) in Kabul, where strategic decisions concerning the police are taken.

Norway's contribution to EUPOL in Kabul consists of an officer located at the EU HQ who works with gender and human rights, responsible for training and education in the Ministry of Interior. This training is aimed at management, and is provided at the Afghan Police Academy in Kabul, among other places.

Norway maintains police contributions in Meymaneh, Faryab province, currently 4 for the bilateral NORAF projects and 11 for multilateral deployment with EUPOL-A. The NORAF project in Faryab involves Norwegian police working with Norwegian military police in a Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (POMLT). Together the Norwegian police and military police conduct training and mentoring in Afghan police stations and police checkpoints. It is worth noting that the Norwegian civilian police recognise that because of the few numbers of police brought in by the international community to conduct police reform, they need assistance from the military to be able to move around the province for security reasons. However, they are uncomfortable with military police sharing responsibility for training what is supposed to be a civilian Afghan police. They are also concerned that the local community does not perceive a difference between the military and police contingents within the PRT. While the Norwegian military police received some police training, and some of the military police have worked as police officers in Norway, all of the military police were recruited by the military for Afghanistan. Those Norwegian civilian police consequently feel it is important not to be part of the military, but to maintain a distinct professional police team identity within the PRT.

EUPOL has a City Police Justice Programme (CPJP) based in Kabul, but which has been extended to the four largest cities in Afghanistan. One of these cities is Mazar-e-Sharif. Since the Norwegian-led PRT is based in Faryab, Norway wanted the police officers seconded to EUPOL to stay in Meymaneh at the PRT camp. Thus the police officers do police training in Meymaneh. In Meymaneh the Norwegian police provide training for the local police in firearms, investigation, forensics, human rights, self-defence, and driving lessons. There is also an initiative to start a CPJP in Meymaneh, which would enable the Norwegian police officers seconded to EUPOL to concentrate their efforts in Meymaneh.

Norway has also engaged in limited interventions in justice sector reform in Afghanistan. From September 2005 until 2008 Norway deployed several legal and justice sector advisers from the Stykebrønnen (Rule of Law Pool of Experts) to Afghanistan. Four (two prosecutors and two judges, and after a year a defence attorney) were based in Kabul, engaged as mentors for the

Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), with a special emphasis on counter-narcotics prosecution service and court. In 2007 a separate project was established with two representatives from the Norwegian Prison Service who were based in Meymaneh, responsible for mapping, mentoring and assisting the development of prison quality and respect for human rights in the prisons of the province. The Kabul-based part of the Rule of Law Pool mission ended in late 2008, and only the prison advisers in Meymaneh stayed on until January 2011. Although the Kabul Rule of Law Pool mission had apparently started well, response from the Embassy was varying, and increasingly negative. The team appeared to become increasingly detached from Norwegian priorities in Afghan development assistance.<sup>79</sup> Other reasons were also cited, including six-month deployments which were too short to establish trusting relationships with counterparts, and the criticism that focusing on counter-narcotics courts could legitimate the extensive corruption in this field. However the main reason appears to be that the mission started to pursue a strategy of engagement on justice reform that was independently arrived at yet which had wider implications for Norwegian foreign policy. An appraisal conducted by NORAD and published in 2010 counselled against the establishment of a follow-on Rule of Law Pool mission in Faryab due to an unclear concept for how such a programme would operate in practice, concerns about the qualifications of staff (specifically expertise on Afghan and Islamic judicial issues), and the need to ensure the security of its personnel, which links such a programme directly to the future of the Norwegian-led PRT.<sup>80</sup>

Although a Norwegian police contingent and members of the Norwegian Rule of Law Pool of Advisers were both working to support the CJTF, there was no formal cooperation between these elements. In view of the close relationship between police investigation and the prosecution's handling of drug cases at the CJTF, close cooperation could and should have been developed among the respective groups of Norwegian advisers.

The preceding discussion confirms that Afghanistan has been a large engagement for Norway. However, its engagement has been criticised as being 'supply-driven' (from the Norwegian side) rather than demand-driven (derived from an Afghan needs assessment). Also it has been described by one respondent as based on a 'political decision' rather than on the usual assessment and planning procedures. The lack of planning was generally seen as a major cause of problems. The failure to do proper assessments as a basis for Norwegian involvement was, according to one observer in the development community, a result of the desire for Norway's development assistance funds to equal its military expenditures in Afghanistan. Most of the money has been channelled through the World Bank administered ARTF trust fund and UNDP administered LOTFA trust fund. One issue is whether the money has been handled properly by the trust funds. The other issue is whether the outcome on the ground is a good one and the intended outcome.

The 'political' nature of Norway's engagement in Afghanistan also has had implications for the process of providing assistance. In development cooperation, it is usually the MFA with its embassies and NORAD that

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<sup>79</sup> NORAD, Appraisal of Extended Rule of Law Project in Faryab, Afghanistan, NORAD Report 19/2010 Discussion (October 2010), p. 8.

<sup>80</sup> NORAD, 'Appraisal of Extended Rule of Law Project', pp. 20-21.

handle the funds and operational interventions. However Afghanistan constitutes a special case where other ministries, in particular the Ministry of Defence, have played a prominent role (although not on administering development funds). While the Norwegian Embassies on the ground has overall responsibility for coordinating development aid efforts, as is the case generally, in Afghanistan, the main difference being that in Afghanistan development engagement has been closely linked to the overall political agenda for the engagement.

Although Norwegian officials have framed the country's engagement in Afghanistan as supporting SSR among other objectives, it is important to note that several people whom we interviewed disagreed that Norway has been engaging in SSR in Afghanistan, or were sceptical whether Norway's efforts constituted SSR, insofar as SSR adopts a holistic perspective which requires understanding the interdependencies between the different elements. Based on that understanding of SSR, one can better understand why several respondents maintained that Norway is not yet engaged in SSR in Afghanistan, and that SSR is not yet part of the coalition strategy for engagement. While there is reconstruction, this is conducted largely by the military, and moreover without the concern for long-term sustainability that SSR implies.

Norway's engagement in Afghanistan has also seen a more conscious attempt to coordinate efforts among relevant actors. On the initiative of then State Secretary for Defence, Espen Barth Eide, the Afghanistan Forum was established. This is a regular meeting at both the political (state secretary) level and at bureaucratic (ministry) level that brings together all ministries engaged in Afghanistan, in the interest of developing a more coordinated and integrated national approach.<sup>81</sup> This mechanism has focused ongoing attention on Afghanistan across government, and provides guidance and coordination at the strategic level (although not necessarily at operational level on the ground). And in 2009 Norway developed a document that established a minimum common platform for civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, where the Norwegian-led PRT is located. The PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab province, consists of a military and civilian component, although the civilian component is part of the embassy in Kabul. It does not implement development projects of its own; funds are channelled via the World Bank, UN and NGOs according to programmes reflecting Afghan national priorities and the recommendations of the PRT.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen, *Norway's Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engagement with Afghanistan*, NUPI, Security in Practice 8 (2009), 25-26.

<sup>82</sup> 'Norwegian led PRT in Faryab'.

## 5. Key Findings and Recommendations

### 5.1 Key Findings

Engaging with SSR constitutes an important instrument for furthering some of Norway's key foreign policy objectives and national values, in particular its support of peacebuilding, good governance, democratization and the rule of law in countries emerging from authoritarian rule or conflict. It is also a means of reinforcing the message that Norway is a good ally, able and willing to contribute in terms of defence diplomacy and supporting the development of effective, legitimate and accountable security and justice sectors in partner states.

While it has proven challenging to determine overall levels of funding provided by Norway towards SSR, figures drawn from functional sectors and data from country programmes suggest that **Norway is in the group of primary donors supporting SSR.**

Norway supports diverse SSR projects in various countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis, but this **engagement often appears to be in 'bits and pieces' as a consequence of the decentralized and rather fragmented nature of project development, funding and implementation of SSR assistance** by Norway.

Although several brief passages regarding SSR have appeared in various policy statements and documents, **there is no overall strategic policy framework for Norway's engagement with SSR.** There has also been **little planning guidance for SSR programming with one significant exception: the joint MFA-MOD SSR strategy devised for the Western Balkans 2010-2014.** Other guidance documents have been much more limited in scope, including a 2006 guide was issued for DSSR in Serbia, and a 'strategy' (common platform) for civilian and military elements of the PRT in Faryab. The Western Balkans joint MFA-MOD joint strategy a strategy document, but is limited to two ministries and applies only to the military and defence dimension.

In consequence of the absence of broad policy guidance, SSR projects have tended to be initiated, developed and implemented within each functional sector – i.e. within and by the defence, policing, and justice sectors, with the MFA's country desk officers and embassy officials supporting projects directly through funding and in theory keeping a broad overview of engagement. **SSR engagement tends to be segmented, with lack of coordination among components, and the absence of a more holistic understanding of where these projects fit within the broader SSR processes within those countries.**

Generally, in the development of a donor's bilateral SSR programming, each relevant government department has a distinct perspective, logic and objectives, which may make interdepartmental coordination challenging. The relatively small numbers of individuals involved working on SSR-

related issues in government ministries in Oslo and on Norwegian-funded projects in the field is recognized as facilitating informal communication and information-sharing between personnel in different departments. Although being a small country has its virtues in a smaller administration and policy elite who are more likely to know one another, this does not, however, fully compensate for the **lack of systematic interdepartmental coordination or development of joint approaches in defence, policing and justice sector assistance to SSR in recipient countries**, which could enhance coherence and effectiveness of assistance.

There also appeared to be a lack of awareness that SSR entailed both operational effectiveness and accountable governance of security and justice systems. While individuals appeared very knowledgeable about reforms in their particular sector, some also appeared to lack understanding of whether the activities in which they were engaged constituted SSR.

**Developing a strategic policy framework could help further a common understanding of the broad goals of SSR, the interconnectedness of the security and justice systems, and foster a more coherent approach across the various Norwegian governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the many aspects of supporting SSR processes.**

One important feature of the current Norwegian approach is the high degree of flexibility foreign policy actors (ministry and embassy officials) enjoy concerning which SSR projects to support. **The ability to react quickly and with financial flexibility is widely agreed to be a distinct advantage for Norway.**

**Norway's comparative advantages include its international profile as a consistently generous donor** as indicated by the significant size of its development assistance budget and proven commitment to maintaining a consistently high level of ODA; **its international image as an honest broker** and not having an overt agenda attached to its assistance, or a colonial history with its negative associations in countries and regions in which it provides assistance, as well as its role in international conflict mediation; **and its nimbleness, or the flexibility of its funding and its capacity to react quickly to changing requirements.**

Norway has shown **commitment to multilateralism**, by prioritizing support of the development of UN and regional organizations' capacities in SSR, and by participating in multidonor trust funds and multilateral SSR projects.

**In terms of bilateral assistance, Norway appears best able to apply its resources and advantages in contexts where major powers are not dominant and do not have strong interests.** It frequently appeared that the provision of bilateral Norwegian SSR assistance was more effective in country contexts or on topics where such openings existed, and provided more visibility for Norway.

Certain Norwegian actors we interviewed also voiced a preference for engaging in SSR assistance in contexts commensurate with Norway's size; large countries were perceived as offering less chance of achieving the desired impact. While the possibility of a joint SSR initiative with a like-

minded donor(s) has been mooted in some contexts, to date cooperation with Nordic/other donor countries in providing country-specific SSR assistance has been very limited.

Some specific capacities that Norway offers include expertise in defence management and civilian control, developing strong community-police relations, expertise and practical experience in gender mainstreaming, the capacity to address several inter-related components of judicial reform through team deployments of national experts, well crafted reintegration programmes, and facilitating access to justice and legal empowerment for the displaced and other marginalised or vulnerable populations.

The use of Norwegian civil servants and uniformed police and military to deliver mentoring and training in functional areas of defence, intelligence, policing and justice also confers an advantage. While certain donors have turned increasingly towards the use of private contractors, consultancy companies and non-governmental organizations for the delivery of such assistance, and while outsourcing offers extra flexibility to donors, it remains common to hear a preference among recipient countries for their security and justice sector personnel to be trained and mentored by their counterparts in donor countries. **Retaining military-to-military assistance and police-to-police assistance also avoids the depoliticization of SSR assistance that tends to occur with outsourcing.**

Norway also gains from having its civil servants and security personnel participating in security sector reform initiatives. **International experience exposes Norwegian personnel to new perspectives and experiences, and brings them into contact with local counterparts who may later prove to be useful contacts for Norway.**

**In places where Norway has provided significant support to SSR, it has often had an important impact on the development of more effective and well governed security and justice institutions through locally-owned and sustainable processes of institutional and human capacity building.** For example, experiences in Serbian police reform, Bosnian intelligence reform, reintegration programmes in Bosnia and Serbia, and Montenegrin defence management development, and justice sector reform in Georgia and Moldova **involved careful attention to close consultation and development of projects in cooperation with local partners, sound planning, effective implementation, and usually some form of monitoring or assessment.**

Even in contexts where Norway has not specifically prioritized SSR, as in Sudan and Southern Sudan to date, Norway has been an important and influential actor. This is **due in part to the high levels of development assistance it provides generally; Norway often carries weight in SSR in effect even if not by specific intent.**

Norwegian contributions to defence-related SSR (DSSR) have benefitted from the dual funding streams available to it according to whether activities are ODA-eligible or not. The ability to provide direct military training and assistance to another state's military can be vitally important to an SSR process. Norway also has good experience in building capacity, training, and

facilitating reform of police in post-authoritarian and post-conflict environments. Compared to defence and policing, Norway has been less active in contributing to justice sector reform; the deployment of a team from Rule of Law Pool of Advisers to Georgia and Moldova was judged very successful, while in Afghanistan it was seen to have mixed results. Although Norway has had limited engagement in assisting intelligence reform through SSR processes, its experience in Bosnia through a NUPI-administered programme is considered to have been very successful, and it also contributes to parliamentary capacity building in Kosovo and the Western Balkans on intelligence and security issues.

On the non-governmental level, efforts by the Norwegian Refugee Council to facilitate land dispute resolution and access to justice, whether formal or customary, are important yet not widely recognized as contributions to justice components of SSR.

In bilateral assistance projects, we heard of several cases of careful dialogue with local actors, needs assessment, good planning and effective implementation. This was not always the case, however, and it emerged that **there is a need for better assessments and planning of SSR projects. Monitoring and evaluation of major or long-running projects supporting SSR should also be conducted.**

**The Styrkebrønnen is a unique Norwegian instrument for contributing to SSR which embodies a number of strengths. Justice nevertheless remains something of a weak link in Norwegian SSR support.** Despite the recognition of interdependence or a 'chain of justice' linking the policing and justice sectors and SSR's emphasis on a holistic approach in which both sectors are engaged, Norway's efforts to date have remained largely segmented, with strong emphasis on assisting police reform, a lesser emphasis on the justice sector, and almost no joint or coordinated assistance linking policing and justice initiatives.

Norway has a strong commitment to multilateral engagement. However, we heard of several cases in which international organizations running large SSR programmes supported by Norway have failed to observe good practice in terms of adequate needs assessment and/or flawed implementation of projects. UNDP programmes in Liberia and Somalia were mentioned in this regard. Given the emphasis that Norway places on providing assistance through multilateral channels, further consideration should be given to **ensuring that Norway exercises due diligence when deciding whether to fund large multilateral programmes, initiating its own needs assessments and monitoring when these appear inadequately prepared by the implementing organization**, and what remedial measures Norway as a major donor can take if it becomes apparent that a large multilateral project is encountering serious difficulty.

**Generally we find that there is a lack of follow up and evaluation of the results of SSR activities. This is an important responsibility for Norway and other donors engaged in SSR because of the serious consequences of flawed or failed support to security and justice system reform for citizens, for the legitimacy of the state, and often in terms of regional stability.**

## 5.2 Recommendations

### **Recommendation 1: Develop a more coherent and coordinated Norwegian approach to SSR**

- Norway should consider developing a strategic policy framework for its engagement in security sector reform. This should be informed by further study of Norwegian experiences, resources and lessons learned in SSR, and set out broad objectives and mechanisms for coordination.
- The development of a joint MFA-MOD strategy for SSR support to the Western Balkans is a positive development in which common objectives were identified, enhancing effectiveness of engagement. Another positive development was the creation of the DSSR unit in NDUC. Further institutionalization of coordination mechanisms is suggested.
- Norway could consider focusing on niche capacities – i.e. what it is really good at and what it can sustain for extended periods. This study has suggested while there is a high level of expertise and capacity across the security and justice sectors, Norway could focus particularly on training and mentoring by defence and police personnel, including the Coast Guard; Styrkebrønnen (the pool of deployable experts on the chain of justice); the focus on women's equality and gender sensitivity.
- The capacity to respond quickly to opportunities with flexible funding constitutes a distinct advantage for Norway. However the development of a more coordinated approach is also recommended in view of the current decentralization. More thinking is needed about how to retain a good margin of flexibility whilst also enhancing coordination and coherence of Norway's support to SSR processes.
- Due to its very strong support for and international identification with the gender policy issue in SSR and other related peacebuilding areas, Norway should consider developing a more active and direct role in shaping developments in gender and SSR at both the conceptual and practical levels. This could entail, for example, involving Norwegian professional security sector practitioners in reviewing and assessing the tools, policy guides and training materials being produced with its funding, which is a continuing lacuna in current approaches.
- Norway has multiple civilian expert rosters on which it draws to second individuals to the UN and other multilateral agencies for crisis management operations as well as bilaterally in support of post-conflict peacebuilding tasks. As these rosters are frequently used in the context of Norwegian support to SSR, it would be useful at this point for Norway to assess how rosters and secondment practices contribute to the achievement of Norwegian policy



objectives, the impact of secondments on local reform processes, and costs and benefits to Norway of seconding experts compared to other types of engagement, such as developing local capacity in recipient countries. There is also the question of what strategic vision governs Norway's use of civilian expert rosters, and whether the fielding of civilian capabilities can be done in a way that is more strategic and coherent rather than reactive and ad hoc. If reliance on rosters and deploying experts is maintained, more attention should be paid to how the experience and insights gained by seconded personnel can be fed back into the policy cycle and used to inform and improve planning processes.

**Recommendation 2: Develop greater knowledge and raise awareness about SSR across government and among the Norwegian public**

- Various actors, including those in the development community, appear to lack basic knowledge about SSR. We perceive a need for greater cross-government sensitization about SSR; what it is, what is the value-added of an SSR perspective; and how it can be undertaken on a practical level.
- Norwegians already involved in SSR training or mentoring or deployed abroad on SSR-related missions or projects are also not always adequately informed about what SSR is, or how their specific efforts relate to the broader picture. There is a need to identify those who would benefit from SSR training, and to provide it to them before they begin their deployment.
- There is also a need to share the respective insights and experiences of the various actors in supporting SSR in a more systematized way, and in this way contribute to a more coherent and coordinated Norwegian approach as outlined in Recommendation 1.

**Recommendation 3: Improve project planning and conduct more assessments, monitoring and evaluations**

- There is a need for more planning, monitoring and assessment, and evaluation of SSR to be conducted in Norway. This will make it easier for Norwegians deployed abroad to work on SSR to tap into knowledge and insights, and should result in stronger, more effective support to SSR.
- Norway should seek to adopt an evidence-based approach to SSR policy which would entail developing policy frameworks from assessments, monitoring and evaluation, and research findings.
- Norway also should think more about how to better connect research, policy and practice of SSR. Norway should build up stronger institutional links among relevant departments and organizations, and identify a forum for exchange and discussion on

SSR and other inter-disciplinary, multidimensional peacebuilding activities that it supports.

- Norway has an interest in publishing the results of research and evaluations of SSR projects that it supports. This can feed information back into Norwegian and international project development and programming.
- Norway could consider the creation of a cross-governmental unit, working group, or an ‘integrated hub’ on SSR that focuses on ensuring mutual understanding between relevant departments and a more coherent and coordinated approach to SSR assistance. Such a unit would help to ensure that political goals underlying SSR assistance as articulated by the MFA are operationalized in specific functional sectors (MOD, MOJ, POD). This could also include a role for Norwegian research institutes and NGOs that contribute to Norwegian assistance to SSR.
- The administrative infrastructures for Norwegian governmental departments engaging in SSR projects in general tend to be under-resourced. In order to properly oversee projects and to evaluate the achievements of completed projects Norway should discuss how to resolve problems with understaffing and corresponding limited capacity to oversee SSR projects.
- Police training must be useful and tailored to the conditions and capacities of the local police. There should also be more attention to following up training through monitoring and checking to see whether those trained are actually implementing what they learned in practice and in the field. We recommend more focus on assessing the outcome of training and on follow-up.
- We identify a need for more follow-up in Norway of police, military, security and civilian experts who have returned home from international deployments in SSR contexts. International experience enriches personnel and strengthens Norwegian capacities when those individuals return. But there does not appear to be a strong system of debriefing returning personnel, i.e., of systematically compiling the knowledge and experience of returnees in any of the sectors we surveyed. Knowledge-sharing, when it occurs, is often initiated by individuals themselves (e.g. an individual returning from being deployed abroad may offer to hold a briefing seminar for colleagues). The knowledge, insights and experiences of Norwegians who have worked abroad on SSR projects should be collected more systematically, analysed, and fed back into policy processes.
- As Norway is likely to become increasingly involved in SSR in Africa, it will be necessary to conduct effective fact-finding missions. This will require sending a multi-disciplinary team.

Documentation of methods and lessons learned, insights and experiences in implementing SSR programmes or projects.

- Although Norway has a strong commitment to maintaining a high level of ODA and is in a stronger position than many other donors in the current financial environment, this does not obviate the need to ensure that money is effectively spent and that projects have the desired impact. Norway already has a strong culture of evaluation of assistance projects, but value-for-money auditing is not as strong. Norway should consider developing greater competence on determining whether money used for specific SSR activities is being well used. This would entail part of a general strengthening of evaluation, monitoring and assessment of SSR projects.

#### **Recommendation 4: Enhance international coordination on SSR**

- A proactively holistic approach also extends to cooperation with partners. Norway has shown itself willing on the ground to respond to efforts to coordinate among donors, for example. However rather than being reactive, Norway could take a more proactive and systemic approach towards coordination. This was seen in Bosnia and Serbia, for example, when as lead nation on a key reintegration programme Norway took on an informal coordinating role among the donors. But in other contexts Norway has been less proactive and has responded to requests by other donors to increase coordination of efforts. Emphasizing a more holistic approach to SSR domestically may well have this effect on Norway's interactions with partners, where it takes the initiative for coordination rather reacting to others' requests for it.
- As an example of initiating enhanced international coordination in DSSR and as suggested by one respondent, Norway could propose the establishment of a clearinghouse role within NATO in which member states can inform their allies about what they are doing to support SSR and where this is taking place. The clearinghouse mechanism could also be used to communicate horizontally to actors such as UNDP.
- As Norway becomes more engaged in African SSR, it may have to do things differently on a practical level compared to how it operated in the Western Balkans. For example, police and defence reform projects in Serbia typically involved personnel travelling regularly to Serbia for short periods. But in African contexts such as Southern Sudan, Norway will likely need to have more people on the ground to better understand the local context, and will likely need highly competent African personnel with relevant experience integrated with the Norwegian team. A model to consider might be that practiced by countries such as the UK, with seconded African experts as members of their SSR team.

- There is growing acknowledgement in the international SSR community of the potential for South-South mentoring and assistance. That is, in many instances countries that have already and recently undergone transitions and reforms of their security sector may serve as better mentors and advisers than those from mature Western democracies, with their long traditions of democratic politics and developed economies. Supporting a South-South model for SSR assistance could be relevant, for example, for Norwegian engagement in countries with Islamic law and customary justice systems, and should be the subject of an assessment.

### **Recommendation 5: Further develop Norway's approaches towards justice sector reform**

- The justice sector is a vital component of SSR. However there is an apparent tendency to focus on police reform in Norwegian SSR efforts without also paying a similar level of attention to the justice sector. Norway should endeavour to focus on all components of the security and justice system more comprehensively, and promote greater cooperation between those working on justice and police sectors reform projects within the same country.
- Norway should also conduct a thorough assessment of how it can best contribute to justice sector reform, specifically examining Styrkebrønnen (Rule of Law Pool of Experts) model of extended bilateral team deployments of senior justice sector experts to address the 'chain of justice' in a holistic, integrated manner. This is a unique model of donor assistance which has functioned very well under the appropriate circumstances. However in more challenging environments the Rule of Law Pool model has encountered problems. It is worth examining how the problems with this unique model for justice sector assistance can be addressed and resolved.

### **Recommendation 6: Develop framework for deciding when and how to outsource SSR assistance and develop more robust evaluations for outsourced SSR assistance.**

- Another issue for consideration in developing Norway's approach to SSR is the practice of using Norwegian NGOs as major channels for development aid. There is a strong pattern of reliance on Norwegian or other Nordic-based NGOs as channels for assistance. This is not problematic when those NGOs are the best qualified to conduct the work in that particular context. In the SSR field, Norway should hire the best organization for the job, without making nationality of the organization the primary consideration. It should thus consider merit-based factors such as the track record of NGOs, local experience, and relevant substantive expertise.
- International implementing partners such as IMG and DCAF, which have received substantial Norwegian funding for SSR projects, should be subject to the same standards of monitoring, evaluation

and transparency that are required of Norwegian governmental and non-governmental actors. We recommend impartial and independent external evaluations of several of the major projects these organizations have implemented with Norwegian funding.

- Norway, which is a major contributor to UNDP generally, should also consider requiring impartial and independent evaluations of UNDP's Rule of Law and SSR-related programmes. Although these programmes have not been a particular focus of this study, several respondents voiced concern about inadequate planning and assessments, inefficiencies, and accountability deficits in certain contexts. In addition to paying more attention to these elements when deciding whether to fund major UN programmes on SSR-related subjects, Norway should also consider initiating its own needs assessments, monitoring or evaluations when existing arrangements for programmes that it supports are deemed to be inadequate.

## List of Interviewees

### **Utenriksdepartementet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)**

Bjørn Andersen. Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Khartoum, Sudan.

Jannicke Bain. Senior Adviser, Western Balkans Section.

Haakon Blankenborg. Senior Advisor, Western Balkans Section

Thorvald Boye. Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire.

Kjell Harald Dalen. Senior Advisor, Africa II Section.

Torun Dramdal. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and North America.

Elisabeth Drøyer. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and North America.

Lornts Finanger. Senior Advisor. Section for South-Asia and Afghanistan.

Anne Kjersti Frøholm. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and North America.

Hilde R. Johansen. Senior Advisor. Africa I Section.

Hanne-Marie Kaarstad. Senior Advisor, Africa II Section.

Hilde Klemetsrud. Head of Project for Women, Peace and Security, Section for Global Initiatives and Gender Equality.

Rina Kristmoen. Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya.

Odd Berner Malme. Police Adviser/Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, New York.

Odd Magne Ruud. Assistant Director General/Head of Sudan-team, Africa II-section - Region around the Horn of Africa.

Eivind Vad Petersson. Consul, Political and Humanitarian Affairs  
Norwegian Consulate General in Juba, South Sudan.

### **NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation)**

Petter Bauch. Senior Advisor, Peace, Gender and Democracy Department.

Randi Lotsberg. Senior Advisor, Peace, Gender and Democracy Department.

Hanne Thonstad. Advisor, Department for Quality Assurance, Statistics Team.

**Forsvarsdepartementet / Militæret (Ministry of Defence / Armed Forces)**

Terje Haaverstad. Former Defence Attaché to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, 2006-2010.

Paal Zandstra Krokeide. Senior Advisor, Department of Security Policy.

Ingjerd Kroken. Senior Advisor, Department of Security Policy.

Sigurd Marstein. Senior Advisor, Section for Security Policy and International Operations.

Børre Rikardsen. Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel, Department of Security Policy.

Finn-Joachim Ruge, Senior Advisor, Department of Security Policy.

**Forsvarets stabsskole / NODEFIC (Norwegian Defence University College)**

Jakob Heradstveit. Senior Advisor DSSR. NODEFIC/ Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College.

Per Erik Rønning. Colonel. Former Deputy Security Sector Reform Coordinator, MONUC.

Atle Svendsen. Major. Program Manager DSSR, Norwegian Defence International Centre.

**Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)**

Guro Lien.

Tore Nyhamar. Project Leader, Conflict Analysis. Research Director, Challenges in Peace and Stabilization Operations.

**Justisdepartementet / Rettsvesenet (Ministry of Justice / Justice)**

Heidi Bottolfs. Senior Advisor, Section for European and International Affairs.

Torolv Groseth. Judge President. Eidsivating Court of Appeal. Former Head of Mission, Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisers to Afghanistan.

Hans Inge Jørstad. Rule of Law Officer, OSCE Office in Baku, Azerbaijan

Pål Meland. Senior Advisor, Ministry of Justice.

Sissel Irene Wilsgård. Senior Advisor.

**Politidirektoratet (POD) (The National Police Directorate of Norway)**

Ellen Ahnfelt. Project Manager/Senior Advisor, POD.

Steinar Aune. Assistant Chief of Police, International Section.

Henning Høgseth. Assistant Chief of Police, Head of International Section.

Iver Frigaard. Senior Advisor, International Section.

Tor Skottum. Assistant Chief of Police, International Section.

Ole Anton Utvær. Assistant Chief of Police, International Section.

**Politihøgskolen (The Norwegian Police University College)**

Dag Dahlen. Police Superintendent, International Section.

Tor Tanke Holm. Head of Post-Graduate Studies.

**Andre fra politiet (Others from the police)**

Gna Gudjónsdóttir. Police Superintendent, Iceland Police / Team Leader, Donor Aid Coordinating Team, UNMIL (United Mission In Liberia)

Tone Midttun. Chief of Police (retired), former Police Advisor in NORAF, Afghanistan.

**Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights - NORDEM**

Karin Lisa Kirkengen. Project Coordinator NORDEM, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo.

**NRC Flyktninghjelpen (Norwegian Refugee Council)**

Benedicte Givær. Director Emergency Response, Emergency Response Department.

Fernando de Medina-Rosales. ICLA Advisor, International Programme Department.

Jochen Peters. Project Manager, UN MSU Standby Team of Mediation Experts. Emergency Response Department.

**Norsk utenrikspolitisk Institutt - NUPI**

Helge Lurås, Advisor, Department of Security and Conflict Management.

**Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces - DCAF**

Daniel de Torres. Deputy Head, Special Programmes.

Mark Downes. Head of the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT).



Antje Fritz, Programme Manager, Security Sector Advisory Programme and Kosovo Programme, Operations Division Europe.

Bard Knudsen. Senior Fellow, Operations.

Darko Stankic. Assistant Director and Head of Operations.

Gregor Zore, Senior Diplomatic Advisor, Operations Division Europe.

**United Nations - UN**

Alejandro Alvarez. Adviser, Rule of Law, Justice & Security, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP, Geneva.

Dmitry Titov. Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO, New York.