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No. 426 May 1990

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**THE CHANGING EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENT**

Political Trends and Prospects

norsk
utenrikspolitisk
institutt



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norwegian institute of international affairs

ISSN 0800-0018

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Prepared for a conference on "NATO Crisis Management in a Changing Europe" sponsored by the RAND Corporation and the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, Hotel Palace, Brussels, April 2-3, 1990.



Norsk Utenrikspolitisk
Institutt
Reg. nr. 137

Summary

The paper analyses prospective changes in the European political order. It looks back from four alternative scenarios of 1999: Europe of the Balance of Power; Europe of Two Alliances; Europe of Regions; Community Europe. Following that sketch of alternative long-term futures the paper explores the short term perspective in terms of eight major trends. The long term futures and the short term trends are linked by a suggested typology of potential contingencies which could strain the carrying capacity of the security order in Europe. Finally, the paper outlines a set of requirements for crisis management in the future Europe.

E: International politics
Political systems
History
Future
Balance of power
NATO
Community

G: Europe
1: NATO
CSCE

ex. 2

THE CHANGING EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT - POLITICAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

1. A Time of Transition

The post-war order in Europe has come to an end. The contours of the new order are still vague and in the making. The 'old world' is in a process of transition. Military threats are disappearing. They are replaced by the risks which flow from uncertainty, from the embrace of the unpredictable. Empires in decline almost inevitably introduce incalculable dynamics in international relations. Social forces are set in motion which are not subject to diplomatic management and suasion. A new Zeitgeist is penetrating the political cultures of Europe. The process of recreating historical Europe, of relinking Central Europe with Western Europe has transformed the political agenda and outlooks in European capitals and societies. Managing peaceful change is replacing managing deterrence as the key security task confronting governments in Europe. The military factor has moved from the front to the back seat. Military attack has ceased to be viewed as a clear and present danger.

Periods of compressed and rapid change often obscure the permanent features of an international order, highlight novelty at the expense of continuity. Vital structures and linkages are ignored as fascinating and captivating change attracts attention and stirs imagination. As societies reclaim state institutions which had been used to suppress and exploit them rather than serve them, state policies inadvertently may collide in the international arena. The removal of barriers and obstacles within national polities, the very process of liberation and revolutionary change, could cause state policies to ignore the structural constraints and competing wills at work in the international arena. The challenges and opportunities for short-term change may obfuscate requirements for long term stability. Transformation could erode the

conditions for balance.

2. Future Scenarios

The future architecture of European security is hardly discernible although rhetoric and wishful thinking sometimes suggest instant fulfilment. The roads leading from the present platform of departure to possible destinations lack pavement and signs of direction. The states of Europe have embarked upon a journey towards a destination unknown. We cannot provide roadmaps, all we can do is to posit a spectrum of possible destinations on the basis of present trends. The trends are contradictory, often inchoate, and invariably uncertain and conjectural. They coexist and interact in the present situation. Any real future destination will constitute an amalgam of the multiplicity of trends at work. For heuristic purposes we shall posit the following set of alternative European futures, all of which could develop from the present trends, but in which the dominant trends vary. We are not attempting to predict the unpredictable but rather to explore the end points of alternative trajectories from the present period of departure. They would involve and pose different challenges to the management of security in future. We shall be looking back from the vantage point of 1999.

2.1 Scenario I: Europe of the Balance of Power

Our first destination is a Europe of the balance of power. The "permanent" alliances have been superseded by a system of shifting alliances designed to contain the hegemonic aspirations of other powers or to further their own. It is a system with a clear hierarchy of power and influence. A group of principal powers (Russia, Germany, Britain, France, Spain and Italy) constitute the key players while the smaller powers attempt to adjust to the changing fortunes of the game and are frequently mobilized into coalitions. Two structural problems strain the carrying capacity of the system, viz. Russian

military power and German economic might. The dialectic of their potential combination, or confrontation, causes recurring vibrations in the system at large. Furthermore, two existential conditions constrain and circumscribe the reconstruction of a balance of power system, a return to the "golden age" of cabinet diplomacy: (1) The democratization of modern European society causes society to intervene in the conduct of foreign affairs making it extremely difficult to conduct diplomacy according to the logic of raison d'état and the perceived imperatives of the balance of power. (2) The existence of nuclear weapons, furthermore, has profoundly altered the traditional equation between power and purpose. In a world of mutual deterrence nuclear weapons tend to command more dissuasive than suasive power, to promote objectives of denial rather than compellence. They tend to stabilize alignments, making them rigid rather than flexible. In the absence of a stable and fixed arrangement for the containment and denial of Russian military power, particularly nuclear weapon power, the reconstituted balance of power system stimulates nuclear proliferation among the major powers of the system, including Germany, Italy and Spain. Nuclear autarchy policies, tous azimuts strategies and shifting arrangements for extending deterrence protection to allies, harbour the seeds of likely catastrophe. It also appears to stimulate nuclear proliferation outside Europe.

The fragmentation of NATO into a traditional balance of power system broke the trend towards integration in the European Community causing it to regress into a free-trade association frequently strained by political and military rivalries.

2.2 Scenario II: Europe of Two Alliances

The second destination is a Europe of two alliances. It is essentially a security order based on a reconstitution of the recent past but in a modified form. The Warsaw Pact has been turned into a voluntary association, motivated by the fear of

a resurgent, united Germany. Polish reactions in 1990 to Bonn's equivocation on the Oder-Neisse border were followed in 1991 by similar Czech concerns in regard to the Sudetenland. Moscow, fearful of the feedback from a non-communist Eastern Europe on the centrifugal nationalist forces in the Soviet Union decided to toughen its stance without attempting to turn the clocks back to the Brezhnev doctrine. Germany is unified, but not on the basis of the amalgamation of East German Länder into the Federal Republic (The Article 23 route), but rather as a confederation between two sovereign states. The community of the German people (Gemeinschaft) is not constituted in a single society (Gesellschaft).

This system exhibits considerable stability at the international level. The sharp edges have been cut off the military confrontation by arms control arrangements with a preferential build-down of the capacities for surprise attack and sustained offensive action. The force levels have come down partly through mutual agreement on withdrawal, partly as a consequence of an agreement on a "no-real growth in defence budgets" regime which was reached in 1993. The CSCE functions as an annual European Assembly for security discussion, involving, primarily, a consideration of the annual reports of the Arms Control Verification Authority and the European Non-Proliferation Authority. The Soviet and American troop levels are below 100 000 men. The East-European states have concluded comprehensive cooperation agreements with the European Community and joined a large free trade area which is referred to as the European Economic Space (EES). The EC constitutes the economic and political engine in Europe.

This is the most "familiar" of our destinations. However, familiarity should not be confused with probability. The stability of the order may be more apparent than real, it is rooted in considerations of security and foreign policy rather than the aspirations of domestic society. Memories of the "Second Spring Time of Nations in Europe", the revolutions of

1989 and the dreams they engendered, continue to exercise pressure on state authority and policy in Europe. Desires to overcome political divisions and bridge gaps in economic and social developments cause recurring unrest in Eastern Europe, as do ethnic minorities striving for greater autonomy and identity, and the sometimes violent reactions of the dominant nations to communal strife. Nationalism constitutes a constant strain on the established order, particularly after the violent break-up of the Yugoslav federation in 1994.

2.3 Scenario III: Europe of Regions

Our third destination is the Europe of regions. It evolved out of the reconstruction which was set in motion by the revolutions of 1989 and the conflicts which arose from the process of German unification. France oscillated between the policies of embedding the united Germany in an integrated supranational European community and seeking containment through special restrictions on Germany and diplomatic coalitions with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Britain sought refuge in splendid isolation from entrapment in the affairs of the continent and a nostalgic return to the special relationship with the United States. Italy and Spain increasingly turned inward as a result of domestic political realignments and their security policies tended to become increasingly focused on the perceived long term challenges from demographic pressures, religious fundamentalism and socio-economic instability across the Mediterranean.

Hence we arrived in a Europe of sub-regional organizations and groupings. Germany leads a Middle Europe in rapid economic development. The Benelux-countries seek to protect their prosperity and urban cultures by continuing the integration of their economies which was aborted in the larger European Community in 1991 as the Western organizational structures disintegrated in a mutually reinforcing manner under the impact of the process of German unification and Soviet

insistence on a neutral Germany in the end. The Nordic Council has been deepened to include also foreign policy and defence. It is dominated by the Scandinavian peninsula countries of Sweden and Norway. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joined as associate members. The Soviet Union has been replaced by a Russian led federation of autonomous states which in Europe include the Ukraine, Byelorossiya, Georgia and Moldavia. France, Spain and Italy compete for leadership in a loose organization of Mediterranean littoral states. The Balkan states have formed a Balkan federation which is haunted by irredentism and ethnic conflict.

The regions interact and compete. The pressure for nuclear proliferation has been growing as some of the regional groupings have shown signs of emphasizing military prowess also in the conduct of their foreign economic relations. The United States has withdrawn its troops from Europe, retaining access only to some air-bases and certain fleet support and radar installations in Great Britain. Several arms races are feared to be imminent and a mood of doom, of waiting for the lights to go out in Europe, is spreading.

2.4 Scenario IV: Community Europe

Our fourth destination is "the hopeful one" of a Community Europe. It developed out of the European Community and its successful dialectic interplay of enlargement and deepening following the revolutions of 1989. The former GDR was absorbed into the Community in the course of 1991-92. Austria joined in 1992 and was followed by Norway and Sweden in 1993. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary concluded association agreements with the Community in 1991 and became full-fledged members in 1997. Finland became a member in 1996 and was joined by Iceland. Switzerland overwhelmingly turned down application for membership in a referendum in 1995. Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia concluded new forms of cooperation agreements with the Community in 1993. However, their economic development has

been hampered by communal conflict and ethnic strife. Increasingly membership in the European Community is viewed as the only viable alternative to a disruptive re-Balkanization of the Balkans.

The transnational challenges of environmental protection, the internationalization of economic operations (multinational companies, international banks, joint ventures, etc.) protection of human rights, technological development and the residual danger from nuclear weapons, all combine to weaken the institution of the nation state and to promote the constitution of community solutions and institutions. The territorial nation state is weakened also by devolution processes transferring power and authority to local communities and institutions. Borders seemed less relevant as the idea of the free movement of people, ideas, goods, and services was generally accepted. A pluralistic culture flourished and European society seemed to have gained strength and inspiration from the traditions of human care and solidarity which had been preserved and nurtured under the thin veneer of oppressive communism in Eastern Europe.

NATO remains as a framework for American engagement in the management of the security order in Europe. American troops are present only in symbolic numbers but they provide the backbone for intermittent exercises of bringing more troops back to Europe. Together with a system of depots with prepositioned heavy equipment they also provide the infrastructure for a reconstitution capability in the event that Russian military power should reemerge as a clear and present danger to peace in Europe. NATO maintains a command structure and a control and information system which is also designed to provide infrastructure for a reconstitution strategy. The former area of the GDR has the same status within the alliance as the Norwegian county of Finnmark, i.e. no allied troops are stationed there nor do allied exercises take place in the areas. Together with Poland, Czechoslovakia,

and Hungary the former GDR constitute a security zone in the European order where nuclear and chemical weapons are banned and where the stationing of foreign troops and their manoeuvres are prohibited. Nuclear weapon free zones have been established in the Nordic and Balkan areas.

In 1992 NATO and the Soviet Union agreed to abolish all short range land based nuclear capable missiles. Nuclear artillery depots were also dismantled in the area west of the Urals in accordance with the "Third Zero" agreement of 1991. The residual pre-strategic capability deployed in Europe is an air-borne capability. It is buttressed by an American capacity for AFAP (Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile) reinforcement of Europe in an emergency. Both Russia and NATO have embraced a concept of minimum deterrence and the START-IV agreement of 1998 brought the strategic arsenals of the two "superpowers" down to a level of 1500 warheads on single warhead missiles and a limited number of semi-modern bombers (B-1 and "Blackjack").

The CSCE has been converted from a negotiating forum to an all-European security institution. Cultural cooperation and Human Rights have been largely transferred from the CSCE to the Council of Europe and economic cooperation to the ECE (Economic Commission for Europe). The CSCE has established a General Conference of 35 participating states. In addition it has established an Arms Control Verification Authority; a Non-Proliferation Authority; a Security Information Authority which issues an annual report on the defence budgets, force structures, major R+D programs and weapon acquisitions, as well as an annual calendar of military activities of member countries; and a Peace-keeping Authority under whose auspices member countries have earmarked military units and cooperated in joint training and exercise programs in order to provide the General Conference with the means to dispatch CSCE peacekeeping forces to trouble spots in Europe. In spite of proposals from the Scandinavian- and Benelux-countries for

majority voting, CSCE decisions are still made by consensus.

2.5 The "real" Future

Our four scenarios do not involve prediction. They serve essentially heuristic purposes. They are rooted in present trends and reflect the broad range of possibilities inherent in those trends. We could, of course, have tried to pursue the trends through the nineties. However, as the trends are enormously uncertain and as the possible combinations so numerous it did not constitute a practical alternative. We should note that our long term scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The real future is likely to constitute a melange of these and other scenarios.

3. The Short-term Perspective

Having sketched a spectrum of possible long-term (1999) destinations we shall explore next some of the short-term decision points which may determine the general direction in which the European political order is likely to evolve. In an attempt to link the short and long-term scenarios we shall then suggest a typology of contingencies which could structure force planning and the development of strategic concepts in NATO in the years ahead.

The political order is developing with unprecedented speed and the development cannot be encompassed in surprise-free scenarios. Prediction has become highly contingent on uncertain assumptions about social forces, cultural climate, tolerance thresholds and statesmanship (or the lack of it). Many governments exhibit a stubborn adherence to a business-as-usual approach, a surprising reluctance to deviate from established agendas and priorities, a failure to sense historical winds of change, a preference for the familiar rather than willingness to seize opportunities; in short, a lack of vision and sense of history. The eloquent appeals for

a broad view and the recognition of historical moment which permeate the speeches of President Havel of Czechoslovakia have elicited few, if any, equally enlightened responses from the West. Most political leaders appear to have difficulties with "that vision thing", preferring its reduction to compartmentalized technical issues to be dealt with by experts and bureaucrats. Statecraft succumbs to technocracy.

Table 1 THE SHORT TERM ISSUES

- * The shape and time schedule for German unification.
- * The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) process of negotiation.
- * The scope and time schedule of Soviet military withdrawals from Eastern Europe.
- * The stability of Central European polities in a period of systemic transition.
- * The impact of nationalism, particularly in south-eastern Europe, on the stability of the European state system.
- * The future of the "inner empire" of the Soviet Union.
- * The institutional framework for European security.
- * The impact of the maritime competition on the security order in Europe.

The trends and policies at work are still wrapped in ambiguity and contradiction. Hence, we shall not attempt to map their complex interplay in any systematic manner, but attempt instead to posit a set of propositions concerning likely outcomes. It is recognized, of course, that our propositions may suffer from insufficient information, wishful thinking or prejudice. Nevertheless, they are formulated with a view to focusing discussion and empirical analysis.

3.1 The Course of German Unification

German unification has become a certainty, not a possible contingency. Nevertheless, some of the parameters remain uncertain and contentious. It will come about as a kind of Anschluss in reverse, as the minor partner insists on being absorbed by the major partner. Unification is driven as much by economic crisis in the East as by a sense of national restoration, by the desire for Deutschmark as much as by a commitment to the idea of Deutschland. It is the result of pressures from civic society rather than the diplomatic architecture of a latter day Bismarck. Society is moving state policy rather than state policy moving society. Unification is likely to take place as five reconstituted Länder of the eastern parts of Germany join the federation of the ten Länder of the Federal Republic in accordance with the constitution of the latter.

The problem then is to create a political framework capable of embedding Germany in a broader community and subjecting it to countervailing influences and community rules and constraints. The four former occupying powers will have to work out the removal of the vestiges of four power rule in Germany, laying the foundation for a series of agreements which would have to also formally settle the issue of Germany's borders with the interested countries. The most complex issue will be that of Germany's membership in the Western alliance.

Moscow has adopted the initial position of excluding a solution involving membership in NATO for a united Germany. Hence, a neutral Germany has been advanced as a solution. However, neutrality must be defined in relation to the parameters of a contest or conflict. What are the parameters in a post-cold war environment? Who should keep Germany neutral if it became a major military power, and who should prevent it from becoming a major military power? The spectre of Versailles looms on the horizon as a possible breeding

ground for German resentment and revisionism. A "neutral Germany" most likely would be the leading power of Middle-Europe. A strongly controlled Germany would struggle to remove the strictures. Hence, it would seem the more stabilizing solution to envisage East-Germany coming into NATO without NATO coming into East-Germany. The five Länder of the present GDR could establish a position similar to the county of Finnmark in Norway where there are no stationed troops nor any military exercises with allied participation. No formal treaty is required as it could be enunciated German policy as well as the announced policy of NATO. A unilateral Soviet declaration about her understanding of German and allied intentions could complete the political framework. It is possible also that such a declaratory regime of mutual reassurance could be embedded in a broader CSCE regime involving the establishment of a security corridor in Central Europe comprising the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the present GDR, and wherein would apply a set of arms control arrangements including a ban on exercises, movements or stationing of foreign troops as well as a prohibition of deployment and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central-Europe would be negotiated bilaterally. The security regime in Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact, as suggested, could be established by and embedded in the CSCE.

However, this peaceful unification scenario may collide with the competitive interests of the other great powers. Soviet insistence on German neutrality and on maintaining a substantial troop presence in Germany for an unspecified period, could cause the process of unification to grind to a halt and result in unsustainable levels of emigration from the GDR. Soviet troop presence in Germany could become a source of political friction, particularly in the context of Soviet suppression of secessionist movements in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union.

Should the "two plus four" negotiations about German unity fail to produce agreement, the repercussions could be extensive for the process of East-West negotiations in other spheres, including arms control. It could cause new barriers to be erected against economic cooperation across the old divisions in Europe, or the adoption by the Western states of sharply differentiated Eastern policies to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. It seems likely that Moscow in the end will accept a united Germany embedded in the Western institutions like NATO and the EC, recognising that such integration constitutes reassurance against Germany's trying to match or emphasize her economic power with commensurate military power. Soviet intransigence could become a real difficulty also for Soviet perestroika.

However, this optimistic outlook could be undermined by a hardening of the Soviet position in the wake of secession crises in the USSR. Moscow may decide to stand firm on confronting Germans with a choice between alignment and unification, or, alternatively with demands for such constraints on alignment (size of the Bundeswehr, level of stationed forces and withdrawal of nuclear weapons) that the de facto outcome would be the same. The real question then becomes the bargaining strength of the Russians and the processing of the dilemmas through the domestic political processes in the two Germanies. Moscow could attempt to manoeuvre into the position of holding the keys to Germany's future, a position which might also provide the future option of another Rapallo.

Any attempt to control a "neutral" Germany by the nuclear oligopoly of the four former occupying powers could stimulate a new German debate about military nuclear options. However, another trajectory is possible: The principle of nuclear non-proliferation in Europe could be reemphasized and amplified by the CSCE, possibly through the establishment of a non-proliferation authority. German strictures could be embedded

in a broader European regime and hence made more equal, thereby preempting the issues of singularity and discrimination.

A neutral Germany could stir fears of German Alleingang in West-European capitals which could break the momentum of European integration. The break-up of NATO, rather than stimulate compensatory deepening and broadening of the European Community, could easily produce a reinforcing trend of erosion and emphasis on national security insurance and anti-German alignments. A European fear of German Alleingang could also engender German frustrations about the limited scope for such Alleingang. In the event of a neutral Germany, Britain and France would be unlikely to abrogate sovereignty and the integration process in the Community could grind to a halt.

The greatest danger in the short run is the chance that suspicions of Germany will translate into self-fulfilling prophecies, that expressed mistrust of German propensities and policies will generate German estrangement and Alleingang. The Federal Republic and a united Germany of the 1990's would not be the German Reich of 1890's or the 1930's. The political culture is different, the national and international structures are different and the international environment is different. The process of integration in the European Community provides a viable framework for integrating Germany into a broader European economic and political order. An enlightened harmonization of developments in NATO and the CSCE could provide a viable framework for integrating Germany into a cooperative security order.

3.2 The CFE Process

The Vienna-based negotiations on conventional forces in Europe constitute a structuring element in the security process in Europe. They were designed originally to stabilize the

military "infrastructure " by seeking agreement on preferential reductions of those elements in the force postures which contribute to the capacity for surprise attack and sustained offensive action. They were predicated on the continued existence of the East-West military confrontation in Europe and sought to reduce the chance that the dynamics of that confrontation should escape political control in a crisis and resulting in a war which no-one wants. Stability replaced manpower reductions as CFE succeeded the stalemated MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) negotiations. It would be the result of a preferential reduction of tanks, artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, helicopters and fighter aircraft. Moscow remained concerned about troop levels, probably because of an economic need to reallocate scarce resources in favour of the civilian economy in order to contribute to the success of perestroika.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe happened on Europe's way to a CFE agreement and changed political perspectives and priorities. The military confrontation was effectively dismantled by social upheaval. Changes could no longer be related to a presumption of a forward Soviet presence in Central Europe. Such a presence would constitute more of a threat to the popular revolutions in Central Europe than to the territorial integrity of Western Europe. Consequently, the priorities changed in the direction of deep cuts in Soviet and, as a reciprocal, American stationed forces in the core area of reductions. Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations about Soviet troop presence in Central Europe at the request of the new governments in that area seemed likely to outrun even the high pace of the CFE negotiations. It seems unlikely that Soviet and American troops will be stabilized at a level of 195 000 men each in Central Europe. The bottom line is likely to be substantially lower.

The CFE negotiations apply to Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and, it is sometimes suggested, from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has consistently attempted to regionalize arms regulations in Europe by confining reductions and restrictions to specific zones wherein Soviet military preponderance would weigh heavily and which would tend to fragment the security system created by NATO. Other countries have been searching for regional differentiation in order to prevent the heartland power, the Soviet Union, from concentrating her forces in particular areas. The solution to this problem of political geometry is likely to be the NATO concept of a division of the area of reductions into four concentric areas around a core area made up of Central Europe, the Benelux countries and, possibly, Denmark. The complex CFE regime will be structured around a set of rules concerning collective ceilings, sufficiency, stationed forces, sub-ceilings and exchange of information. The concept of sufficiency is designed to provide insurance against military hegemony for any single power. No single state will be allowed to possess more than 30% of the collective holdings of any treaty limited item. Several technical issues must be resolved in relation to the counting rules, particularly the classification of aircraft, and the rules of access to controlled depots containing treaty limited items.

The CFE negotiations are confined to the two alliances in Europe. However, as the negotiations draw to a close, one of the alliances is on the verge of rapid fission. The concept of collective ceilings could come to collide with the changing political realities and constitute a remnant of a waning order providing the Soviet Union with a droit de regard with respect to the distribution of forces among East-European countries. The concepts of political and military stability diverged while the negotiations approached the end-game phase.

The political reconstruction proceeded with particular speed in relation to the unification of Germany. The solution which

will be found in the so-called "two plus four" negotiations will determine to a large extent the future rôle and fate of NATO as well as the role of Germany in the emerging order. Form could here assume considerable substantive importance. In the event that the participating powers in the "two plus four" negotiations should agree on limits on stationed forces in Germany, they could adopt a format which would avoid the agreements' forming an integral part of the constitutional status of Germany, but rather an understanding among the participating powers. The situation NATO may seek to avoid is one in which such limitations be viewed or construed as limitations on German sovereignty, a factor of singularity, which could provide a long term breeding ground for revisionist pressures inside Germany. Arms limitation agreements could be shaped in a multilateral context. If the "two plus four" negotiations were to be turned into arms control negotiations they could undermine any multilateral regime in addition to introducing long-term instability into the politics around German security policy.

NATO probably would seek to avoid being manoeuvred into a position where it is asked or forced to pay a price for Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Such withdrawals now seen first of all to be the likely outcome of bilateral negotiations within the Warsaw Pact. The major exception here is the Soviet forces in the present GDR, and their drawdown and withdrawal will be linked to the solution of the modalities for German unification. Any formal agreements could be embedded within a multilateral European framework in order to prevent it from becoming a long term point of friction between Germany and the Soviet Union only.

With regard to CFE-II negotiations it is difficult to envisage a format which is predicated on the continued existence of two equal and opposed alliances. Hence, their deployment in the multilateral framework of the 35 CSCE states would seem a likely outcome. Such a format could, however, reintroduce the

issue of regional disparities and decoupling. It is possible that CFE-II negotiations would shift its emphasis to measures of crises prevention and crisis "management". The real balance of military power in a post CFE-I Europe will be that between the Soviet Union and NATO.

3.3 The Scope and Time-Schedule for Soviet Military Withdrawals from Eastern Europe

Bilateral negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other are likely to lead to agreements about complete withdrawal with rapid implementation. The memories of Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 continue to linger in the national consciousness of the two Central European countries. Withdrawal constitutes a logical consequence of the choices made in the Kremlin in the course of the fall of 1989 to abandon the Brezhnev doctrine and adopt the Sinatra doctrine of letting them "do it their way" in terms of social and economic organization. In addition the security calculus had changed in Moscow as the marshals of the Great Patriotic War vanished from the scene. The new military leaders had had their outlooks shaped by the period of Soviet ascent to the status of a nuclear superpower. Security was no longer considered a function of a territorial buffer enabling the Soviet Union to defend against invasion outside the homeland or to mount a threat against her adversaries from forward positions. The territorial perspective had been altered by the reality of nuclear weapons, which, in combination with long range delivery systems, had blown the roofs off the territorial states. Security had become a product of the condition of interdependence created by nuclear weapons and constituted in a system of nuclear deterrence. Eastern Europe was no longer viewed as essential to Soviet national security. The "geopolitical realities" had changed in the eyes of Moscow. The "message" spread rapidly throughout Eastern Europe, the scope for national assertion had broadened.

The Soviet military presence in the GDR constituted a commitment sui generis. It did not prevent the popular revolution nor its insistent demand for unification now. The Soviet garrisons in the GDR were no longer viewed as the potential spearhead of a Soviet military offensive into Western Europe, but rather as a tangible stake-out of the Soviet claim for influence over the process of German unification. Bonn's equivocation over the issue of Poland's western frontier caused Warsaw to back-track on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. They were now viewed as constituting, in part, insurance against future German revisionist policies. In any event, the Soviet garrisons in the GDR would be unsustainable in the absence of a system of logistic support and transit arrangements in Poland.

Moscow made a choice concerning Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989 and that choice now seems basically irreversible. The Russians could not attempt to roll back the new political forms except at the expense of possibly quite extensive bloodshed and a major disruption of the cooperative trend in East-West relations. However, secessionist pressures in the Baltic republics could force Gorbachev to make concessions to the military who resent retreat from established positions, and toughen his stance in the bilateral talks on withdrawal. Moscow could come to emphasize the need to secure and maintain the infrastructure for a rapid reconstitution of forward deployments in Eastern Europe and the conduct of exercises to demonstrate the capability. The military arrangements could amount to a baseline for a possible future reimposition of imperial control.

3.4 The Stability of East-European Polities in a Period of Systemic Transition

The countries of Central Europe have entered a period of basic social and economic transformation, replacing one-party

communist autocracy with pluralist democracy, and command economies with market economies. Free elections have changed the political texture of the systems. However, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and the eastern part of Germany the democratic traditions are very thin. Furthermore, the institutional infrastructure - political parties, a network of voluntary associations which cut across the cleavages in society, and independent judiciaries, press and bureaucracies - cannot be created overnight. The new regimes to a large degree will depend on the civil service and executive apparatus of the ancien regimes. The opportunities for silent and stubborn obstruction and negligence of reforms abound.

The real challenge in Central Europe is a crisis of expectations. Democracy could be the loser as revolutionary enthusiasm erodes in an encounter with economic hardship. The basic economic restructuring on which they have embarked, of moving from command to market economies has never been undertaken before. The task is formidable as are the obstacles, not the least of which is that of debt, particularly in Poland and Hungary. Easing the burden could require new enlightened moves by the OECD countries, possibly involving a swap whereunder Poland and Hungary were paying back the debt in local currency invested in cleaning up a highly polluting industry. In any event the transition will be painful and the Schmerzgrenze remains uncertain.

It is possible to imagine "counter-revolutionary" reactions to the hardships of converting to democracy and a free-market. The social safety-net is inadequate and the populations may become estranged from the new system. The imposition of a new autocracy cannot be excluded, for instance by a take-over by the military. On the other hand the revolutions of 1989 demonstrated a considerable social resilience, the existence of a vibrant society beneath the thin veneer of a communist system with few if any roots in society. The social network

and basic human solidarity which developed in response to the oppression of the communist regimes could provide the wherewithal to persevere on a slow and arduous journey into the future. It is easy and dangerous to forget the spiritual resources which Central Europe will contribute to the European construction. In the words of President Vaclav Havel, the countries of Central Europe should be able to approach Western Europe "not as a poor dissident or a helpless, amnestied prisoner, but as someone who also brings something with him: namely spiritual and moral incentives, bold peace initiatives, untapped creative potential, the ethos of freshly gained freedom, and the inspiration for brave and swift solutions" (from his speech to the Polish Sejm on January 21, 1990). The changes in Poland and Hungary were not the result of spontaneous revolution but rather of long-term struggle, organizational build-up, and meticulous preparation creating viable structures for systemic reform.

3.5 The impact of Nationalism on the Stability of the European Order

The potential challenge to security in Europe could be in the process of shifting from large scale invasion across clearly defined borders to ethnic and communal strife, particularly in South-Eastern Europe. The ethnic mosaic of that part of Europe could create new tensions and bloodshed. However, such conflicts need not constitute a clear and present danger to peace and order at large. The passion and violence of such conflicts nevertheless introduce an element of uncertainty and unpredictability into the European order.

The idea of nationalism, the proposition that state borders should coincide with ethnic borders, has proved its potency as a mobilizing force in spite of its impossible imperative. History has not distributed the peoples of Europe in such neat congregations. The existing mosaic militates against the solution, as do considerations of economic viability. However,

in the past passions have not been easily contained and constrained by such logic. The systemic consequences of the break-up of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires have not been absorbed and contained by the state system in Europe. They were in some sense put into the deep freeze during the "Cold War". The present thaw causes them to reemerge and exert pressure on inter-state relations as well as on established state structures. Vestiges are coming to light of the old division between Western Christendom in the lands of the Habsburg Empire and those areas which developed under the wardship of the Orthodox Church and Ottoman domination. Yugoslavia straddles that division, and a tenuous federation could easily come apart at the seams and crumble.

The solidarity expressed in the revolutions of 1989 reflect countervailing trends to that of chauvinistic nationalism. They were patriotic upheavals, but patriotic assertion need not augur nationalist desertion. Recent communal violence between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, however, point to the delicacy of cohabitation. The distinctiveness of nations need not require separation and autonomy. It is to some degree a question of cultural identity and human rights, and the rights of minorities may have to be spelled out and codified in a parallel European convention to that on human rights. The congruence of ethnic cultures and their states may seem less compelling in an age when the state itself is losing its contours as it is outrun and undermined by transnational processes and challenges as well as pressures for devolution and decentralization inside the polity. These trends are in a very real sense the fruits of the advanced stage of that very industrialization which caused modern man to strive for a fusion of culture and polity into coinciding space.

3.6 The Future of the Soviet Union

The last of the European empires appears to have entered the phase of dissolution. How the process will unfold and how it

will end are questions wrapped in uncertainty and conjecture. The centrifugal forces of nationalism interact with the attempt at reforming Soviet society from the top. Economic perestroika requires political reconstruction involving a curtailment of the pervasive structures of party control and abolition of the monopoly position of the CPSU. Restructuring creates voids and tensions which in turn invite and incite nationalist forces.

Gorbachev is faced with irreducible dilemmas. If he were to slow down or halt the process of perestroika in order to contain and constrain nationalism in the union republics he runs the danger of moving back to the stagnation of the Brezhnev years. That in turn involves the prospect of taking the Soviet Union out of the league of major powers by the turn of the century and of eroding the legitimacy of the communist system due to its inability to deliver, that the regime could crumble like a paper tiger in confrontations with a restive society. The process of reform can break the forces of lethargy and resistance only by destabilizing the system in order to change it. It is a calculated risk which is magnified by the time it will take to turn the economy around. The absence of tangible results could undermine the legitimacy of the policy of perestroika in its confrontation with rising expectations. The Schmerzgrenze of the Soviet people is probably different from that of the people in the West. The Soviet culture and present realities have not nurtured the expectation of instant gratification. However, the absence of improvement and the reality of a deteriorating situation could create an explosive crisis of expectations. Gorbachev is not a popular figure inside the Soviet Union, except in certain sections of the intelligentsia who cherish the new glasnost' and intellectual freedom. Soviet citizens live not by bread alone, but they need bread to live.

Curtailing and reversing the arms race amount to an economic necessity in the context of perestroika. The scarce resources

of skilled manpower, engineers, managers, scientists and computers must be reallocated from the defence and space sectors of the economy to those engaged in civilian production. However, the rigidities are enormous, the scope for obstruction vast and the difficulties of conversion huge. Conversion has many faces, one of the more frightening ones is that of integrating demobilized military personnel into Soviet society, providing them with housing, schools, jobs and social security, particularly those who return from service in Eastern Europe. The military has been a privileged caste in Soviet society and their privileges are being removed as the institution is reduced. Russians are no longer looking to officer training as an attractive entrance to a career. The non-Russian nationalities are knocking at the gates of the officer schools in increasing numbers, with long term implications for the integrative functions of the Red Army following the relative demise of the CPSU.

The Soviet Union is a multi-national state encompassing more than 140 nationality groups. Again the notion that ethnic boundaries should coincide with state boundaries amounts to an unworkable organizational principle. The nations are distributed in a manner which makes such restructuring impossible. Nevertheless, the nationalist flames are likely to cause fire alarms, violent clashes and chauvinistic reactions in the years ahead. Empires in decline inevitably constitute factors of uncertainty in international relations. That uncertainty is compounded in the Soviet case by the fact that the Soviet Union is a nuclear weapon state with an arsenal of some 30 000 nuclear warheads dispersed in depots throughout the territory of the union, including areas of actual or potential strife and unrest. Here we must distinguish, of course, between the physical security of the special munition sites and the ability to use the nuclear munitions if unauthorized groups should get hold of them. However, desertion and violence would introduce disturbing uncertainties.

If Gorbachev were to give in to secessionist pressures he risks being swept aside by the forces of Great Russian nationalism and a communist Counter-Reformation. If he resorts to the use of force he risks being consumed by the forces of repression in addition to putting in jeopardy his policies of detente and arms control with the Western powers, thus undermining a precondition for perestroika. Finally, he is faced with a domino problem. Conceding secession to the Baltic states will kindle separatist forces in other republics more central to the viability of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If he should decide to let Lithuania leave the union he would have to exact a price which would constitute an effective deterrent to emulation elsewhere, particularly in the Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia or Moldavia. Aspirations for independence in the Baltic republics are clearly influenced and excited by the events in Eastern Europe. East-European countries will have strong incentives, therefore, to raise the threshold against a reimposition of Soviet tutelage by getting the troops out and integrating their economies with those of the West. Western banks may provide protection against Soviet tanks.

3.7 The Institutional Framework for European Security

Barring complete disintegration, the Soviet Union or Russia, will remain for foreseeable future the single dominant military power in Europe. It will remain a formidable nuclear weapon power. Such facts will shape and constrain the institutional framework for European security.

Institutional construction takes time, much more time than dismantling domestic institutions. In periods of compressed and extensive change expectations concerning international change may exceed the bounds of the possible. Europe has entered a period of transition which is likely to be characterized by interlocking and overlapping institutional

arrangements. We are concerned here primarily about institutions relating to security.

The European Community is the primary structuring institution in the present political order in Europe. It constitutes the principal point of reference and attraction for the new democracies of Central Europe striving to reenter the mainstream of European history. It is the pivotal institution also in the process of creating a European Economic Space comprising all the industrialized countries of Western Europe. It projects a community solution to the problems of human organization in the age of the trans-national challenges to the territorial nation-state. It could provide a framework for the integration of multi-nation states into a stable community order wherein the cultural identity and local autonomy of nations and regions could be preserved without breaking up existing territorial sovereignties. Spain provides an interesting example. For foreseeable future the Community is likely to remain primarily a political and economic organization without a defence component. The task of European reconstruction across the old East-West division would seem to be facilitated in the short term by this limitation on the competence and scope of the Community. In the hierarchy of present institutions the European Community is the most important to preserve and develop. It is indispensable for the construction of minimum order in Europe after the break-up of the cold war system.

Containment of Soviet military power, including nuclear power, will require continued American engagement. NATO is likely to remain as security insurance in order to maintain an American commitment to contain Soviet military power in Europe. NATO's continued existence and future functions relate to the balance of power in Europe and not to the future of the Warsaw Pact. The presumption of symmetry could produce dangerous instability and flux. The two alliances are not symmetrical constructions. NATO constitutes a voluntary association which

retains the support of Western societies, the Warsaw Pact is an imposed association which commands little social support in Eastern Europe. NATO covers the western rimland of the European continent linked to its major protector across the Atlantic. The Warsaw Pact constitutes a westward extension of the major heartland power on the Eurasian continent. A future balance would be a balance between the Soviet Union and NATO. That balance will remain a conditio sine qua non for stability in Europe and for the possible long term construction of a successor system of collective security.

Table 2 NATO's FUNCTIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

- * Provide a stable framework for American engagement in the process of European security;
- * Provide insurance against risks and dangers in a period of increased uncertainty and reduced predictability;
- * Provide insurance against a reconstitution of the Soviet threat and raise the threshold against such reconstitution;
- * Provide insurance against the reemergence of instabilities and tensions in Europe which could threaten the condition of peace;
- * Provide particular insurance for the flanks of Europe bordering directly on the Soviet Union, in the case of the northern flank, directly on Russia;
- * Provide a framework for German alignment without provoking fears of German dominance;
- * Provide implicit support to the countries of Eastern Europe and their policies of securing independence from the Soviet Union;
- * Provide a framework for nuclear security by removing incentives for nuclear proliferation.

It is far from certain, but still likely and we would argue, desirable, that NATO will survive the process of transformation in Europe, particularly in relation to the future of Germany. NATO, of course, is not an end in itself, but a means to an end, viz. security. An alliance linking the United States to an association of like-minded states in Europe will constitute a necessary condition for security to prevail on a continent which includes a major Russian military power. The alliance should be restructured in order to adjust to the waning of the massive threat in the center of Europe, and in order to provide for a different distribution of labour and influence between Europeans and Americans within the alliance.

The major challenge to NATO's future is the process of German unification. It is possible, of course, that in the absence of a visible military threat the German public could opt for neutrality or non-alignment in order to obtain unification if Moscow should insist on that equation. Alternatively, Moscow could insist on so many strictures on Germany's participation (demilitarization of the five eastern Länder, denuclearization, severe limitations on Bundeswehr and equal limitations on stationed forces) that German alignment would lack substantive content. It would be ironical indeed if the Western powers should permit a Soviet Union in decline to impose upon them such heavy costs of victory.

In order to prevent outcomes which could lead directly to our unstable long term scenarios of a "balance of power Europe" or a "Europe of regions" Americans should be aware of the dangers of viewing all changes in NATO as slippery slopes to be avoided, and Europeans of the dangers of converting pessimistic views of history into self-fulfilling prophecy. NATO is not coincidental with the present force structure, strategy or deployments. In most countries of NATO the American guarantee is not conditioned by the presence of a large number of American troops or large numbers of nuclear

weapons. The issue of alignment must be separated from the issues of military organization and disposition. For the Western powers to reduce their troops in the western part of Germany below CFE-I levels, the Soviet Union should take her troops out of East Germany. Geographical asymmetry should translate into asymmetric reductions. The Soviet Union should remove all her nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe, the residual balance should be between deployments in Western Europe and the Soviet Union west of the Urals, i.e. the ATTU (Atlantic-to the Urals) area.

It is unreasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will become the "victor" in the "two-plus-four" negotiations. The Soviet Union is not in a strong position. It needs to slow down the arms race, to concentrate on restructuring her economy, political system and union, and it needs cooperation with the West. Initial positions are not identical with bottom-line positions. East-Germany has paid to keep the 380 000 Soviet troops in the GDR and the united Germany would inherit that commitment for a transitional period. This will give the German government financial leverage over the timing of Soviet withdrawal. Arrangements which limit NATO dispositions in the eastern Länder of Germany do not amount to a weakening of the Western alliance or of Germany's commitment to NATO. It could constitute a contribution to a new arrangement for stability and security in Central Europe following a Soviet military withdrawal, an element in a system of mutual reassurance. The stability of the cold war system rested on a clarity of division and commitment. The lines were clearly drawn. It has been replaced by greater ambiguity. In the past NATO designed policies and military arrangements to deal with Soviet strength and proximity. In the future it has to deal with the challenges flowing from Soviet weakness and distance. The spectrum of scenarios and potential challenges have changed, the thresholds become uncertain and the rules of engagement largely undefined. The new "red-lines" in Central Europe could be the crossing of Soviet troops into Poland and NATO troops

into the territory of the former GDR. ¹ Stability will have to be secured in new ways. The task is in no way impossible, and the absence of direct confrontation and a clear and present danger of military attack, will reduce the rôle of military force as an arbiter of European politics and broaden the scope for changing the paradigm and constructing a more cooperative security order in Europe, for moving from confrontation to interdependence, for providing institutional substance to a concept of common security. NATO's policies and structures should be developed also with a view to strengthening and developing the CSCE.

The military force structure and strategy of the alliance needs to be adjusted to novel circumstances. The concept of forward defence at a line of confrontation will need to be abandoned in favour of greater mobility and capacity for mobilization and concentration. A strategy which emphasizes attack against follow-on forces in Central Europe collides with the political objective of building confidence in Central Europe and removing incentives for coalescing with the Soviet Union. NATO will need to project a defensive orientation via the new force posture. Clearly the role of nuclear weapons will have to be reexamined. Battlefield nuclear weapons should be removed from Europe (a "third zero") and a "fourth zero" could apply to short range land-based nuclear missiles (SNF). NATO's theatre nuclear posture most likely would be confined to some aircraft systems and a US capacity to bring in artillery fired atomic projectiles in an emergency. The Soviet view of theatre nuclear forces has been changing, moving away from the posture of complete abolition to one of retaining a minimum capacity. Moscow appears to be moving towards a policy of deterrence rather than forward deployment. NATO and the Soviet Union are likely to coalesce on a concept of minimum deterrence constituting a de facto rather than a formal no-first use regime.

¹ I am indebted to Arnold Horelick for this idea.

The US force level is likely to be cut beyond the 195 000/225 000 ceiling of the emerging CFE-I treaty, and would probably be stabilized at about 90 - 100 000 men. The major function of the US forces would be to

1. provide a cadre for reconstitution of a substantial presence in the event of Soviet rearmament;
2. provide enough capacity for US forces to be immediately engaged in combat in the event of attack;
3. protect the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe.

The CSCE will provide a broader framework embracing all the states of Europe as well as the United States and the Soviet Union, extending across the northern hemisphere from Vladivostok to San Francisco. It is likely to be converted gradually from a negotiation forum to a permanent institution. Its competence is likely to expand in the field of arms control. CFE-II negotiations are likely to take place in the CSCE following the constitution of essential parity between the two alliances in CFE-I. It is possible to envisage institutionalization of the CSCE in the form of a Strategy Forum for discussion of doctrine and force structure, an Arms Control Verification Authority; a Crisis Prevention Authority; an Arms Information Authority issuing a CSCE counterpart to the Armaments Yearbook of the League of Nations; a Peace-keeping Authority coordinating the ear-marking and training of troops for peacekeeping in Europe in local conflicts which could ignite larger conflagrations, or which pose threats to human rights, or the rights of minorities. The CSCE itself is unlikely to move away from consensus to majority voting, and the constitution of a CSCE Security Council dominated by a few major powers would be unacceptable to most of the participating nations. Hence, collective security will remain a distant goal, although certain components of such a system could emerge.

The CSCE could form a key element in the new architecture for the future political order in Europe. It should be restructured in order to provide for an effective division of labour and jurisdiction with the ECE (Economic Commission of Europe) and the Council of Europe with respect to "Baskets 2 and 3". Its primary functions should evolve from the "Basket 1" agenda. In order for the CSCE to perform an interesting function and in order to prevent a system of interlocking and overlapping institutions from draining the essence out of the European Community which is the key institution in the new Europe, the EC Commission should be given a seat in the CSCE. It is possible also that the Secretary General of NATO should sit at the table in order to promote harmonization of developments in NATO and the CSCE.

3.8 The Maritime Competition and the Security Order in Europe.

NATO is a maritime alliance dependent on the sealines of communication for the integrity of its security structure. In the years ahead the scale of the threat to the sealines of communication seems likely to diminish as the size of the Soviet submarine fleet decreases due to block obsolescence of large classes of submarines. For the task of cutting sealines of communication numbers remain important and may but to some extent be compensated by quantitative improvements. Furthermore, dismantling of the forward confrontation in Europe and the withdrawal and demobilization of large numbers of Soviet ground forces would reduce the urgency of early reinforcements via the sealines of communication.

In the context of a stable Central Europe with low tension it is possible that the northern and southern flanks could become new flash points of tension and that the naval competition could intensify in these areas. NATO would need to maintain a strategy and capacity for forward defences while defence budgets are likely to drop to a level where it may no longer

prove possible for the US to maintain 14 aircraft carriers. In such an environment the competition for carrier task forces could grow and NATO may not come out on top in such competition.

The pressure for naval arms control is likely to grow and the opposition in the US Navy will prove unsustainable in the long run. The process has already started with confidence building measures, encompassing a series of bilateral incidents at sea agreements. Such agreements have been negotiated between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States, Great Britain, France, The Federal Republic, Italy, Canada, and Norway on the other. It could be followed by a dialogue about naval strategy and force posture, agreements to notify major exercises or fleet movements, and provisions for mutual observation of exercises. Measures have to combine the interest of the flag states in the principle of freedom of navigation and of the coastal states in preventing political pressure from naval activity. The Americans are primarily concerned about reducing the threat to the sealines of communication, the Russians about reducing the threat to the homeland from the sea. Hence, a possible naval arms reduction agreement could involve a preferential build-down of ocean going attack submarines and nuclear tipped sea-launched cruise missiles. The latter ought to be in the interest of the West also as Western nations on the whole are much more exposed to nuclear threats from the sea than is the Soviet Union.

4. Possible Contingencies in a Europe in Transition

The canonical scenario of a Soviet attack across the line of division in Central Europe with the aim of establishing mastery in Europe seems remote today. It is not impossible that the threat might reemerge some day. However, it could not be launched from forward positions and it would take a long time to build it up.

Contingency planning in NATO will have to encompass a much broader spectrum of potential contingencies, force planning to concentrate on generic capabilities rather than threat conditioned capabilities, strategy to concentrate on designs to cope with uncertainty. The means for flexible response may have to be orchestrated in a novel manner.

4.1 A Typology of Possible Future Contingencies

For purposes of analysis we shall propose a typology of possible scenarios encompassing eight clusters, or classes, of conflicts with which NATO could be confronted in the years ahead. We are not in a position to assign probabilities to the clusters nor do we claim that they are equally probable. We shall not attempt to identify any class of contingency as the design case. The alliance will have to develop force postures and crisis management procedures for dealing with a broad spectrum of contingencies, designing around the uncertainties rather than attempting to reduce them.

Table 3 A TYPOLOGY OF POTENTIAL CONTINGENCIES

- * Intimidation scenarios
 - A. Soviet show of force against NATO countries
 - B. Soviet show of force against non-NATO countries in Europe.
- * Fait accompli scenarios
 - A. Rapid Soviet limited military action against NATO countries
 - B. Rapid Soviet limited military action against non-NATO countries
- * Intervention scenarios
 - A. Soviet military intervention in (former) Warsaw Pact countries.
 - B. Soviet military intervention in neutral countries.
- * Reconstitution scenarios
 - A. Rapid overt Soviet remobilization
 - B. Slow covert Soviet remobilization
- * Soviet Turmoil scenarios
 - A. Military suppression of secession attempts
 - B. Wars between Soviet nations or union republics
- * Soviet Break-down scenarios
 - A. Military take-over (Bonapartist solution)
 - B. Anarchy (war-lord system)
- * Internecine warfare scenarios
 - A. Civil wars rooted in ethnic conflicts in Europe
 - B. Inter-state wars triggered by ethnic conflicts in Europe
- * Out-of area scenarios
 - A. Conflicts threatening to spread to Europe (Middle-East, the Mahgreb)
 - B. Conflicts threatening vital Western interests

Our previous discussion has indicated that for NATO the challenges ahead will be two-fold. (1) To deter attack and reconstitution of a waning threat, and (2) to provide a framework, including the military infrastructure, for ensuring stability in the political order in Europe. It must be protected against the spill-over from conflicts within the Soviet Union and the escalation of internecine conflicts in Europe, particularly in south-eastern Europe.

It seems clear that NATO will need a new strategy, 14/4 designed to cope with the new and changing realities. The new strategy will comprise some of the concepts from 14/3, including the concept of flexibility and a spectrum of options. The role of nuclear weapons needs to be reexamined including their possible role in deterring or containing reconstitution in addition to providing substance to notions of minimum deterrence.

The forces will be smaller, the defence levels will change and the spectrum of possible contingencies broaden. NATO will need to maintain a flexible and redundant system of command and control, and an infrastructure to counter reconstitution which contributes to stability rather than stimulating rearmament races. The next great debate may focus on choices between "defensive defence" and mobile defenses. Political and military criteria might suggest different conclusions.

Intimidation scenarios indicate a need for visible forces and sustained consultations about how to show resolve, confidence and calm without rocking the boat. Fait-accomplis scenarios might constitute a particular danger to the flanks in the context of Great Russian chauvinism as a dialectic response to secessionist pressures inside the Soviet Union. They may require rapid intervention forces and a capacity for rapid consultations. Intervention scenarios may pose some of the same requirements as intimidation scenarios. Reconstitution scenarios indicate a need for a robust command and control

system, an effective system of mobilization, a steady R+D effort and prepositioned equipment. It will require a capacity for continuous consultation and an ability to respond to strategic warning, incremental change and repeated warning. Soviet turmoil and breakdown scenarios essentially involve requirements for non-provocative defenses and a capacity for sustained consultations and effective surveillance. Internecine warfare scenarios could create the need for multinational peacekeeping forces, possibly under CSCE auspices. They will require capacities for emergency consultations and access to expert assessment of the anthropology of ethnic animosities and aspirations. Out-of-area contingencies will pose a need for rapid consultation and concertation among the most affected allies and those capable of intervening outside the NATO area. The alliance should not attempt to act as a collective outside the treaty area.

4.2 An Uncertain Future

History is not in the habit of progressing in straight lines. It could still take unexpected turns. The question is not so much whether a return to the old order is possible or likely. History cannot be recaptured. The question is rather what choices will be made among many future alternatives and, particularly, how the choices of many actors will interact and create new realities.

In the short run, as already noted, Soviet policies on Eastern Europe are likely to be heavily influenced by developments inside the Soviet Union. Gorbachev will have to prevent the future of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being settled through a process of falling dominoes. The struggle over Lithuania is not confined to a conflict about Lithuania, it has become a test of the union. Can Gorbachev detach the Baltic dominoes from the rest? Mass demonstrations in the Ukraine in support of Lithuanian independence herald the difficulties. There are also significant military issues. The

Soviet Union has created an extensive military structure, including nuclear weapons depots, in the Baltic republics which is of particular significance for the Soviet naval presence in the Baltic. The Baltic republics also constitute an important staging area for the Red Army. The Soviet 30th Air Army with numerous nuclear-armed aircraft has its headquarters in Latvia. Access to the enclave around Kaliningrad, part of the old area around the East Prussian city of Königsberg, will have to be resolved in the event of Lithuanian independence. It could mean imposed concessions on Poland. It could also lead to redeployment of troops and relocation of installations to the Leningrad Military District. Such changes could profoundly affect the security situation in Northern Europe. Desertion of conscripts challenge the authority of the Soviet Army as an institution at a time when morale is at an all-time low. (It experienced an eight-fold increase in draft dodgers 1985-89). Gorbachev needs the support, and can ill afford the opposition, of the Soviet military to his policy of perestroika. Nationalist ambitions in the Soviet republics are probably stimulated by the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe. Moscow may be compelled to toughen her stance in relation to East-European desires to disconnect economic and security ties with the Soviet Union. A hardening of the Soviet position is unlikely to entail reconquest, but it could lead to intransigence over Germany and the conditions for withdrawing troops from Central Europe, thereby altering the present atmosphere of euphoric projection.

The process of German unification could follow complicated tracks. Moscow could, as we have suggested, insist on a choice between alignment and unification in order also to serve notice to the rest of the countries of Eastern Europe that there are still limits on how far they can proceed in their rapprochement with the West. Differences could emerge between the Federal Republic and her Western allies over the parameters and priorities determining Germany's international

position. East-German dissatisfaction with the currency conversion arrangements which were proposed by the Bundesbank in April 1990 as a basis for the currency union, could slow down and sour the process also at the level of the two Germanies. East-European countries eager to enter the European Community may react to the message that they have to qualify first, and that such qualification will take a long time, with impatience and anger. A souring of EC-East-European relations could affect the ideological consensus on the community in West-European societies. However, the EC Commission has played the key role in coordinating the economic assistance of the G-24 countries to the East-European countries. It is in the process of negotiating "first generation" trade and cooperation agreements with them, and of developing "second generation" association agreements. Such agreements could contain development provisions for eventual membership when the countries involved have reached a level of economic development which makes it possible. In the meantime other broad schemes for a European confederation constructed around an EC which is based on economic, monetary and political union constitutes an alternative, or perhaps an intermediate, vision.

The institutional framework is likely to be in a flux. The future of NATO is likely to remain uncertain for quite some time. It needs to change to survive, but resistance to change is strong in an extensive institutional machinery. The European Community is entering a period of profound transformation. The establishment of the internal market by 1992 could sharpen the contradictions between enlargement and deepening, raising the question of how the Community can preserve its identity and preserve on its road to integration while at the same time providing a framework for the integration of Central (and Eastern ?) Europe into a larger European construction. The construction of a broader European Confederation could compete with the plans for economic and monetary union in the Community. The resolution of such

dialectics would profoundly affect the future role of Germany in Europe. The future role and development of the CSCE in turn could affect the evolution of NATO and the EC. The short term future will be characterized by hybrid solutions of overlapping and interlocking institutions in dynamic development and interaction.

4.3 Implications for Crisis Management

The very term "management" seems odd when applied to crisis, as it suggests a degree of control and logical conduct which is unwarranted by previous history. If a situation is susceptible to management it hardly qualifies as a crisis. Political authorities remain sceptical of attempts to institutionalize and constrain choices by procedures and machinery. The latter tend to assume a life of their own; the means threaten to become the ends, to determine policy rather than serve it. From the political vantage point diplomacy is viewed as the art of the possible, and what is possible must be ascertained in concrete situations and circumstances. Political authorities will remain sceptical also of contingency planning which will lock them on to fixed tracks in a crisis, the contours and context of which cannot be foreseen. Scepticism is likely to increase in a period of flux when specific threats give way to more diffuse risks and dangers.

The task confronting NATO is one of enhancing the ability to improvise in a crisis rather than develop plans for how to cope with a wide variety of contingencies. We have outlined above a spectrum of contingencies rather than attempted to provide a platform or basis for specific planning. In many instances, which do not involve attacks on NATO territory the first task at hand would be to define NATO's interests and objectives because they cannot be derived from the North-Atlantic Treaty, nor does it seem likely that allies will be willing or able to define them before the fact. Such

definition could in itself generate tensions.

Withdrawal from the forward line of confrontation in Central Europe could reduce the chance of inadvertent escalation in a crisis. However, a greater separation of forces could result in less cautious behaviour in crises, precisely because the dangers of inadvertent escalation are deemed to be less acute, there could be more room for miscalculation even if the scope for deescalation would broaden. In ambiguous circumstances allies also run the danger of increasing the ambiguities by uncoordinated action and communication.

Rather than develop plans and machinery for coping with potential future crises the focus should be more on the development of generic guidelines and capabilities which will broaden the scope of available options, provide the instruments for orchestration in a crisis rather than attempt to write the score to be played.

The scenarios which are encompassed by the suggested spectrum, involve general and specific requirements in terms of NATO's responses. General procedural requirements include collection, dissemination and assessment of intelligence, coordination of alert measures, political consultation, and communication with the potential adversary. The specific requirements comprise capabilities which are structured and practised with a view to tailoring them discretely to the challenge at hand.

Table 5 CRISIS "MANAGEMENT" REQUIREMENTS

- * Capability to increase surveillance
- * Capability to increase readiness
- * Capability to increase force strength
- * Capability for rapid reinforcement
- * Capability to reposition forces
- * Capability for non-provocative orchestration of dispositions
- * Capability for rapid and convincing deescalation and termination
- * Willingness to grant the adversary a graceful exit.

Our list of requirements indicate a need to coordinate force planning, strategy and preparations for crisis management in NATO. Standing forces in a high state of readiness will diminish as levels are drawn down and the potential threat recedes. Stability will no longer be a function of clearly drawn lines of division and military commitments. It will depend on the ability to assemble and organize forces at times and places of NATO's choosing in specific circumstances. Flexible response will remain an essential principle, but the specific options will have to be retailored. Nuclear weapons are likely to play but a residual role as a last resort, contributing to pre-strategic deterrence rather than warfighting in the theater of operations. Reassurance will be as important as deterrence, and in fluid situations non-provocative configurations of military forces and dispositions constitute necessary requirements for crisis management. NATO's ability to control and deescalate crises will depend, furthermore, on not burning its bridges or bombing all those of the adversary, on leaving the adversary opportunities for graceful exit.

4.4 The Road into the Future

In considering a spectrum of potential future contingencies and possible generic capabilities which would enhance the capacity to deal with them, attention should be devoted also to how those capabilities might be developed from current capabilities and institutions. In a situation of lower force levels and defence budgets increased attention will be focused on the task of providing viable and credible military capabilities for reconstitution. The task may pose competing requirements to that of providing flexible and discrete responses to more limited contingencies, leaving NATO with the need to reconcile the conflicts.

Several of the potential future contingencies could require peace-keeping operations. NATO has no experience with such operations as an alliance, although several of the member countries have considerable experience from UN operations; Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. The multinational forces of the alliance, the ACE Mobile Force, STANAVFORLANT (Standing Naval Force Atlantic), STANAVFORCHAN (Standing Naval Force Channel), NCF (NATO Composite Force) provide framework for training also for peacekeeping. Other constructions are possible also if NATO were to decide to contribute capabilities for peace-keeping missions which in the future may be mandated by the CSCE. In this connection cooperation, including joint manoeuvres and joint training, could be envisaged also with Soviet and neutral and non-aligned forces in Europe.

As we have noted above the CSCE is unlikely in foreseeable future to develop into a security institution based on majority voting. However, the weight of the majority could increase as the institution develops. The availability of a peacekeeping instrument could increase the chance that it will be called upon as an alternative to unilateral or competitive intervention, that the parties to an internecine conflict

would see an alternative to its destructive prosecution. A peacekeeping instrument would be no panacea, just a useful tool in the assembly of means available to the nations of the CSCE. We should recall in this connection that NATO operates on the principle of consensus. The real basis for credible action by international institutions will always be a confluence of interest. The CSCE and NATO could broaden the basis of common interest by engaging in concrete cooperative undertakings.

* * * * *

NATO could disintegrate if it fails to reform and adjust to the new times. A basic examination of the purposes and structure of the alliance is required, an even more fundamental assessment than the Harmel exercise of the 1960's. The CSCE could atrophy if nations remain "waiting for Godot"!

Europe is in the making. Change may challenge stability. Stability may constrain change. Uncertainty complicates planning. Planning often ignores uncertainty. Military dispositions may constrain political choice. Political choice often ignores military constraints. Defence planning and political assessment are often miles apart, in future the twains must meet. The two cultures must be made one if NATO is to succeed in managing crises which transcend and transpierce the easy categories of yesterday.

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