# Bulwark, Bridge, or Periphery?
## Polish discourse on Poland and Europe


Hege Haaland

# Contents

## Preface

After the Communist regime started crumbling in 1989, the official foreign policy of Poland has been redefined. A central characteristic in this process has been Polish involvement in the process of European integration and an application for membership in the European Union. These policies have not been undisputed in Polish political debates. Analyses of Polish European policy tend to concentrate on the official foreign policy of Poland and the strategies of cooperation and integration proposed by EU member states. What they seem to forget is that debates on Europe and what shape the relations between Poland and Europe should take exist within Poland as well. This thesis is an attempt to fill in this gap. The central question is *what kind of Europe do Poles promote?*

Supporting the road of Poland to the [European] Union we are not lead by emotions, we are not making use of neither pathos nor doubts. […] the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] conceives common Europe as an answer to the present challenges of civilization and as the protector of a high standard of democracy and human subjectivity (980319/ 017).[1]

I think that the old Rzeczpospolita [Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth] was in a miniature scale the prefiguration of the European community – in the Polish landscape there was a place for the Catholic Church, as well as the temple of the Greek Catholics, the liturgy of the Orthodox, Jewish synagogues and Tartar minarets. This should also be the pan-European vision (Foreign Minster Bronisław Geremek in Wprost 1998).

Entering the European Union does not bring about the rejection of our national and Christian identity. The Holy Father John Paul II said during his Homily in Gniezno in 1997 that the framework of European identity is built on Christianity. I would like the Polish contribution to the process of European integration be the reminder of these fundamental principles  (990908/ 004).

We will teach Europe what a Christian nation is, a nation that does not allow itself to be forced into financial slavery, one that is capable of managing its own affairs. With this we will contribute to the collapse of world globalism, just as we halted the expansion of the Germans, the Mongols, the Swedes, the Turks, and the Soviets. It may be in Poland that the fall of the New World Order will begin (Nasz Dziennik 1998).

## 1.0 Introduction

The theme of this thesis is the preconditions for Polish European policies. The Polish Communist regime pmoterod a foreign policy that was defined by "fraternal neighborly Polish-Soviet relations". It represented the West (Western Europe and the USA) as an antagonist to the idea of a socialist Europe and maintained that by counterworking socialism the West attempted to "push our country into the abyss of chaos and anarchy". Only a socialist Poland could "remain on the map of Europe as an independent and sovereign state" (Gomułka quoted in Bromke 1967: 120).

While the Communist regime produced such statements, the opposition made other statements that related Poland to Europe and with such practices reproduced alternative policies. These policies surfaced as the Communist regime crumbled and allowed for a policy change and ultimately for Polish participation in the projects of European integration. In this thesis I argue that there are always alternative policies that attempt to subvert the dominant one(s) and that policies are sustained, modified or crushed, in social interaction.

The epigraphs above are recent statements of central Polish politicians. They reveal that there are a number of different ideas in Poland of what shape the European political project should take. Moreover the epigraphs

---

1   References to debates in the Polish Parliament take the following pattern: (year month day/number of speaker).

disclose that there are different ways of defining Poland's role in relation to the Europe that is promoted. This thesis argues that foreign policies are conditioned by the ways in which certain concepts are represented in discourse. Its purpose is to present you with an overview of the existing Polish European policy positions, analyze the representations on which they rest and, on the basis of the analysis, draw some conclusions about the preconditions of Polish European policies and make some tentative predictions for they may develop in the future. The purpose of the analysis is thus both explanatory and predicative.

Discourses are closely related to the discourses that precede them. I believe that a background study of Polish discourse during Communism is an important background study in order to explicate the foundations of today's discourse. I will therefore devote a considerable part of the thesis to the discourse of this period. Polish European policy debates also reveal that history is continuously kept alive in the shape of extensive references to historical facts and events. We may say that history functions as a catalogue of resources when Poles set out to discuss Europe and Poland. Some even argue that history is of particular importance in Poland and that no analysis of Polish politics can be performed satisfactorily if the historical heritage is not taken seriously. This thesis devotes a significant number of pages to the pre-history of the present discourse. It studies in what ways it has parallels in the past and demonstrates how history is and has been actively evoked in Polish European policy debates.

When Poles set out to discuss Europe and their relations to Europe, they also discuss the nature of their own community. We may say that Polish European policy and Polish identity are mutually constitutive phenomena. This makes Polish identity an important aspect of Poland's relations to Europe and a factor with explanatory power. In this thesis I will study the relationship between these phenomena in the discourse on Poland and Europe in Poland. Doing this I will not only look into how Europe is thought of in terms of difference from Polish identity, but also consider how Europe is included into Polish identity.

In the following section I will identify and elaborate on the central question of the thesis. I will introduce the theory and method on which I base my analysis so that I may formulate the questions of research and specify a model of the central concepts of the study as well as the proposed relationships between them. I will conclude with some remarks on delimitation. The subsequent sections will discuss theory and method in more detail and illustrate how I will apply it in this particular case. I will finish the introduction with an outline of the chapters.

## 1.1 The Question

In my view Poland is a country that has a central political location in Europe and the potential of becoming an important actor on the European political scene. Polish European policy is an important field of study because it may influence the developments of Europe as a political project. A central question in this respect is: *What kind of Europe do Poles promote?* A more pre-

cise formulation of the question necessitates a brief introduction of the theo-
retical and methodical approaches.

### 1.1.1 Theoretical approach

In recent years the discipline of International Relations (IR) and the sub-dis-
cipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have experienced a surge of inter-
est in identity and identity formation. The behavioral schools of neorealism
and neoliberalism have traditionally dominated IR and FPA. When identity
is brought into the analysis, these schools treat it as just another independent
variable that has a measurable effect on foreign policy. The ontological sta-
tus of the identity is not questioned and the possibility that the relationship
between identity and foreign policy may be of another nature is not investi-
gated. I believe that the alternative approach of *constructivism* gives a richer
understanding of the relationship between identity and foreign policy and
will apply this approach to study the question.

Constructivists question the ontological status of identities and argue that
instead of being objective realities they are subjects to individual interpreta-
tion and evaluation. Identities are studied as socially constructed phenomena
that both influence and are influenced by foreign policies. The theoretical as-
sumption that is made is that foreign policies and identities are mutually con-
stitutive phenomena. Another theoretical assumption is that foreign policy
actors stand in a mutually constitutive relationship to the social context in
which they appear. The identities of the actors and the foreign policies they
pursue both affect and are affected by the environment in which they act.

This thesis will base the analysis of Polish European policy on theories of
identity construction and constructivism and look into how Polish identity
and Polish European policy stand in a mutually constitutive relationship to
each other and to the institutional and cultural environment to which they re-
late. The institutional and cultural environment in which these identities ap-
pear is Europe.

### 1.1.2 Method of Analysis

A common criticism directed at constructivist work is that the presumptions
on which it rests imply that identities, foreign policies, and institutional and
cultural environments are in the process of constant change. This compli-
cates any study of them. This problem may be partially solved by the appli-
cation of a particular method of *discourse analysis*.

Discourse analysis concentrates on language and the primary units of
study are statements. Language is not treated exclusively as an unproblema-
tic system of concepts that refers directly to reality, it is also treated as a so-
cial system that has its own logic and that contributes to the constitution of
different realities (Neumann 2000: 8). Bartelson (1995: 70–71) argues that
statements cannot be studied in isolation as they

> form discourses that are held together by regularities exhibited by the relations
> between different statements; discourse is a system for the formation of state-
> ments. […] While autonomous and primary, discourse is caught up in a web of

practices; its primacy in relation to them depends on its ability to organize them systematically as being essentially discursive practices, that is, systems of statements for the organization of practices.

In other words, discourse may be defined as a particular kind of social system that is inherent in language and that conditions what can be meaningfully said. On the other hand, statements are organized as discursive practices that uphold a certain discourse.

Neumann (2000) defines institutions, representations, and positions as central concepts of discourse analysis. The *institutionalization* of a discourse is the formalization of a set of statements and practices that it consists of. Institutions endow discourse with materiality and regularity that appear in a set of social relations. By inscribing themselves into certain institutions and appearing as more or less normal, discourses constitute reality for their bearers. *Representation* appears between the physically given world and our perception of it, and is the way in which the world appears. More specifically, a representation in discourse analysis is the definition of the most important set of reality claims that the discourse is comprised of. When the carriers of the same representation institutionalize, they make up a *position* in discourse. Representations have to be reproduced by discursive work that consists of the production of statements and practices that confirm the representations. When a representation obtains a status of being comparatively unchallenged in discourse, so unchallenged that it appears 'normal', there is a condition of *hegemony*.

The definition of discourse as a system for the formation of statements, and the presumption that discourses organize practices as discursive practices, imply that discourses condition foreign policies. Foreign policies have to be organized as discursive practices upholding a certain reality. The writers of the Copenhagen School argue that the key political ideas that constitute the concepts of state and nation will form the basis of institutionalization when the collective self partakes in political cooperation (Neumann 1999: 30). The principal scholar of the Copenhagen School, Ole Wæver (1998; 1999), argues that the possible set of European policies that may be put into practice is conditioned by domestic discourses on the concepts of state and nation, as well as how these concepts relate to domestic discourses on Europe. He assumes that state, nation and Europe, that are collective identity concepts, are the most central concepts and that they are more *stable* than other concepts that appear in this particular discursive space. Applying this method on the Polish case I will look for representations of state, nation, and Europe, and how these representations are tied together in discourse.

### 1.1.3 The Model

At the outset I asked the question of *what kind Europe do Poles promote?* In the light of the theory and method I have introduced above, the more precise formulation of this question is *what are the Polish European policy positions and how is the discourse of which they are constitutive parts structured?* Engaging myself in an analysis of the Polish discourse on Europe I will theo-

retically be able to explain Polish European policies and be able to make some predictions.

An important element in the Polish discourse on Europe is Polish identity. In this thesis Polish identity is defined as Polish representations of state and nation. Polish representations of state and nation relate to Polish representations of Europe. Polish European policy positions are conditioned by the structures of these discourses. In order to perform the analysis I will have to give an answer to the following research questions: *What are the different representations of state, nation and Europe in Polish discourse and how do these concepts relate? What Polish European policies does the discourse on Europe depict?*

At this point I may specify a model that defines the relationships between the key concepts that have been identified in the discursive space:



*Figure 1.1.3*

Polish identity, defined as Polish representations of state and nation (box A), and Polish representations of Europe (box B) are mutually constitutive entities (box 1). These constellations have an impact on Polish ideas of what kind of political project Europe should be from which the actual policy positions get their substance (box 2). The relationship between box 1 and 2 is recursive. European policy positions do not only affect the processes of representing state, nation and Europe indirectly through the impact they have on the European political construct, but also directly. Note that box A refers to the first layer of the discursive space, the layer of Polish identity, and that box B refers to the second layer, the relational layer. Box 2 refers to the third layer, the layer where we find the Polish policy positions that are derived from layer one and two. These are in turn recursively related to box 3 that is Europe as such, the environments to which the actors relate. Europe is in its turn mutually influenced by the practices of representing the concepts of Europe, state and nation in Polish discourse.

### 1.1.4 Delimitation

I will not specify nor investigate in detail all the relationships in figure 1. The main focus of this study is how the constellations in box 1 put restrictions on the set of options in box 2. I do not deny that other factors influence the variables in the model or suggest that the other relations in the model are not relevant for the analysis. I just delimit *my* area and *my* field of interest to the one described above.

Engaging myself in the analysis of the different and changing meanings conveyed by certain concepts, I need to keep other concepts stable. The concept of Catholicism probably conveys a different meaning in Poland today than it did only a hundred years ago and at present there may be different ways of representing Catholicism in Poland. The same applies for example for the concept of Communism. I will nevertheless not engage myself in the discourse on other concepts than state, nation and Europe, because this would confuse the analysis.

When I study the policy positions I will concentrate on policies concerning Polish relations with the European Union (EU) as a European political project. The political processes within the EU include a wider range of policy areas, if compared to other European projects, like NATO, OSCE and the WEU. In addition the concept of Europe seems widely connected to the EU in Polish discourse and is often used synonymously to the EU (Mach 1997: 43).

When used in this thesis, the notion of identity is always referring to *collective* identities. Individual identities are not considered relevant for the analysis. I also exclusively speak of *political identities* because it is the ways in which identities are *politically* constructed in discourse that is relevant to my analysis.

I have delimited the study thematically to an analysis of Polish European policy. The format is too small to provide a full discussion of the Polish relations with Europe throughout the entire history. I therefore have to delimit the time focus of the study. I will concentrate the analysis to the period after 1989. This year marks a definite shift in Polish European policy and the opening of a public debate on Polish integration with European political institutions in general, and with the EC/ EU in particular.

As already suggested, I dedicate a significant amount of time and space to the pre-history of the contemporary discourse – to historical representations of state, nation, and Europe and the policy positions that were derived from these. This is a necessary exercise because the discourses of today always build upon, and thus cannot be detached from, the discourses of yesterday. A discourse analysis that fails to include how certain realities have been represented in history, may lose important aspects that might be significant for the outcome of the study.

### 1.2 Theory

The following section looks into the theory on which I base my analysis in more detail. The first part of the section gives an account of the theories of identity formation on which constructivism and discourse analysis base their assumptions. I will delimit the part on theories of identity formation to three

main assumptions: Identities are constructed, identities are relational, and identities are contextually dependent.

The second part of the section concentrates on constructivist theories of identity and foreign policy. It gives a brief presentation of constructivist literature on the relationship between identity and foreign policy and points out weaknesses and strengths. It argues that foreign policy may be defined as a way of constructing boundaries, that identities and foreign policies are mutually constitutive, and explains how identities and foreign policies may be looked upon as contested projects that deconstruct and displace one another. It is argued that all these assumptions have to be taken seriously in an analysis of Polish European policy.

### 1.2.1 Theories of identity formation

Theories of identity formation that are applied in FPA and discourse analysis build on the tradition of a vast literature from several scholarly traditions. Here I will concentrate on theories of particular relevance to foreign policy and relate them to the theme of this thesis. The common denominator of these theories of identity formation may be summed up by the postulations that identities are constructed, relational, and contextually dependent phenomena.

#### 1.2.1.1 Identities are constructed

An individual that identifies herself with a certain community rarely has direct access to this group. She may feel that she belongs to the Polish nation even if she does not know all its constituents. Her identification with the Polish nation is based on her own subjective evaluations and generalizations. She is capable of making such evaluations and generalizations because she takes part in social interaction. From what she experiences and absorbs through such social interaction she constructs a representation of the Polish nation.

Benedict Anderson (1996) has argued that collective identities, like nations, are *imagined* communities that are endowed with meaning through the continuous coupling of identity to certain *material factors*. He calls this exercise an act of *representing,* because factors that initially have a history of their own are presented in light of the history of the 'self'. The process of constructing an identity thus presupposes a *representation* of what makes up the 'self'. An example may be provided by what is called *presentism* (but it might as well have been called *representism*), which is the art of writing "history in terms of the present" (Bartelson 1995: 55). Examples of presentism may be found in history books written after the emergence of modern nation-states in the 19th century. Such books often refer to the history of the Middle Ages in terms of the modern concepts of 'state' and 'nation' and may be regarded projects of representing history in terms of modern categories in order to construct national identities (imagined) and couple them with the existence of a state (material factor).

### 1.2.1.2 Identities are relational

You cannot have an identity without knowing what you are not (Friis 1998: 132). We say that identities are *relational* because they do not exist in themselves but only in the identity's relation to difference (Connolly 1991). Put in another way: representing a certain self always involves representing a certain 'other'. Representations of the 'other' are central in the process of selecting the criteria that characterize representations of 'us' and that construct 'our' identity (Friis 1998: 133).

Barth (1969) suggests that the nexus of self and other should be studied in terms of the boundary markers of identity. Such boundary markers appear in the shape of dichotomies made up of mutually exclusive categories that he calls *diacritica*. Examples of *diacritica* are Orthodox/Catholic and Polish speaker/foreign speaker. The reproduction of boundaries by such markers is looked upon as an essential part of identity construction because this is what provides identities with substance. In the following analysis we will se several examples of how *diacritica* are constructed as a way of marking a border between the Polish 'self' and the European 'other' as well as between the European 'self' and various 'others'.

Wæver (1998: 104–105; 1999: 36–38) argues that studying identity in the shape of self/other relations is less fruitful than if more differentiated systems of difference are applied. When studying Polish identity and Polish European policy one should not only investigate how Polish identity is constructed in relation to Europe as the other, but also how Europe as a concept, vision and project is included into the Polish 'we'. We should also study Polish European identities – how Poles represent Europe as a part of the Polish identity. Studying identities in this way also have a normative aspect because it does not fire up under antagonisms but rather concentrate on the features that unite.

### 1.2.1.3 Identities are contextually dependant

Identities depend on the context in which they appear. Different identities are activated in different situations. When relating to Germans and French, a Polish identity might be activated. When relating to people from Russia, a European identity may override the Polish one. Analyzing identities also involve the investigation into what identities that gain predominance in different contexts (Neumann 1998: 53).

I have already delimited the context of this analysis to the European. However, as discourses change, the content of Europe changes, and the context in which the actors appear will never be exactly the same. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the predominance of Polish and European identities may vary through the time scope of the analysis.

## 1.2.2 Constructivism

Constructivists dedicating themselves to the study of the relationship between identity and foreign policy define foreign policy as a way of constructing boundaries; a "political practice that makes 'foreign' certain events and actors" (Campbell 1998: 61). The boundary produced in the making of foreign policy is a boundary between 'us' and 'them'. If this boundary had

not been continually reproduced, 'we' would cease to exist because there would be nothing that differentiated 'us' from the rest; it would be impossible to locate 'our' particular identity.

*The Culture of National Security* (Katzenstein: 1996) is an important contribution to constructivist FPA that explores a theoretical framework where environmental structures (predominantly institutional and cultural elements) are related to the actors' identities, interests, and policies. A problem with the theoretical model on which this volume bases its analysis, a problem that seems to apply for most constructivist work, is that the it does not include the possibility that foreign policies may reproduce a certain identity directly – foreign policies may only change identities indirectly if they succeed in changing the environment – the context – to which the actors relate.

In *Writing Security* (1998), David Campbell provides a genealogy of the mutual relationship between American foreign policy and American identity. He argues that foreign policy is not something that is subsequent to the state or the interstate system, but integral to its constitution. It is not the bridge between two distinct realms, but something that both divides and joins the inside and outside, the state and the interstate system (ibid.: 60). Campbell's book provides a genealogy of the dominant representation of American identity and the foreign policies that reproduce this identity. The problem is that his approach does not allow for *competing identities*. In this way there is no room left for studying the processes whereby identities *change* (Neumann 1999: 27).

I will base this analysis on the assumption that identities and foreign policy are not monolithically constructed projects. On the contrary I believe they emerge in a process of discursive battles with other identity and foreign policy projects that struggle, clash, deconstruct and displace one another. Looking into these battles one may detect how identities are constructed in order to subjugate other identity projects. Making this assumption opens up the possibility of change. In the next chapter I will explain how this may be studied in practice.

## 1.3 Method of analysis

This section explains how I will carry out the analysis and put theory into practice. The first part argues that a combined approach of genealogy and subjugated knowledges may prove fruitful. The second part takes the three steps of discourse analysis proposed by Neumann (2000: 32–60). The third part shows how I expect the Polish discursive system to appear and explains how I will proceed in order to analyze it. In the fourth part I argue that if we want to open up the possibility that discourses change, not only as a result of a change in the relative power distribution between a set of positions, but also as a result of changing practices of representing, we will have to supply the structurally founded framework of the Copenhagen School with a poststructuralist feedback-loop that consists of institutions, values, and realities that uphold the realities of the positions. This approach includes the materiality of discourses into the analysis as an additional factor that endows discourses with stability. Neumann suggests this as a possible fourth step in discourse analysis. To take this step adds a poststructuralist critique of the

structural conditions of the Copenhagen School to the analysis. The fifth part argues that the most appropriate way of locating the discourse is in public texts. The sixth and final part of this section discusses the aspects of validity and reliability.

### 1.3.1 Genealogy and subjugated knowledges

Milliken (1999) provides an overview and evaluation of different ways of performing discourse analysis. Her article concludes that two methodical approaches, *genealogy* and *subjugated knowledges*, have the greatest potential in "leading readers to question orientations and actions that they ordinarily take for granted" (ibid.: 243).

The discursive approach of subjugated knowledges explores alternative positions in depth, showing that they are enabled by a discourse that does not overlap substantially with the dominant discourse (ibid.: 243). All discourses are looked upon as "unstable grids, requiring work to 'articulate' and 'rearticulate' their knowledges and identities (to fix the 'regime of truth') and open-ended meshes, making discourses changeable and in fact historically changing" (ibid.: 230). Scholars working from this position often try to explain how the alternative accounts are excluded or silenced by a hegemonic discourse.

The genealogical method examines the contingency of contemporary discursive practices through historical studies of past discursive practices.

> [H]istory is not interpreted as a progression leading to the present, but as a series of discursive formations that are discontinuous, breaking with one another in terms of discursive objects, relations, and their operationalization. Genealogical studies thereby emphasize that dominating discourses, including contemporary ones, involve relations of power in which unity with the past is artificially conserved and order is created from conditions of disorder (ibid.: 243).

This study applies a combination of the genealogical method and subjugated knowledges. The reason why I want to look at alternative discourses instead of sticking to the dominant one is twofold: *First*, if there is a dominant discourse we cannot trust that it will stay dominant. It is therefore important to study subjugated discourses in order to know what the alternatives are if the dominant discourse loses its dominance. *Second,* an important concern of mine is to investigate the rhetorical weapons the actors use as they try to subjugate other discourses and gain dominance. One strategy is to try to break down the representations of the challenging discourses. Another is the continuous representation of their own realities and, for example, attempts at representing them in a way that constructs a unity with the past. *Third*, sometimes representations in discourse are built on misinterpretations of history or representations appear with a hostile bias. An important analytical project is to point out such representations and present *alternatives* that already exist, or lie latent, in the discursive space.

### 1.3.2 Three steps in discourse analysis

Discourse is the sphere that supplies language, such as the concepts of Europe and Poland, with meaning. I assume that foreign policies take the shape of discursive systems that have a certain structure where the identity related concepts are the most important. The structures within discursive systems condition possible policies. By studying discourse I may derive the actual European policy positions and detect the foundations on which these positions are built.

Neumann (2000: 32–60) argues that there can be three important steps in performing discourse analysis. First you have to select and delimit the discourse, second, you have to make an inventory list of the representations that exist in the chosen discourse, and third, you have to investigate how the layers in discourse are structured in relation to each other. In the following I will take these steps.

*1.3.2.1 Step one: selection and delimitation of the discourse*

I have already taken the first step proposed by Neumann, that involves *limiting the field of study in time and space*. I have limited the analysis to the study of Polish European policies, more specifically to studying the relationship between Polish identity and Europe, and the main focus is on the period between 1989 and 1999, although, as I have argued earlier, a historical background analysis will be necessary in order to enrich and understand the analysis of the selected period, to locate the sources of the representations, and show how they have developed through history.

*1.3.2.2 Step two: The representations of the discourse*

Step two involves the *making of an inventory list of the representations that exist in the chosen discourse*. Discourses reproduce certain realities, so another word for these representations are *realities*. The chosen discursive field will often contain one dominant representation of reality and one or more alternative representations. In my case this step involves making a list of the existing representations of Europe and the representations of state and nation that are linked to them. Doing this I will work in what Milliken (1999: 234) calls a "grounded way". I will not selectively choose data according to *a priori* theoretical categories, but build my own categories via empirical study and abstraction. On the basis of new data I will see whether these categories fit and, if necessary, reformulate the categories so that they become empirically valid.

*1.3.2.3 Step three: The discursive layers*

Step three concerns the layers in discourse. The question I have to ask here is if all the traits of a given representation are equally persistent; how the layers are structured in relation to each other. If some traits unite and some traits differentiate, it is reasonable to assume that the traits that unite are more difficult to change.

Ole Wæver (1998; 1999) divides discursive practices into the following categories: The *discursive space* is the field in time and space sharing a *discursive system*. The system is a layered set of key concepts that are socially constructed. At each layer, a particularly dense and powerful constellation is

defined which he calls a *structure*. These structures condition possible policies. The deeper down in the system the layers appear, the more solidly sedimented are they, and the more difficult is it to politicize and change them.

Wæver suggests a layered model where the concepts of state and nation are located at the first and most sedimented layer. The relational position of state and nation to concepts of Europe makes up the second layer. This layer is assumed to be less sedimented than the first layer, but the structure is relatively stable. The structures of the first and second layers condition the structure of the third layer that consists of concrete policy positions that tell us what political European project that is promoted. In this case the structure may be illustrated like this:

*Table 1.3.1*

| 3. The policy layer | Polish ideas of Europe; concepts related to the content of Europe; proposed relations between Poland and Europe |
|---|---|
| 2. The relational layer | Relational perception; how Europe is represented in relation to Poland; moral assessments |
| 1. The identity layer | Representations of the state; representations of the nation; varying relations between the concepts of the nation and the state |
| Layer | Concepts |

Ole Wæver proposes a special set of questions that he suggests one should pose in order to analyze the discursive system, its layers, and the relations between the different concepts. In the following part I will present these in detail and relate them to the Polish case.

### 1.3.3 Analyzing the discursive system

Ole Wæver bases his examples mainly on the French and the German cases; however, there should be no difficulties in adapting the framework to the Polish case. The following parts will look into the different layers of the discursive system, as Wæver believes they tend to appear in general in the European case, and go through the tools and the questions he believes are important to apply in the analysis of each of the layers.

*1.3.3.1 The layer of Polish identity*
The first layer of the discursive system consists of the basic constellations of state and nation. Analyzing this layer of Polish identity I have to answer the following questions: What is the idea of the Polish nation? What is the idea of the Polish state? How are these two concepts tied together?

Drawing on a long scholarly tradition, Ole Wæver (1999:55–62) suggests that two ideal constructions of state and nation may be used as measure instruments: The German and the French. The French identity layer consists of a fusion of state and nation. The French nation is a political nation and the state is the central institution that the nation spins its identity around. There is no specific concept of the nation and no specific concept of the state. The two stand in a mutually constitutive relationship and cannot be separated.

The German basic constellation is quite different from the French. The nation and the state are thought of as units that rest in themselves. As concepts they may be thought of independently. The German nation has its emphasis in culture, myth and blood. In order to become a member of the nation one has to be born into the *Kultur-nation*. When it comes to thinking about the state, in the German case it spins around the Hegelian idea of the 'power-state' that finds it expression in external power projection and *raison d'état* reasoning. German identity is constructed on a foundation where the nation is culture and the state is power.

Wæver suggests we use five main tools when analyzing level one. "Firstly, one may ask whether the country in question spins its identity around a tight coupling between the nation and the state, as in the French case, or whether the two can be thought of independently, as in the German one" (ibid.: 59). The second question concerns the criteria of national membership, or the construction of the nation: "is there trace of a *Kultur-nation* where membership is dependent on birth and culture, or is it a political nation which is open, at least in principle, to assimilating new members?" (ibid.: 59). For the third, one may look into how the state is constructed along two dimensions: the external and the internal one.

The external part of the state-idea refers to the state's projection of itself onto the world while the internal dimension refers to its projection 'backwards' onto its constituency. Concerning the external dimension Wæver makes a rough distinction between the Hegelian power state, which "sees itself as engaging in classical balance of power politics and *raison d'état* logic", and the negation of this: the anti-power state, which makes "foreign policy either a moral enterprise leading to for example peace-keeping and support for development policies, or an absence of engagement" (Wæver 1999: 60). Examples of the internal dimension are the welfare state, the liberal-capitalist state, and the socialist state.

Fourthly, Wæver recommends looking for 'attachments' to the idea of the nation. Such 'attachments' are constructions that are underpinning and supporting the construction of the nation as well as the constellation of the state and the nation. In the French case, for example, the *patrie* is such a concept that refers to the emotional bond to the past and cultural roots. Finally, one might find other concepts that describe the actual linkages being made between the state and the nation, or the nation and its 'attachment', such as *society* or *the people*.

I will argue that in the Polish case there is a dominant constellation that resembles the German *Kultur-nation* as Wæver describes it. I will call this *culture nation/power state*. However, there is also a challenging constellation that looks more like the French. I will call this *political nation–centralized state*.

### 1.3.3.2 Relational layer

The second layer is made up of relational perceptions of Poland vis-à-vis representations of Europe. Here I have to investigate how the basic constellations from level one are related to representations of Europe. Wæver regards the relation between the constellation at level one and the representation of Europe as comprised by two moves. The first entails a particular

articulation of the constellation at level one. This move underpins that "while the basic construction of state-nation is providing a highly structuring impact on the discourse on Europe, it is not without room for maneuver; there is often flexibility or ambiguity connected to the way in which the constellation has been fused" (ibid.: 62). Going from level one to level two may therefore require revisions in the first layer. The second move concerns the relationship established between the particular articulation of the state-nation construction at level one and representations of Europe.

I will argue that the statements in this analysis show that when the culture nation/power state constellation relates to representations of Europe, it involves rearticulating layer one either strengthening or a weakening power and/or culture as a way of self-expression on the international arena. I believe there are four main ways that the culture nation/ power state relates to representations of Europe. One relates to a Europe as a meeting place of values and de-emphasizes both power and culture. Another relates to a Europe whose values are under constant threat and involves the rearticulating layer one in terms of culture as a way of self-expression. The third relates to a Europe that is decadent and in decay. This activates both power and culture. The fourth relates to Europe as a power, something that activates power as a way of self-expression.

### 1.3.3.3 The policy layer
The third layer is made up of the more specific policies pursued by specific groups of actors, often political parties. This is the most concrete and per-haps most important layer of analysis for a number of reasons. Wæver argues that it is at this level concrete political actors are found and, secondly, that it integrates a dynamic element into the structural model. He suggests that actors contest each other in three important ways:

> firstly, by arguing that their opponents fail to offer an appropriate construction of level one, that they offer a misleading – or even dangerous – interpretation by not paying sufficient attention to, for example, the cultural identity of the nation, or the necessary bond between the state and the nation. Secondly, the actors argue that the 'Europe' their opponents construct will pose a threat to the proper construction of the state-nation constellation. And thirdly, they claim that their opponents' interpretation of the character of the EU is out of touch with the real-ity of the EU, that the competing position, in principle, operates with a proper construction of the basic state-nation constellation, and that there is, again, in principle a sufficient correspondence between this construction and its 'Europe', but that this is an unrealistic construction given the character of European inte-gration (ibid.: 64–65).

By studying the discourse at this level we will be able to identify the realities the statements reproduce on all layers and thus discover certain European policy positions in discourse that define what kind of European political pro-ject that is promoted and what role Poland should play in it.

### 1.3.4 The materiality of discourse

As I have suggested earlier, the meaning conveyed by the concepts in discourse is in flux. The Copenhagen School solves this problem by suggesting that some concepts are more stable and that some layers are more sedimented than others. The scholars perform a variant of discourse analysis based on structural assumptions. The result is that there is little room left for explaining how discourses change; how the different identity projects clash and coincide, how the discursive practices work not only to perceive the representations that they uphold, but also how they modify these realities. The works of the Copenhagen School supply us with the existing policy positions in discourse and the discourse on which they rest, but it is not left any room for how the representations change, or even terminate. It is, for example, a fact that in Polish discourse today there is no such representation of the nation that defines it exclusively as the nobility. This representation has expired. In order to enrich the study with this important aspect I will supply it with an analysis of the institutions in discourse.

As I have argued before, the regularities of discourses are being held up by social practices. Such systems of rules may not only be discovered in language, but they also have a materiality in e.g. institutions. Institutions add materiality to discourse in establishing discursive practices that resist attempts to change the reality they reproduce. Representations in Polish discourse are thus likely to have some kind of social resonance, in one shape or another, which makes social practices reproduce them. This adds yet another stable element to discourse. Drawing on the work of Janice Bially (1998) and Iver B. Neumann (2000), I suggest that these processes may be thought of as a feedback-loop.

The feedback-loop is made up of a certain representation of reality, e.g. a certain representation of Poland. Another element is the values that carry this reality, e.g. certain notions that differentiate 'us' from 'them', or Europe from Poland, e.g. that a Pole is against abortion. These values are reproduced socially in a series of practices that coagulate around certain institutions that make up the third cluster, e.g. the Catholic Church. These institutions lend materiality to the particular reality of Poland represented by e.g. the Catholic Church. Resonance enters the picture when subjects act according to representations, values and institutions existing in the field (Neumann 2000: 56). The example may be illustrated with this feedback-loop:



*Figure 1.3.4*

Reality is always changeable. What it means to be a Pole will always be in a state of flux and 'we' do not even have to continue being Poles. The feedback-loop above may work as an example to illustrate this. To be against free abortion may be considered a value that according to a certain position represents a Pole. One of the notions that differentiate 'us' (Poland) from 'them' (Europe) is to be against abortion. The representation of a Pole in terms of being against abortion is provided with materiality by certain institutions (e.g. the Catholic Church). If alternative structures manage to break the feedback-loop presented above, for example that Poles are Europeans and liberal defenders of the right of free abortion, the Catholic Church will receive some serious hits that will threaten its institutional status as a reproducer of this specific reality. Another scenario is that the Catholic Church modifies its values and reproduces a modified version of reality where Poles may be defenders of free abortion.

I argue that in the kind of discourse analysis I will carry out in this thesis, it is important to show how values, institutions, and realities are ordered in relation to each other. Such a project opens up the bracket of individual agency, as well as it opens up for the possibility of change – not only as the result of a redistribution of power between a structurally defined set of positions, but through the process in which the representations in discourse change internally. Furthermore, as one of my objective goals is to provide you with tentative predictions of future developments in Polish European policy, it is important to be able to point out how the positions may change internally, not only how the discourse may change as a result of changing power between the positions.

In order to assess the persistence of the positions in discourse I will locate the values, institutions, and realities of different positions in discourse and look into how the different positions attempt to displace the values, institutions, and realities of other positions. I will in particular concentrate on political parties, but also certain periodicals, organizations, and the Catholic Church. I will argue that what kind of relationship that is promoted between Poland and Europe at the policy layer depends in particular on the values that assess Polish identity in relation to Europe at the second layer. If there is a border that is created between the two identities, with diacritical markers, the assessment of these markers defines the relationship. If the position reproduces Polish identity as a European identity, the markers that define this common identity will define the promoted relationship. In most cases there are combinations of Polish European identities and exclusive Polish identities. But the exclusive identities may also involve notions that are related to Europeanness. For example, as this thesis will show there is a position in Polish discourse that represents Poland as more European than the rest of Europe and as a 'bulwark' against the threats against European values. This thesis will show that the relationship with Europe is promoted in a way that reproduces the values that define the constellations at layer one and two and that in order for the position to change, these are the values that have to be modified or crushed.

### 1.3.5 The textual approach

Covering an entire domestic discursive space is in principle impossible. It is therefore necessary to apply certain measures that limit the texts to the ones that are highly relevant for the study. It will probably be helpful to start with secondary literature (Neumann 2000: 30). Reading this literature it will be possible to discover some texts that are *canonical* in the sense that they are often cited and referred to. These texts will be more important for the analysis because they have large reception and hence reproduce reality or change the all over frames of reference. Examples of such texts from IR discourse in the 1990s are for example Francis Fukuyama's "End of History?" or Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations". In the Polish case the *Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage* by Adam Mickiewicz ([1832] 1946) and the article "A New Evolutionism" by Adam Michnik ([1976] 1985) are examples of texts that we might say are canonical.

Secondly, texts by politicians acting in their official function, but also by others who contribute to shaping public discourse, e.g. intellectuals or researchers, will be highly relevant. When reading politicians it is more fruitful to select interventions in heated debates where they need to mobilize rhetoriccal power, and consequently draw on those semiotic structures that generate most meaning for their purpose, instead of negotiated blurred statements like party platforms (Wæver 1998: 115). Empirical research conveys that parliamentary debates seem to provide very clear representations of constructions of the key positions (Wæver 1999: 68). I will therefore devote a large share of the analysis to the study of Polish parliamentary debates and supply with articles from newspapers and journals.

Who are the actors in discourse? In discourse analysis everything that involves the medium of language is looked upon as actions (Neumann 2000: 29). The actors are therefore everyone who participates in discourse. Processes that go on in the minds of individuals are difficult to integrate into a foreign policy approach and in discourse analysis this is not what is at stake. Discourse analysis works on the structural condition and endeavors to derive the options among which choices are made. What interests us is which codes are used when actors relate to each other.

In order to analyze politics through discourse I have need of cultural competence. I need to be able to read texts in the original language and have to be familiar with certain cultural and political rules and codes (ibid.: 29). I have studied Central and Eastern European politics with a special focus on Poland for the last four years, including one year at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow in Poland. I believe I am familiar enough with Polish culture and Polish language to consider myself competent for the task.

### 1.3.6 Validity and reliability

What is the validity of making the concepts state, nation, and Europe operational through textual contributions? Could important representations be excluded from the analysis due to the textual approach? I have already argued that representations got to have a certain reception if they shall be able to make a difference in discourse. Representations communicated through electronic media, through direct speech, or in art, will also, if they have a

certain room of resonance in the public, make themselves visible in textual contributions. I therefore believe that all relevant constructions may be located in text.

What about the reliability of the data? What if the actors that make the statements lie? What if they do not really mean what they say? In discourse analysis it is not the truth claim that is crucial when it comes to reliability – it is the resonance of the text that is important. To question reliability one has to evaluate the resonance of the texts among the public (because it will be impossible to cover all texts) and question if all representations are included. I will study texts from various environments and presume that this will suffice to cover the whole field. I will emphasize texts written by opinion makers and people that are well known in cultural and political life.

I consider to have analyzed a sufficient amount of texts (the analysis can be said to be validated) at the moment when the theoretical categories I have generated work for new contributions (Milliken 1999: 234). In this respect it is important to announce that if, after my analysis is completed, someone brings me a contribution that may not be included into one of my categorical sets of representations, I will have to revise it.


## 1.4 The chapters

Discursive practices are historically constructed and confined. History is therefore an important analytical instrument. Chapter two provides the pre-history of the present discourse and presents you with the facts and events that are central for the understanding of today's proposed relationships between Poland and Europe. It sets out with some general remarks on historical analysis and it is argued that one has to read historical analysis critically. This is because historical studies are ingredients of institutionalized discursive practices. Historical analyses thus manifest certain positions in discourse that sustain certain realities by reproducing particular values and linking them to a certain representation of reality. The main part of the chapter is a reading of the Polish history endeavoring to locate the representations of state, nation, and Europe that today's discourse build on and suggest some policy positions. The Communist period will be treated in depth, as this period is closer in time to the more recent discourse, and because I believe it may serve as an example of how a discourse, the Communist one, was silenced by discursive practices of actors that institutionalized other representations.

Chapter three provides the identity layer and the representational layer in the shape I believe they emerge in Poland in the most recent years. The categories I end up with are based on the constellations I have discovered in the material I have studied from the period from 1989 to 1999, but I argue that all these categories have roots in history. At the identity layer there are two constellations; one that resembles the German one and one that resembles the French. I call them *culture nation/power state* and *political nation–centralized state* respectively. I argue that the political nation–centralized state has only one way of relating to Europe, a relation in which Europe is represented as a teacher that teaches Poland how to become European. The culture nation/power state relates to Europe in four different ways and each of

the relations involve either a weakening or a strengthening of power and/or culture as a way of self-expression on the international arena.

The categories are good tools to relate to in chapter four which is an analysis of the discourse between 1989 and 1999. This chapter locates the constellations presented in chapter three in the most recent discourse, and studies how these condition the concrete and proposed Polish European policies with emphasis on the EU. It is searched for continuity and brakes with history and investigated how continuance is kept and how breaks occur. It is also examined which values certain institutions, mainly political parties, reproduce that contribute to the reproduction of the realities in question: Poland and Europe. The process in which positions clash and coincide – how representations and positions change as a result of the reformulation of values, realities, and institutions – is also treated. It is argued that the most important values that the European policies have to reproduce – the most crucial values that the positions have to reproduce in order to sustain the position – are those who define how the different constellations of nation and state promote themselves on the European (international) arena. These feedback-loops are identified and make examples of how the positions may change internally. The analysis also provides an example where a position *has* changed in the course of the decade.

The fifth and last chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis and makes some concluding remarks.

## 2.0 The heritage

> The foreigners speak of us as obsessed with our past. Even if they somewhat exaggerate, we ourselves tacitly admit to a slight infatuation with Clio, particularly when she is clothed in white and red. History is an important and serious concern among us – it is present in the everyday life of the people and citizens, the society and the nation. [It] is everywhere in our country and it pulses with authentic life (Lepkowski 1984).

All statements are implicitly depending on history and on the discourses that precede the contemporary one. The language used in the present is always affected by the language of the past. A good discourse analysis can therefore not ignore the pre-history of the discourse in question. Another methodical argument for dedicating a whole chapter to history is that I have decided to take a combined approach of subjugated knowledges and genealogy, and genealogy is exactly the investigation into how the power of a certain discourse depends on how it conserves a certain unity with the past. There is also an empirical argument. In the epigraph it is suggested that history is of particularly great importance in Poland. Andrzej Walicki (1990: 21) maintains that the Poles are living "with the entire burden of history on our shoulders, without being able to forget about the past, or liberate ourselves from its omnipresent influence". Because of this, he argues, little analysis on Polish politics and society can be done without taking the historical dimension into account. Statements like these are flourishing in Poland and suggest that there is a central representation of Poland where historical consciousness is an important value.

All kinds of discursive practices are selections of facts and events. Facts are accepted truths. It is a fact that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was multicultural. When this fact is evoked in the present, it anchors the tradition of the Polish state in multiculturalism. It is also a fact that the population of the Kingdom of the Piast dynasty was relatively homogeneous in the cultural sense. When this fact is evoked in the present, it links the Polish state to a homogeneous population.

An event is a happening that may be represented in different ways. When the event that the Pope baptized Mieszko of the Piast dynasty is evoked in a statement on Poland's relation to Europe, it becomes part of a distinct discursive practice of representing Poland and Europe, and the relations between them, in terms of the common value of Christianity. If the statement evokes the event of the Warsaw uprising in 1944, it becomes part of a discursive practice of representing Europe in terms of fraud, because the dominant representation of this event is that in the Warsaw uprising Europe failed to come to Poland's rescue. Discursive practices are in other words shaped by the ways in which an event is and has been coupled to material factors in order to endow it with meaning; the ways in which it is *represented* and *has been represented* through history.

As this chapter will reveal, when the modern conception of state and nation developed in the 19th century, Poland as a territorial entity did not exist. What used to be the Polish lands belonged to three partitioning powers: the Russian, the Habsburg/Austro-Hungarian, and the German empires.

The partitioning powers were, and are still, often represented as repressive and foreign systems that deprived the Poles from their independence, sovereignty and freedom. The same applies for certain representations of the Communist regime. Much thinking on state and nation in Poland has therefore been dedicated to explaining why the Poles were deprived of their freedom, how the nation should be organized in order to regain sovereignty and independence, as well as how to resurrect Polish statehood. Such thinking has formed the basis of different historical schools and literary movements, like idealism, realism, romanticism, Messianism, and positivism. These schools and movements are examples of institutionalized discursive practices that uphold certain realities by reproducing particular values and should be studied as such.

This chapter provides you with facts and events from Polish history that are relevant for today's discourse on Europe. It also presents you with the legacy of Polish representations of state, nation, and Europe. I have chosen to start my presentation of Polish history with the baptism of Mieszko, as this is the first juncture where I have managed to find an intersection between the concepts of Poland and Europe in the material on which I base my analysis.

## 2.1 The roots of the Polish state and nation

Today, the dominant representation of the Polish state seems to trace its beginning back to the baptism of Mieszko in 966. Mieszko was the chief of a tribe called Polanie[2] whose members are commonly represented as the predecessors of the Polish nation. Most history books ignore the periods before 966, or treat them only in brief with some remarks on climate and topography, and maybe a few references to the various  tribes that inhabited what later became the territory of the Polish Kingdom. It should be clear, however, that in this period we speak neither of a Polish state in the modern sense of the word nor of a Polish nation. Neither was Europe a concept that was in common use in this period.

In the following section I will present you with what we may call the prehistory of the representations of the Polish state and nation, the concept of Europe, and Polish relations to Europe. As I do not have direct access to original material from this period, and as one of the purposes of my thesis is to show you how history is represented, I base the first section of the chapter on how Polish history is commonly represented in recent books and articles on Polish history. In later sections I will also bring contemporary statements into the analysis, and all the way I will attempt to take a critical approach to the material and try to distinguish the representations and the positions they suggest.

---

2    Polanie and Poland are believed to come from the Slav word pole meaning plain.

### 2.1.1 Piast

Mieszko was a member of the Piast[3] dynasty and his son, Bolesław the Brave, became the first crowned king of Poland in 1025. The administration was centralized and Christianity was consolidated. Although the early Piast kings ruled an autonomous kingdom, they were under considerate pressure from the Holy Roman Empire of Germany that they both cooperated with, especially in the ecclesiastical sphere, and fought numerous wars against.

During a period of fragmentation and feudal divisions (1138–1295) the Polanian princes fought the Teutonic order that had established itself as a power in the northern realm. Blessed with the papal mission to convert the Lithuanians, the order made far more success conquering land. In addition to this menace, the Polanian princes faced threats from the east and the west. The Mongols, who invaded the Polanian territories in the 13th century, destoryed many cities and murdered large shares of the population. This opened up for the *Drang nach Osten* that involved the rebuilding of destroyed cities under German auspices and the introduction of German law. Added to the economic power of the Hanseatic League, this strengthened German influence in the Polish territories.

The kingdom of the early Piasts was linguistically relatively homogeneous, with the exception of Jewish and German settlements in the towns. After the period of feudal division, a centralized administration was restored. Kazimierz the Great (king 1333–1370) freed himself for expansion to the east by resigning Silesia to the Luxembourgs, and by the time of his death in 1370 he had gathered large parts of Ruthenia under Polish rule, thus regaining in the east what he had lost to the west. Ruthenians and other Slav minorities were incorporated into the kingdom. The Jewish community increased as the kings encouraged Jewish refugees from the German Empire to settle in Poland.

Historical analyses of this period seem to agree that the main threat came from the Holy Roman Empire of Germany and the Teutonic knights[4]. The administration of the Polish Kingdom was rather centralized and the population predominantly Catholic and Polish speaking. To the extent we may talk about clear borders, they were located about where they are today. A study made by Kristian Gerner (1998) shows that the legacy of the *Piast* dynasty, as well as the heritage of the subsequent *Jagiellonian* dynasty, that will be presented in the following part of this section, have been cemented in Polish discourse as concepts describing specific traditions of thinking about the Polish state in relation to Europe. While the Polish state traditions of the Piast dynasty is based on a western orientation, a location at Europe's core, a centralistic state structure, the acceptance of subordination, Catholic religion, and a relatively homogenous population, the Jagiellonian tradition is based on an eastern orientation, a location at Europe's frontier, a federal state structure, a position of dominance, as well as on pluralism and multiculturalism.

---

3  Piast was probably an authentic person and is believed to have been a farmer, but the name is believed to be a later construction derived from the Polish verb piastować, meaning to "cradle in ones arms" (Borucki 1998: 10).
4  In discourse the multinational Teutonic power is often represented as a predecessor of Prussia and Germany.

### 2.1.2 Jagiełło

Lithuania accepted Catholicism from Poland in 1386 with the marriage between Queen Jadwiga of Poland and Prince Jagiełło of Lithuania. The Polish Kingdom and the Duchy of Lithuania were considered equals partners of a personal union. The event may be interpreted as a common need to gather forces against the Teutonic knights (Borucki: 33; Davies 1991: 116) and in this respect it was indeed a success. The victory at the battle of Grunwald in 1410 contained the expansion of the Teutonic knights and a good hundred years later King Zygmunt (1506–1548) turned the Teutonic realm into a secular fief of the Polish Kingdom.

Jagiełło established the Jagiellonian dynasty under which the Polish-Lithuanian Union became a major force ruling territories stretching from the Baltic to the Black and the Adriatic seas. The Polish-Lithuanian Union made up the largest empire of Christendom at the time, and emerged as a leading force in the fields of science, literature, and learning. There was a burst of economic activity and material wealth flourished.

The Polish-Lithuanian Union was populated by a multicultural and multilingual mass of people. Less than 50% were Catholics, about 30% were Uniates and the rest were Jews, Orthodox and, after the Reformation, Protestants (Davies 1991: 162). The largest language communities were the Polish, the Ruthenian, the Lithuanian, and the German. This multiculturalism is often used as an explanation of the great religious tolerance that supposedly existed in the Kingdom.

### 2.1.3 The emergence of a national consciousness

During the period of feudal divisions, regional assemblies had been held in order to advice the Polanian princes. When a central authority reemerged in the early 14th century, the king gave up his absolute powers and started to consult a general assembly, the *Sejm*[5], in order to increase his support. When Poland joined Lithuania in a union, the monarch was to be elected. In reality the title was hereditary until the death of the last Jagiellonian king. The leading role in the *Sejm* was played by the *szlachta*[6], the Polish nobility. Every nobleman had the right to own land, enjoyed reduced tax obligations, was eligible to the *Sejm* as well as to the throne, and had the right to vote. These political rights were embodied in the notion *Natio Polonica* to which every nobleman belonged regardless of confession, ethnic origin, or language. With time, the nobility developed a common identity based on their political privileges. In other terms, we may say that the Polish nation was a *political community* where loyalty to the Polish political tradition was the central element.

The Polish-Lithuanian Union was decentralized. The regional *Sejmiki*[7] decided all matters of local importance and elected and instructed their own representatives to the *Sejm*. The Lithuanian nobility had their own political system, but matters concerning both countries were settled jointly. Besides

---

5    The Polish word Sejm comes from a Slav term that means 'big rally'.
6    The Polish word szlachta is believed to come from the German slecht that means kinship; family.
7    Sejmik is the diminutive of Sejm and literally means a small Sejm.

proclaiming laws the *Sejm* fixed taxation, controlled the administration and the finances of the kingdom, and received reports from foreign ambassadors and envoys. It also decided on important foreign policy issues, especially on questions concerning peace and war. The king was prohibited from declaring war, because it was believed that this right could make him pursue personal or dynastic ambitions. In 1505 the *Sejm* codified a parliamentary practice called *Nihil Novi* (Nothing New), a resolution that obliged the king to refrain from introducing any changes in the established system without the agreement of the *Sejm*. *Nihil Novi* drastically reduced the powers of the monarch and opened for a system of noble democracy.

With the Union of Lublin (1569), Lithuania and Poland were united as the *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów* (The Commonwealth of Two Nations), a name that emphasized the equality of the Polish and Lithuanian nations (defined as the Polish and Lithuanian nobility). English texts on Polish history commonly replace *Rzeczpospolita* with "republic"; however, the direct translation of the word is "common good". Historians who choose to translate *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów* with "the Commonwealth of two Nations" thus provide a better understanding of the meaning this word seems to have expressed in this period. In the *Rzeczpospolita* Poland and Lithuania were joined under a common foreign and security policy coordinated by a jointly elected ruler and a joint *Sejm*, but kept a set of dual administrative offices on all levels. They had a joint customs and monetary union, but kept their own treasuries. Although Poland and Lithuania per definition were equals of a federation, Poland was the stronger part when it came to political power and cultural influence. Polish was increasingly used as the administrative language of the *Rzeczpospolita* and the Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobility in the eastern territories adopted Polish language in order to distance themselves from the local peasants (Törnquist-Plewa 2000: 13).

The resolutions of the *Sejm* were enacted according to the principle of consensus – each representative had the right to *liberum veto*. The right to veto was based on the belief that an individual member of the *Sejm* had the moral duty to resign private or minority interests for the benefit of the *common good* of the Polish nation. If he had the courage to use the right of free protest to rule out the will of the majority, it was assumed that his motivation emerged from the conviction that the proposed law would inhibit the realization of the common good, and his veto had to be respected. The same idea justified the right to form a *confederation,* which was an expression of the individual nobleman's right to oppose the *Sejm* and the king. A confederation took the shape of an armed association of men, sworn to pursue their grievances until justice was obtained, and was a kind of legalized form of civil war undertaken in the name of the common good; by nobles acting in the defense of the law and conscious of its protection.

The political system of the period may be thought of as the institutionailzation of a set of discursive practices upholding a hegemonic representation of the nation where anti-authoritarianism and egalitarian principles were central values. The king, the members of the *Sejm,* and the rest of the nobility, were considered equal members of the Polish nation. Every member of the nation was eligible to the *Sejm* and also had the theoretical possibility to be elected king. Each individual member had the right to pursue overthrowing

the king and the *Sejm*, institutions that today are part of the state concept, if he thought they were menacing the common good of the nation. It was expected that all members of the nation would give up personal or minority interests for the sake of the common good of the nation. The rights to veto and confederate were rarely practiced during the 15th, 16th and 17th century. Against this background we may say that the political system of the *Rzeczpospolita* succeeded in reproducing a set of values that represented the Polish nation as a *moral* community.

## 2.2 A Catholic Poland in a Christian Europe

The following section will look into the period from the end of the 16th century to the partitions that found place in the end of the 18th century. It is common to perceive the end of the 16th century as the beginning of a Polish time of troubles. A combination of a difficult political situation both internally and externally was accompanied by economic difficulties and a relative decline in political power.

In this period we see a consolidation of a representation of Europe as a Christian community. Christianity also becomes a part of the representation of the Polish nation, as well as the belief that the nation has a mission in Europe defending its Christian values. Towards the end of the period these thoughts are contested by the representation of Europe that was introduced with the Enlightenment and the definition of a certain nation as the people inhabiting a certain state.

### 2.2.1 Bulwark

We may trace the political differentiation of a Christian community back to the Middle Ages. This project necessitated the construction of a border, the definition of a *sui generis* frontal zone, separating Christianity from heathen, Moslem, and schismatic countries (Olszewski 1992: 72). As Christianity progressed, new countries joined the Christian community and became so-called *finis* (bordering states) or *antemurales* (bulwarks) *christianitatis* (of Christendom). This status proved that the country was involved in the constant defense of the Christian community against invasion by pagan neighbors. Wars waged against pagan invaders were not only justified as wars defending the frontier country, but also as wars protecting states lying deep inside the community (Krzyżaniakowa 1992: 3).

Europe as a term began to be used frequently and took on political importance only after Christendom had been politically fractured under the strain of the Ottoman onslaught (Neumann 1999: 44). In the 16th century the dominant representation of Europe in Polish discourse was as a Christian community and Poland was commonly represented as a "bulwark" (*przedmurze*) of Christendom. This representation could theoretically have worked in an integrating manner with room for all variants of Christianity, but in practice the representation seems to have been predominantly reproduced by the institutions of the Polish Counter-Reformation and thus involved the safeguarding of Catholicism (Olszewski 1992: 72–73). This representation brought with it a strong anti-Russian rhetoric: Moscow was regarded as a be-

trayer of the Roman Catholic Church and an uncertain partner in the family of Christian states. The Turks were characterized as enemies of the Holy Cross and the adversaries of the whole of Christianity (*Sejm* resolutions 1690 and 1634 cited by Olszewski 1992:76).

Poland was involved in many wars during the 16th and 17th centuries and all of them were in one way or another legitimized as wars to fight paganism and reactivate Catholicism (Cyrnarski 1992: 33). Zygmunt III Wasa (King 1587–1632) planned to establish a close alliance with the Habsburgs in order to jointly fight for the reactivation of Catholicism in Northern and Eastern Europe. A period of 60 years of warfare between the Poles and the Swedes followed, culminating in what is called the Deluge (*Potop*). One of the few strongholds of resistance against the Swedes was the monastery at Jasna Góra in Częstochowa. Within the walls of the monastery was an icon of Virgin Mary famous for its miraculous powers. After the war she was ascribed the miraculous capacity of saving Poland from oppression by foreign powers and the king organized a ceremony in which he declared Virgin Mary 'Queen of Poland' (Törnquist-Plewa 1992: 34). Through the 17th century many kings tried to organize crusades against Turkey, and in 1621, after the successful battle against the Turks at Chocim, Pope Urban VIII is supposed to have proclaimed that Poland was an *antemurale christianitas* (bulwark of Christendom) (Wilamowski et al. 1998: 113). The bulwark metaphor is actively used today and, as I will argue in subsequent chapters, the idea that Poland is the protector of European values still defines a position in Polish discourse.

### 2.2.2 Sarmatism

In the 16th century a theory was launched purporting that the *szlachta* was descending from Sarmatians who had enslaved the peoples inhabiting the areas around the Wisła and the Volga rivers. While other peoples intermingled with slaves, prisoners and aliens, the Sarmatians allegedly managed to keep themselves of pure ethnic stock (Prizel 1998: 43).

Sarmatism represented the Polish nation and the Polish state as superior to the rest of Europe and the noble republic as a perfect political system of God designated by him to the Polish nation. The author Andrzej Maksymilian Fredo (1620–1679) claimed that the creation of the political system of the *Rzeczpospolita* was ascribed to God, that God had designed a different model of existence for the Poles and therefore protected their faith (Cynarski 1992: 34). Poland was represented as the granary of Europe and the Sarmatian nobility adopted the representation of Poland as a bulwark of Christian Europe. It was argued that the Western monarchies did not present a threat. On the contrary they would rather protect Poland, as they were consciously aware of the fact that the *Rzeczpospolita* defended them from assaults of the infidel (Walicki 1994a: 11).

The Sarmatic representation of the Polish nation was more exclusive than the political definition, making Polish language and Catholicism imperative values. It was believed that the Polish nation was unique because of its faith, courage, and love of freedom. Any reform aiming at changing the contemporary political system would destroy these values. The *Rzeczpospolita* was

believed to be different from other European countries that had instituted the principle of absolutist monarchy or were experimenting with revolutionary ideas of bringing the masses of the people to power. When the thoughts of the Enlightenment established a firm basis among the Polish political elite, they constituted a serious challenge to the Sarmatist representations.

Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the differences within the noble estate had been rapidly increasing. In the 18th century political power seemed to be concentrated to a handful of nobles called magnates. On some occasions the magnates appeared to have more loyal subjects in their service than the king himself and they often made decisions going against the king's preferences. Such ventures at times took the shape of confederations backed by foreign powers. Foreign powers also bought votes from the nobles in order to paralyze the *Sejm*. The extensive use of the right to confederate and veto impeded political reforms and produced a political deadlock.

### 2.2.3 The Polish Enlightenment

The thoughts of the Enlightenment were in many ways opposed to Sarmatism and politicized the identity layer as it brought about different representations of Europe, state, nation, and the relations between these concepts. The values, realities, and institutions of the Polish Enlightenment challenged the representations of the Sarmatist nobility. The Enlighteners often made fun of the Sarmatist nobility, like Stanisław Kostka Potocki, who in *Podróz do Ciemnogrodu* (A Journey to Ignoranceville) accused it of being ignorant, backward and full of prejudice against the outside world (Jedlicki 1999: 15).

Enlightenment thought was rationalistic and promoted relativism and humanism. This undermined the representation of Poland as the frontier wall of Christendom as well as the representation of Europe as a Christian community. Industrialism was opposed to the belief in the centrality of agriculture. The definition of the nation as all the inhabitants threatened the privileged position of the nobility. The definition of freedom as something relying on an enlightened form of constitutional monarchy was in contrast to the values of noble democracy where the concept of freedom was coupled with the noble privileges. The Polish Enlightenment may in part be thought of as the institutionalization of a set of discursive practices aiming at breaking the feedback loop of Sarmatist values, institutions, and realities.

The enlightened elite tended to represent Europe as a civilization of modern thought and development. They blamed what they perceived as Polish backwardness in relation to the rest of Europe on the Sarmatist *szlachta* because they believed that this group preserved a regime that denied Poland access to Europe; to development in pace with the civilization to which Poland really belonged. The institution of law was regarded as a guarantee for the freedom among nations and peoples and it was argued that only if the natural rights of man were made universal, peace and prosperity would prevail. The Polish Enlighteners described the nation in terms of land, language, and historic relics while "governments, laws, arms, customs, education and sciences – together with reason and civilization – are shared by all nations" (Staszic quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 27). The process of reform would have to be accompanied by the construction of a strong national identity among all

the inhabitants of the state. This necessitated an educational program that in addition would homogenize the population culturally and linguistically.

The Polish Enlightenment represented a different relationship between the state and the nation. The nation was defined in a broader sense as all those inhabiting the Polish state. It was contended that the state first had to be strong and centralized under a hereditary monarch in order to integrate the nation as a political entity, but the goal was that the people would be enlightened so that they could become active and responsible citizens with political rights and duties. Europe was represented in terms of civilization and constitutional law regulating the relationship between the state and the nation.

The Polish Enlighteners believed that Poland, surrounded by strong and powerful neighbors, was too weak to stand on its own feet without the support of one of the surrounding powers. Stanisław August Poniatowski, a protégée of Empress Catherine II of Russia, was elected king in 1764 and while accepting Russian influence he aspired to maximize independence in internal affairs. Together with his advisors and the *Monitor*[8] group, he made efforts to carry out reforms that would remove the most obvious disadvantages of the system of magnate oligarchy, the most important perceived as the abolishment of the *liberum veto*, strengthening the monarchical institution and making it hereditary, and helping Poland out of economic and cultural backwardness (Jedlicki 1999: 4 and 46).

In 1772 large shares of Polish territory were distributed between Russia, Austria and Prussia in the first Polish partition. In 1791, on 3 May, a new liberal Constitution was enacted that removed the *liberum veto*, made the throne hereditary, limited the influence of the magnates, extended burghers' rights, and put the peasants under legal government protection. The text of the document emphasized the "unity of the nation" and replaced the concept of "the two nations" (Poland-Lithuania) with the "Polish nation", thus abandoning the idea of federalism for the idea of a unitary state-nation (Walicki 1989: 72–73). The conservative faction of the nobility opposed the Constitution and some of them confederated at Targowica. Until today Targowica stands as a symbol of treason when Poles, following their own private interests, allied with a foreign power and brought about the disintegration of the Polish state.

With the blessing of the Russian Empress the Targowica confederates succeeded in banning the reforms of the enlighteners. In 1793 Poland was partitioned for the second time. In 1794 reformists as well as revolutionary groups joined forces in the Kościouszko uprising, supported by Stanisław August, aiming at restoring Polish independence. Russian forces brought down the uprising, the Constitution of 3 May was abolished, and Poland was wiped off the map by a third partition in 1795.

## 2.3 Partitions

The period of partitions lasted from 1795 to 1918. This is the same period in which the modern concepts of state and nation were defined and consoli-

---

8   Monitor (1765–1785) was a Warsaw journal propagating the philosophical and moral ideas of the Enlightenment.

dated in European discourse. The Polish discourse was influenced by these thoughts and was characterized by battles over what kind of Poland that should be revived when independence was reestablished.

Enlightenment thought was mixed with an idealistic and revolutionary movement in the Polish legions. The Polish legions reproduced a representation of Europe as the guarantor of universal law and national freedom. The National Romantic Movement opposed the representation of Europe as the guarantor of universal law and instead represented it as a sphere of regress and a threat to Christianity and Polish values. The positivist movement that emerged in the 1870s revitalized the representation of Europe as a progressive civilization and promoted Polish association with European civilization as a precondition for Polish national existence. The romantic trend was invigorated towards the end of the 19th century and sustained the representation of Europe as a sphere of decadence and decay moving towards the edge.

### 2.3.1 A Europe of national freedom

The Polish legions fought for the freedom of all European nations under the banner *za wolność wasza i nasza* (for your freedom and ours). The legions were institutions representing Europe in terms of universal values manifested by Enlightenment thought with national freedom as the core value. The legionnaires believed in a universal revolution in which all the nations of Europe, including Poland, would be freed from slavery. It believed that Poland would receive help from the rest of Europe in resurrecting national freedom, in terms of the resurrection of Polish statehood, and that this would be achieved in a European revolution against absolutism.

The hymn of the legions operating in Italy under the auspices of Napoleon later became the Polish national anthem. The text is a good illustration of the *credo* of the freedom fighters: *Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła, póki my żyjemy* (Poland is not yet lost, as long as we live). In other words, as long as the nation is alive and the will to fight for national freedom lasts, Poland will also exist. We see that at this moment in time there had been a separation between the concepts of state and nation. The existence of a Polish nation did not require the existence of a Polish state; it was the will of its people that counted. This may of course be interpreted as a result of the fact that Poland as a state did not exist at the time and that the only possibility of preserving the reality of a Polish nation was a redefinition of the relationship to the state. We may say that there was a need to institutionalize the values that depicted the reality of the Polish nation in another shape than the state. Representing the nation as an entity that justified itself on the international arena by promoting European values did this.

The legionnaires' representation of Poland as a nation fighting for the freedom of other nations was easily adapted to the representation of Poland as a defender of Christian Europe as well as to the historical legacy of the wars of the 16th and 17th centuries when Poland was represented as the defender of Christian Europe against the onslaughts of the infidels. The difference was that this time Europe was not represented in terms of Christian values. Europe was first and foremost represented as the defender of univer-

sal law and national freedom. Europe was a bastion of Enlightenment and rationalism.

### 2.3.2 Bridge

The representation of Europe as the guarantor of national freedom had a variant that took a more reformist approach than the legionnaires. Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861) believed in the institutionalization of the universal principles of the Enlightenment in "a supra-national institution" in which all nations will have their representatives and whose aim would consist in mediating and arbitrating in international conflicts. This would start out as an all-European organization whose first task would be to liquidate all kinds of national oppression. Czartoryski did not believe in revolutions or national insurrections. In contrast he thought that European integration could only be reached in understanding with the empires and in this process Poland could serve as a "bridge between the East and the West" (quoted in Walicki 1994b: 85).

Czartoryski's statement shows how the West and the East served as representations of the civilized and the less civilized, but also that he regarded both these spheres as parts of Europe. The metaphor of Poland as a "bridge between the East and the West" could be amended to the previous representation of Poland as a country spreading European values to the East in terms of Christian values. The reformist approach of Czartoryski and the metaphor of Poland as a bridge have, as we will see later, remained in Polish discourse up till today and defines a position in the Polish discourse on Europe.

### 2.3.3 Pagan Europe

In the beginning of the 19th century it became increasingly popular to represent the Polish nation as a "Christ of Nations" suffering for the sake of Europe. The martyr image and the allusions to Poland as a Messiah of Europe characterized a Polish romantic tradition called Messianism. Adam Mickiewicz explicitly formulated the representation in 1832 in his *Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage* (*Ksiengi narodu polskiego i pilgrzymstwa polskiego*). "In the beginning there was only one God and there was freedom in the world", but then the rulers of Europe created new idols for their people to worship; the French bowed to "Honor", or the Golden Calf; the Spaniards to "Political Power", or Baal; the English to "Sea Power and Commerce", or Mammon. God sent them the greatest punishment, which was slavery. Surrounding Poland, the only nation that had not resigned the one and only true God and thus was the embodiment of "Freedom", was a "satanic trinity". This trinity decided to slay and bury "Freedom".

> But the Polish nation did not die. Its body lies in the grave; but its spirit has descended into the abyss, that is into the private lives of people who suffer slavery in their country. But on the third day the soul shall return again to the body, and

the Nation shall arise, and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery (Mickiewicz [1832] 1946: 42).

The statement represented Europe in terms of absolutism and decay. It fused the Sarmatian image of the Polish nation as morally, culturally, and politically superior to other nations with the idea that it had the sacred mission to protect the freedom of Europe. This freedom could only be secured by the return to the universal law of Christianity. The European powers were represented as morally and culturally corrupt and only Poland, which had kept itself pure, had the potential to bring freedom back to Europe in terms of a salvation. The statement represents the historical event of the partitions in terms of a spiritual mission given to the Polish nation.

It is worth noting that Mickiewicz represents the Polish state, the body, as the worldly part of a higher substance, the soul, which represents the nation. The state and the nation are one but at the same time separated. The statement idealizes the Polish state as it had been before the partitions. "Freedom" symbolizes the noble republic and it is suggested that Poland should be resurrected with "two souls in one body", the other soul representing the Lithuanian nation.

National romanticism propagated a definition of the nation that de-emphasized the empirical in favor of the spiritual and moral. Maurycy Mochnacki wrote that the "essence of the nation is not a collection of people living on a territory defined by certain borders, but rather the collection of their own ideas, feelings, and thoughts" (quoted in Porter 2000: 20). Poland existed because the Polish people existed, but the representation of the nation also worked on a deeper level: the nation was fundamentally the representation of a moral principle. Mochnacki believed that the nation possessed a coherent existence that transcended the disparate accumulation of ideas, feelings, and thoughts; the nation was moving towards the realization of an inner *telos*, towards greater perfection. The nation was the representation of a universal ideal (Porter 2000: 21).

Among the national romanticists there was a tendency to reject the thoughts of the Enlightenment, especially those of universal laws and rules of government, as foreign elements that interrupted Polish national history and impeded the nation from realizing its own biography and identity (Jedlicki 1999: 18–20). Joachim Lelewel, one of the most important political ideologues of the national romantic movement, created a myth asserting that ideas perceived as the foundations of European freedom, equality, and fraternity, as well as republican democracy, originated in the traditions of the Polish nation and the Polish *Rzeczpospolita*, thus the Poles could claim priority over the French and the English (Jedlicki 1999: 33). Poland had nothing to learn from the West. On the contrary, the contemporary West, decayed as it was, should learn from Poland. The position of Lelewel was 'the Polish way'; Poland should restore the political system as it had been before the partitions and should keep itself clean from influence from the West. The primary threat against the nation was the collapse of the original national features that had developed from within.

The romantic tradition modified the Sarmatist representations of the nation and the state. Some still maintained that only the nobility comprised the

nation up to the 20th century, but with time they allowed for other layers of society to be included into the concept of the nation as well. This may be explained as a result of the dissolution of the *szlachta* as an institution reproducing the nation. The romantic tradition tended to represent Europe as a Christian community, only that today, it was claimed, Europe was decadent and decayed.

### 2.3.4. Uprisings

The Polish patriots, understood as those striving for the resurrection of a Polish state, both Enlighteners and romanticists, joined forces on several occasions during the 19th century. In 1830 they united in the *November uprising* that was brought down by the Russians in 1831. In the 1830s, with the outbreak of the uprising, a delegate to the *Sejm* stated:

> Europe is looking at us. Yes, Europe may admire us, but it will also judge us. […] European critics will observe, scrutinize, and judge all our steps. […] We are still novices in constitutional education, but the degree of statute in the hierarchy of the civilized nations will depend on or statute of national representation (quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 16).

The delegate represented the relationship between Poland and Europe as that of learning. The representations of Poland as a 'novice' and Europe as a 'teacher' were common during the Polish Enlightenment. We will see such metaphors invoked in recent statements in the following chapters and I will argue that they define a position that resembles that of the Enlighteners.

Many had expected Western help in the uprising, and the fact that this was not provided was a hit against the representation of Europe as the defender of national freedom. On the other hand it fired up under martyr images of Poland as a nation suffering under Europe's sins. In 1848 Mickiewicz organized a small legion fighting for the liberation of Northern Italy from Austrian rule and in the same year Poles were engaged in the Rumanian and the Hungarian revolutions. The "Springtime of Nations" ended with the victory of reactionary forces and erased Polish hopes of freedom. In 1863 Polish patriots joined forces in the *January uprising*. The uprising failed and the West did not intervene with support.

### 2.3.5 Positivism

The school called positivism emerged in the 1860s and claimed that Europe had ceased to exist as a political idea, but that it continued to exist as a vital civilizational idea into which subjugated and backward peoples would have to enter or alternatively perish (Jedlicki 1999: 225). Industrialization was the only way to ensure active membership in this civilization and was also necessary in order to ensure national survival. The features of the previous regime of noble democracy were discredited and the necessity of a strong authoritarian government was put in its place.

The positivists represented the nation as an entity that justified itself through its produce, not through any metaphysical mission or higher goal:

Let us forsake the illusory thought that we are an indispensable condition for European equilibrium, an indispensable dam checking the waves of Asian barbarity […]. We should try to justify the Poles' right to existence not by claiming that Europe cannot sleep peacefully without them, that they are the most faithful guardians of Europe's barns and granaries, but by the fact that they exist for themselves and by themselves, that they form a separate quite numerous nation that has its own, reasonably developed civilization which adds to mankind's progress and enriches it with significant original elements. Those, whose right to life stems from these sources, will be understood and finally respected by the whole world (Świętochowski quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 224).

So far, Poland did not deserve respect as it had not adopted a modern scale of values and remained "perhaps the least democratic nation in Europe." Poland still cultivated the cast system that allowed for the separation of "aristocracies of birth, of money, of rank, and of learning." Because of this Poles were disliked in Europe and it was not without reason that the nation was ridiculed as a "long obsolete anachronism" (ibid.).

The positivist tradition may be regarded an attempt to break the realities, values, and institutions of the romantic and the idealist tradition. According to the positivists the Polish nation existed in itself and it expressed itself through its abilities to develop and modernize. The positivists represented Europe as a civilizational idea and the nation justified itself as a modern nation by adapting to European standards. Being European signified a certain status that one had to qualify for and Poland did not qualify. Poland was represented as inferior that had to learn from Europe.

### 2.3.6 Neo-Romanticism

Towards the end of the 19th century the representation of Europe as a sphere of decay and decadence was revitalized and reinforced. The journalists of the daily newspaper *Czas* (Time) compared the contemporary European monarchies with ancient Asian states "which likewise rested exclusively on material power and overthrew each other successively, and left no historical legacy behind" and the European development with the worship of the Golden Calf and the tower of Babel, the only difference being that this tower "sank deeper and deeper into the ground in order to oppose its earthly power to that of heaven" (quoted in Jedlicki 1999: 216–217).

*Młoda Polska* (Young Poland) was a neo-romantic literary movement that existed from 1890 to 1918. Its members suggested that Europe was close to catastrophe and criticized what they perceived as a decadent form of contemporary social-political life. *Młoda Polska* contested the positivistic ideas of resurrecting Poland through modernization and adoption to the standards of European civilization as well as the ideas that the nation manifested itself through its produce. *Młoda Polska* turned to the glorification of the national uprising as the demonstration of the will to exist as a nation.

In the romantic drama *Wesele* (The Wedding) from 1901 Stanisław Wyspiański (1869–1907) combines the tragic history of Poland's demise with a hope that the intelligentsia (the groom, the poet) and the peasants (the

bride) will join forces and regain Polish independence through an uprising. But first, the national spirit of the people has to be awakened.

> Bride: But where is this Poland, where? Do you know?
> Poet:  You may search, dear Bride, all over the world for Poland, and never ever find it. […] But there is one small cage – Jagusia, place your hand on your breast. […] - - - there beats?
> Bride: […] My heart-!-?
> Poet: Well, that is Poland [*A to Polska właśnie*] (Wyspiański 1956: 192–193)

The dialogue is an example of how the Romantic Movement tended to describe the Polish nation in metaphysical terms – as a concept that existed in the hearts of the people. The metaphor of the sleeping nation that has to be awakened resembles the idea of Christ that lies in the grave and waits to arise. In the end of the play, a peasant is supposed to blow a golden horn so that the nation will wake up and take part in a glorious and successful uprising. The attempt ends in tragedy. The peasant loses the golden horn and the nation remains in its sleep.

The neo-romanticists perceived the industrial, social, and scientific revolution of 19th century Europe as the antithesis of the Polish values that reproduced the national reality of the romanticists and the proposed relationship was no relationship. Some turned to the trend of international socialism. Others stayed with the tradition of internal insurrections. The neo-romanticists also redefined the representation of the nation replacing the noble nation with the whole people of the Polish lands, but the values were the same and continuance with the noble traditions was kept.

### 2.3.7 National Democracy

The literary positivist and realist tradition inspired and supported Dmowski and the National Democrats, to whom I will turn to in a moment. In *The Trilogy* the Nobel laureate Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846–1916) described the battles of the 17th century that led to Poland's demise as a powerful European state. The work is filled with descriptions of noble heroism and courage, but reveals clear suspicion towards the noble democracy of the time. On the other hand the Polish king is always described as a strong, but simultaneously a caring and loving man – as the father of the nation and a gathering symbol:

> The King is our Father, and the Rzeczpospolita our mother. The King is a just and merciful man, but those kinglets [the magnates] are another matter! There's no way for a man to live with them and their rents and their tithes and taxes…It's their tyranny that supports the Jews who squeeze blood out of this land like water from a cheese!" (Sienkiewicz [1884] 1999: 92).

The bias against the magnates and the Jews is easily detectable. The works of Sienkiewicz sought to rebuild loyalty to the state institutions. They also contributed to the construction of other Polish enemy images in the shape of foreign prototypes, like Teutonic knights, Tartars, Turks, and Swedes, in

contrast to the Catholic Poles acting as the civilizing defenders of Christendom and freedom (Giergielwicz 1968: 82–83). Nation building was important for the positivist and realist traditions. Stefan Żeromski (1864–1925) quested for great ideas that could endow life with meaning and he rejected one after another until only the nation remained:

> I prefer to die for a holy idea. That heart, that great unknown will no longer be god [sic], because I do not know him, not religion, because I despise it, not a future life, because I doubt [its existence] – it will be a collective soul, the visible god, the tangible religion and the life of centuries: the fatherland [ojczyzna] (quoted in Porter 2000: 115).

*Ojczyzna* is a notion, derived from the word *ojciec,* the Polish word for father, which may be translated into English by fatherland. The concept *ojczyzna* appeared in Polish culture already in the Middle Ages, but it was only in the period of the partitions that it was represented as non-dependant of the concept of a Polish Kingdom, independent of the existence of a Polish state (Bartmiński 1993: 23). The positivists tended to represent the *ojczyzna* in concrete terms, as earth, national territory, as a collection of people, the nation, as a family, and as a collection of values. The romantic tradition tended to represent the fatherland more metaphorically, as they represented the nation, as an idea. They also tended to personify it as a mother, a lover, or a Godlike creature, that was suffering and bleeding.

Roman Dmowski (1864–1939) and the National Democrats promoted the construction of a new nation that could act in a world plagued by the unending war of all against all. They used the rhetoric of *power* and *struggle* to justify the need for a homogenous nation and rejected the thought that history had generated, or would generate the nation, of its own accord. They repudiated the slogans "for our freedom and yours", and the belief in universal ideals of ethics and moral that stood above the national struggle, denied that history was progressive and leading somewhere, and instead insisted on authority, homogeneity, and discipline, and the resurrection of a centralized state as the only way of surviving as a nation. In 1905 Dmowski wrote:

> Only a strong national organization, based on a deep respect for tradition, is capable of guaranteeing human society moral health over the centuries […] Thus national ethics is the foundation of interpersonal ethics […] Wherever [these ethics] perish, all of social life will gradually dissolve, society will atomize, all moral bonds will be broken, mutual obligation will disappear, and we will reach the state of homo homini lupus (quoted in Porter 2000: 194).

The paraphrase of Hobbes anchored Dmowski in realism. His idea was to organize the nation socially in a strong nation-state, a Leviathan, Hobbes' repository of individual autonomy, that would bring the lost, atomized, savage, human race out of the *lex naturalis*.

Dmowski represented Catholicism as the core value of the Polish nation:

> When we examine the elements in our souls that make us today a modern European nation we can find their roots in both our ancient ethnic origin and the exi-

stence over centuries of the Polish state, as well as in our millennium-old attachment to Catholicism. Catholicism is not an adjunct to Polishness, merely coloring it in some special way, but is inherent in its very core and to a large extent constitutes its very essence. Any attempt to divide Catholicism and Polishness, to separate the Nation from the religion and the Church, then, strikes at the very essence of our nation (quoted in Hall 1987: 231).

Dmowski represented contemporary Europe as a bourgeois society that had turned away from the honest Christian faith to a brutal egoism emancipated from all moral standards. But socialism, as proposed by a large share of Polish society, was not the solution to the disorder that threatened society. On the contrary the quest for order, beauty, and faith within a just society culminated in "socialist decadence", wrote Dmowski. This false (in his view) resolution to the crisis of modernity was the product of humanitarianism, which he linked to an imagined feminization of Polish culture (Porter 2000: 195). These statements were direct attacks on the romantic tradition as well as on the camp of his greatest opponent, Józef Piłsudski, who was an affiliate of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). I will return to him later.

The National Democrats formed the foundation of a *cultural nation/ power state* with strong ties between them and a strong emphasis on both power and culture as means of self-expression. In order to maximize power the state had to be culturally homogeneous and strongly organized. Dmowski favored Poland with the borders of the Piast era and accused the nobility that had "neglected the Western core of the Polish lands, the cradle of the Piast dynasty, where the masses were ethnically Polish" (quoted in Crampton 1997: 9). The Kingdom of the Piasts was represented as a prefiguration of what an independent Polish state should look like. Catholicism was an important feature of national culture and Europe was a Christian community; however, European society at the present was degenerating, turning away from its core values for the sake of brutal egoism emancipated from moral standards.

The National Democrats saw Germany as the chief threat to Polish nationhood and argued that only a strong and healthy Poland could contain further German expansion. They sought to regain Polish independence through legal means and advocated conciliation with the Russians.

### 2.3.8 Piłsudski

Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) remained faithful to the idealistic-romantic project of reviving Poland through an insurrection against the partitioning powers. He cultivated the myth of the former uprisings as heroic patriotism: "each generation must demonstrate with its blood that Poland is alive and that she will not reconcile to foreign bondage" (quoted in Bromke 1967: 26). He promoted the recreation of Poland in its historical shape as a huge federation, rejoining the peoples of Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania in one nation that could cordon off Russia from the rest of Europe. Russia was to Piłsudski an "Asian beast, concealed behind a European façade" (quoted in Bromke 1967: 24) while Europe was first and foremost the protector of law regulating the relationship between the state and its citizens.

Piłsudski represented the nation as those inhabiting the *Rzeczpospolita* of the pre-partition period. To him Polish values were first and foremost promoted through the state. Piłsudski and his associates promoted the construction of a state-nation in pace with the European traditions that Dmowski was opposed to. This was fist and foremost thought of in terms of a constitution securing the rights of national minorities and integrating different cultures into a republican state as citizens.

## 2.4 The Second Rzeczpospolita

Poland regained status as an independent state as a result of the peace treaties after the First World War. The Versailles treaty designated the new Polish state with a far narrower territory than that of the old *Rzeczpospolita.* Piłsudski, who was declared president and chief of the Polish armed forces, immediately started working on the project to establish the old historical borders by fighting the Russians. His soldiers succeeded in gaining vast areas of land to the east and more than doubled the territory that Poland had been assigned through the Versailles treaty. The war against the Russians has later been represented as a war that stopped the westward expansion of bolshevism, thus the *antemurale* concept was invoked in terms of Poland being a bulwark against Communism (Crampton 1997: 39; Mach 1997: 37; Wilamowski et al. 1998: 114).

The Polish Constitution of 1921 manifested the second *Rzeczpospolita* as a liberal democracy. The borders that were finally established in 1922 included 30% minorities, but with the new constitution all citizens were guaranteed legal equality and protection by the state irrespective of origin, nationality, language, race or religion. The head of state was to be an elected president. Presidential powers were cut to a minimum and the strongest organ in the new body politic was the *Sejm*, to which the government was responsible. The *Sejm* was elected by universal suffrage and elected the president together with the Senate. The constitution was designed after the desires of Piłsudski, with a strong democratic element and a weak presidency, and was supported by Gabriel Narutowicz, who was elected president in 1922, the representatives from *Polskie Stronnowictwo Ludowe "wyzwolenie*" (PSL) (the Polish People's Party "liberation"), a party that argued for modernization and Europeanization of Poland, and the circle around Prime Minister Jan Ignacy Paderewski, who was educated in the West and a promoter of Western idealism in terms of international cooperation for peace. The National Democrats strictly opposed the constitution and argued that it resembled the institutions of noble democracy and would throw the country into the same kind of anarchy that had led to the partitions. What was needed was a strong state and national integration.

The presidential election in 1922 turned out a farce. The National Democrats accused the victorious presidential candidate of having been elected by the votes of national minorities and Jews and called for a president backed by "Polish votes". On the very inauguration day the president was murdered. The president's killer stated that the historical tragedy of Poland was the result of weak government and that Poland needed an iron hand. After the retrieval of independence and the wars against the Russians that had made

Piłsudski a hero, the people had waited for dictatorship, "for a slogan, for a word of command that could lead them in heroic effort". Instead of being ruled by "one head" there were "four hundred rulers" [the *Sejm*] and "the most complex matters of the state had been entrusted to stable boys and shepherds". "Who needs soft rule?" he asked. "Honest citizens, people with a clean conscience, do not fear an iron hand." Those who needed democracy and freedom were "thieves, profiteers, bandits, tax-evading peasants, Jews, plotters, traitors of the state" (quoted in Bojarska 1995: 340–341). Narutowicz's killer was a National Democrat and called for the need of a strong centralized state or a strong ruler that could organize the nation and bring it out of chaos.

After the murder on the president, Piłsudski retired from political life. In his last address he quoted what Narutowicz had told him after a ride they had through the streets of Warsaw after his electoral victory had been announced: "You are right, this is not Europe. These people felt better under those who trampled on their backs and punched them in the mouth" (quoted in Bojarska 1995: 344).

The National Democrats formed a coalition government with PSL. In 1926 a right-wing coup was expected, but instead Piłsudski mounted a *coup d'état*. The regime took the name *Sanacja*, which may be translated as *return to (political) health*. The main instrument of the regime was its parliamentary caucus, the Non-Party Block for Co-operation with the Government (BBWR). Initially *Sanacja* gained large support in the *Sejm* and pursued an indulging policy towards the minorities. With the economic and political crisis of the late 1920s and an increasing Ukrainian nationalism, the regime turned into a dictatorship that to a greater and greater extent based its policy on nationalism and repression of minorities.

The initial weakness of Germany and Russia after the First World War spurred the representation of Poland as a great power. Even if it was evident that Germany and Russia were recovering incredibly fast, this representation dominated the discourse all through the inter war years. As late as in 1938 a pamphlet entitled *Polska jest Mocarstwem* (Poland is a great power) asserted that Poland was "representing the cornerstone of the political order in Central Eastern Europe" and that "the fate of contemporary Europe depends on the policy of Poland no less than those of other greater powers" (quoted in Bromke 1967: 37). This text shows that, although the state had been in the 'abyss' for 150 years, the precedent role of a great power was readily available and not too far removed historically (Neumann 1992: 123). Poland made its own non-aggression pacts with both USSR and Germany and made plans of creating a "third Europe stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans" (Crampton 1997: 38). These plans as well as the representation of Poland as a great power were brought to demise when German and the Soviet troops invaded the country in 1939.

## 2.5 Second World War
The Polish Government-in-Exile attempted to restore Poland of the inter war years and its hopes were based on the assumption that Russia would defeat Germany and that the West in turn would hinder Russia in expanding

(Bromke 1967: 47). During the Second World War the Poles were allies of the Western powers and 230 000 Polish soldiers were under British command reaching their greatest success by capturing the German stronghold at Monte Cassino in Italy in 1944. After the failure of the Warsaw uprising in 1944 and the installation of the Communist regime, the Government-in-Exile split. One branch ruled out any suggestion of cooperating with Russia or the Communists and claimed that Polish freedom could not be based on an alliance with the Western powers. With the Yalta agreement the West had shown no interest in keeping Russian hands off Poland. Nevertheless, the group decided to stay in exile believing that a conflict between the East and the West was imminent and that this conflict eventually would lead to Polish independence (ibid.: 48). The other branch was encouraged by the West to work actively to find a *modus vivendi* with Russia. This group advocated a conciliatory approach and returned to Poland to participate in the Provisional Government of National Unity together with the Communists.

The Yalta agreement moved Poland two hundred miles westwards, four million people were relocated, and the Red Army was stationed on Polish soil. Inter war Poland had been multicultural, but in the Second World War and postwar period border-revisions, ethnic cleansing, and forced emigration, made it one of the most homogenous states in Europe. Moreover, large shares of the intelligentsia were executed or forced into exile. The first years after the Second World War saw the enforcement of the Communist regime and the implementation of the Polish People's Republic (PRL).

## 2.6 The Polish People's Republic

During the first decades of the PRL Europe was not frequently evoked as a political concept in Polish discourse. On the contrary the discourse on the East and the West was vivid. The West comprised Western Europe as well as the United States, and those who opposed the Communist regime predominantly represented the West in terms of the cultural sphere to which Poland belonged. On the other hand, the advocates of the Communist regime represented the West as a threat to the Polish nation.

In the 1970s Europe was revived as a slogan in Polish discourse and took the shape of a concept that embodied the repudiation of the Communist regime and Soviet decrees. The concept of Europe and the manifestation of Polish European identities may be regarded as an important rhetorical weapon in the battle of the opposition. By representing Polish identity as a European identity, or as a Western European identity, the opposition attempted to prove that the Communist regime was foreign. Other weapons of the opposition were statements suggesting that the Communist regime was building a national identity that was neither respecting the historical heritage of the nation nor its culture, for example that the Communist regime did not reproduce Christianity as a national value. In the following I will look into this battle in more detail.

### 2.6.1 The Communist regime

The home Communist faction, led by Władysław Gomułka, undermined the dominance of the Moscow Communists of the Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR) in the course of the 1950s. The Polish Communist regime represented the West as antagonists to the idea of socialism. Gomułka stated that the West worked against Communism and that its adherents attempted to "push our country into the abyss of chaos and anarchy". Only a socialist Poland could "remain on the map of Europe as an independent and sovereign state". Poland would therefore have to pursue a foreign policy that was based on "fraternal neighborly Polish–Soviet relations" (quoted in Bromke 1967:120).

Gomułka's political reasoning became an integral part of the PZPR program and was sustained by his successors: Gierek, Kania and Jaruzelski. At one moment or another they all underlined that the Polish-Soviet alliance was not only rooted in proletarian internationalism; it was an integral, and an unchangeable part of the postwar settlement between the great powers of Europe. The United States did not recognize the Polish western border as final, but the Soviet Union guaranteed it. This provided the Communist regime with a persuasive argument for Poland's close bonds with the East. In this way Communism and the eastern alliance was legitimized in terms of a political balance of power.

### 2.6.2 Znak

An opposition group of Catholic intellectuals convened in a political grouping called *Znak* (Sign). The group expressed their views in the periodicals *Znak* and *Tygodnik Powszechny* (The Universal Weekly) and ultimately obtained representation in parliament. *Znak* promoted an "open Catholicism" and argued that the existence of an irreconcilable, doctrinal difference between Catholicism and Marxism should not prevent Catholics and Marxists from cooperating on practical matters (Bromke 1967: 136–137).

This was perhaps possible because, although *Znak* affirmed that Christianity was a central element of Polish national culture, it was not believed that this was the channel through which the nation promoted itself. *Znak* built on the positivist tradition and defined patriotism in terms of the overcoming of the "material, technical, and organizational shortcomings of everyday life"; this was "the only expression of heroism […] Patriotism is changing its content; it is less pathetic and less deceptive. […] Its ultimate substance will emerge only with major economic success (quoted in Bromke 1967: 241).

*Znak* built explicitly on the legacy of Dmowski and advocated an ethnically and religiously homogeneous state that did not leave major Polish minorities outside of Poland. In contrast it distanced itself from Dmowski's nationalism:

> We decisively reject Dmowski's nationalism and we critically assess his social views as well as the totalitarian tendencies he revealed toward the end of his life. Yet, we accept Dmowski's view of 19th century Polish politics and his general assessment of Poland's position between Russia and Germany. These views of Dmowski we adopt as our own (Stomma [1960] 1987a: 144).

This statement distanced *Znak* from PAX, a group of Catholic intellectuals who expressed a strong nationalism and anti-Semitism, as well as from the fusion of the power state and the culture nation promoted by Dmowski.

*Znak* insisted that Poland was part of the West in cultural terms, but repudiated the belief that the West would come to the political rescue of Poland.

> Emotionally I am closer to the people who fought against Russia and who sought assistance against the East from the West. Yet, the tragic events of 1939–1944 demonstrated that such emotional predispositions do not consort well with rational thinking. As a result, in international politics I have declared myself for Dmowski (ibid.: 144–145).

Strategic concerns, not ideological, forced Poland to remain loyal to the Soviet Union. On the other hand *Znak* expected a gradual weakening of international tensions and hoped that this would pave the way for a genuine détente between East and West and the ultimate meeting halfway between the two worlds. Poland could play a particular role in this process because it served as a meeting ground of ideas from the West and the East, "the outpost of Christianity" and the "shop-window of the socialist camp". This predestined Poland to the role of a bridge between the two worlds  (quoted in Bromke 1967: 243).

*Znak* institutionalized a reality in which Christianity was a central value of the Polish nation. Poland was also believed to be a Western European nation in the cultural sense of the notion. *Znak* represented the state in power terms, like Dmowski had done, and as detached from the nation. They expressed that it would be possible to reproduce these values even if the state was of another character. They represented economy and produce as means through which the nation justified itself. When the geopolitical climate of the present changed, however, it was believed that Poland could serve as a "bridge" between the East and the West. We remember that Czartoryski used this metaphor in the 19th century and the expression has been used on many occasions in Polish discourse. To *Znak* the expression was first and foremost used as a metaphor representing Poland as a meeting place of ideas from the East and the West. *Znak* did not repudiate socialism; it was the distorted shape socialism took in totalitarian Soviet Marxism that was perceived as repressive and foreign.

### 2.6.3 European socialism

In order to give legal and financial assistance to workers who had been arrested after extensive strikes in 1976, the left-oriented intelligentsia established the Committee for Workers' Defense (KOR). The same year Adam Michnik published an article called "A New Evolutionism". Michnik's article may be called a *canonical* statement and manifests a turning point in Polish discourse. He was indulgent to the policies of *Znak* but, referring to the failure of installing 'socialism with a human face' in Czechoslovakia, contended that it was unrealistic to count on the subversion of the PZPR. Inspired by the Helsinki process he claimed that an alternative and much more useful approach would be to start working for the expansion of civil liberties and

human rights. Gradual and piecemeal change was the road to independence. The most fundamental brick of the new evolutionism was "faith in the power of the working class" and the belief in a program for evolution "addressed to an independent public, not to totalitarian power" (Michnik 1985: 141). Michnik ended the famous article by propagating the building of a "framework of democratic socialism, that would not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real, day-to-day community of free people" (ibid.: 148).

The new evolutionism was not defined as an anti-socialist process, but as a movement wanting to bring socialism closer to Europe. Europe was represented as a democratic community of free people ruled by human rights, as opposed to the non-human totalitarianism of contemporary Soviet Communism, that it strongly opposed. In short Michnik's article expressed the wish to humanize and democratize socialism or, as Stanisław Stomma, who adopted the thoughts of a new evolutionism, expressed it, to bring socialism "closer to Europe" (Stomma [1981] 1987b: 180). Europe emerged as a symbol of democracy, human rights, and a legal institutional structure. The Solidarity movement was to put the ethos of a new evolutionism into practice and joined the forces of the leftist and Catholic intelligentsia as well as the Church and the workers' movements. The last groups tended to be more concerned about the culture of the nation, did not place much emphasis on the geopolitical situation, and usually argued for a more radical approach than depicted by the new evolutionism.

### 2.6.4 Christian Europe

During Communism the Catholic Church was granted full autonomy as long as Party rule was not openly denied. In 1978 the Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope and the following year he made a pilgrimage to "his fatherland". A note of recollection on the papal election reads: "It was the next morning […] that I felt for the first time the division between 'us', the people, and 'them', our rulers" (Sikorski 1997: 50). In the following I will explain how the Pope put up a border between the Communist regime and Polish national identity and reproduced Polish identity as a European identity.

The homilies of the Pope heralded the concept of a Christian Europe and reflected the Vatican's policy of uniting Europe on the basis of Christian values:

> Is it not Christ's will, is it not what the Holy Spirit disposes, that this Polish Pope, this Slav Pope, should at this precise moment manifest the spiritual unity of Christian Europe? We know that the Christian unity of Europe is made up of two great traditions, of the West and of the East. […] Yes, it is Christ's will; it is what the Holy Spirit disposes, that what I am saying should be said in this very place and at this moment in Gniezno (John Paul II 1979).

To the Pope, Europe was first and foremost a Christian community and he expressed that this one uniting feature might overrule all political and economic divisions. Moreover, his statement implied that his election as Pope was

no coincidence and that it gave the Poles a mission in uniting the East and the West.

The speeches of the Pope worked as implicit and explicit attacks on the Communist regime in manifesting European unity within the framework of Christianity; he represented the Communist regime in terms of difference in relation to Polish identity. Continuously the Pope emphasized the long-standing and intimately Catholic nature of Poland. He referred to the close bonds between the Polish nation and Catholicism and stated that the "exclusion of Christ from the history of humanity is an act against man. Without Christ it is impossible to understand the history of Poland" (quoted in Wasserman 1979: 15). With these words the Pope represented religion as an integral part of Polish identity and, keeping in mind that Marxism philosophically opposes Christianity by presenting a materialistic and atheistic interpretation of human existence and that it accuses religion in general and Christianity in particular of alienating man, the Pope clarified the contradictory nature of Communism and Polish identity. He represented the Communist regime as an institution creating a Polish nation based on values that were neither contingent with history nor with culture. On the other hand, the Catholic Church was contingent with the past, as it represented the nation in terms of history and culture as well as it reproduced Polish identity as a European identity. The Solidarity workers' movement in particular picked up the ideas of the Pope.

### 2.6.5 The workers' Solidarity

The workers' faction of Solidarity was more reluctant towards a compromise with the Communist regime than the Catholic and leftist intelligentsia. The workers' faction was more concerned about the culture of the nation and vividly cultivated their ties with the traditions of the *szlachta* and the Polish knights, the legions, and the uprisings. Songs and poetry written and proclaimed during the strikes and manifestations represented Solidarity as the continuance of these traditions and created unity with the past (Törnquist-Plewa 1992). Leaflets were spread calling for a "joint action of enslaved nations against Communism and Soviet imperialism" with the heading "for our freedom, and yours", and the text reassured that the authors were ready to "sacrifice their blood, and, if need will be their lives, to that end" (quoted in Bromke 1987: 56).

The workers' faction also gathered inspiration from Catholicism and the belief in religious miracles. Many Poles referred to the election of a Polish pope as a miracle and believed that it was the first step towards Polish freedom (Törnquist-Plewa 1992: 56). The Pope talked of the Virgin of Częstochowa in terms of the "Mother of the Polish Nation" and begged her to take Solidarity into her care (ibid.: 95). Lech Wałęsa always wore the icon of the Virgin of Częstochowa on his chest, and the Gdańsk strikers pinned the slogan "The Madonna is striking with us" to the shipyard fence (Boyes 1994:3).

The workers' faction allowed for a stronger manifestation of the culture nation and had a stronger anti-Russian and anti-Communist rhetoric than *Znak* and the left. In this respect they often evoked Europe as a contrast. In a statement from the Polish League of Independence (1980) Europe was de-

scribed as a definite scale of values: truth, justice, and human rights and "the freedom of the individual to pursue these ideals" (ibid.: 186).  Moreover Europe was the cradle "of the rights of nations and of respect for their independence and integrity. It was also the birthplace of international understanding and cooperation" (ibid.: 188). Addressing the possibility of choosing a path independently of Europe, the statement says: "Poland – as always since the eighteenth century – can be either European or Russian […]. Although we find ourselves in Moscow's sphere, to some extent we can preserve our European character, but we can lose it if we don't struggle for it"(ibid.: 192).

The statement reveals that the concept of Europe was linked to the fight for Polish independence and a strong contrast to Russia. The European values had been cultivated and preserved through the ages of Polish and European existence and had been fought for by generations of Poles and Europeans. The culture of the nation was a more important aspect than it was to for instance the opposition of the left and the Polish nation substantiated itself as a European nation in manifesting European values on the international arena.


### 2.6.6 Central Europe and Kultura

The Paris-based magazine *Kultura* opposed the thoughts that Poland was indispensable to Europe and that Europe would help Poland subverting the Communist regime. Russia was simply more important to Europe than Poland was in the geopolitical sense. *Kultura* advocated that Poland should exploit its heritage as a Roman Catholic and Slavic state and serve as a bridge between Russia and the West. Poland should devote its energies to 'Europeanizing' Russia, since only a process of 'Europeanization' would enable Poland to escape its fate as a Russian satellite or keep it from being the object of Russo–German competition (Korek 1998: 219; Prizel 1998: 95).

*Kultura* published a range of articles on the concept of the Polish nation. Jan Józef Lipski (1981) maintained that there were two ways of thinking of the Polish nation, or the *ojczyzna,* with both their ways of defining patriotism. The first patriotism was defined as love for everything Polish and hatred against everything non-Polish. This cultivated hatred against neighboring countries, like Germany and Russia, as well as against minorities, like the Jews. This involved keeping Europe at a distance. This was patriotism towards the *ojczyzna* defined in an ethnic and exclusive way. The other patriotism was defined by Christian ethics, and involved the value to "forgive and ask for forgiveness". This was the patriotism the Polish nation should relate to, a patriotism that involved a "return to our greater fatherland – to Europe".

The European ideals were represented in strict opposition to Communism and Russia, but *Kultura* also warned against a strict Western European orientation. As an antidote to the Central European region's obsession with the West, *Kultura* propagated it as a cultural bloc, rejected the West as an ideal and pursued the construction of a separate Central European identity. *Kultura'*s rejection of the West extended to the sphere of economics and reflected an aversion towards open market capitalism. Other opponents of the Communist regime also reflected such thoughts, ranging from Pope John Paul II to the founders of KOR (Prizel 1998: 97).

### 2.7 Europe and Polish identity throughout history

In this section I have illustrated that Europe was functioning as a slogan for the opponents of the Communist regime in the way that Europe was represented in terms of the values of Christianity as well as humanism and democracy. The section also suggests that representing Polish identity as a European identity, or even as a Western European identity, was an important discursive exercise in this period. Another important discursive practice was to attack the Polish reality represented by the Communist regime as destructive to Polish values, history and culture, and instead manifested 'our' representation of Poland in terms of a specific historical and cultural tradition. We may suggest that discursive practices like these worked in a way that undermined Communism and a Polish alliance with Russia, or the Soviet Union, as a possible policy alternative for Poland.

The chapter on the pre-history of the Polish discourse on Europe has so far showed that there have been many different ways of representing the Polish state and nation throughout history, just as there have been different ways of representing Europe and the relationship between Poland and Europe. The next chapter will present a categorization of the Polish layer of identity as it has emerged in the analysis of Polish history, as well as in more recent statements that I will come back to in the next chapter. I will also propose how these constellations relate to Polish representations of Europe.

## 3.0 Polish identity and relations to Europe

At the outset I asked: *What kind of Europe do Poles promote?* I decided to approach the question through a discourse analysis that will reveal how Polish identity, defined as representations of state and nation, is constructed in relation to Polish representations of Europe. The more precise formulation of the questions is: *What are the Polish European policy positions and how is the discourse of which they are constitutive parts structured?* This section will establish the identity layer, show how it connects to representations of Europe, and what changes this relation causes in the state–nation constellation. It will refer to the legacy these representations and constellations have in the past discourse, which was covered in chapter two, and suggest how they are represented and have developed in the most recent discourse.

Drawing on the theories of the Copenhagen School I made the assumption that discursive spaces are made up of layered systems of concepts. The discursive space that is subject to analysis in this thesis is the one that discusses Europe in relation to Poland. According to the methodical assumptions the layer of Polish identity, which consists of the concepts of state and nation, is more sedimented and more difficult to politicize and change. Polish representations of state and nation may be studied in relation to Polish representations of Europe, and the ways in which these concepts relate to each other in discourse make up the second layer. The second layer is theoretically more sedimented than the third layer, which consists of concrete policy positions. The ways in which the concepts of the first two layers relate to each other in discourse, condition the third layer.

It seems like the structures of the layers are relatively stable throughout the last decade, but this is not the only reason why they are presented already at this point in time. Presenting them before the actual analysis of the discourse in focus will make it easier for us to categorize and analyze statements in the period from 1989 to 1999 in a sensible way and pose the questions that Wæver suggested: Do the actors argue that their opponents fail to offer an appropriate construction of level one? Do they argue that the 'Europe' their opponents construct will pose a threat to the proper construction of the state–nation constellation? Do they claim that their opponents' interpretation of the character of the EU is out of touch with the reality of the EU? As one of the objective goals is to indicate what shape Polish European policy may take in the future, it is important to be able to point out possibilities of how the positions may change internally, not only how the discourse may change as a result of a shift of power between the positions in discourse. Establishing these categories now will also make it easier to see if there actually *has* been a modification of values, institutions, and realities – if the positions have changed – in the course of the last decade.

The Polish layer of identity appears more complicated than the French and the German cases on which Ole Wæver bases his examples. First of all, it seems impossible to boil down the state–nation constellation to one. I believe that the Polish layer of identity is dominated by a constellation similar to the German constellation, but at times a constellation similar to the French challenges it. The dominant constellation defines the state in terms of power and the nation in terms of culture. I call it *culture nation/power state*. The culture nation has its legacy in the era of national romanticism, but may be

traced further back in time to Sarmatism and the culture of the Polish *szlachta*. The power state emerges first with Dmowski's realism and Piłsudski's irredentism and the belief in Poland as a great power. The other state–nation constellation has clear similarities to the French as it puts the state in the center and defines the nation as a political community of citizens. I call it *political nation–centralized state*. It has its legacy in the political institutions of noble democracy, the Enlightenment, and the revolutionary movements of the late 18th century.

The second layer consists of the relational positions of the state–nation constellation at level one to representations of Europe. What has to be investigated at this stage is whether the relationship to Europe requires revisions of the first layer. This is particularly so in the case of the culture nation/power state. When this constellation relates to Europe in discourse it involves either a strengthening or a weakening of the power and/or the culture aspect. When it has been explored what revisions take place at level one, I have to investigate how this particular articulation of the state–nation construction relates to representations of Europe.

## 3.1 Culture nation/power state

The idea of the culture nation is separated from the idea of the power state. Thinking about the nation does not involve a conception of a state and the state may be thought of independently of the nation. This way of thinking about the relationship between the state and the nation emerged with the partitions that spurred the need to define the nation independently of the existence of a Polish state. The national romanticists often represented the state as the body, sleeping, while the soul, the nation, was alive and existed in a higher sphere as an ideal the Polish people carried within them.

The first trace I have found of a representation of the nation in terms of culture, is Sarmatism. It represented the nobility, the Polish nation, as a community with a common descent and common cultural features, namely Polish language and Catholicism, that differentiated it from the other layers of society. This challenged the broader representation of the nation that, although it was exclusive to the extent that it only embraced the nobility, did not take religion or language into account.

Polish national romanticism cultivated the idea that each nation was an entity with its own specific features that it needed in order to perform its predestined mission. The nation was represented as an ideal that people obliged themselves to. The ideal was Poland the way it actually is, the way Poland should be. Striving to reach the national ideal brought out the Polish values that built on the legacy of the Polish knights and the *szlachta*: great-heartedness, truth, goodness, love, brotherhood, solidarity, and courage. Those participating in the national uprisings were represented as descendants of the knights and as a group manifesting the national ideal and national values. Those engaged in the battle against the Communist regime, especially those taking part in open demonstrations against it, were represented as successors of the tradition of Polish national uprisings. At present Solidarity is provided with this special status.

Cultural factors are decisive in order to identify the nation and the most important ones are language and Catholicism. The moral commitment to the national ideal excludes Poles who do not work to realize the Polish ideal even if they are born in Poland, brought up there, and speak Polish. Peoples with other ethnic origins may be considered as Poles as long as they are morally obliged to the national ideal. We may, however, say that making the moral obligation towards the Polish ideal presupposes adopting certain Polish values and the assimilation into Polish cultural norms. Dmowski, for example, denied that he was promoting an ethnic nation, but the way in which he defined those working against the national ideal made his representation work as ethnic nationalism anyway (see Porter 2000: 230).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, much Polish thinking on the state has represented it as a threat because, in the wrong hands, it could become a tool, purchasing minority or individual interests that could be harmful to the nation. To avoid this situation the state had to be decentralized and moral principles had to make up the fundament of politics. Examples of such decentralized institutions ruled by a moral principle were the institutions of noble democracy. All members of the nation had the same right to oppose political decisions through the institutions of *liberum veto* and confederation and were morally obliged to pursue the national common good. The state institutions, like the king and the *Sejm*, were parts of a decentralized power system that dammed up against the possibility that individual interests would depose the common good as the ultimate policy goal of the Polish state. In the period of partitions thinking about the state was shaped by the fact that the state as such did not exist, that it was something to be created or recreated, an idea, an ideal, a higher goal, or a potential that waited to be realized. The power potential of the state was perceived as a threat against the common good of the nation and the state therefore had both to emerge from the nation and be controlled by it. The principle has manifested itself in later years in endeavors to reach consensus, build broad coalitions, and in Michnik's statements that emphasize that one should build large civic movements instead of political parties.

In the late 19th century there emerged a representation of the state in terms of a strong centralized power. The state ranked above the individual and history was a struggle for power and self-expression. Dmowski represented the state as the incarnation of the cultural nation, its political representative, and a medium through which the nation realized itself. The construction of a power state gradually permeated the Polish discourse of the interwar years and became a dominating feature of Polish domestic and foreign policy. The power basis of the state is the ability it has to make supreme decisions concerning the interests of the nation. The power state represents the interests of the nation and it is believed that Polish foreign policy should be derived from Polish domestic policy and national interests should be superior to international goals. The guiding principle of international politics is maximizing power and securing national interest. International cooperation is perceived as a zero sum game that is possible only on the terms that some lose what others win. The power state engages itself in classical balance of power politics and *raison d'état* logic. Along the internal dimension the

power state protects the nation from chaos and disorder and represents the national interests.

*Ojczyzna* (fatherland) is an important attachment to the Polish nation evoking Polish national culture and history. The concept may also represent all those generations of Poles (the fathers) who have fought to realize the Polish ideal. The members of the nation should feel an obligation to fulfill their struggle. A link between the nation and the state is embodied in the term *Rzeczpospolita* reflecting the idea of the common good of the nation. *Rzeczpospolita* refers to the Polish lands, but it is also a synonym of the Polish ideal state and every Pole should feel the moral obligation to work for its fulfillment.

## 3.2 Europe and the culture nation/power state

When the culture nation/power state constellation relates to representations of Europe, layer one is reshaped either strengthening or a weakening power and/or culture elements as ways of self-expression on the international arena. I believe there are four main ways that the culture nation/power state relates to representations of Europe. One relates to a representation of Europe as a meeting place of values and de-emphasizes both power and culture. Another relates to a representation of Europe that is under constant threat and involves rearticulating layer one in terms of culture as a way of self-expression. The third relates to a representation of Europe as decadent and in decay. This activates both power and culture. The fourth relates to a representation of Europe in terms of power, something that activates power as a way of self-expression.

In the structure of this layer we may recognize certain values that either distinguish Poland from Europe or unite Polish and European identity. At this stage I will only suggest what these values are, and relate them to positions that have reproduced them in the past. In the analysis of the third layer, which I will come back to later, I will show you how these values are manifested in recent discourse, suggest how they are reproduced in feedback loops together with realities and institutions, and how other positions attack them and try to shatter or modify them.

### 3.2.1 Europe acknowledges Polish Europeanness

Some groupings represent European values as contradictory to the values of the Communist regime. European values are first and foremost Christianity, democracy, laws, human rights, tolerance, and international cooperation for peace. Europe is represented as a meeting place of values and in order to become European nations have to pick and choose the best European traditions and make them their own.

Europe is represented as a sphere affirming or denying other countries Europeanness. When the culture nation/power state relates to this representation of Europe, Europe becomes an antidote both to a strong cultural expression of the nation as well a denial of a strong power demonstration. Poland manifests itself on the international scene by becoming/being/staying European and it is believed that Poland may become non-European if it does not

strengthen the European values of its identity. Picking out and focusing on the elements of Polish identity that correspond with the good European values may accomplish the Europeanization of Polish identity. As the next section will show, some groupings argue that these elements are first and foremost to be found in the Jagiellonian tradition, when the nation was defined in broad terms and tolerance prevailed.

Poland has to 'return' to Europe in order to rediscover its good values. Europe is represented as a sphere embodying both an Eastern and a Western tradition and both spheres are believed to comprise good and bad values. Poland is represented as a discursive field where these traditions meet. The contribution of Poland to Europe is to show both the East and the West how to build a national culture that is unique and European at the same time. This is a project that tags on the positions of *Kultura*, *Znak*, and the founders of KOR, like Adam Michnik.

### 3.2.2 Poland defends European values

Others too represent European values in terms of notions contradictory to the values of the Communist regime, like Christianity, democracy, laws, human rights, tolerance, and international cooperation for peace. Europe is, however, represented as a sphere facing major threats because the values that make up its fundament are threatened by the trends of secularism, consumerism, and materialism. This might bring about a moral relativism that will throw Europe into decadence. This will destroy the European community of values as we know it and make it barely a distorted shadow of itself.

This representation activates culture as a way of Polish self-expression, while the power factor remains inactive. Poland is represented as a state/ nation that always has lived at Europe's frontier where it has defended European values. Poland has always defended Europe against onslaughts form the infidels and has also engaged itself in defending the European value of national freedom from foreign oppression. The endeavors to protect Europe have caused the Poles great pains and sufferings as Poland time and time again has fallen victim to the uncontrollable forces of history, like the partitions at the end of the 18th century and the Yalta agreement. However, much because of their continuous struggles to defend European values, the Polish nation has managed to preserve them much better than any other country. Today Poland once again has the potential of protecting European values in working against the effects of trends such as secularism, consumerism, and materialism. This will be done by leading Europe back to its roots, to its common heritage of Christianity.

This construction of Poland in relation to Europe entails that Christianity and solidarity become the most important features of Polish national culture and the means through which the Poles express themselves on the international arena. Being a Pole means being a European, it includes a European element. Being a Pole requires a moral commitment to the Polish ideal, but it also requires a moral commitment to the European ideal in terms of a unified Christian society of free nations.

### 3.2.3 Poland manifests its interests outside of a decadent Europe

Another position represents Europe as a decadent sphere in decay lost in a game of power politics, consumerism, individualism, and democratic and liberal experiments. The beliefs in money and material goods have replaced the Christian belief and the European economy is moving towards the edge. This representation of Europe activates both culture and power as means of self-expression.

The state is represented as the incarnation of the nation. The state stands above the nation and has to do so in order to prevent chaos. Poland is represented as morally superior to the rest of Europe and should have a non-relationship with it in order not to be infected with its decadence. The alternative is to endeavor at constructing a Christian international community. Self-sufficiency and independence in the economic sphere have to be preserved. Sovereignty in the narrow sense of the world, national interests, and *raison d'état*, are important values manifesting the culture of the nation and the power of the state.

### 3.2.4 Poland manifests its power in a European power sphere

The last variant represents Europe as a geopolitical sphere of power. The Polish nation expresses itself through the power of the state. This redefines Poland as a power state that primarily engages itself in classic balance of power politics and *raison d'état* logic. As Poland is a country with only a medium range of power and a geographical position that makes it exceptionally exposed, it needs allies. Both Eastern and Western Europe stand out as too powerful partners to become Polish allies. Western Europe is represented as economically more developed and politically more powerful than Poland. If Poland seeks partnership with this block of countries, foreign investors will "buy" the country and will have the opportunity to intervene in Polish internal affairs. In this way Poland will lose its independence and sovereignty and the power of the state will decline. The Eastern block convenes around the states of the former Soviet Union and is regarded as an impossible partner for Poland to cooperate with, not because of its economic power, but because of its size, population and military capacity. Both the East and the West are too powerful blocks for Poland to cooperate with in the political sphere because cooperation will erode the power of the state as a Polish means of self-expression on the international arena. The alternative is the construction of a third power block in Central Europe. The idea has its legacy in the state traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Union and Piłsudski's idea to create a third Europe as a counterweight to Russia and Germany.

## 3.3 Political nation–centralized state

The constellation of the political nation and the centralized state has always been marginal in Polish discourse. This may partially be explained by the fact that the Polish state more or less did not exist for 123 years, but also because the position has been silenced by the dominant discourse of state and nation. The constellation has been revitalized after the crumbling of the

Communist regime in 1989 and is, on the political arena, first and foremost represented by the deputies of the post-Communist parties.

The political nation is tightly coupled to the centralized state. The state and the nation are fused. There is not necessarily a concept of a specific state or a specific nation, but there is the idea that these entities stand in a mutually constitutive relationship that is important.

The political nation – centralized state may be traced back to the Polish enlighteners who tried to construct a modern Polish state that would lead Poland out of what was perceived as being a situation of political and economic backwardness. It was argued that weak state institutions caused the economic and political crisis by impeding the reforms necessary for development and modernization. If the Polish state was to regain the ability to direct its own political destiny, it had to become centralized, strong and interventionist. The nation would have to be integrated into the state through central administrative units and a joint system of education based on the Polish language. A main goal of this education was to teach the nation how to become active citizens of the state as well as to increase the general level of knowledge in order to spur social, political, and economic progress.

The nation consists of all individuals that are citizens of the state and is without restrictions concerning culture and moral consciousness. This makes the nation open to the assimilation of new members through the institution of citizenship.

Along the external dimension the state is thought of as highly interdependent with the outside world and it is assumed that it needs a high level of external communication and cooperation. Strong ties to the outside world are important in order to develop and modernize, but also in order to ensure national security. In addition to threats against state borders and state institutions, threats against national security are first and foremost constructed in the spheres of development and modernization. If these processes stagnate or, more seriously, are reversed, something that may be caused by the turn to a nationalistic or religious rhetoric in domestic and foreign policy, the political, economic, and social situation will destabilize. Another matter is that Poland will be looked upon as a backward country by the outside world. This is believed to cause a decline in the external will to include Poland in international cooperation. Considerations on international relations are guided by the idea that cooperation increases the welfare and security of all countries participating and that cooperation promotes peace and stability.

Along the internal dimension the state is thought of as a means of organizing society into active citizens of the state. The social order is based on a legal document, in the shape of a constitution, between a group of individuals and the state. The institution of law secures freedom and ensures political, economic, and social development. Development and moderni-zation make up the rationale of the state. A state that does not ensure the nation economic and political progress has low legitimacy in the nation.

*Rzeczpospolita* is an attachment to the political nation – centralized state that refers to an emotional bond to the past as well as cultural roots. It is the embodiment of the history and traditions of the Polish state, its territory and the people who have inhabited it.

The Polish nation consists of the members of the Polish state. Another way of saying this is that they are *obywatele* (citizens) of *Rzeczpospolita*. Citizen is a concept that is used interchangeably with nation and implies the responsibility every member of the nation has in relation to the state and the state in relation to the citizen. Another concept that links the nation to the state is *społeczeństwo* (society). These words are believed to be more neutral than nation, as they are void of connotations to religion, language, moral, and culture.

## 3.4 Europe teaches Poland Europeanness

There is a centuries-long tradition in Polish discourse of representing Europe as the cradle of modernization and progress. This goes back to the period of the Enlightenment when Europe was represented as the ideal of good states-manship, laws, rational thinking, education, and political and economic de-signs. Today this representation of Europe goes together with ideas of it as a symbol of liberalism; the free play of economic and political forces, a variety of traditions, values, cultures and moral systems and of individual freedom. The plurality of Europe is based on tolerance among people and the institution of universal law and well-proven institutions. Europe is a modern civili-zation leading the process of development. Europe is also represented as a supranational community that eases tensions and conflicts between the states that are comprised by it.

This representation of Europe does not involve a redefinition of the poli-tical nation – centralized state. In relation to Europe, Poland is represented as a country in transition from backwardness to Europeanness, from dwelling in the European periphery, to become a part of Europe. The relationship that is established is that of learning. Poland has to learn from Europe how to become a European state with European citizens. Europe is the 'teacher', Poland the 'student'. If Poland does not do its 'homework' it will be punish-ed, either by the other European countries, or by the results that will follow if Poland does not take the natural path of development. Poland has for a number of reasons been kept at a lower developmental stage and is now in the process of ridding itself of the remnants of feudalism and step into the rows of developed, civilized, and modern states. Such states are liberal-capi-talist ones. An important role of the state is to administer the process of transformation and inform and educate the citizens in democratic and liberal-ist-capitalist behavior.

## 3.5 Summary

This chapter has provided a categorization of layer one and two of the dis-cursive system. It has been argued that the Polish layer of identity consists of one constellation that may be though of as dominant, the culture nation/pow-er state, and one that challenges this, the political nation–centralized state. At the second layer there are five main representations of Europe that in differ-ent ways redefine layer one and establish certain sets of values that create borders between and/or unite Polish and European identity. The next chapter will analyze the Polish discourse on Europe in the first decade after the dis-

solution of the Communist regime. It illustrates how the actors attempt to break down the values, realities, and institutions of other positions in discourse, as well as it identifies concrete European projects that are promoted by Poles. I will also illustrate how discourse draws on history and how the actors attempt to establish continuance with the past. Throughout the analysis, the statements will be connected to the categories that I have established above.

## 4.0 The Polish discourse on Europe 1989–1999

This study investigates the preconditions for Polish European policies. In order to do this it locates different representations of state, nation, and Europe in Polish discourse, looks into the ways in which these concepts relate to each other, and how they condition the sets of possible foreign policies that Poland may pursue in relation to Europe, or, more specifically, in relation to the EU. Chapter two offered a cut into the pre-history of the discourse and located different representations of state, nation, and Europe, throughout Polish history. Chapter three provided a categorization of the first two layers, the layer of Polish identity and the relational layer to representations of Europe. This chapter analyzes the Polish discourse on Europe from 1989 to 1999 according to the set of categories that I have established and relate them to the concrete policies suggested in relation to the EC/ EU process.

## 4.1 The policy layer

The chapter on the pre-history of the discourse revealed that there have been certain continuities in the ways in which Poles think about their own identity and of Europe. However, there have also been shifts and brakes with previous discourses, like with the encounter with the Enlightenment, that may be thought of as an event where a changing context (Europe) provided for a redefinition of values (e.g. universal law), something that produced new realities (e.g. a centralized state strongly linked to a political nation), and ultimately made some institutions perish (e.g. the noble democracy). This is one explanation of the phenomenon. In the following sections I will search for continuity and breaks with history, ask how continuance is kept, and how breaks occur. I will also investigate what values certain institutions, mainly political parties, reproduce that contribute to the reproduction of the representations in question: Poland and Europe. This project addresses the materiality of discourse, allows for changing representations and positions with the reformulation of values, realities, and institutions, and provides a post-structural supplement to the structural design of the Copenhagen School.

The third layer is made up of more specific policies pursued by the actors in discourse. The question we have to ask here is: Do the actors argue that their opponents fail to offer an appropriate construction of level one? Do they argue that the 'Europe' their opponents construct will pose a threat to the proper construction of the state–nation constellation? Do they claim that their opponents' interpretation of the character of the EU is out of touch with the reality of the EU? By studying the discourse at this level we may discover certain positions in discourse that define what kind of European political project is promoted and what role Poland should play in it.

The chapter will provide concrete policy statements and analyze in depth statements from the *Sejm*, as well as articles from newspapers and journals. The purpose of the readings is to locate Polish European policy positions, the ways in which these positions clash and coincide in discourse, and how continuance with the past is sought and kept. Doing this I will also locate the representations of Europe, state, and nation on which these positions rest and

how the different positions attempt to displace the values, institutions, and realities of the other positions.

The last section of this chapter provides statements from the last three years of the period, from 1997 to 1999, and links these to specific policy positions. These policy positions define the third layer as it appears in this period in time and attempt to define some central values and realities that certain institutions reproduce in discourse. In this period I believe that we may spot a change in one of the positions, one that rests on the culture nation/power state, represents Europe as a sphere of moral decay, and reproduces values separating European and Polish identity in terms of Catholicism, sovereignty, and national interests. A variant of this position emerges towards the end of the period producing statements maintaining that it is possible to lift out economy as a sphere of cooperation with Europe without the culture of the nation being infected or the sovereignty of the state being weakened. This involves a reconstruction of the value of sovereignty, representing it in terms of independence through interdependency, at least in the economic sphere.

## 4.2 A post-Communist Poland in a new Europe

In 1989 the Polish Communist regime agreed on roundtable talks with a united opposition consisting of Solidarity activists, independent intellectuals, and representatives of the Catholic Church. The compromise allowed for the establishment of a presidency, a bicameral legislature, and semi-free elections. The opposition won 99% of the freely elected seats and founded the Citizens' Parliamentary Committee (OKP). Tadeusz Mazowiecki, editor of the Solidarity Weekly (*Tygodnik Solidarność*) and one of the front figures of *Znak*, became Prime Minister of a coalition government. The *Sejm* granted General Jaruzelski renewed confidence as President of Poland. In this section I will present and analyze statements from political debates after the inauguration of the Mazowiecki government in the autumn of 1989.

### 4.2.1 The Polish "return to Europe"

> Europe is changing. We do not negate these changes; we wish for them, take part in them. At the same time we have to take care of the interests of our state. I think that they play together with the European interest. The present Polish government under the leadership of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki has brought about the Polish return to her place in Europe […] We support the idea of a united Europe and the execution of that idea through cooperation and integration between the European states (Skubiszewski [1989] 1997: 29).

Krzysztof Skubiszewski made this statement in the *Sejm* just after he had been inaugurated as Foreign Minister. The statement established a different relation between Poland and Europe than that of the former regime. Mazowiecki promoted a Europe that emerged as a unified political community of states pursuing their individual interests and cooperating in common interest. It is worth noticing that he emphasized the state and state interests.

Skubiszewski put the state in the center as the organizing principle, also in international politics, just as the Communist regime had done.

Another element that highlights the change of position is that while the Communist regime had represented Germany as a great, perhaps the greatest, enemy, the new government presented the support of a united Germany as one of the cornerstones of its European policy:

> There cannot be a united Europe with the preservation of a divided Germany, and we all want a united Europe. The unity of Germany will lead to its inclusion into the integration process, the continuation of the Helsinki process, the destruction of the gap between the poor and schizophrenic East and the rich and rational West (Skubiszewski [1990] 1997: 47–48).

The government promoted a Europe without dividing lines and the symbol of European unity was the unification of Germany. According to the government a united Germany could not have a neutral status because this could make the European Community (EC) become a tool of German domination or alternatively disintegrate under German hegemony and pose a threat against Polish security (Prizel 1998: 117–118). European unification and integration was thought of as a solution to this problem as this would eliminate the "poor and schizophrenic" features of Europe and make Germany and Poland partners of the same "rich and rational" political community defined according to the standards of the Helsinki process. The statement suggests the Europe that the government promoted: a Europe united under a set of social and political values, the belief that cooperation on the basis of such values would undermine strong culture and power politics, and that this would lead to peace and affluence.

A later statement of the Foreign Minister provided Poland with its place in the process of European unification. He emphasized that Poland was firmly situated in the culture of Western Europe, but that the country also had the attribute that it "understands and knows the East" better than any other Western or Central European State. Poland was also better understood in the East because of close relations and long-lasting mutual influence of values. He concluded that Poland has the best potential of all European states to serve as a "bridge between the East and the West" (Skubiszewski [1990] 1997:72). Skubiszewski represented Poland as a meeting ground and a mediator between the East and the West and as a country that could have an important position in the process of European unification.

The statements of Skubiszewski show great affinity with statements from *Znak*, some from *Kultura*, save those who promoted a Central European identity with a strong anti-Russian rhetoric, and with new evolutionism. The government adopted the policy of conciliation, with Russia as well as with Germany, for which *Znak* and *Kultura* and the secular left had argued. They represented the years of Communism and Soviet dependency as the result of the difficult geopolitical situation of Poland. Now that the geopolitical situation had changed, integration, and a 'return to Europe', to a 'normal' situation, was possible.

### 4.2.2 Post-Communist Europe

The PZPR had included a section of so-called 'reformers'. This group was sympathetic to the position of *Znak* and the secular left and mainly argued for alliance with the Soviet block in terms of geopolitical considerations. The PZPR was dissolved in January 1990 and fragmented into several smaller political parties. The largest fraction founded the Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*) (SLD) that agreed with the government that Poland had its rightful place "in the common European home". However, they advised the government not to construct political slogans that would cultivate the belief that Poland would arrive at European standards automatically when it 'entered Europe'. On the contrary, the process of Polish integration with Europe would be

> …long, and our country will have to fulfill a lot of demands and regulations before it obtains a proper status […] only the strength and aptness of our economy guarantee a true partnership, respect and recognition. The economy depicts the status of the country and the efficiency of its foreign policy (Oleksy quoted in Pasierb 1996: 86).

The representatives of the SLD did not agree with the manner in which the government represented the relationship between Poland and Europe and was concerned that the slogan 'return to Europe' produced expectations that the Poles would become European without working for it. The slogan 'return to Europe' would have to be replaced with the encouragement of economic activity and modernization and Poland would have to fulfill Europe's set of demands and regulations before it could call itself European. Polish integration with Europe had to be a slow and considerate process.

The last sentence of the statement situates it in a category that defines international status in terms of economic success and modernization. The SLD is not representing the nation in terms of culture. Neither does it represent the state in terms of power. This does not mean that it occupies the same position in discourse as does those de-emphasizing culture and power in the relationship with Europe. I will argue that the SLD deputies have revitalized the constellation political nation–centralized state and that they mainly represent the relationship between Poland and Europe as one in which Poland learns from Europe.

### 4.2.3 Two roads

Adam Michnik was a representative of the OKP and the editor of *Gazeta Wyborza*. He argued that Communism had repressed the Polish national culture and that the fall of Communism requested that it be revived. On the other hand, the revitalization of the Polish national culture had to be done according to a particular set of European values. The national identity had to be revived as a European identity. Michnik defined the 'return to Europe' as a

> …commitment to certain attributes of European culture. It means replacing the totalitarian dogmas of Communism with an attitude that presupposes a critical

distance toward oneself, and it means respecting tolerance in public life and skepticism in intellectual endeavors (Michnik [1990] 1998: 146).

Michnik indicates that not all aspects of Polish identity are good and that some have to be redefined. In *Kultura* Krzysztof Gawlikowski (1990: 5) mirrored Michnik's ideas: "Wanting to enter the Europe of our dreams, we have to bring our national conscience to effect and revise our historical views," he wrote. But there were forces that contradicted this and turned to the rhetoric of nationalism, populism, and religious fundamentalism. "In Poland the European spirit is struggling with a narrowly nationalist one," Michnik stated. He described the future of Poland and "our newly freed neighbors" as the choice between two roads:

> …one road leads to border wars, the other to minimizing borders, reducing them to little more than road signs; one leads to new barbed-wire fences, the other to a new order based on pluralism and tolerance; one leads to nationalism and isolation, the other to a return to our 'native Europe' (ibid.: 149–150).

In the statement Michnik produced a dichotomy between Europe and a strong promotion of the nation in terms of culture linked to a strong promotion of the state in terms of power. Both Gawlikowski and Michnik represented Europe as a sphere of particular values and to be European as a value through which the nation justified itself. Michnik portrayed Wałęsa as a figure that could fuse the European spirit with the need to recover the roots of Polish national identity. He was soon to be disillusioned.

### 4.2.4 War on the top

> It is painful for me to observe Wałęsa's evolution from the symbol of Polish democracy to its present grotesque caricature. The decision to deprive Gazeta Wyborcza of the Solidarność logo for criticizing Wałęsa was the first shibboleth of what will happen to Polish democracy when these people reach for state power. […] [H]e [Wałęsa] will not be president of a democratic Poland. Rather he will become a destabilizing factor, creating chaos and isolating Poland from the rest of the world […] The harm done by Wałęsa to the Polish cause through his utterances is based on this: on giving the impression of a country which is not stable, which is torn by constant conflicts. […] What path do we wish to follow? Is it a path to the Europe of contemporary, democratic standards, or, on the contrary, a path of a return to bygone traditions symbolized by authoritarian regimes, the hell of national conflicts, and extreme cases of religious intolerance? The position of Poles in Europe depends on the answer to this question (ibid.: 160–164).

Michnik's statement was a comment to the presidential campaign of Wałęsa. The statement portrays Wałęsa as a possible dictator who will bring about totalitarianism, censorship, national conflicts, religious intolerance, chauvinism, fundamentalism, chaos and isolation, bring Poland down the path that leads away from Europe, away from democracy and stability. The article

more than suggests the scenario of the interwar years and the chaos and nationalism that are connected to it. In the same period Michnik published articles with references to the interwar period and the subsequent dictatorship of Piłsudski, "…the man who fought and won freedom for Poland, the father of Polish independence, also laid the foundation for dictatorship in Poland" (ibid.: 154). The parallel to Wałęsa was more than evident.

The prelude to the dispute was that Wałsa had expressed impatience with the pace of reforms promoted by the government fraction. He argued for a clear break with the former regime and immediate free elections of both parliament and president. *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Tygodnik Solidarność* criticized Wałęsa's impatience and Wałęsa answered by dismissing the editor of *Tygodnik Solidarność,* who was no other than Prime Minister Mazowiecki himself, and depriving *Gazeta Wyborcza* of the right to use the Solidarity logo. Wałęsa referred to the government fraction as the architects of a "pink-red" accord between the "secular left" and the Communist party designed to circumscribe the influence of the political right (Vinton 1990b: 24). Poland needed the development of a right, left and center, a strong government and a powerful presidency "as a force for balance and political innovation" (quoted in Vinton 1990b: 19). Wałęsa defined democracy as a "war on the top": "I am for a continuous political unrest; a continuous public discharge of conflicts. To me parliamentary democracy is a peaceful war of all against all" (quoted in Wilamowski et al. 1998: 161). In May Wałęsa split with the OKP and established the Center Alliance (*Poruzumienie Centrum*) (PC).

Mazowiecki contended that freedom had opened the way to a "Polish hell, a tendency to disregard the common good in a mass of conflicting interests". Poland's situation required "a broad democratic consensus" and "refraining from demagogic bidding contests" (quoted in Vinton 1990a: 20). The Mazowiecki fraction accused Wałęsa of being a "primitive despot" who was prone for a *coup d'état* and called his supporters "Jacobins" and "revolutionaries". They declared themselves carriers of European ideals and represented these in opposite terms of the totalitarian, autocratic, nationalist, chauvinist, populist, and fundamentalist degeneration of the Wałęsa camp. The government fraction adapted the slogan "freedom without chaos" (Vinton 1990b: 24) and founded Democratic Action (ROAD), later turned into the Democratic Union (UD). The dispute provides an example of a classical discourse. Wałęsa argued for a state so powerful that it could be more apt for action and carry through reforms. The Mazowiecki faction argued for a state constructed as a safeguard against compiling power.

On the occasion of the inauguration of the first freely elected parliament in 1991, Wałęsa, who had been elected president in December the preceding year, held a speech on Polish identity and the 'return to Europe':

> We know where we are going. Without looking back we know where we are coming from. That tradition gives us an identity different from others. It allowed us to stand years of partitions, occupation and exploitation. While the fatherland [*ojczyzna*] was language and speech, the Church was our national institution. It was and it stays that, because Poland grows out from the Christian circle, its values remain strong in us, from centuries, in culture and in daily life. They are our roots.

We often talk about our return to Europe. We have always been there, not only geographically. Then, after Yalta, the Iron Curtain […] divided it. The Curtain fell and the wall was put in ruins. Nothing divides us, people and ideas are roaming. We remember that if Poland managed to attract the attention of nations, it concerned the issue of our culture. That culture always created values growing out from the stem of Mediterranean civilization, with the Christian spiritual community, but at the same time gave the world original and non-repeated values, our own, Polish. Thus, in moments as difficult as the present, we also have to hold on to the efforts of the creators and workers of culture. We should attempt to make the culture overcome the threats in the financial sphere; allowing it to enrich the nation with its fortune, and in front of the world witness of Poland's greatness (911125/ 001).

Wałęsa emphasized the nation as an entity justified in its culture. He represented the fatherland, the 'attachment' to the nation, as "language and speech", and the Church as a national institution, a community that organizes the nation. Furthermore, he talked about the return to Europe in the terms that the Poles had always been there. To Wałęsa Europe was first and foremost Christianity and Mediterranean civilization and Poland had always been a part of this. It became a popular statement of the Polish right to claim that, in contradiction to the 'return to Europe' slogan, Poland has always been in Europe, even during Communism. This was a possible statement because the nation always had been a Christian nation and Europe was represented in terms of Christianity. Wałęsa suggested that the nation justified itself in the world through its culture and that the greatness of Polish culture took precedence over the more difficult economic situation. Wałęsa represented the Catholic Church as the institution that reproduced and was reproduced by the Polish culture nation. The most important value when relating to Europe, what unified Polish culture with Europe, was Christendom.

## 4.3 The Sejm debate on the Europe Agreement 1992

The Europe Agreement on Polish association with the EC was signed 16 December 1991. It was a legal framework on the cooperation between the EC and Poland and was to be used to help draw up schedules for incorporating the Community's *acquis* and transposing its legal rules into national law prior to Polish accession. In the following I will present the position of the government as it emerged in the *Sejm* debate on the Polish Europe Agreement, and subsequently give an overview of the alternative positions.

### 4.3.1 The government position

Discussing our relations to the Community we talk mainly of economic matters. […] Our association, our accomplishment of membership, is primarily of a political character. It is about […] once and for all distancing ourselves from the ghost of totalitarianism and securing the democratic future of our country. […] On the other hand it is about ensuring our country a secure place in Europe. This goal is more important to us than to the countries that are members of the Com-

munity today. We must not forget that throughout the last two hundred years not only our borders were threatened, not only our independence, but also our national existence. Association with the Community will for us be a guarantee […] not only for economic and civil development, but first and foremost a guarantee for the conservation and promotion of our national existence (920521/ 009).

Skubiszewski represented the Agreement as a choice between the two extremes of totalitarianism and democracy, but also in terms of security. This may be considered a response to the security vacuum that had emerged due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the insecure situation in the Soviet Union, and the refusal of Polish NATO membership, but it is important to note that he defined *national existence* as more important than state security as such. On several occasions he called on the "indivisibility of Christianity from the Polish national existence". He represented the EC as a unification process that was building on the two thousand-year-long project of unifying Christian Europe. He reminded the *Sejm* that the Pope supported the EC process because it was in line with the Vatican's efforts to "gather all the nations of Europe in one spiritual and cultural society…". This way of arguing suggested that working against the ratification of the Agreement and Polish membership in the EC was a denial of the Christian element of Polish identity.

We remember that the former statements of Skubiszewski had not represented the nation but rather put emphasis on the state. Neither did he speak of Europe in terms of Christianity. This statement suggests an amendment of the representation of the government, probably as a result of the final dissolution of the remnants of the Communist regime and the free elections in 1991 that had produced a coalition government more in line with Wałęsa's position.

### 4.3.2 SLD
A representative of the Social Democratic Union (SLD) did not completely agree with Skubiszewski and maintained that the Europe Agreement was:

…a chance, not a guarantee, a proof, not of our often naïve expectations, but rather of our responsibilities and abilities. Poland is going to consider if it is to become a stable state and politically predictable, respecting laws and civic duties, offering good products, a country open towards European partners, and not xenophobic and engaged exclusively with itself […] Europeanness is not only a question of geography, history or political declarations. It is simultaneously and first and foremost the ability of giving a practical answer to the question, what we offer Europe, [interruption] if we are serious, creative and responsible. Today the answer to that question is […] negative. Unified action is needed in order not to lose this historical chance (920521/ 015).

The delegate represented the Europe Agreement as an acknowledgment from the outside of Polish responsibility and abilities. Implementing the Agreement Poland would have to become a stable, predictable, open, and productive state, respecting laws and civic duties. The Poles would have to be seri-

ous, creative, and responsible if they were to prove themselves European. Today this was not the case.

In the 18th century Potocki introduced the concept *ciemnogród* (Ignor-anceville) as a word that describes the prejudice and parochial backwardness of the conservatives and the Sarmatist nobility. The word was later adopted in Polish colloquial language as a notion that describes "a place to which culture and progress do not reach" (Sobol 1997: 94). Another word with a similar meaning and an equally full of historical connotations is *zaścianek,* which literarily describes a residence in the countryside inhabited by the petty nobility (ibid: 1127) but that, in the same manner as its derivative *zaściankowość*, is used as an abstraction describing backwardness and distance from intellectual life. In the debate on the Europe Agreement an SLD representative stated that "Poland has to decide whether she wants to be an island by herself […] cultivating her particularity, a kind of enlarged *zaścianek*, or rather find herself in the mainstream of development of the modern world, in modern Europe" (920521/ 045).

Turning to the asymmetry of the Agreement, that some argued was a negative feature, the SLD delegates described it in positive terms, as a capital of knowledge that Poland could benefit from:

> The agreement makes it possible for us to access a lot of new, to this time not accessible to us, conquests on the field of technology, science, education and culture. This makes valuable terms for a quicker and better knowledge for us of Europe, making use of its leading conquests in the world…(920521/ 067).

The SLD represented the relationship between Europe and Poland as that of learning. Europe teaches Poland how to become European and Poland is not yet European. SLD resembled the Polish enlighteners who described Poland as backwards compared to Europe, indicated a linear and progressive understanding of development; a development that Europe was leading while Poland was following a couple of paces behind. Europe is the modern: laws, science, technology, culture, and education. At the same time the SLD opposes power and culture as elements that should be applied in domestic and international politics and Europe is also a symbol opposing these trends: human rights, democracy, tolerance, and cooperation based on such values to gain peace and prosperity. In the following sections we will see that the SLD constructs Polish identity in terms of a political nation and a centralized state at the first layer, and a relationship of learning between Poland and Europe. They promote Polish EU membership through a slow and considerate process that allows for education and information, teaching the Poles how to behave as conscious and responsible citizens and economic individuals of a democracy and market economy.

### 4.3.3 UD
A representative of the Democratic Union (UD) argued that not to strive for membership would

> …send an unambiguous signal to the world that Poland resigns from the road that the developed countries once chose, that she once again engages herself in experiments of political designs, as she decides to go her own way and close up against other countries, that her choice is isolation and autarky (920521/ 014).

The statement is very similar to the 'two road' metaphor of Michnik and represents membership as development while any other strategy conveys a regress of which the interwar chaos is a lurking threat. Striving for membership shows the rest of the world that Poland chooses development.

The delegate represented the Europe Agreement as "a challenge, addressed to the whole nation, which for all of us is going to be a strict exam in our national abilities of self-organization, responsibility and capability of making use of the arising occasion". The picture of Europe as a teacher evaluating the work of Poland is a common feature in parliamentary and public debates, and was also common in the language of the Polish enlighteners that represented Poland as a 'pupil' who had to do 'homework' in order to become the 'best in the class'. Europe gave the homework and Poland had to comply (Jedlicki 1999: 16). In the *Sejm* debates in the early 1990s bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects in Eastern and Central Europe were often represented as tests in Europeanness. A UD delegate termed the Visegrad cooperation between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia a "test of the stability of our European region and a strengthening of the position of our countries as partners of the European Community and as candidate countries" (920710/ 027).

The UD representatives tended to point out that Poland was not yet European and that the Poles would have to work continually in order to achieve the goal of reaching such a status:

> European is also the nation that has learnt to brush its teeth and have clean fingernails. This is also connected to the idea of Europeanness, and in that respect I am afraid that we have to aspire for Europe continually, we cannot behave like we already are Europeans (920508/ 027).

This way of representing the relationship between Poland and Europe illustrates how Europe was represented as a superior and Poland as an inferior. Playing on the metaphor of personal hygiene the delegate invoked the image some Poles seem to have of their own nation as dirty, filthy, and primitive opposed to European cleanness and civility (see e.g. Janecki 1998). The statements above also underline that although the UD, as I will show below, recognized that the nation existed through its culture, it did not represent culture as a means through which the nation justified itself on the international arena. The nation justified itself in striving for development and Europeanness.

To this point the rhetoric of the UD resembles that of the SLD. Association and membership were a signal to the outside world that Poland was on the 'right road', being offered association through an Agreement was an acknowledgement that Poland should be grateful for, and striving for membership a means to make Poland European. Europe stands above Poland and teaches it Europeaness. But at one important point the positions divide. The

same UD delegate called on the two thousand-year-long tradition of unifying Christian Europe. In this process the bishops and popes had been active, and Schumann, Gasperi, and Adenauer, all great European and Christians, had after the disasters of the war felt the responsibility to carry on this tradition:

> The key to their vision of a unified Europe was a common historical, cultural, and religious identity, but also equality between the nations and respect of separate features. This strongly commensurate with the commitment repeated so many times in the speeches of John Paul II about European unity. […] The European Agreement is a tool that may lead to the fulfillment of the vision of such a Europe that gives her nations the feeling of accomplishing its centuries long missions (920521/ 014).

We see that the position of the UD rests on a different constellation of the first layer and that Europe is represented not only as a sphere of technology and economy, but also as a community of values that have their source in Christianity. The culture nation manifests itself in the statement as the European project has to make the nations fulfill their own separate missions, and it was stressed that the EC would have to be "the fulfillment of the great vision of Europe built on common culture, rich in experiences and separate features, made up of fatherlands [*ojczyzn*]" (920521/ 014).

The notion *Europa ojczyzn* (Europe of fatherlands) has become a common concept in the debates on Polish EC/ EU membership. It should not be confused with the French *l'Europe des patries*, because the French *patrie* is an 'attachment' that corresponds with another concept of the nation, namely the political nation (see Wæver 1998; 1999). *Europa ojczyzn* as the members of the UD represented it, is a Europe that respects national culture, traditions, history, and territory, and that builds on the common heritage they have in Christendom and civilization.


### 4.3.4 ZCHN

"A country of the size of my fatherland must find its place among the large wolves in this world, where wolves' laws apply," said a delegate of the Christian National Union (ZChN) in Parliament. With these words, and the reference to *homi homini lupus*, he anchored his statement in the realism of Hobbes and Dmowski. He continued:

> Seeking such a place, and seeking always demands certain sacrifices, we cannot betray the values that comprise our national identity. A nation ready to betray the values that decide what it is and what it was, serves under the same conditions as a person who is ready to erode himself serving someone more powerful, stronger, and richer, in order to win material advantage (920521/ 026).

The statement attacked those who argued for European integration in terms of modernization and development, like the SLD and the UD. The representative accused the government and Skubiszewski of being "driven by illusions, wrapping things in cotton, and drawing pink visions of the agreement".

However, "in this terrible, cartelized world" Poland had to conduct tough negotiations with a basic strategic goal.

> That strategic goal cannot be any myth of a united Europe. There are different ways of uniting Europe and different visions of it. If it is to be Europe in line with its traditions and in line with those great civilizational values that have […] created it and that it brought to the world, it has to be a Europe of fatherlands [*Europa ojczyzn*]. And we want to find ourselves in that kind of Europe. In a Europe of free, independent and self-governing sovereign nations. And I hope that shoulder to shoulder with the Irish we will build such a Europe…(920521/ 026).

While Skubiszewski had emphasized the indivisibility of Polish national existence and Christianity, the ZChN representatives highlighted the indivisibility of Catholicism and Polish identity that was a more exclusive representation. The statement suggests Polish moral superiority over the rest of the world as Poland guarded the original European values while the rest of the world had become terrible, absorbed in materialism and applying the laws "of wolves". The rhetoric of the ZChN may be described as basically realist and nationalistic, also playing on the sufferings of the Polish nation and the decadency of Western Europe. The paraphrasing of Hobbes and Dmowski highlights the layer one construction of cultural nation–power state which when relating to the outside world emphasizes both. The state organized the nation in order to make it strong enough to handle the outside.

The core of the original European values was based on Catholicism and the nation-state. On several occasions ZChN representatives accused the SLD and the UD of regarding "the liquidation of nation-states as the aim of the integration process". They asserted that their "so-called European ideology" was applied to combat the Catholic religion whose social and national role allegedly "posed a barrier to the loudly advertised 'return to Europe'". According to ZChN representatives Poland was "already a part of Europe and had always been there". They called on patriotism as a necessity, as capitalism was not sufficient "to appeal to the patience and selflessness of the citizens" and maintained that the "core of Polish patriotism, the most important feature of Polish identity, and the truest of all universalisms that link Poland with other countries, is Catholicism" (*Polish Western Affairs* 1992: 258–259).

We see that the ZChN argued that their opponents did not offer the appropriate construction of layer one, or that they tended to de-emphasize the culture and power aspects as well as the necessary strong link between the state and the nation that were so essential if the nation-state was to survive. They also attacked the representation of Europe in terms of development, modernity, and affluence, instead of culture. Lastly, they argued that the EC posed a danger to the constellation of Polish identity and they were therefore reluctant regarding membership.

### 4.3.5 KPN

Representatives from the Confederation of an Independent Poland (KPN) were pro European integration, but insisted that it had to be a project seeking

to integrate the whole of Europe, not only its western parts (920521/ 021). Instead they promoted an alternative project: a federation of all the former vassal states of the Soviet Union including Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, the Balkans and the Yugoslav sphere. All of these countries were considered too weak alone to implement a *powerful foreign policy*, but if they integrated and formed a political system, they could launch the kind of developmental project experienced by the Western European countries after the Second World War. "Only in this way may the countries in this region become equal partners to Western Europe, to what may develop in the Russian sphere, and moreover to the Far East and America" (920508/006).

The statement reveals that the ultimate goal of the KPN was a powerful foreign policy. Poland justifies itself on the international arena through the power of the state. The philosophy of the KPN emphasized power politics and geopolitics. Europe was represented as a power sphere divided into two blocks: Western Europe, convening around the EC and NATO and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. If Poland went into an alliance with the Western European countries, and this was the prospect of the Europe Agreement, it would become victim to an asymmetric alliance. Western Europe was too powerful in terms of economy. Neither was an alliance with the East an alternative, because it was too powerful in terms of population and territory. Poland therefore had to launch its own project of integration, built on the model of the Western European project, but with exclusively Central European countries taking part. The project of the KPN was called *Międzymorze* (Middelsea) and built explicitly on the legacy of Piłsudski's dream of a Central European federation.

## 4.4 An ordinary Poland in an ordinary Europe

While the government's European policy priorities were met with general approval, disillusionment with the "return to Europe" grew. The bulk of the problem was probably economic reforms bringing with them unemployment and declining real income. As the EC imposed numerous restrictions on Polish agricultural imports, Europe was also increasingly represented as arrogant. Skubiszewski felt compelled to remind the EC to "remain faithful to the ideas of its founders and not transform itself into a fortress closed off to the rest of Europe" (quoted in Vinton 1995: 63). In 1992 a sociologist presented a report maintaining that to most people the "return to Europe" had been replaced with "compliance to Europe" (Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 1992: 101). This might have been a result of the rhetoric of for example the SLD and the UD that tended to represent the relationship between Poland and the European Community in such terms. This language was also reflected in Polish media.

After the 1993 elections, the conservative parties failed to establish a coalition and were marginalized in Parliament due to higher thresholds. The post-Communist parties SLD and PSL established a government coalition. The outcome of the election was called the "velvet restoration" (Michnik [1993] 1998: 306) and was by some observers regarded as a restoration of the Communist regime. Michnik, however, welcomed the new government

as a "symbol of gray and ordinary Poland" (ibid.: 314), and the government as "people proposing a conversation of an ordinary Poland in an ordinary Europe" (ibid.: 316). To him the fact that this faction could come to power in ordinary elections was a sign of Polish political stability, a democracy that worked, and of Europeanness.

There were no major *Sejm* debates on the Polish relation to Europe during the SLD-PSL government period. In 1994 the *Sejm* unanimously decided to formalize the aspiration for EU membership as a part of Polish foreign policy after a short debate in which conflict level was low. In the following section I will present the position of the government. In the subsequent parts I will describe alternative positions as they appeared in *Kultura* and in *Tygodnik Sollidarność*.

### 4.4.1 SLD-PSL

In his first exposé as Foreign Minister (940512/ 001), Andzej Olechowski declared that "the straightest road to a Europe without divisions is the enlargement of the well assessed structures of the North Atlantic Association and the European Union", the latter which he described as "the most European of all European institutions". He expressed satisfaction with the good neighborly relationship with a "democratic and European Germany" that Poland could look to with trust and he followed up by claiming that if Poland had any mission at all in Europe, it had to be to keep good relations with Germany so as to "liquidate serious threats to a potential conflict in Europe". The road to achieve this was to "link Poland and Germany to the same community of nations, to the European Union". He considered the relationship to the East as too frail and called for more cooperation politically, economically, and culturally. He summed up the main tasks of the new government's foreign policy in three terms: "durable security, favorable conditions for development, and individual personal contacts." The greatest threats against accomplishing these tasks were: "intolerance, conservativism, protectionism, and stereotypes."

Olechowski revealed that he regarded Poland's position between the new states in the East and Germany as the chief determinant of its security and that the relations between Poland and Germany were crucial for European security. He defined the chief enemies as intolerance, conservativism, protectionism, and stereotypes, values that, as we have seen earlier, were represented as contradictory to the European values by this party. Europe and the EU were represented as communities that dampened power and culture politics and thus also conflicts between nations. The SLD-PSL government promoted a cautious approach to integration with Europe and emphasized that the Polish people would have to learn how to become active citizens of the *Rzeczpospolita* as well as responsible actors on the European market. Because of the cautious approach the coalition was criticized from the opposition in that it impeded reform and slowed down the process of integration.

The position of SLD-PSL was reflected in the statements of Jerzy Jedlicki, who maintained that Poland always had been a "Suburb of Europe" (Jedlicki 1993; 1999). In an article called "Poland's Perpetual Return to Europe" (1993) he made the argument that there had *always* been a gap be-

tween Poland and the Western part of Europe on the civilizational level, "even in the 'golden age' of its political and cultural history, Poland could not close the gap that separates it from centers of European civilization" (ibid.: 81). Communism itself did not create the problem of the European peripheries. "But whatever their ideological visions, the Communists aggravated this centuries-old problem and deepened the civilizational gap in Europe" (ibid.: 84). "At present Polish prospects are not very bright. Those who hoped that the collapse of Communism would mean the end of the troubles of the nation were naïve" (ibid.: 87). Neither was free-market democracy nor political solutions enough. "Indifference and despondency will be the worst enemies. Regaining self-confidence is the first and foremost condition for progress. A major spiritual and psychological revival is needed to overcome adversities and to open new vistas to the future. In this task the desire of Poland to return to Europe may once again prove instrumental: not in order to return anywhere, but to move ahead" (ibid.: 88).

Poland was not European but it should aspire towards Europeanness. Europe was represented as a sphere of development, progress, and education. The rhetoric resembles that of the Enlightenment. The Poles have to become educated if they are to enter Europe. The article anchored the position in history and created continuance with the past. If we compare Jedlicki to the subsequent sections, we will see some major differences in how the 'Golden Age' and Polish history are represented.

### 4.4.2 A European Polishness

The writers of *Kultura* emphasized that there was a Polish distinctiveness in drawing on both Western and Eastern European culture, that Poland should use this heritage politically by integrating the East and the West, and that the revitalization of a Polish national identity should tag on the political tradition of Dmowski's realism mixed with the cultural tradition of the Jagiellonian period.

Jan Maria Bocheński (1993) identified three existing traditions of defining the Polish nation, the classical, the national and the Messianic. Messianism was the ideology of the post-partition period; the idea of Poland as the Christ of nations who was bleeding for Europe's sins. Messianism regarded Europe as a decadent area of moral decline as opposed to Poland's spiritual highness. If Poland was to become an open, European nation, it was imperative that this ideology was eliminated.

The national ideology defined the Polish nation in a narrow, ethnical sense and thus excluded lingual and cultural pluralism. The state was centralistic and the good of the nation was defined as the highest good. Catholicism was interpreted in a nationalistic and intolerant way and for a non-Catholic it was impossible to be considered a Pole. The practical conesquences of adopting a national ideology would involve reluctance to give up claims on Vilnius and Lwów. Intolerance and anti-Semitism would grow stronger and, even if the national ideology acknowledged that Poland was a country building on Western European tradition and values, relations with the community of Europe would not be favored since the good of the nation was put in front of the good of the community of Europe. What Bocheński

describes here is a Polish identity that emphasizes the power state and perhaps also the culture nation. Such groupings in Parliament are, as we have seen, first and foremost the KPN and the ZChN.

Bocheński argued that the Polish nation was beyond doubt anchored in Western Europe, first and foremost because Poland had adopted Christianity from there and since then adopted the Western traditions. "[T]he Polish nation is and remains a Western European nation, or it will not exist at all" (ibid.: 15). But in order to stay Western European the Polish nation would have to revise parts of its identity and turn to the classic definition of the nation that entailed the broadest possible definition of Polishness, a turn to the Jagiellonian national tradition. The classical ideology promoted a federal model of the state and the Polish nation was defined in a wide and pluralistic sense as anyone living in Poland or anyone acknowledging her- or himself to the Polish nation. Catholicism was an important feature of Polish identity, but in contrast to the national ideology there was also room for other religious traditions.

Bocheński argued that one of the original features of the Polish nation was its Europeanness, and defined Europe as the "group of nations confessing themselves to the Christian faith". Moreover, he contended: "the Europeanness of classical Poland is without comparison deeper than in most other nations. For them it is more about economic gains, while the Poles are attached to Europe by years of bloody battles for her defense" (ibid.: 13). With this statement Bocheński demarcated a clear diacritic border between Poland and the rest of Europe defined by Poland being more European than the rest and that Polish Europeanness was to a larger extent anchored in moral values than in economy. Although Bocheński repudiated Messianism, he still emphasized the cultural aspect, only this has to be a European culture according to certain Western European standards. The anchoring of Poland in Western Europe was regarded as a means to fight nationalism and narrowmindedness, anti-democratic tendencies and intolerance while Europe was defined in terms of a larger community of Christian values. The practical consequence of applying the classical ideology would be that Poland became "a bridge between the East and the West" (ibid.: 15).

*Kultura* de-emphasized both the culture aspect and the power aspect. Although they acknowledged the deeper Europeanness of Poland in terms of more profound moral values and Christendom, they did not endow Poland with any mission in enforcing these values in the rest of Europe. Instead Poland should function as a bridge, as a means of transferring understanding between East and West and bringing Europe to unity. This was a normative assignment that Poland should take. Poland's role in the process of European unification was not indispensable.

### 4.4.3 A Polish Europeanness

In 1996 Zdzisław Najder published a series of four articles in *Tygodnik Solidarność* under the headline: "Pole, become who you are" (Najder 1998: 23–30). The heading drew on the thoughts of the Greek poet Pindar, who argued that man carries a potential self within him and that he becomes a real man only when this potential is realized, when he becomes his sub-

stantial self. Najder transferred this idea onto the Polish nation. Due to the serious hits the national image received during Communism, the contemporary image was not a reflection of the nation's substantial self. However, there still was a chance to rebuild the real image. Najder defined "real Polishness [*polskość*]" by paraphrasing the Polish romantics to whom it was "a kind of obligation, not only the right to the heritage of certain goods. A real Pole is the one who serves Poland as it should be: independent and just" (ibid.: 29).

Najder exemplified the Jagiellonian period as one when Polishness was defined according to this idea, when the Polish nation was a multicultural community made up by Jews, Lithuanians, Germans, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and other peoples. What united the national consciousness was a set of values that Najder related to the ethos of the Polish knights: great-heartedness, brotherhood, solidarity, courage, and the strength to forgive and ask for forgiveness. "If we do not regain those virtues, we will not fulfill the challenge that I introduce in the title [Pole, become who you are]" (ibid.: 26). In short, Najder evoked the Jagiellonian period, with its tolerance and multiculturalism, as a symbol of real Poland, and the knight as the symbol of real Polishness.

Najder attacked those who throughout history fled the country or avoided taking part in the real national uprisings, like Mickiewicz, and honored those who put their lives at risk, or even suffered death, for the sake of real Poland, like Piłsudski and Krzysztof Kamil Baczyński, a Polish poet who died in the Warsaw uprising at the tender age of 23. Najder's ideal was the poet, the intellectual, and the heroic insurgent who help building *national solidarity* beyond the dividing line of social class. Real Poles must have the will to stay Polish and if necessary die for the sake of national freedom "…[t]he real death of the nation is not even the loss of independence, but the loss of the belief that the battle of independence is worth the sacrifice of life. That belief has been and still is connected to Poles, just as it was connected to the knights" (ibid.: 27). Najder represented Poland in terms of the traditions of the knights and the *szalchta* and drew lines from this to the traditions of the national uprisings. His statement resembles that of Pilsudski, who maintained: "each generation must demonstrate with its blood that Poland is alive and that she will not reconcile to foreign bondage" (quoted in Bromke 1967: 24).

Claiming the existence of a 'real' Poland implies the existence of the opposite. In Najder's eyes the 'unreal' Poland was the kind of image that was created during Communism. The Communists constructed a distorted image of Polish identity that was determined by blood and biology instead of moral obligation and the PRL wanted a return to the real Poland of the Piast. Xenophobia and hatred were cultivated internally, as well as externally towards the West. Through this 'false' image, the Communists kept Poland from becoming what it is, contended Najder. In his eyes the Communists were barely "Poles" (ibid.: 30), the inverted commas signifying the falseness of their Polishness. From Najder's point of view Solidarity represented the 'real' Poland's uprising against the 'false'.

Najder described real Polishness while continually highlighting differences between 'us' and 'them', between the real Poles and the false Poles, and ascribed them two contradictory value patterns. 'We' are pluralistic and

democratic; 'they' are totalitarian and despotic. 'We' are tolerant; 'they' are xenophobic nationalists. 'We' are Christians; 'they' are atheists. Najder admitted that the 'false' image of Poland had a great impact and that a lot of hard work had to be done in order to recreate the 'real' image. What was needed was the reconstruction of Polish identity based on the model of 'real' national images. These images were to be found in the Jagiellonian period, in historical literature, in the shape of Polish heroes who fought for the 'real' values of the nation, and through the history of national insurrections. In his numerous texts on Polish history, Najder recalls and honors these moments and personalities. Contrary to Bocheński and *Kultura*, Najder did not go to the Jagiellonian era to pick out aspects from Polish history and culture that linked it to Europe in order to enforce these and strengthen Polish European identity. To Najder the Jagiellonian tradition *was* Polish identity in its unique sense. As genealogical endeavors, Najder's articles may prove to be good examples of how to construct continuance with the past and make order of disorder, for example in defining Communism as 'false' Polishness and thus mark it as an anomaly in Polish history.

Najder placed Poland "in the heart of Europe", but he emphasized that it is well situated within the culture and traditions of the western part of the continent. "From the point of view of the whole culture of Europe, Poland was a co-creator and co-contributor to the western civilization." Situated at the "borders of Latin Europe", the Poles had from the very beginning the mission to "develop, strengthen and represent Western culture as well as to defend their own culture against Eastern despotism". Another mission was to teach the Polish "neighbors to the east, south and north what a national culture can and should be. If we manage to recreate that role, we will become what we were in our best times…" (ibid.: 28). With this statement Najder defined Poland's place in (Western) Europe as a bulwark against the negatives of the East and as a missionary teaching its own national and Western values to its neighboring countries. He communicates that Polish culture should be promoted on the European scene and that in doing this the Polish nation justifies itself because promoting national culture is a part of 'real' Polishness'.

In Najder's view Poland needed to enter the EU in order to protect its sovereignty, especially in the light of the uncertain situation in the east, but also in order to secure internal democracy and to fight nationalism. Najder wrote that if Poland does not enter the EU, one could not guarantee against the repetition of history in terms of the scenarios of the Communist and the interwar period (ibid.: 98). On the other hand, Najder believed that Europe also needed Poland because the continent is threatened by "soullessness": Money is becoming more important than moral values and ethics, internal authorities and ties are being destroyed, people are exposed to the temptations of consumerism and permissiveness, and the markets are flooded with pornography, aggressive commercials and cultural trash. The economy is threatened by the process of globalization, "the unwanted child of liberalism", something that will ruin it totally if it is not counteracted. The EU was a means of fighting the unwanted tendencies and Poland was an important element in this process:

> …the bishops recall that the culture of Europe is a Christian creation, and that the uniting of Europe and the 'return of her Christian soul' is the natural task of the Christian. I add to this message that if the Poles in reaching Europe do not make use of their Christian inspiration – that will be the same as supporting the Union as a soulless supranational supermarket (ibid.: 128).

Europe needed, and expected, Polish help in fighting "the deluge of cosmopolitan, 'global' mass culture ". In this sense the real Poles of today were not only fighting for the sake of their own nation, but also in terms of having the potential of saving the whole European civilization from cultural destruction.

According to Najder the possibilities of future developments were the following: "Either Poles manage to develop their real image, fulfill the requirements, put up with the past and the present and 'become who they are' – or the cosmopolitan civilization of the global market will wash over us" (ibid.: 23). In other words, the nation manifests itself in its culture and through its mission in saving Europe from evils or it perishes. Poland should justify itself as a nation by manifesting Christian values and fighting the decline in moral values for the sake of material goods. Poland is provided with the role of a bulwark, not only to the evils in the East, but also against globalization and cosmopolitan mass culture where money replaces moral values.

## 4.5 Polish European policies at the turn of the century

The purpose of this analysis is to locate Polish European policy positions and show how the discourse of which the positions are constitutive parts is structured. Chapter three categorized the representations and the relations between layer one and two. The analysis so far has confirmed these categories and revealed that there are disputes between the actors occupying the different positions in discourse and that one result of this is that different European policies are being promoted. The statements and the analysis of them have made suggestions of the structure of the third layer. This section categorizes the policy layer more explicitly in relation to concrete statements from the most recent Polish debates on the relationship with Europe.

An important project is to point out how the positions may change internally, not only how the discourse may change as a result of changing power between the positions. In order to assess the persistence of the positions, I decided to locate the values, institutions, and realities of different positions in discourse and look into how the different actors attempt to displace the values, institutions, and realities of other positions. I argue that what kind of relationship is promoted depends on the values that evaluate Polish identity in relation to Europe. If the political discourse reproduces Polish identity as a European identity, the markers defining this identity will define the Polish European project. If there is a border between the two identities, with diacritical markers, the assessment of these markers define the relationship. An important aspect here is whether diacritical marker for Poland is negatively evaluated and the European positively, or if it is the other way around. It will be shown that the relationship with Europe is promoted in a way that reproduces values that correspond to, or at least do not contradict; the values that reproduce the constellations of layer one and two. The most important values

that the Europeans reproduce – the most crucial values that the actors reproduce in order to sustain the position – are those that define how the different constellations of nation and state are promoted on the European (international) arena. These feedback loops will be defined and some scenarios of how they may change, as well as an example where I believe it *has* changed in the course of the decade, will be suggested.

Before I turn to political parties and opinion makers, I will illustrate an example of how there have been made attempts to silence the position occupied by the more hard line Catholics, like the ZChN. This could be the reason why, as I will show you later, there has been an internal change in the position of the ZChN in the recent years modifying the values and realities of the feedback loop in a way that has opened up for Polish EU membership.

### 4.5.1 A European Church

After the parliamentary elections in October 1997 the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) formed a coalition government together with the Freedom Union (UW). The AWS was a broad alliance of rightwing parties, the ZChN and KPN included, which had managed to join forces under the leadership of Marian Krzaklewski. The UW had been established in 1994 unifying the forces of the UD and some other smaller parties.

Partly due to opinions that have been expressed by some Catholic factions, efforts have been made by the AWS-UW government to convince the Poles that the European Union is an organization built on values corresponding with the Christian fundament and a project that is working to obtain the goals of the Catholic Church. In 1997 the Polish episcopate sent a delegation to Brussels in order to inspect the condition of the Union. The response of the delegation was overwhelmingly positive and the event received great media coverage. After their return they expressed unison support to Polish integration with the European structures and, seing in it no threats against Polish identity. In a comment to the event Jerzy Turowicz (1997) foresaw that the joint statement would have great influence on the public opinion and that 'euroscepticism' eventually would fade away.

In 1999 the Pope was invited to the *Sejm* for the first time. He made it clear that the Vatican supported Polish integration with the European Union.

> The Holy See has from the beginning supported Polish integration with the European Union. The Polish nation's historical experience and its spiritual and cultural wealth can contribute effectively to the common good of the entire human family, especially in consolidating peace and security in Europe (John Paul II 1999).

The Pope also expressed concern about the present development in democratic states:

> the Church warns against a reduced vision of Europe which would see it solely in its economic and political aspects, as she does against an uncritical attitude towards a consumerist model of life. If we wish Europe's new unity to last, we must build on the basis of the spiritual values that were once its foundation,

keeping in mind the wealth and diversity of the cultures and traditions of indi-
vidual nations. This must be the great European community of the Spirit. Here
too I renew my appeal to the Old Continent: Europe, open the doors to Christ!
(John Paul II 1999).

Not all the Catholic organizations were convinced by the offensive cam-
paigning of the government. In the following I will present statements from
the *Sejm* and from printed media on Polish EU-relations from 1997 to 1999.

### 4.5.2 AWS

Entering the European Union does not bring about the rejection of our national
and Christian identity. The Holy Father John Paul II said during his Homily in
Gniezno in 1997 that the framework of European identity is built on Christianity.
I would like the Polish contribution to the process of European integration be the
reminder of these fundamental principles. […] I would like to underline that our
contribution to the European process of integration may be the fulfillment of the
values that have been the mark of Polish politics for the last 20 years, and name-
ly the fundament of solidarity. It is actually that fundament that led to the victory
over the past symbolized by totalitarianism and the iron curtain. Today the fun-
dament of solidarity, both between countries that already are members of the
Union, and between the Union and other countries, especially those that are
aspiring for membership, may become one of the fundaments of a real European
unity (990908/ 004).

Buzek rejected the representation of the EU as a threat to the Polish identity
and to the value of Christianity and Catholicism. He gave the Poles a mis-
sion in the process of European integration in reminding Europe of the
framework of its identity – Christian values. Suggesting that this was need-
ed, indicated that Europe was threatened by secularization and moral decay
and needed help from Poland in overcoming these threats. Europe was repre-
sented as a collection of values being threatened and Poland was represented
as a country that could work against these threats.

Buzek gave the Poles the honor of having lifted the iron curtain and pre-
sented the achievements of the resistance movement as a contribution to the
European process of integration. With this he strengthened the feeling of
having been a part of Europe and the process of integration, even if situated
at the other side of the wall. The feeling of solidarity was presented as a spe-
cial Polish value that, included into the general European pattern of values,
could unite Europe in its natural shape.

Europe would appear in its natural shape when it included all of the coun-
tries that belonged to the European tradition of culture and values. Buzek
gave Poland the role of a European missionary in these territories. The
remedy to a continued artificial division of the continent was the Polish role
of being a "bridge between the ones who are aspiring for Europe and the
ones who belong to Europe". With this statement Buzek rejected that the
countries to the east of Poland were European. It has to be underlined that
the 'bridge' metaphor was not used in the sense of a meeting place of values,

but as a way of transmitting Western European values from the West to the East.

Marian Krzaklewski represented Poland as a victim of history:

> More than half a century ago – not of our own wills – we were placed behind the iron curtain, on the totalitarian side of the divided Europe. Because of this, and only because of this, we did not take part in the process of reshaping the free states of Europe that took place from the forties to the eighties. The verdict of history gave us another role – to crush the walls put up by Communist totalitarianism. We passed the exam (990908/ 008).

The statement underlines that to be a part of Europe is the natural condition for Poland while the Communist period is described as an anomaly. Furthermore, the statement represents Poland as a bulwark against Communism and manifests that Poland served the task of defending Europe from this destructive and non-European trend. This way of describing the history of the country gives Poland the status of a passive victim of uncontrollable forces that work against the free wills of the Poles, but it also gave them a mission. That mission was to crush Communism and the walls that were dividing Europe. Suggesting that the Poles performed this task successfully, Krzaklewski invoked the self-sacrificing Pole who saves Europe from the dangers threatening to destroy its institutions and its values. Thanks to the heroic struggle of such brave Poles, Europe had the chance to regain its natural unity. "It is thanks to Solidarity, thanks to the wish of freedom of millions of Poles, that Europe again is one." When Poland becomes a member of the European Union, he continued, this would be the "final victory over the artificial divide of our continent and the final victory of Solidarity, who already in 1980 reminded us of the responsible place of Poland in Europe, changing the face of Europe and the world".

With the "responsible place of Poland in Europe" Krzaklewski had in mind the slogan "there is no united Europe without an independent Poland", referred too earlier in his speech. This slogan, painted on the banners of the striking workers in Gdansk in 1981, forced through Polish freedom and independence by indicating the European necessity of a free and sovereign Polish state. It also added yet another heroic feature to the Solidarity movement: it was claimed that at the same time as Poland fought for its own freedom, the nation also fought for the sake of the freedom of all of Europe. Krzaklewski highlighted that it is not the first time Poland defends Europe; Poland has always defended Europe. The reasoning resembled the idea of Poland as a bulwark of Christendom protecting Europe and the European values but also as a promoter of these values. "Poland, in the measure of her strength, may enforce the identity of the whole European community, supporting the fundament that was laid by the Christian democrats: De Gasperi, Adenauer and Schuman" (990908/ 008).

An important aspect for the AWS delegates was the concept of national identity. Addressing worries of some groups that this would become an empty concept if Poland entered the EU, Krzaklewski stated that:

> …Poland is not limiting her identity as she goes into the European Union, rather the opposite. Integration within the framework of the Union is a chance to build and strengthen our identity and the threats against this are all the extremes, void of respect for traditions, the moral relativism promoted by some of the organizations of the left (990908/ 008).

The last sentence was an attack directed at the SLD and the values that their representations of Europe and Poland were reproducing. The Prime Minister and the leader of the AWS represented the EU as an organization in which Poland could strengthen its culture by promoting and enforcing Polish values. The rhetoric is quite different from that of the SLD and some of the UW delegates that tended to talk about European integration in terms of Polish compliance to European standards. In this case the relationship is the opposite, Poland brings with it values to Europe and Europe is supposed to implement them.

*4.5.2.1 Policy: Poland integrates with the EU as part of its moral mission*
The AWS and the Catholic Church represent Europe predominantly in terms of a cultural community of Christendom. On the other hand, Europe at present is believed to be lost because of the influx of trends such as liberalism, globalization, and secularization. When this representation of Europe is linked to the representation of Poland it activates the culture of the Polish nation and deactivates the power state. The Polish nation has always been a part of Europe in the cultural sense. Throughout history it has lived at Europe's frontier where it has defended European culture against onslaughts form the infidels. Much because of this the Polish nation has managed to preserve its European culture much better than any other country and has the mission to bring Europe back to its roots. The relationship that is created is one where Polish culture is superior to European culture.

The statements of the AWS repudiated the option of the EU as a future federation. The EU will function as a framework of cooperation on the basis of common denominators of European culture, civilization, economy, and politics. But the essential components are and will be nations. The national traditions have to be conserved because all nations have their own values and their special mission adding to the completeness of Europe and the world. A commonly used denotation of this framework is *Europa ojczyzn* (Europe of fatherlands). The EU also has to aspire towards the east with the purpose to include new nations. Poland should be assigned the task to transmit European values to its neighbors. A EU that is based on a Western core, or that supports differences between the nations that it comprises, is against the nature of the European ideal. The value of solidarity is represented as a unique Polish value that should be guiding the unification process. This indicates a kind of egalitarian status of the members. A Europe of several speeds is not a policy that will gain support from this fraction.

The EU is represented as an organization founded on the basis of Christian values and idealistic principles and as the major instrument in fighting the demoralizing and deteriorating processes that threaten Europe. The EU wants and expects Poland's help in doing this. The position attacks those who define the EU in terms of a liberal political and economic organization

that is not interested in the Polish mission and neither in Polish moral intentions. It also attacks those who regard the Union as a threat against Polish identity. It is, on the contrary, argued that Poland is strengthening its identity by entering the EU. This is because entering the Union Poland may fight the lack of respect for traditions and moral relativism. The reason for this may be traced back to the identity layer and the relational layer. According to this position the Polish nation depends on a certain mission in Europe consisting of moral principles and this identity is depending on acts of representing Polish values on the European arena. The feedback loop may be illustrated like this:



Fig. 4.5.2.1 Bulwark

If Poland ceases to promote its culture, Christianity and solidarity on the European arena, the values, institutions, and the reality will perish, or alternatively be redefined so that the loop will be modified. With the prospect of entering the EU, statements that EU membership is a way for Poland to express its culture, an arena where Poland will protect Europe, sustain the loop. A scenario that could make the loop break or be modified is for example if the context, Europe, changes, or does not confirm the Polish European identity (value), for instance if Poland is denied EU membership on an equal footing, if the EU is taking explicit distance from the Christian foundation, or if the EU will not enlarge further to the east. I refer here to the model in the first chapter of this thesis, that illustrated the three layers in relation to the context, Europe. If the context changes, this would lead to a redefinition of representations and policies.

The position constructs continuity with the past in representing the position as a continuation of the traditions of the Polish knights, the values of the *szlachta*, and the many uprisings against oppression and inequality. It represents EU as a project that is built on a Christian fundament as they call on the founding fathers who were all "great Europeans and Christians". This too constructs continuance with the past on the part of the EU and merges it with the values of the feedback loop. The EU wants to reproduce the same values as Poland. It only needs Poland's help in doing so.

### 4.5.3 UW

Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek from the UW gave a lot of interviews on European integration and European history, both as Foreign Minister and as a professor of European medieval history. In an interview with the weekly *Wprost* (1998) on Poland, Europe, and the EU, he interpreted the concept of Europe as the "rejection of one truth and one ideology, the rejection of intolerance", a definition that resembles Michnik's definition. Furthermore, he stated that the "national cultures are the wealth of Europe. If she integrates, she should unite under the standard unity within variety, without losing what up too this moment has made up her wealth". He also emphasized that the process of integration should "proceed with respect for national traditions and sovereignty".

> I also think that the old *Rzeczpospolita* was on a miniature scale the prefiguration of the European community – in the Polish landscape there was a place for the Catholic Church, as well as the temple of the Greek Catholics, the liturgy of the Orthodox, Jewish synagogues and Tartar minarets. This should also be the pan-European vision (Wprost 1998).

The statement endeavors to link the concept of Europe to the heritage of the Jagiellonian period and thus represents it in unity with Polish history. We are familiar with such thoughts from the article of Bocheński. The UW occupies a position in discourse that resembles that of *Znak* and of the leftist intelligentsia during Communism. The UW consists of many of the same people who were central in the leftist intelligentsia and former vital members of *Znak*, like Mazowiecki. In Parliament Mazowiecki (990908/ 009) acknowledged that Europe had "problems with the development of its soul" but emphasized that these problems would have an impact on Poland even if it did not enter the Union. He expressed the hope that the words of the Pope, which the Prime Minister too had referred to in his speech, would also have an impact on the debate on Polish national consciousness. Mazowiecki distanced the UW from the position of the AWS. Christian values were regarded as important national values, but the nation did not express itself by promoting these values.

*4.5.3.1 Policy: Polish identity is Europeanized with EU membership*
The UW, as well as periodicals, newspapers and organizations such as *Kultura, Gazeta Wyborcza,* and *Znak*, represent Europe as a sphere of values that are antidotes to both a strong cultural representation of the nation as well as the denial of strong power politics. Poland has to Europeanize its identity continually by picking out the values of its identity that confirm its Europeanness. Such values are particularly to be found in the Jagiellonian tradition. With this continuance with the past is preserved and the traditions of the European Union are linked to them.

Europe is made up of an Eastern and a Western tradition and Poland is situated between these spheres. The Western sphere is represented in terms of political, economic, and societal designs, and it is underlined that Poland should not endorse to this uncritically, but rather find its own solutions and work against the negatives that are produced by e.g. a free-market economy

and extensive liberalism. Both Europe and Poland have trends that work against European values and they have to cooperate in order to fight them.

The contribution of Poland to Europe is to show both the East and the West how to build such a national culture that is unique and European at the same time. Europe is represented as a unity that incorporates the East and Poland lies in the middle and is a meeting place of Western and Eastern values. This means that room is given for the possibility that the West might learn from the East as well. Europe is also Christianity, but Poland has no mission in Europe.

Based on this construction is a policy that regards the EU as a community that has a democratic, egalitarian and tolerant foundation. The EU is considered to be a suitable channel for promoting the reconstruction of a Europe based on these values. The position promotes a Europe that is unified, incorporating both the East and the West on equal terms. This repudiates a Western-based Europe as well as a Europe of several speeds. Europe also has to be made up of fatherlands with the nations as the central elements.

Polish membership in the EU is believed to be a way of strengthening Polish identity because it manifests Poland's Europeanness. The EU is also looked upon as an organization that ensures Polish national security, as it anchors Poland in a community where the values of tolerance and democracy are central. Polish EU membership is thus regarded as necessary in order to secure Poland within the European sphere and avoid that it disappears into the chaos of nationalism, totalitarianism, and isolation. Although these institutions reproduce a Polish reality where it does not express itself through power or culture, the nation justifies itself internationally by showing that it is European – stable, predictable, tolerant, and cooperative. Confirmation of its Europeanness from the outside is important when it comes to the external dimension. EU membership is a strong symbol of the acknowledgement of Polish Europeanness from the outside.



Fig. 4.5.3.1 Bridge

A possible scenario that may cause a modification or a break of this feedback loop is if Poland is denied membership in the Union, or if the rest of Europe (context) contradicts the values constituting the Polish European identity, for example if Poland is not acknowledged as a European nation.

### 4.5.4 Nasze Koło

In April 1999 Jan Łopuszański was expelled from the ZChN because of an increasing dissidence on the European policy of the coalition. He founded a separate parliamentary caucus called Our Circle (NK) and a political alliance, Polish Agreement (PP), which enjoys support from the political organization Polish Family (RP) and the chief ideologue of this organization, Piotr Jaroszyński. This fraction consists of the most outspoken opponents to Polish EU membership. The RP is associated with *Radio Maryja* (Radio Mary) which is part of the most conservative wing of the AWS. A daily newspaper representing the views of these groups is *Nasz Dziennik* (Our Daily).

These groups link the representation of a decadent and decayed Europe directly to the EU. The constellation is perceived as the source of the spread of evils and an institution that upholds the continuous process of deterioration. In an interview with *Gazeta Wyborcza* (1998b), Piotr Jaroszyński described the EU in the following terms: "What kind of creation is it? If there are to be no nations but only some societies, if abortion, euthanasia and homosexual marriages are to be legitimate, is that a formation, or a malformation?" In the *Sejm* Łopuszański contended that in the EU "organized anti-Christian forces dominate, and their overarching domination consequently increases" (980319/ 009).

The groups represented the EU as a conspiracy aiming at destroying Poland's status as a free and independent country. "The plans of the EU concerning Poland are to weaken our position, to strip us of independence and to cut the people down to the size of laborers working for the West" (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 1998b). Statements like this have strong parallels to the partitions and also the to Soviet period. Fears like this have similarities to the thinking of Dmowski, who believed that Poland would be too weak in an alliance with Germany because it would be dominated by its culture and its economic potential.

The fear that Polish sovereignty will evaporate if Poland enters the EU is in opposition to representations claiming that Polish sovereignty will increase once it becomes a member. This has in great part to do with the way in which these groups define Polish sovereignty. A fully sovereign country cannot be dependent on another country, not even in the economic sphere, according to the groups affiliated with *Nasze Koło*. Łopuszański maintained that it was "part of the essential functions of a sovereign state that its foreign politics are derived from its domestic politics. Our own goals are superior and the international goals are secondary". In the European Union, however, "the international unity seems to be superior while the national life has to go through a process of adjustment to international standards […]. Attaching Poland to the European Union in its present shape would be suicide for Poland" (980319/ 009). Jaroszyński accused the government of working against Polish objectives: "The goal of the government coalition is non-Polish. Unfortunately, it is international. They want to incorporate us into the European Union" (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 1998b).

Jaroszyński and Łopuszański rejected the possibility of being both international, a member of the Union, and Polish. In their eyes there was a permanent clash between these concepts that could not be united. Voices claim-

ing that the concept of sovereignty was changing and contending that entering the Union Poland will have a say in matters essential to her development in a changing reality, something that in turn will strengthen her sovereign position, were accused of making use of pure rhetoric.

> Before we used to hear those kinds of arguments when the secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party took the word, maintaining that the strengthening of the so- called friendship with the Soviet Union led to the strengthening of Polish independence. I would like to make the organizers of Polish integration with the EU aware that they are about to repeat the accomplishment of the Targowica [confederates], only that the direction of the international engagement, the geographical direction, is different (990908/ 011).

By evoking the event of Targowica, Łopuszański accused those who want to integrate Poland into Europe of collaborating with forces intending to disintegrate Poland. Piotr Jaroszyński drew parallels to the period of Communism:

> The European Union is the USSR *à rebours*. It is supported by an antidemocratic system.  The bureaucracy of Brussels devours the structures, the independence and the sovereignty of the member states […] Today the Communist ideology is no longer threatening us, but the threat is the domination within the EU of a socialistic-secular ideology (cited in Bogusz and Stachura 1998: 32).

The alternative of NK, PP and *Radio Maryja* is the Polish way.

> …instead of continuously turning to the West, we should seek our own solutions that should be in line with our tradition, culture, civilization, faith. The Polish way will be a way to fight conformism and dependency and remain an example of the true European values […] We will teach Europe what a Christian nation is, a nation that does not allow to be forced into financial slavery and that is capable of managing its own affairs. Thereby we will contribute to a collapse of world globalism, just as we halted the expansion of the Germans, the Mongols, the Swedes, the Turks, or the Soviets. It may be in Poland that the fall of the New World Order will begin (*Nasz Dziennik* 1998).

While we have seen that the ZChN have reformulated the concept of sovereignty to mean cooperation in the economic sphere, this fraction strongly correlates economy and sovereignty. Tadeusz Rydzyk was concerned that the EU was a place where "the land of the peasant is being bought by foreigners, and the farmer himself dies from hunger" (cited by Surdykowski 1998: 28). A representative from Solidarity Ursus, a workers' movement, maintained that in this sense the EU was even worse than the former regime. "The Union is taking measures to complete what not even Bierut or Gomułka managed to do: to liquidate 90 percent of Polish agriculture" (cited by Surdykowski 1998: 28). The reasoning of the groups is based on a strong state with an autonomous economy of self-subsistence.

*4.5.4.1 Policy: Poland defends its autonomy outside of a decadent Europe*
The position represents Europe as a lost culture decaying with games of power politics, consumerism, individualism, and democratic and liberal experiments. The state is thought of as an incarnation of the nation. The state has a solid power element and stands above the nation, and has to do so in order to prevent chaos. An important reason why the state has to be strong is because the outside world is threatening the culture of the nation as well as its state. Poland is represented as culturally superior to contemporary Europe and should have a non-relationship with it in order not to be infected with its decadence. The alternative is to endeavor to construct a Christian community of cooperation.

The EU is conceived of as a strategic tool in the hands of the greatest European powers. The main intention of its existence is to gain political, cultural, and economic superiority. These strategies involve the project of disintegration of Poland. The EU is represented as a step in this process, that leading to the 'fourth partition of Poland' and as the embodiment of the processes of secularization and moral decline; the turn from spiritual to material goods; from family values to individualism and egoism.

It is believed that the laws of the EU are undergoing revisions continuously lowering their standard and that this is being brought to Poland. Examples of juridical standards not wanted in Poland are abolition of capital punishment, legalization of abortion, and homosexual partnership. The EU is regarded as a threat to the national culture and the policy option is thus not to cooperate with it. Poland could take part in a European project of cooperation, but this has to be a project that preserves the nation-states, a project that does not challenge Polish national sovereignty in the narrow sense. Besides, it has to be a European project of cooperation that preserves the original Polish and European values – it has to be a Christian project.

Those who promote this policy position argue that the supporters of Polish EU membership, who often underline the Christian basis of the EU, are out of line with reality. Moreover they argue that the European project of integration that is promoted by the opposition is posing a threat to national freedom.



Fig. 4.5.4.1 Island

For the feedback loop to modify or break, there has to be a redefinition of the values that Poland justifies itself as a nation through its Catholicism and through strong state that is sovereign (autonomous) and that has the power to enforce national interests. In the following I will describe a variant of this position where I believe that exactly this has been done, thorough a redefinition of the value of sovereignty.

### 4.5.5 ZChN

"We, the Polish nationalists, look at issues concerning foreign policy through the prism of two criteria: national interest, that marks the range of politics, and realism, that points at the concrete possibilities and conditions of pursuing our national foreign policy" (980319/ 026). The delegate of the ZChN represented Europe as a troubled continent in moral decline: "There is no way around noticing the ideational crisis of many Western European societies, a crisis that according to the ZChN is caused by leaving fundamental values on which Europe was built in the historical and civilizational sense." The delegate formulated European integration as a great challenge to the entire Polish nation, a challenge to bring forward their national interests in the process of negotiations and to introduce their own concept of European integration. This concept will replace the idea of integration that exists in the present.

> Europe of cathedrals, Europe understood as Europe of fatherlands [*Europa ojczyzn*], and the model of Europe as a Christian community of free nations; this is the model we support. We do not support a Europe of abortion, a continent of nihilism, a continent of the legalization of deviations. We will never support such a vision of integration (980319/ 026).

When it came to the question of sovereignty, the delegate agreed that

> in the reality of the present it is necessary to formulate the definition of sovereignty anew. In a situation where a considerable percentage of Polish trade and the Polish economic relations in general rely on the European Union, where the existence and successfulness of the Polish family rely on the state of those exchanges and on the economic and political situation of the Union, entering the Union and gaining influence on its politics will in praxis extend our sovereignty (980319/ 026).

In an interview with the daily newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* (1998a) the same delegate expressed that he regarded the EU exclusively as "a common market" and a "technical creation that makes it possible to solve certain problems at the technical level". He thought Western Europe was an area of de-Christianization, but noted that such developments were not identified with the EU: "The great transformation of the civilization is of a global character. It would have been taking place also if there was no Union. It is the result of mass culture, media, democratization – One must oppose the negative effects, but that cannot mean combating EU." If we see these statements in re-

lation to earlier statements by ZChN deputies, we get the picture of an institution that represents the EU as a structure purely for technical bargaining.

*4.5.5.1 Policy: Technical integration according to national interest within a Europe of nation-states*
The value of promoting national interests through a powerful national-state is sustained, but isolating the economic sphere has modified the position. This has been made possible through a redefinition of the value of national sovereignty as independence through interdependence, as well as a redefinition of the representation of the EU. The EU is no longer the source of all evils. These evils are a universal problem. I believe these redefinitions and the modification of the position may partially be explained by the campaigning of other institutions attempting at subjugating the position held by the ZChN. Relating this to model which I introduced in the first chapter, we may say that foreign policy has influenced identity directly, without taking the path through the context, Europe. The modified feedback loop may be illustrated like this:

Fig. 4.5.5.1 Island redefined

This is a variant of the position of *Nasze Koło* and *Radio Maryja*. Apart from the redefinition of sovereignty the feedback loop is the same. The position demands that the government starts defending national interests more forcefully in the negotiations with the EU. European integration is a great challenge to the whole nation, a challenge to make it serve the national interests, and to introduce the Polish concept of European integration. The Polish concept of European integration is often communicated through the term *Europa ojczyzn* (Europe of fatherlands). This is not to be understood in as the UW describes it, but as Europe of Christian nation-states that strongly promote national interests and state power.

**4.5.6 KPN**

> It looks as if the government promises that right after entering the European Union every one of us gets a Mercedes. They only forgot to add, that every one of us gets a Mercedes to wash! (990908/ 012).

The KPN entered the AWS in 1996. From 1997 to 1998 a KPN representative, Adam Słomka, was the deputy of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as chairman of the *Sejm* Committee on European integration. But the KPN did not agree with the government in European policies and later it split with it and re-established a separate fraction. KPN continued arguing for the construction of *Międzymorze*. "Entering the European Union has nothing to do with the geopolitical position of Poland; it has to do with the financial bill – gains and costs" (990908/ 012). The deputies accused the government of lying as it claimed that Poland would gain by entering the European Union. It would only lose as the European Union is much stronger economically and Poland will become a "second class member". The KPN would continue to promote the "Piłsudskian vision of the 'Middelsea', the vision of those nations that have the same faith, history, and economic condition as us, the countries between Russia and the European Union" (990908/ 012).

In 1999 Leszek Moczulski, the leader of the KPN, published a book entitled *Geopolitics. Power in Time and Space* (Moczulski 1999), where he manifests the tradition of the 'Middelsea' in history and thus constructs a continuance with the past.

> This geopolitical mega region always distinguished itself in Europe. Several decades of Communist rule have burdened it with political, economic, social, and mentality problems, already unheard of Western Europe. The size and the geopolitical weight of the Middelsea are nevertheless substantial (ibid.: 638).

In addition to giving a thorough presentation of realist international political theory, the book is a thorough analysis of the power potential of the economy (GNP), population, and territory, of the three European blocks.

*4.5.6.1 Policy: Poland balances power between East and West by constructing the 'Middelsea'*
The position rests on a representation of Europe as a sphere of power that is divided into the East and the West. Poland exposes itself through the power of the state and the state has to be powerful in order to safeguard the interests of the nation on the international arena. Because both the East and the West are too powerful blocks for Poland to cooperate with in the political sphere, since cooperation will lead to a relative power loss for Poland, the alternative is the construction of a third block. This will take the shape of a political and economic cooperation zone between the Central European states in which the central zone will be Warsaw–Kiev. The constellation has its legacy in the state traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Union and the idea of Piłsudski to create a third Europe as a counterweight to Russia and Germany.

The EU is regarded as a threat, not because of its decayed culture, but because its economic power is too great for Poland to handle. The integration

of Europe is regarded a well functioning project and the EU is perceived as a success, but entering the Union at this moment in time will bring about a major relative loss of power for the Polish state so that it will be unable to assure the interests of the nation. In order to survive as a state in Europe, Poland has to pursue a strong foreign policy to obtain a sufficient amount of power and resources so that it can cooperate with the EU, as well as with the other power blocks of the world. Such a policy may be performed within the structures of a Central European federation that together aim at obtaining the same level of development as the Western European states.

This is the foundation of the policy line of the KPN that promotes the construction of the *Międzymorze* region to include all the former vassal states of the former Soviet Union. The integration project that is pursued through the present institutions of the EU is criticized because it does not include the East and the Central blocks as equal partners of the West. The defenders of this position attack their opponents first of all because they claim that the opponents do not pay enough attention to what makes the basis of the state, that according to them is the possibility to pursue an offensive foreign policy without any other state intervening. Secondly, they argue that the character of the cooperation between the EU and Poland that is argued by members of the opposition is not on terms with the real character of this cooperation. The EU is a construct based on asymmetry and the Central European states can, if adhering to it, only lose while the Western European states will gain due to their superiority in political and economic power. Claiming that it will take on an all-European character if the Central European states integrate is therefore false. Central Europe must first obtain a higher level of development and compile enough power in order to be able to face the EU in negotiations as equals.



Fig. 4.5.6.1 Middelsea

The EU has to assure a sufficient amount of international power and sovereignty for the Polish state if Polish membership is to be relevant. At the present this is impossible. The feedback loop will not reproduce these values and this reality if Poland becomes a member of the Union as the Polish values of sovereignty and state power will be destroyed. If Europe (the power

distribution) changes, if Poland is believed to have a sufficient amount of power, the position will theoretically allow for Polish EU membership.

### 4.5.7 SLD

> …I have not noticed that the European states, in the process of connecting us to the European structure, bestowed on us the mission of creating one moral system. On the contrary, the postwar shape of Europe is supported by tolerance, plurality, and coexistence of different moral systems, on the free play of political and economic forces. […] They are going to ask us for economic contribution, of the renewal of laws, of the compatibility of the army, of respecting the constitution and the democratic procedures. […] I am a Pole, an inhabitant of Europe. And as a citizen of the *Rzeczpospolita*, under any Government and in any political situation, I want to benefit from the whole humanistic heritage of Latin Europe that is made up of antique philosophy, law, the culture of many nations and religions, Slavism, orthodoxy, Judaism, and the reformative stream of Christendom. I want to benefit from that heritage, and not teach others, because Western Europe will manage without us, even in the moral sphere (971110/ 025).

"We thank Mrs. Waniek for reminding us of all of the European values on which her political organization built its identity for 45 years" (971110/ 026), stated the next speaker, a UW delegate, ironically.

While some delegates attacked the SLD on the grounds of its 'non-European heritage', the SLD delegates on their side attacked the right wing for its ideologically uniform conception of Europe and Poland's place in it. Poland was not to moralize Europe, because Europe was made up of a variety of traditions, values, cultures, and moral systems. Instead, plurality, individual freedom and tolerance were emphasized as the foundational features of the European construct, as well as democracy, freedom, and political and economic liberalism. In this way, the AWS was made the tyrant that wanted to enforce the straitjacket of uniformity and deny the European citizen the fundamental European value of freedom, while the SLD became the guarantor of preserving it. The political and economic standards that the EU comprised should become the main goals of Poland, not trying to make the rest of Europe adjust to any Polish moral norm.

> A modern European state that is friendly towards its people does not get involved in philosophical disputes. It is a secular state which effectively guarantees the freedom of all its citizens, a state in which the law is not used to serve any philosophy, in which one's attitudes towards religion do not constitute the basis for neither preference nor discrimination, where the dignity of women is respected and no legal obstacles are placed against conscious parenthood (971110/ 010)

We see that once again the debate on free abortion is brought into the debate, now as a symbol of Europeaness. Another feature of the right-wing rhetoric that the representatives of the SLD attacked was the idea of Europe as a *Europa ojczyzn*.

> We respect the views of those who talk about Europe of fatherlands, but we do not always know what is to be understood by this idea. Some think that the democratic standards of Europe threaten Christian values. At the same time these values are believed to be specifically Polish, not remembering that the Western democracies do not conceal their ties to Christianity (980319/ 017).

This too was a hit at the AWS and its practice of representing the Polish nation as more European than other European nations. The SLD delegate continued with suggesting his representation of the EU that he though was an example of a global process changing the basic functions of the state and the concept of sovereignty in itself. Taking part in this process, that Poland would have to deal with no matter what relations the country would have to the EU in the future, it was important not to get lost in ideology or emotional debates.

> Supporting the road of Poland to the Union we are not led by emotions, we are making use of neither pathos nor doubts. […] the SLD conceives common Europe as an answer to the present challenges of civilization and as the protector of a high standard of democracy and human subjectivity (980319/ 017).

A gap of civilization and entering the EU as a means of overcoming this gap were often-appearing features in the debate. "There is no doubt that problem number one for Poland consistently is to decrease the gap of civilization segregating our country from the highest developed states, and that integration into the European Union is an enormously important means to make this possible," a SLD representative said (990908/ 018).  The SLD frequently underlined the need for education. "For our own future and for Europe we are going to be useful only if we become a society of educated people, enlightened, presenting our best national features. A Poland of poor people may still be tolerated in Europe, but a Poland of poorly educated people – no more" (990408/ 020).

### 4.5.7.1 Policy: The EU teaches Poland how to become European
SLD occupies a position where the constellation political nation–centralized state relates to a Europe represented as the key to modernization and development. Europe embraces good social, political, and economic designs, universal laws, high-level education, responsible citizens, and the values of humanism and democracy. Europe is also a supranational community that eases tensions and conflicts between the states it is comprised of. Poland is not a part of Europe and the relationship established between them is that of learning. Poland has to learn from Europe how to become a European state with European citizens. We remember that this is the relationship that was established during the early Enlightenment with the constriction of a civilizational gap between Poland and Europe.

The EU is represented as the promoter of European progress and development. Polish membership is a chance to decrease the civilizational gap that divides Poland from Europe. In order to do this, Poland will have to adapt to the institutional design of the EU and follow the policy provisions

of the latter. Strong promotion of national interests in negotiations with the EU is not encouraged as national interests is against the nature of the universal principles of development. The EU is not promoted as a federal project. The state-nations have to be preserved as fundamental entities of a Union that is built under an overarching supranational framework of universal law. At present Poland is lagging behind and has to adapt to these laws.

The position opposes those who argue that Poland should enter the EU in order to remind Europe of its Christian roots. First of all, the representation of the EU as a Christian organization is mistaken. The EU is quite conversely built on the coexistence of several moral systems. The EU will manage perfectly well without Poland. On the contrary, Poland will not manage that well without the EU. The EU is perceived as an organization that will help Poland become a modern country, politically and economically. However, Poland cannot enter the Union at once. It has to adapt slowly and in a considerate manner. This is exactly because the civilizational gap is so large that the Polish economy will need time to adapt to the common market. Quick reforms will cause setbacks that in turn spur skepticism against the process of integration. Another aspect is that the state and the nation need time in order to learn about the political and economic mechanisms at work within the framework of the Union.



Fig. 4.5.7.1 Periphery

Poland expresses itself internationally through modernization and development and if this is not done the reality (centralized state of citizens) perishes. The EU is represented as an organization that anchors Poland in Europe, in the sphere of modernization and development, and thus enforces the values that reproduce Polish identity. If Polish EU membership fails doing this, the position will probably be modified.

## 4.8 Summary
This chapter has presented the recent discourse of Poland and Europe as it appears in Polish domestic debates. I have related the statements to the categorization of layer one and two established in chapter three, and I have categorized the third layer. As an important project has been to point out how the

positions may change internally, not only how the discourse may change as a result of changing power between the positions, I have located what I believe are the most central values, institutions, and realities of different positions in discourse, and looked into how the different actors attempt to displace the values, institutions, and realities of other positions. I have argued that what kind of relationship that is promoted depends on the values that evaluate Polish identity in relation to Europe and that the most important values are those that define how the different constellations of nation and state promote themselves on the European (international) arena. The feedback loops have been defined in terms of the metaphors bulwark, bridge, island, redefined island, Middelsea, and periphery and in the following chapter these will be the notions used describing the corresponding policy positions.

The feedback loops illustrate how the positions may change. I have also exemplified a position that has changed in the course of the last years and have argued that this may be explained by a redefinition of the value of sovereignty. In the next and final chapter I will summarize and draw some tentative conclusions.

## 5.0 Bulwark, bridge, or periphery?

> Words have a force of their own; it is they that create the world in which we live, the intellectual climate and spiritual air we breathe. Each of us chooses the language that suits us (Michnik [1993] 1998: 292).

This thesis has analyzed the precognitions of Polish European policies from the perspective that discourses condition what can be meaningfully said and done. It has revealed how we may derive Polish European policy positions from the ways in which the concepts of state, nation, and Europe, are and have been represented in Polish discourse. The purpose of the analysis has been to provide an overview of European policies in Poland, to explain these policies, and to make some tentative predictions on the basis of the findings. I think such an analysis is important because most analyses on the relations between Poland and Europe generally seem to neglect the fact that there is an internal Polish debate on the content of Europe and what relations should be established between Poland and Europe.

## 5.1 Identity, relation, policy

The study has answered the central question of what kind of Europe Poles promote through a categorization of different policy positions. The analysis has linked these positions to a relational layer that defines Polish identity in relation to representations of Europe, and to the identity layer on which the positions rest. It has been argued that the dominant constellation at the identity layer is the culture nation/power state and that the constellation political nation–centralized state is challenging it. Moving up to the second and third layers, however, I find it difficult to distinguish a dominant position.

In the period between 1989 and 1993 the Polish government promoted a policy closer to the position of the UW and *Kultura*. It was indicated that Poland would become acknowledged as a European country through integration with the EC/ EU. Acknowledgment of being European seemed especially important and the bridge metaphor was used extensively as a way of describing the Polish place in Europe. The Europe that was promoted was a Europe that would consist of free and equal nations and include countries to the east of Poland.

In the period from 1993 to 1997 the emphasis was more on learning and the periphery metaphor is perhaps a better characteristic of the way Poland was represented in relation to Europe. The Europe that was promoted was a Europe that consists of a center and a periphery where the center pulls Poland closer to the nucleus through the process of learning.

Policies indicating that Poland should integrate with the EU as part of a Polish moral mission have been more visible after 1997. Central government spokesmen have tended to represent Poland as more European than Europe itself in the cultural sphere and argued that Poland should come to Europe's rescue. However, I doubt that this position is dominant. Generally there seem to be three dominant positions in the discursive space and I believe that they may be described in terms of the metaphors bulwark, bridge, and periphery. The other positions, the island and the Middelsea, seem to be more or

less successfully subjugated by the more dominant positions. The modification of the island position, the redefined island, seems to be doing well, has at the present a strong voice in official Polish European policy, and should be observed in the future. The modified position can for the time being not be classified as an independent policy position, as it overlaps substantially with the island position.

The analysis discloses that there is a dispute on what kind of Europe Poland should promote and that the different policy positions may be derived from the structures of the discursive system. It also reveals that the third layer generally corresponds with the positions of the second layer. This indicates that there is mainly layer two and three that are politicized in the Polish discourse on Europe. This is exemplified by what I have argued is the redefinition of the value of sovereignty as a value that reproduces the reality of Poland as a nation-state for e.g. the ZChN. The redefinition of this value has probably been the result of clashes with other positions in discourse that attack the particular values reproduced by the particular representations of e.g. the ZChN. The change serves as an example where layers two and three have been politicized. The values that define Poland in relation to Europe have been recast and the position has been modified.

The analysis suggests that there are some traits that unite across some of the different positions. The content of Europe predominantly includes the East and underlines the primacy of an all-European political project. It is also evident that Europe is always promoted as a project that conserves either the nation or the state as primary units. All positions also, in one way or another, includes the representation of Poland as European. This indicates a strong discursive power in the practice of representing Polish identity as a European identity. Europe is represented both as an 'other' as well as Europe is included into the 'Polish self'. Language builds both borders and bridges between the inside and the outside.

What prospects for the future may we draw from the analysis? The analysis allows us only to make a few negative predictions. We may suggest which scenarios that are *not* likely. First and foremost it is not likely that Poland will promote a Europe that takes the shape of a federation that undermines the state as the constituent international actor. Even if some groupings seem to think about the concepts of the Polish state and the Polish nation independently, as an overall trend in Polish discourse the idea of national freedom seems to be strongly connected to the idea of a state. Poland is also unlikely to promote an international project of several speeds, as egalitarianism between international actors is a strong principle in discourse. The SLD seems to be the only political party upholding a position that allows for a Europe consisting of a center and a periphery and thus allows for this kind of project. It is also evident that largely the positions promote a Europe that is open to include the countries to the north, south, and east of Poland.

## 5.2 History
The chapter on the pre-history of the discourse has been important in many ways. First and foremost it has revealed the roots of the present discourse. Doing this it has strengthened the argument that discourses are historically

contingent. Statements that define Poland as a bridge between the East and the West, as a bulwark protecting Europe from evils, as the last outpost of moral and Christianity, as a great power, and as a European periphery, are not at all new and may be traced back to the 19th century or even further back in time.

Throughout history the discourse has changed. The surge of Sarmatism, the impact of Enlightenment thought, the philosophy of the Romantic Movement, and the representations of the realist movement of National Democracy and Roman Dmowski, may serve as examples of moments in which the discourse has changed substantially. Much thinking on state and nation in Poland has been dedicated to explaining why the Poles have been deprived of freedom, how the nation should be organized in order to regain sovereignty and independence, as well as how to regain Polish statehood. In this respect Europe has often been a central concept either embodying freedom or on the contrary been the antithesis of it.

Without the chapter on the heritage it would have been difficult to illustrate how present positions endeavor to preserve continuity with the past by presenting the past in terms of the realities on which the position rests. It has for example been showed that the position of the SLD represents Poland as a country that always has been behind the modern and developed Europe and I have showed that Jagiełło and Piast are often evoked as historical paradigms of the concepts of state and nation. History is subject to representation in light of the present and becomes part of the discourse of today.

## 5.3 Theoretical and methodical remarks

The genealogical approach suggests that one studies how the actors conserve (or create) unity with the past. Throughout the analysis I have provided you with many examples of how this has been done. It has in particular been pointed out that there is an ongoing project of anchoring the post-Communist Polish identity in the 'European' traditions of the Jagiellonian period and that this is explicitly done in order to subjugate the positions that uphold a Polish identity that, according to this position, involves ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism. On the other hand a moral foreign policy in which Poland brings Europe back to its Christian roots has also been represented as building on the heritage of the Jagiellonian period. This position also has a strong historical anchorage in wars Poland has fought against the Russians, the Mongols, the Tatars, the Swedes, and the Turks. It builds on the tradition of the uprisings, the legions, and Solidarity. All these endeavors are represented as events when Poland fought for the freedom of the whole of Europe. The Middelsea position builds on the legacy of Piłsudski and the island position on the legacy of Dmowski.

The position of the SLD is not so solidly founded genealogically and this might be one of the problems the position meets in the battle of discursive power. The position argues that Poland always has been a periphery and rejects the historical analysis of other positions that represent the Jagiellonian era as a period when Poland was on par with, or even ahead, of the general European development. From the point of genealogy, the more recent history works against the position of the SLD as the Communistic heritage and the

lack of foundation in Polish identity, history, and tradition, is often used against it in discourse.

In the introduction I criticized neorealist and neoliberalist approaches because they study identity as an objective reality and as a variable among many other variables that has a measurable effect on foreign policy. I do not reject these theories and acknowledge that studies applying them may produce useful insights. What I do believe this study has showed, and the more conventional approaches do not allow for, is that Polish identity cannot be studied as an objective fact because there are several coexisting projects of what Polish identity is. These projects compete with each other but they also influence one another.

The thesis has showed that European policy positions are constructed in ways that do not challenge the layer of Polish identity. The state-nation constellation at layer one is always preserved when moving up to layer two and three. Showing this, I have strengthened the assumption that Polish identity has an effect on Polish foreign policy. But the analysis also strengthens the assumption that foreign policies are not results of a certain identity, but integral to its constitution, as I also have pointed out how foreign policies influence identities. The foreign policies of Polish nationalist groupings have for example motivated an identity project among layers of the Polish intelligentsia of creating a European Polish identity based on some traditions of Polish national culture and history that are regarded uniquely Polish but yet European. Furthermore contextual changes, changes in Europe as such, may have an effect on Polish identity, but only through the ways in which these changes are represented in discourse.

The Copenhagen School argues that one should not only study identities through a set of diacritical markers, as the construction of the 'self' through the construction of a border towards the 'other'. This study has confirmed the theoretical assumption that foreign policies are political practices that make certain events and actors 'foreign'. On the other hand it does not support that foreign policy is a bridge between two distinct realms, but rather that foreign policy is something that both divides and joins the inside and the outside. For example, the thesis has revealed that Europe often appears in Polish discourse as a way of thinking about the Polish self and I believe that the prevalence of representing Polish identity as European indicates that representations that fail to include Europe as a part of the self are not viable.

The thesis has offered an analysis of values, institutions, and realities in discourse, suggested how certain positions have changed throughout the period, and identified certain core values that have to be modified for the positions to change in the future. The thesis has provided an example where a position has been modified. I believe that this strengthens the assumption that foreign policies may change identities directly and that this may result from the ways in which positions clash with other positions. If I had not extended the analysis with the post-structuralist loop, I would not have managed to explain the emergence of this modified position.

The turn to values, realities, and the materiality of discourse (the institutions) has disclosed how the concepts in discourse are in a process of constant redefinition. However, the positions (institutions) tend to sustain continuity with past statements. In addition to text, the primary unit of study of the

Copenhagen School, institutions should also be considered as elements that add a certain stability to discourse, as they tend to resist change.

## 5.4 Concluding remarks

A problem I have wrestled with throughout the analysis is the process of change. I have managed to show that discourses change, and that they change as the result of redefinitions of values, realities, or institutions, and that this again may be explained through clashes with other discourses. It seems, however, that to locate where the impulses that cause such redefinitions come from, it is necessary to enlarge the analysis to the European, or even the to the general international discourse.

It may be asked if the Polish discourse in fact reflects more general European or international discourses. To a certain extent I believe this is true. The Polish discourses on the Enlightenment, modernism, civilization, romanticism, and realism, all reflect greater European discourses. Today the debate on globalization and the evils contra the goods this brings with it is a part of the Polish as well as the general European discourse. However, I believe that I have managed to show that these discourses take on particular traits when they are included into Polish discourse and that they are adapted to particular domestic sets of representing reality. This means that these discourses cannot simply be reduced to mere components of larger international discourses. At the same time it has to be underlined that Polish discourse is not different from discourses in other European countries in all respects.

I will leave aside the question if the approach taken in this thesis is primarily structuralist or post-structuralist. What it *has* managed to show is that the approach has not resulted in a study that challenges modernist categories. The findings of the thesis show that in Polish discourse the state is still perceived as the central actor on the international scene.

## 6.0 References

Anderson, Benedict (1996), *Forestilte fellesskap: refleksjoner omkring nasjonalismens opprinnelse og spredning*. Oslo: Spartacus.

Barth, Fredrik (1969), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

Bartelson, Jens (1995), *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartmiński, Jerzy (1993), "Polskie rozumienie ojczyzny i jego warianty", pp. 23–47 in Jerzy Bartmiński (ed.) *Pojęcie ojczyzny we współczesnych językach europejskich. Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*.

Bially, Janice (1998), *The power politics of identity*. PhD delivered to Yale University.

Bocheński, Maria (1993), "Co to znaczy być polakiem?", *Kultura*, (4): 3–18.

Bogusz, Anna and Zofia Stachura (1998), "Unia Antyeuropejska", *Wprost* 1 November.

Bojarska, Anna (1995), "On Niewiadomski", pp. 331–351 in Michael Bernhard and Henryk Szlajfer (eds.), *From the Polish Underground. Selections from Krytyka, 1978–1993*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Borucki, Marek (1998), *Historia Polski do 1997 roku*. Warszawa: MADA.

Boyes, Roger (1994), *The Naked President: A Political Life of Lech Walesa*. London: Secker & Warburg.

Bromke, Adam (1967), *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bromke, Adam (1987), *The Meaning and Uses of Polish History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Campbell, David (1998), *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Connolly, William E. (1991), *Identity \ Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Crampton, Richard J. (1997), *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and after*. London: Routledge.

Cynarski, Stanisław (1992), "The Ideology of Sarmatism in Poland (16t–18th Centuries)", *Polish Western Affairs* 33 (2): 25–44.

Davies, Norman (1991): *God's Playground. A History of Poland. Volume I. The Origins to 1795*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Friis, Karsten (1998), "Identitet som diskurs: Et teoretisk perspektiv på nasjonal identitet", *Internasjonal Politikk* 56 (1): 127–140.

Gawlikowski, Krzysztof (1990), "Europejska wspołnota kulturowa a nacjonalizmy", *Kultura* 1990 (April): 3–12.

Gazeta Wyborcza (1998a), "Prawdziwy endek świata się nie boi". 16 September.

Gazeta Wyborcza (1998b), "Nic nie jest takie jak się wydaje". 12 October.

Gerner, Kristian (1998), *Piast, Jagiello or Jadwiga? Poland and Europe at the End of the 20th Century*. Uppsala University: Department of East European Studies. Working Paper 42.

Giergielwicz, Mieczysław (1968), *Henryk Sienkiewicz*. New York: Twayne Publishers.

Hall, Alexander (1987), "The Legacy of National Democracy" pp. 225–237 in Adam Bromke, *The Meaning and Uses of Polish History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Janecki, Stanisław (1998), "Lustro Europy", *Wprost* 5 March.

Jedlicki, Jerzy (1993), "Poland's Perpetual Return to Europe", *Cross Currents. A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, 1993 (12): 78–88.

Jedlicki, Jerzy (1999), *A Suburb of Europe. Nineteenth-century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

John Paul II (1979), *Homily at the Cathedral of Gniezno*.

John Paul II (1999), Address to the Polish Parliament. Friday, 11 June 1999, Warsaw. [online]. – URL: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/jo…/hf_jp-ii_spe_11061999 _warsaw-parliament_en.htm

Katzenstein, Peter (ed.) (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Korek, Janusz (1998), *Paradoksy paryskiej "Kultury": ewolucja myśli politycznej w latach 1947–1980*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Koźniewski, Kazimierz (1998), "Módlimy się o laicką Europą", *Gazeta Wyborcza* 15 May.

Krzyżaniakowa, Jadwiga (1992), "Poland as Antemurale Christianitatis. The Political and Ideological Foundations of the Idea", *Polish Western Affairs* 33 (2): 3–24.

Lepkowski, Tadeusz (1984), "Historia i spolczenstwo. Przed zjazdem historyków polskich", *Tygodnik Powszechny* 19 August.

Lipski, Jan Józef (1981), "Dwie ojczyzny – dwa petriotyzmy. (Uwagi o megalomanii narodowej i ksenofobii polaków)", Kultura (10): 3–29.

Mach, Zdislaw (1997), "Heritage, dream, and anxiety: The European identity of Poles", pp. 35–50 in Zdislaw Mach and Dariusz Niedzwiedzki (eds.), *European Enlargement and Identity*. Kraków: TAiWPN Universitas.

Michnik, Adam (1985), "A New Evolutionsim", pp. 135–148 in Adam Michnik, *Letters From Prison and Other Essays*. London: University of California Press.

Michnik, Adam (1998), *Letters From Freedom. Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives*. Berkeley, London and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Mickiewicz, Adam (1946), *Księngi narodu polskiego i pilgrzymstwa polskiego*. Rome: Instytut Literacki.

Milliken, Jennifer (1999), "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (2): 225–252.

Moczulski, Leszek (1999), *Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni*. Warszawa: Bellona.

Najder, Zdzisław (1998), *W Sercu Europy. Zbiór komentarzy z „Tygodnika Solidarność"*. Warsawa: „TYSOL" Sp. z.o.o.

Nasz Dziennik (1998), "Wchodzić do Europy?" 24 February.

Neumann, Iver B. (1992), "Poland as a Regional Great Power. The Interwar Heritage". pp. 120–149 in Iver B. Neumann (ed.), *Regional Great Powers in International Politics*. London: Macmillan.

Neumann, Iver B. (1998), "Identitet i internasjonal politikk", *Internasjonal Politikk* 56 (1): 52–54.

Neumann, Iver B. (1999), *Uses of the Other. "The East" in European Identity Formation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Neumann, Iver B. (2000), *Mening, Materialitet, Makt. En innføring i diskursanalyse*. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.

Olszewski, Henryk (1992), "The Ideology of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the Bulwark of Christianity", *Polish Western Affairs* 33 (2): 69–86.

Pasierb, Bronisław (1996), "Spory parlamentarne wokół genezy polskiej orientacji europejskiej" pp. 65–90 in Bronisław Pasierb and Krystyna Paszkiewicz (eds.), *Współczesna polska myśl polityczna*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego: Wrocław.

Polish Western Affairs (1992), "Our Questionnaire: Polish Political Parties on Foreign Policy", *Polish Western Affairs* (1): 249–271.

Porter, Brian (2000), *When Nationalism Began to Hate*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Prizel, Ilya (1998), *National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia  and Ukraine*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sejm debates [online]. – URL: www.sejm.gov.pl
   (911125): 1st candidacy, 1st session, 1st day
   (920508): 1st candidacy, 14th session, 3rd day
   (920521): 1st candidacy, 15th session, 1st day
   (920710): 1st candidacy, 20th session, 1st day
   (940512): 2nd candidacy, 20th session, 3rd day
   (971110): 3rd candidacy, 2nd session, 1st day
   (980319): 3rd candidacy, 14th session, 2nd day
   (990908): 3rd candidacy, 57th session, 1st day

Sienkiewicz, Henryk (1999), *Ogniem i mieczem*. Krakow: Zielona Sowa.

Sikorski, Radek (1997), *The Polish House. An Intimate History of Poland*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Elżbieta (1992), "Polska w Europie: Między petentem a partnerem. Zapis dyskucji w OSM w dniu 1302 1992 r.", Polska w Europie (8): 97V104.

Skubiszewski, Krzysztof (1997), *Polityka Zagraniczna i Odzyskanie Niepodległośći*. Przedmówienia, Oświadcyenia, Wywiady 1989–1993. Warszawa: Interpress.

Sobol, Elżbieta (ed.) (1997), *Mały słownik języka polskiego*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe PWN.

Stomma, Stanislaw (1987a), "Positivism in the Light of Ethics", pp. 143–149 in Adam Bromke, *The Meaning and Uses of Polish History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Stomma, Stanislaw (1987b), "A commentary to the situation", pp. 177–183 in Adam Bromke, *The Meaning and Uses of Polish History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Surdykowski, Jerzy (1998), "Eurofobia. Czego się boi Polska Partia Strachu", *Wprost* 5 May.

The Polish League for Independence (1980), "Poland and Europe. PPN Statement", *Survey* 25 (1): 186–194.

Turowicz, Jerzy (1997), "Biskupi za integracją europejską", *Tygodnik Powszechny* 16 June.

Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara (1992), *The Wheel of Polish Fortune. Myths in Polish Collective Consciousness During the First Years of Solidarity*. Lund: Publication of the Slavonic Department, University of Lund.

Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara (2000), "Eastern Central Europe (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic)" in Stephen Barbour and Cathy Carmichael (eds.), *Language and Nationalism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vinton, Louisa (1990a), "Open division in Walesa's Citizens' Committee", *Radio Free Europe. Report on Eastern Europe* 1 (27): 18–21.

Vinton, Louisa (1990b), "Solidarity's Rival Offspring: Center Alliance and Democratic Action", *Radio Free Europe. Report on Eastern Europe* 1 (38): 15–25.

Vinton, Louisa (1995), "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1989–1999" pp. 23–72 in Andrew A. Michta and Ilya Prizel (eds.), *Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered. Challenges of Independence*. St. Martin's Press: New York.

Walicki, Andrzej (1989), *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood. Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Walicki, Andrzej (1990), "The Three Traditions of Polish Patriotism" in: Stanisław Gomułka and Stanisław Polonsky (eds.), *Polish Paradoxes*. London and New York: Routledge Press.

Walicki, Andrzej (1994a), *Poland between East and West. The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Walicki, Andrzej (1994b), *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Wassermann, Adam R. (1979), "Some Aspects of the Social Philosophy of Pope John Paul II", *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report 208.

Wilamowski, Maciej et al. (1998), *Leksykon Polskich Powiedzeń Historycznych*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.

Wprost (1998), "Rzeczpospolita europejska. Rozmowa z Bronisławen Geremkiem, ministrem spraw zagranicznych RP". 21 June.

Wyspiański, Stanisław (1956), *Wesele*. Wrocław: Nasza Biblioteka Ossolineum.

Wæver, Ole (1998), "Explaining Europe by Decoding Discourses", in Anders Wivel (ed.), *Explaining European Integration*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press.

Wæver, Ole (1999), "Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory", pp. 31–78 in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *Between Nations and Europe: Regionalism, Nationalism and the Politics of Union*. London: Routledge.

Załuska, Wojciech (1999), "Do i od Europy", *Gazeta Wyborcza* 26 May.

## Summary

After the Communist regime started crumbling in 1989, the official foreign policy of Poland has been redefined. A central characteristic in this process has been Polish involvement in the process of European integration and an application for membership in the European Union. These policies have not been undisputed in Polish political debates. Analyses of Polish European policy tend to concentrate on the official foreign policy of Poland and the strategies of cooperation and integration proposed by EU member states. What they seem to forget is that debates on Europe and what shape the relations between Poland and Europe should take exist within Poland as well. This thesis is an attempt to fill in this gap. The central question is *what kind of Europe do Poles promote?*

This report investigates the preconditions for Polish European policies using the theoretical and methodical framework of the Copenhagen School. It locates different representations of state, nation, and Europe in Polish discourse, looks into the ways in which these concepts relate to each other, and how they condition the sets of possible foreign policies that Poland may pursue in relation to Europe, or more specifically, in relation to the European Union (EU). In addition to this rather traditional Copenhagen approach, the article also investigates what values certain institutions, mainly political parties, reproduce that contribute to the reproduction of the realities in question: Poland and Europe. This project addresses the materiality of discourse, allows for changing representations and positions with the reformulation of values, realities, and institutions, and provides a post-structural supplement to the structural design of the Copenhagen School.

## Biographical note

Hege Haaland (b. 1974) is a market adviser at the Commercial Section of the Norwegian Embassy in Warsaw. She finished her Cand.Polit. at the University of Oslo in January 2001 with thesis *Bulwark, bridge or periphery? Polish discourse on Poland and Europe.*