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The political economy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)


Selective literature review and preliminary agenda
for research

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Stina Torjesen

[Abstract] Recent insights on war economies have important implications for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). This paper identifies an underlying dilemma of DDR: on the one hand, in order to convince warring factions to commit to peace, DDR strategies will have to offer significant incentives that in turn may entrench the factions' economic and political standing. On the other hand, offering the armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise post-war economic reconstruction, perpetuate cycles of underdevelopment and risk entrenching instability. It is argued in the paper that while more insights are needed on how DDR can be improved, it is equally important to go one step further and identify the positive as well as negative consequences for the economy, the market and the state when attempts at comprehensive disarmament and reintegration of combatants are undertaken. The paper discusses key findings from the literature on political economy of armed conflict and suggests possible directions for new research.

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Introduction: economic implications of DDR

Studies of civil wars have increasingly focused on the economic agendas of warring factions and the self-financing nature of intra-state warfare. Acknowledging the economic dimensions of contemporary conflicts has serious implications for how we conceive of post-conflict strategies of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).¹ If combatants stand to benefit economically from war, then a major challenge for peacemakers is to persuade fighters and commanders that peace will be equally advantageous. Strategies and initiatives undertaken under a DDR umbrella take on central importance in this regard: the design and scope of DDR will matter for whether fighters are persuaded to lay down their arms; DDR may affect the kind of transformation that might ensue with regard to the economic roles played by fighters and commanders; and policies adopted as part of reintegration packages may also have considerable consequences for state (re)building and how the market economy functions in the post-conflict period. This is particularly pertinent as the 'R' in DDR – reintegration – continues to grow in scope and importance within peacebuilding efforts.

There is an underlying dilemma inherent in the above-mentioned challenges. On the one hand, in order to convince warring factions to commit to peace, DDR strategies will have to offer significant incentives that in turn may entrench the factions' economic and political standing. On the other hand, offering the armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise post-war economic reconstruction, perpetuate cycles of under-development and risk entrenching instability.

This working paper explores this dilemma by way of a selective literature review and indicating a preliminary agenda for research. Assessing the economic implications of DDR is a timely endeavour. Strong consensus exists within the international community on the necessity of DDR in post-conflict phases.² Given the centrality of DDR in post-war strategies and interventions, it seems justified to do a stock-taking of these strategies and assess their implications for post-conflict economic recovery.

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- 1 The UN Secretary-General's Report (S/2000/101) 'The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR' defines DDR as follows: '**Disarmament** is the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management programmes, including their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction. Demining may also be part of this process. **Demobilisation** refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military force. **Reintegration** refers to the process that allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects.'
 - 2 Regarding the consensus on the necessity of DDR see for example Statement of President of the UN Security Council on 'Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building' (S/PRST/1999/34) and UN Secretary General Report S/2000/101 'The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR'. Among the many report and guidelines available are: 'Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues' UNDP (BCPR) New York 2005.

The DDR gap in the literature on political economy of armed conflict

There is a growing body of literature that deals critically with DDR, as well as various studies on the political economy of armed conflict. These studies form a central underpinning for this paper and the proposed research agenda to be presented here. Selected works will be discussed below, but before proceeding to that, I want to note one aspect that appears understudied in these two sets of literatures and that might benefit from further analysis. Academic assessments of DDR ask what happens to fighters and commanders when attempts these initiatives are undertaken. The central questions are often the following: are weapons collected and do the fighters reintegrate successfully into society? While this is indeed an important topic, equally significant is the following, slightly different perspective: what happens to the economy, the market and the state when attempts at comprehensive reintegration of fighters and commanders are undertaken? What kind of transformations, if any, unfold with regard to the economic role of fighters, fighter networks and top- and mid-level commanders in the course of DDR programmes? And what are the implications for the functioning of the market economy and efforts at state building at the local and national levels?

The second perspective constitutes a good starting point for formulating a new research agenda that may yield original and useful insights on both DDR and post-war economic development. Before spelling out in greater detail the key points of this research agenda, this paper first presents some central insights from recent studies of the political economy of armed conflict.

Understanding civil wars

Civil wars have, broadly put, been portrayed in three ways.³ Over-simplified, one perspective sees civil wars as a breakdown of normality and rationality, followed by purposeless cycles of violence (Kaplan 1994). A second perspective stresses the profound animosities among conflicting parties based on either ingrained hatreds, or political or social grievances on some or all parties to a conflict (e.g. Lund 1996). A third approach emphasises the economic agenda, focusing on 'greed' and the economic incentives that warring parties have for initiating and continuing conflicts. This is an approach that argues against the notion that civil wars always centre on a contest between two sides trying to win: it holds that, rather than marking a breakdown, civil war can equally well be viewed as the creation of an alternative system of profit, power and protection (Keen 2000).

An important starting point for studies on the political economy of armed conflict was the 'greed and grievance' dichotomy launched in debates over research findings by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002). From a wide-ranging econometric survey of countries suffering instability, Collier and Hoeffler found a correlation between natural resource dependence and higher risk of conflict.⁴ Later studies have since modified these insights and

3 This draws on the outline given by Berdal and Keen (1997); see also Berdal and Malone (2000).

4 See also Nitzschke and Studdard (2005), p. 223

indicated that while economic factors alone cannot fully explain the outbreak of conflict, economic dimensions do influence the onset, character and duration of conflict in important ways. (Nitzschke and Studdard 2005; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003: 1–13). Several major research initiatives on the political economy of armed conflict have been undertaken, including the International Peace Academy's (IPA) three-year project on 'Economic Agendas in Civil Wars', the UK based 'Transformation of War Economies after Conflict' led by Michael Pugh, and FAFO's 'Economies of conflict'. The insights of these and other research initiatives have been summarised in a number of publications.⁵ Some key findings relevant for this paper include:

Regional dimension: Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper note in 'War economies in a regional context' that contemporary conflicts are often misleadingly labelled 'internal'. Instead, civil wars are better understood as unfolding in the context of 'regional conflict complexes'. Economic, military, political and social networks – often regional or even global in scope – take on important roles during conflict. The regional embeddedness of contemporary conflicts not only makes these areas vulnerable to insecurity 'spillovers' from neighbouring countries: illicit regional trading patterns or military or political alliances across regions may contribute to perpetuating the conflict. In this perspective, border areas assume special importance. Border zones have in many regions been observed to be marginalised politically and economically – and as such seen as potential incubators of conflict (Studdard 2005). Moreover, as Studdard notes, 'border areas are often where state authority and influence is most limited, and where informal networks may thrive on illicit economic activities and grow into spoilers for peace' (ibid).

State capacity: In countries where governments are facing losses in legitimacy and governing effectiveness, including in security provision, conflict may easily arise. Weak capacity may spur or re-ignite ethnic or communal animosity and trigger security dilemmas (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 9). There is an important economic dimension to this. As Ballentine points out: 'state weakness is a critical component of the opportunity structure that makes violent challenges militarily and economically feasible...where state weakness is associated with incomplete territorial reach and already large informal economies, the feasibility of launching and sustaining economies is enhanced because of the expanded access it affords income generating resources and opportunities' (ibid). This also has implications for how we conceive of the link between natural resource dependence and war. As Ballentine notes, this is not a direct relationship, but is mediated by the critical failure of economic resource governance.

Crime: civil war may spur economic activities that will often be labelled 'illegal'. Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, however, stress that in war-torn and post-conflict societies there is often a legal vacuum. This means that labels such as 'criminal', 'illegal' and 'unofficial' (implicitly in opposition to 'authorised', 'legal' and 'official') may have limited descriptive and analyti-

5 See in particular: Malone and Nitzschke (2005); Ballentine and Sherman (2003); Nitzschke and Studdard (2005); Studdard (2005).

cal value. They note: ‘in some cases so-called “illegal” economic activity is tolerated and even encouraged by officialdom, not only because it offers elites opportunities for self-enrichment, but also because in conditions of chronic underdevelopment or conflict, it has positive social effects in enabling people to cope along the margins of a dysfunctional formal economy’ (Pugh et al. 2004: 8). Alternative labels such as ‘parallel’ economy also have major shortcomings.⁶

Understanding war economies

The above discussion on crime points to the complexities of economic activities unfolding as part of contemporary conflicts. David Keen was among the first to draw attention to this phenomenon by stressing that the calculations and behaviour of the parties to a conflict may give ‘rise to a particular *war economy* and a distinctive dynamic of conflict’ (in Berdal and Malone 2000: 2). As to the economic underpinnings of war, he noted:

Conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances, ending civil wars become difficult. Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may precisely be the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes’ (Keen 1998: 6)

The writings of Keen implied a radically new view on violence in contemporary civil wars.⁷ Keen argues that at the local level there can be various economic, security and psychological pay-offs for those who carry out acts of violence. War and violent activity may be profitable for a range of groups. It may be safer to be part of an armed group, than be counted among the vulnerable civilian population. In psychological terms, previous relationships of humiliation and dominance can be reversed, to the satisfaction of the executor of violence.

These latter local-level acts point to the existence of both ‘top–down violence’ as well as ‘bottom–up violence’. Political leaders and entrepreneurs can mobilise violence on a large scale so as to become major elite actors in a conflict situation. However, violence may also ‘be actively embraced by ordinary people (either civilians or low ranking soldiers) as a solution to prob-

6 This is a term often deployed on the shadow economies on the Balkans. Pugh et al. stress nevertheless that the term: ‘suggests economic activities and networks that run alongside, and are completely independent of state run economic activity. Instead there is often a symbiotic or parasitic relationship between the two – for example where state officials are actively involved in subverting state regulation or where state regulation creates incentives for unofficial trade’. (Ibid: 8)

7 Keen stressed that one main function of violence is oriented towards changing (or retaining) laws and administration procedures, including those related to the long-term distribution of resources. An alternative function may be more geared towards circumnavigating the law – not so much changing it, as ignoring it. Incidents of this latter type include local and more immediate actions

lems of their own,⁸ and these may at times combine with the top-down mobilisation of violence.⁹

These points have since been expanded upon by other writers who have further differentiated between types of war economies and the number of distinct actors participating in economic activities. One important differentiation has been introduced by Jonathan Goodhand, who distinguishes among the ‘combat economy’, the ‘shadow economy’ and the ‘coping economy’ (Goodhand 2004). Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke have designed a table (adapted from Goodhand’s outline) to illustrate these three aspects of war economies (see below).

As is clear from Table 1, differentiating among the three types of war economies also makes it possible to recognise different types of actors. A combat economy may involve not only insurgents but also state agents, private-sector actors, transnational criminal organisations and private security-sector companies (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 11). Moreover, as was alluded to with Keen’s distinction between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ violence, there are several sub-distinctions in relation to the category ‘combatants’. Top leaders, mid-level commanders and fighters may have different motivations as well as roles in the war economy. Followers and supporters of armed groups, likewise, may differ from the combatants in their commitment to insurgency and ability to navigate in the war economy (ibid: 7–8).

As can be seen from these brief remarks on the complexities of war economies and the various actors engaged, there are important implications for how we conceptualise the transformation from war to peace – and the transformation from a war economy to a peace economy. Playing on Clausewitz’ classic definition of war, Keen has suggested that war may in some ways be regarded as the pursuit of economics by other means (quoted in Berdal and Malone 2000). How should we then view the peace economies emerging after formal agreements to end hostilities: are they simply war economies pursued by other means? That is, do we find the same kind of economic activities and actors, only with different forms of threats of violence? And, if so, does this preclude post-war economic development and stability? What role do DDR initiatives play in these processes?

⁸ quoted in Berdal and Malone (2000), p 25

⁹ According to Keen, some of the concrete short-term economic functions of both top-down as well as bottom-up violence may be a war situation that ‘legitimises’ physical and economic abuses of particular civilian groups (and, in this way, wartime abuse is not a means for winning the conflict but rather an end in itself); facilitation and opportunities for pillage; allows for demand of protection money for those spared from abuse; makes monopolisation of trade possible; facilitates exploitation of labour; changes terms for claiming land rights; allows for the extraction of aid; and institutionalises benefits accruing to the military. From Berdal and Malone (2000), p 31.

Table 1: Economies, Actors, Motives and Activities during Armed Conflict¹⁰

	The Combat Economy	The Shadow Economy	The Coping Economy
Who? Key Actors	Commanders, “conflict entrepreneurs”, fighters, suppliers of weapons and matériel	Profiteers, transport sector, businessmen, drug traffickers, “downstream” actors (truck drivers, poppy farmers)	Poor families and communities
Why? Motivations and Incentives for War and Peace	To fund the war efforts or achieve military objectives Peace may not be in their interest as it may lead to decreased power, status, and wealth Fighters may have an interest in peace if there are alternative sources of livelihoods available	To make a profit on the margins of a conflict Peace could be in their interest if it encourages long-term investment and licit entrepreneurial activity Peace requires alternatives to the shadow economy; otherwise a criminalised war economy will become a criminalised peace economy	To cope and maintain asset bases through low-risk activities, or to survive through asset erosion Peace could enable families to move beyond subsistence
How? Key Activities and Commodities	Taxation of licit and illicit economic activities; money, arms, equipment, and mercenaries from external state and non-state supporters; economic blockages of dissenting areas; asset stripping and looting; aid manipulation	Smuggling of high-value commodities; mass extraction of natural resources; control over currency order and exchange system; aid manipulation	Employment of diverse livelihood strategies to spread risk; subsistence agriculture; petty trade and small businesses; on-farm and off-farm wage labour; labour migration and remittances; redistribution through family networks; humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance

¹⁰ From Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005) p 8; Ballentine and Sherman (2003).

DDR and transformations from war economies to peace economies

Joanna Spear's recent article 'From political economies of war to political economies of peace: the contribution of DDR after wars of predation' (2006), deals directly with some of these issues and highlights the important link to DDR. Spear discusses the traditional key components of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration strategies and explains how, in light of the new insights on war economies, these components could be fruitfully adjusted and expanded. A key argument of Spear is that the all three stages of DDR needs to better accommodate the different economic needs and challenges associated with the different categories of combatant: fighters, mid-level commanders and top leaders. It is particularly important, for example, to address the needs of mid level commanders separately from fighters, since the former often have played central roles in the war economy, and are likely to continue their activities unless viable alternatives are provided for them. A central premise of Spear's article is that DDR can be an important tool in jumpstarting a transition from war economy to peace economy – and indeed that the deepest possible entrance of former combatants into the 'licit' economy is desirable, provided that former combatants abandon their criminal activities. This is, however, as Spear also acknowledges, no easy task. There is also room, in my view, to problematise further the transformative vision that Spear puts forward. Is it really possible to accommodate fighters economically and at the same time steer them into the 'licit' economy? And can this come about without any costs for existing actors in the 'licit' sphere or without impinging on how the 'licit' economy functions?

The case of Tajikistan offers a highly interesting example in relation to these questions.

Post-war Tajikistan: stability without development?¹¹

Nearly a decade after the formal end to fighting, Tajikistan now enjoys remarkable levels of peace and stability – yet good governance and sustainable development have apparently not followed, and large-scale illegal drugs trafficking is undermining the very foundations of the state. DDR programmes were central to the peace settlement, and they may be one of the possible variables that have been shaping Tajikistan's distinct post-war economic and political trajectory. The comprehensive peace settlement called for tough compromises from the two main parties to the conflict. There was an emphasis on reintegration over and above demobilisation and disarmament. Entire units of anti-government forces were included into state military and police structures, while opposition leaders were given 30% of the top government posts. Given the full-scale integration of opposition units into the government forces, demobilisation was in some ways partial. Fighters were disarmed to some degree, but large weapons stocks remained with commanders, and little pressure was levied on medium- and top-level leaders to surrender their weapons.

During the Tajik civil war, many independent, yet locally entrenched, commanders were operating. Most of them committed to the peace agree-

11 This section draws heavily on Torjesen and Macfarlane (forthcoming)

ment, and there were relatively few spoilers.¹² This commitment can, arguably, be explained by the intended and unintended consequences of the Tajik settlement, which gave the majority of commanders on both sides a significant stake in the peace process. A central feature here was the large-scale integration of armed groups into the military and law-enforcement structures.¹³ The reintegration process was coupled with an initial ‘hands-off’ policy on the part of President Rakhmonov with regard to the commanders’ control of former opposition areas, (the Rasht and Tavildara Valleys and Gorno Badakhshan). Most of the police and law-enforcement structures in these areas were initially made up of opposition fighters and commanders, and there was little direct involvement or control from the central government in local affairs.¹⁴

The peace settlement, however, also entailed several other incentives. Most prominently, political and military leaders from both sides have acquired flats, indeed whole blocks of flats, shopping centres, factories, cattle-grazing areas as well as cotton fields and cotton-processing facilities. Most of the prominent political and military leaders from 1997 are now holders of major economic assets that were previously state property. The Tajik state had not embarked upon a large-scale privatisation process before fighting broke out in 1992, and there were no major formal initiatives of this kind during the civil war. This particular set-up meant that there existed a range of economically attractive state properties whose ownership could be transferred to the actors who had facilitated and accepted the peace process.

Due to government connections and the continued command of fighters that guaranteed protection, the erstwhile military and political leaders were also favourably placed for initiating new and profitable economic activities in the post-war market economy. Former government commander Gaffur Mirzoev, for example, successfully established a major casino (‘Jomi Jamshed’) in Dushanbe, while one important civil war leader acquired control over the profitable import of wheat from Kazakhstan.

These strategies were accompanied by the decision of President Rakhmonov not to prevent corrupt practices and/or the abuse of government positions for personal enrichment. Tajikistan has one of the lowest scores in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (in 2006, ranked 142 out of 163).¹⁵ There have been no lawsuits against corrupt individuals – the exceptions being former political or military leaders who have challenged Rakhmonov politically. In these cases, extensive and detailed compromising material has been presented, documenting deep-seated corrup-

12 although indeed there were also some serious incidents of spoiler behaviour. See Torjesen and Macfarlane (forthcoming); see also Torjesen, Wille and Macfarlane (2005)

13 Most military commanders of some standing were offered lucrative and high positions in the MVD, Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS), Ministry of State Security (MB) or State Committee on Border Protection (KOGG). In addition, in the years immediately following the peace settlement they continued to enjoy direct control over potent fighting forces, since the combatants had followed the commanders into the new state structures. Arguably, this preserved trust while it also facilitated a commitment to uphold the peace agreement on the part of the commanders.

14 Since 2001 and the consolidation of President Rakhmonov's power there has been extensiverotation of the police cadres; former government fighters or original MVD personnel from other areas are now serving in the former opposition areas.

15 Transparency International 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006

tion.¹⁶ The promotion of former military and political leaders into government positions has, therefore, provided the dominant civil war actors with an easy means of enriching themselves, while also giving them a stake in the survival (if not the proper functioning) of government institutions.

This deliberate and uneven neglect of corrupt practices is compounded by the drug trafficking through Tajikistan. In 2003, Tajikistan's law enforcement intercepted over five tons of heroin; small-scale drug couriers are regularly arrested (ICG 2002). And yet, there has not been any police campaign or court trials against the main organisers of the drugs trade in Tajikistan – except for allegations of drug dealing made during seemingly political trials against Rakhmonov's opponents. During the war, the commanders financed weapons purchases through drugs trafficking (*Literaturnaya Gazeta* 1995). The dominant figures on both sides of the civil war were those best positioned to engage in drug trafficking after 1997. Some of these leaders sought to remain central figures in the drugs business, and President Rakhmonov has done little to hinder their activities.

In the short and medium term, it is difficult not to deem Tajikistan and the policies of the Rakhmonov administration a success. Far less certain is what the long-term implications of Rakhmonov's strategies will be. The case of Tajikistan highlights several questions which tend to arise in the wake of DDR processes: What are the development consequences of an entrenchment of the economic roles of civil war actors? Is there a point when 'over-facilitation' of the interests of former combatants will jeopardise the overall economic well-being of the country and perpetuate cycles of underdevelopment, grievance and insecurity? Tajikistan exemplifies these dilemmas. Nearly a decade after the signing of the peace agreement, it is becoming increasingly clear that the state's tacit acceptance of a wide range of criminal activities may jeopardise the very foundations of the state and could distort the prospects for economic development. There is a potential for further and large-scale criminalisation of the Tajik state and society, as a result of the multi-billion dollar drug transit through the country. This may seriously affect economic and political developments, and could, in a worst-case scenario, bring renewed cycles of instability to Tajikistan.

Towards a research agenda on the political economy of DDR

The case of Tajikistan and the preceding literature review point to several questions which could benefit from further assessment. The main issue in need of more research seems to be the following:

- ❖ How do DDR processes impinge on the type of economic actors that emerge after the formal end to fighting, and what interplays typically occur between DDR processes and the activities of these actors in post-conflict settings?

This overarching question touches on several research themes that in turn involve various sub-questions. Below are some preliminary suggestions.

16 See RFE/RL 2005a; also RFE/RL. 2003 and RFE/RL 2005b

Fighter networks in the post-war economy

- Will the type of DDR approach (coercion vs. consent-based) influence what type of economic roles civil war actors may obtain in the post-conflict period?
- How do armed actors respond to peace? Do they diversify their economic, political and military networks? Are the links to mid-level and top commanders maintained?¹⁷
- What impact do potential re-grouping and the loss of ties have on the ability of commanders to re-mobilise soldiers or use soldiers for civil economic (violent) purposes?
- What implications do DDR processes have for the economic role played by female combatants and female camp followers in post-conflict settings?

Violence in the post-war economy

- If, as is often the case, full disarmament has not been achieved, then does this have an impact on violence rates? Are there any links to activities in the post-war economy?
- Is there a transformation in the deployment of violence strategies in the post-war phase?
- What is the effect of the interplay, if any, between top-down versus bottom-up perpetrators of violence when these attempt to transform into peacetime (and potentially violent) economic actors?

Market economy in the post-conflict phase

- Does the transformation of civil war actors into peacetime (and potentially violent) economic actors spur distortions in the functioning of national, regional or local markets? If so, what are the developmental and poverty-related effects of this?
- Are there any links between DDR processes and potential transformation in border regions and cross border trade?
- How does the presence of significant foreign deployments in countries like Afghanistan and Georgia affect local legal and illegal economic activities?

State consolidation, order and security

- To what extent does the degree of commitment of security resources (provision of peacekeepers or scope of foreign military intervention) on the part of external agents (foreign governments, multilateral organisations) shape the conditions and opportunities that civil war ac-

17 I am grateful to Michael Bhatia, University of Oxford and Brown University, for pointing out this dimension to me.

tors have for gaining advantageous economic roles in post-conflict periods?

- How does the emergence of private security providers hinder or benefit economic activities in post-conflict periods?
- To what extent does integrating combatants into state security structures shape the state's potential to play a constructive role in the post-conflict economic recovery process of the country?

Conclusion

The above questions represent a preliminary attempt at operationalising research around the dilemma signalled in the introduction to this working paper: in order to convince warring factions to commit to peace, DDR strategies will have to offer significant incentives that in turn may entrench the factions' economic and political standing. On the other hand, offering the armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise post-war economic reconstruction, perpetuate cycles of under-development and risk entrenching instability.

Further research is needed on the consequences of the possible compromises underpinning DDR efforts. While more insights are certainly also needed on improving DDR, it is equally important to go one step further and identify the positive as well as negative consequences for the economy, the market and the state when attempts at comprehensive disarmament and reintegration of combatants are undertaken.

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