



REPORT

THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NEW EUROPEAN DIASPORAS AND MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: POLES IN NORWAY

WARSAW
SEPTEMBER 2015



GoodGov

AUTHORS: JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI, MARTA STORMOWSKA, KINGA DUDZIŃSKA

THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

New European Diasporas
and Migration Governance:
Poles in Norway

Authors:

Jakub M. Godzimirski, Marta Stormowska, Kinga Dudzińska

Warsaw, September 2015

© Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2015

Copy editor
Anthony Casey

Technical editor and cover designer
Dorota Dołęgowska

978-83-64895-58-6 pdf

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
ul. Warecka 1a, 00-950 Warszawa
phone (+48) 22 556 80 00, fax (+48) 22 556 80 99
pism@pism.pl, www.pism.pl

Contents

Summary	5
Introduction	7
Part 1. EU Framework for Migration and Mobility under Pressure	9
Mobility and Migration in the EU Regulatory Context	10
Towards a Common EU Migration Policy?	11
The EU's Mobility and Migration Challenge, and New Initiatives	13
Conflating Mobility and Migration: What Does This Mean for Freedom of Movement?	14
Part 2. The Dilemmas of Sending and Receiving Countries: Poles in Norway	17
Polish Policy towards the New Polish Diaspora and Poles Abroad	17
The New Polish Diaspora: An Opportunity or a Challenge?	18
Stimulate Return or Immigration?	19
Norway as a Receiving Country: The Broader Context	21
The Polish Diaspora from the Perspective of Norway as a Receiving Country ...	24
The Polish Diaspora in Norway and Norwegian-Polish Relations	25
Poles in Norway: Key Features and Possible Economic, Social and Political Challenges	26
Citizenship and Naturalisation	27
Political Participation in Norway and Poland	28
Identity Issues	29
The Barnevernet and the Polish Community	31
Economic Factors	33
Conclusions	37

Summary

The EU has usually considered immigration policy for third country nationals and the free movement framework for EU citizens to be two separate policy fields. Increasingly, they are being conflated. This places a country such as Poland in an ambivalent position. When it comes to the treatment of third country nationals, Central and Eastern European member governments—including that in Warsaw—are reluctant to agree on fixed quotas to relocate forced migrants from the south, fearing that this could strain their limited resources and entail heavy political costs. When it comes to free movement, by contrast, Poland and other sending countries of the region are having to defend the status of their own citizens residing in Western Europe and call on support and solidarity there. This report examines how this may affect the specific situation of the Polish migrant community in Norway. Poland can draw lessons from Norway, which has only recently made the transition to becoming a country of immigration.

Introduction

When it began in 2013, the GoodGov project chose to address the question of migration governance in the Polish-Norwegian context primarily because of the growth of the Polish community in Norway. Since Poland acceded to the European Union in 2004, the Polish diaspora in Norway has grown more than tenfold, and already by 2007 Poles made up the largest immigrant group in Norway. The growth of the Polish diaspora has been caused by various migratory push and pull factors, as well as by the transformation of the legal framework that mediates the relationship. For a decade now, this has had a significant impact on Norway and Poland, and on Polish–Norwegian bilateral relations.

Current European politics provides a broader and more immediate reason for addressing migration issues. The EU faces a real migratory challenge at its southern border, and may encounter similar in the east should the conflict in Ukraine worsen. The ongoing migration crisis in the Mediterranean, and the EU's apparent inability to address this challenge effectively, not to mention the perception of the Middle East as a dangerous area controlled by Islamic fundamentalists posing a threat to core European values, have all contributed to anti-migratory sentiment in Europe.

The European Parliament elections in May 2014 showed that support for EU-sceptic and xenophobic parties is on the rise in Europe. Because the distinction between free movement and migration “has not resonated with publics who are largely indifferent to the distinction between migrant and EU citizen when it comes to their own communities,” this increasingly negative attitude towards migration may have direct and indirect consequences not only for forced migrants coming from conflict zones, but also for other groups, including those EU citizens whose migration is regulated by the EU framework.¹

This report is divided into two main sections, and builds in part on studies conducted earlier within the GoodGov project:

In the first section we map how the EU approaches questions related to migration by examining the EU framework regulating the free movement of people and migration of third country nationals, both to and within the EU. It shows that, although the two policy fields remain largely separate, they are increasingly being treated as part of the same restrictive debate. A better understanding of the recent evolution of the European political debate on migration and the possible impact of this debate, as well as other factors, on the formulation of EU policy on migration and mobility is crucial for the study of the Polish migration to Norway that takes place within this broader European regulatory framework. On the one hand it might be assumed that any changes in the European regulatory framework may have an impact on the situation of the Polish community in Norway and in other EU/EEA countries, but on the other hand the huge inflow of labour migrants from new Member States, combined with economic crisis, has already contributed to the politicisation of the issue and may result in changes in the EU regulations.

In the second and main part we look at migration-related questions from two perspectives—Poland as a sending country and Norway as a receiving country—paying special attention to the situation of the Polish community in Norway, and the challenges that the rise of the Polish diaspora in Norway may pose to Norwegian migration governance, to Polish-Norwegian bilateral relations, to Norway's affiliation with the EU, and to EU policy on migration and mobility. In this part we also look at what lessons Poland, which is on the verge of transforming from a sending only country to a sending and receiving one, may learn from Norway. The latter has undergone a similar transformation and has to cope with a number of migration-related challenges, including the rise of the Polish diaspora in the wake of EU enlargement.

¹ E. Collett, “Is Europe Faltering in Addressing its Multiple Migration Challenges?,” MPI, 17 December 2013, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/issue-no-5-europe-faltering-addressing-its-multiple-migration-challenges.

Part 1. EU Framework for Migration and Mobility under Pressure

The free movement of workers is one of the EU's four fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, capital and services being the others), and is still rated by European citizens as one of the most highly appreciated achievements of the European Union.² It is so important that third countries with privileged relations to the EU, such as European Economic Area (EEA) member Norway, have had to sign up to these rules as part of their respective agreements with the EU, thus opening up their labour market to millions of EU citizens from the old and new Member States.

However, especially after the “big bang” enlargement of the European Union in 2004, when labour markets in old Member States attracted more people from the newcomers than they had bargained for—and even more so after the outbreak of the European economic crisis in 2008, which revealed some deep structural problems in the EU and led to increased unemployment and other social problems—the inflow of labour migrants has created tensions and has been instrumentalised for political reasons in countries such as the UK, Sweden, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. Free-moving labour migrants from the new Member States have found themselves viewed as part of a general migratory problem, and less as a solution to local labour shortages.

Although labour migrants coming from other EU Member States do not pose any kind of direct “societal threat,” due to the fact that most of them have similar cultural backgrounds and shared European values, their sheer presence may be used for political purposes by parties that are interested in undermining the legitimacy of national governments and of the whole EU integration project. In societies struggling with economic problems and uncertainty, it is therefore relatively easy to present the inflow of migrants as a source of not only economic but also societal disorder.³ Two questions in particular have become a cause of contention: access to work in shrinking labour markets, and access to welfare benefits in receiving countries.

Increased scepticism towards the EU project and migration in general have compelled the EU to adopt a more nuanced approach to the question of migration from outside. The new European Commission has undergone an institutional restructuring that is to make it better prepared to address new migratory challenges,⁴ and this—combined with other factors—may result in the modification of the existing framework regulating migration of third country nationals into the EU. For instance, in response to the ongoing crisis in the Southern Mediterranean, on 13 May 2015 the European Commission presented a new document outlining the EU's priorities in this field.⁵

At the same time, the newly re-elected British Prime Minister David Cameron has launched a campaign that may result in the renegotiation of the conditions of UK membership of the EU, and in possible changes to the EU regulations on the mobility of labour within the Union. However, no matter what popular and populist perceptions of migration are, and what regulatory changes are going to be introduced by national governments and the EU in response to politicisation, of the issue, it is beyond any doubt that the two migratory flows—the free movement of EU citizens, and the entry of third country nationals—will continue to be regulated differently.

² See for instance Standard Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015, “Public Opinion in the European Union. First Results,” p. 31, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf in which the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU is considered the most positive result of the EU project.

³ For more on that see B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, pp. 119–121, and O. Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter, London, 1993.

⁴ For more on that see E. Collett, *The Development of EU Policy on Immigration and Asylum: Rethinking Coordination and Leadership*, Policy Brief Series No. 8, Migration Policy Institute Europe, Brussels, 2015.

⁵ European Commission, “A European Agenda on Migration,” COM (2015) 240 final, European Commission, Brussels, 2015.

Mobility and Migration in the EU Regulatory Context

Freedom of movement guarantees the free entry into another EU country to all EU citizens, and is granted by the Treaty of Rome. However, there are some formal strings attached to this general rule that kick in after the third month of residence in another EU Member State, and this unconditional right to reside beyond the first three months applies only to workers and the self-employed (and their direct family members) who have found employment and can support themselves. Active job seekers also have the right to reside without conditions, but their stay cannot in principle exceed six months, although they can stay longer if they have a “genuine chance” of employment. Other categories of EU citizens, for instance students and pensioners, may reside beyond the three-month period, but only if they have sufficient financial means to support themselves and their family, and are not a burden to the host EU country’s social security and health systems.

All EU citizens who have been continuously resident for five years in their adopted EU country have the right to settle permanently, but this does not give them an automatic right to apply for new citizenship, as such questions are still regulated nationally, and different laws apply in different countries. As regards access to welfare benefits, this is regulated mostly by Member States. Governments cannot, however, treat citizens of other Member States better or worse than their own citizens, due to the principle of equal treatment of all EU nationals, which forms a basis of the EU framework in this regard.⁶ That said, EU regulations do provide some safeguards to prevent non-active EU citizens from becoming a burden on national social and welfare systems, even if these rules have proven somewhat impractical. Meanwhile, Regulations (EC) No. 883/2004 and 987/2009 deal with the coordination and transfer of social security benefits (old age pension, survivor’s pension, disability benefits, sickness benefits, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, family benefits, and health care) within the EU.

When it comes to the migration of third country nationals to the EU, and their mobility within the Union, the situation is quite different. As noted in a previous GoodGov study, “[t]he rights that EU citizens have when exercising freedom of movement go far beyond what is available for non-EU migrants. For them entry is difficult, rights are not the same, and mobility is limited.”⁷ Their entry is regulated by EU immigration and asylum policies that are still not fully developed, although it has been almost 15 years since the Tampere Programme was launched by heads of state and government, with an ambitious legal blueprint for this field.⁸ The EU has never managed to agree on a common policy covering the admission of all third country nationals, and since 2005 a number of sector-specific solutions have been launched.

This started with the European Commission’s 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration,⁹ and was followed by the adoption of the Blue Card (Highly Skilled Workers Directive) in June

⁶ For more on this question see P. Minderhoud, “Access to Social Assistance Benefits and Directive 2004/38,” in: E. Guild, K. Groenendijk, S. Carrera (eds), *Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU*, Ashgate, Farnham, 2009, pp. 221–238.

⁷ A. Lazarowicz, “Governance of the Free Movement of EU Citizens: Weathering the Storm of Politicisation,” *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 3 (105), March 2015, p. 6.

⁸ For a good overview of the evolution of the EU’s immigration and asylum policy see E. Collett, *Future EU Policy Development on Immigration and Asylum: Understanding the Challenge*, Policy Brief Series No. 3, Migration Policy Institute Europe, Brussels, 2014. On the recent developments in that field, and attempts to adopt and implement a new more coherent policy through institutional rearrangement see E. Collett, *The Development of EU Policy on Immigration and Asylum...*, *op. cit.*

⁹ European Commission, “Policy Plan on Legal Migration,” Brussels, 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0669&from=EN>.

2009,¹⁰ the EU Single Permit in December 2011,¹¹ and the Seasonal Workers Directive¹² and Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive in the spring of 2014.¹³ The remaining legislative proposal in this field, the new Students and Researchers Directive, was adopted by the European Parliament at the end of February 2014. In addition, in order to ease immigrants' paths to integration and make it possible to them to be more mobile within the EU, the Union also launched the Family Reunification Directive¹⁴ and the Long Term Residents Directive.¹⁵ The Family Reunification Directive has become an oft-used route into the EU for new migrants, and Member States such as the Netherlands and Denmark¹⁶ have called for it to be revised.

Towards a Common EU Migration Policy?

There are at least two reasons why the EU has not managed to design and implement a common migration policy for third country nationals. First, this group of potential and actual migrants is made up of various subcategories, which confronts policy makers with a number of theoretical and practical challenges. At one end of the spectrum we find people from countries beyond EU borders who have some special skills that could be of benefit to the EU. In the middle there is a huge group of people who seek protection from persecution, or aim for better life opportunities, through various legal channels. At the other end of the spectrum are those who try to reach and stay in Europe illegally, challenging both national and European migration governance structures and regulations. Migration of skilled migrants is regulated by special rules at national and EU levels and some third country potential migrants could be even encouraged by the EU to move to the Union, to fill various gaps on the labour market that cannot be filled successfully by intra-EU mobility. However, even when dealing with this category, the least controversial among migrants, the EU has had visible problems with policy coordination at national and EU levels.¹⁷

As one of the key experts on migration wrote recently, "Western Europe will face stronger competition for skilled labour," and in fact there are already a number of challenges in that field that cannot be solved solely by intra-EU mobility.¹⁸ One of the reasons is that Europeans are not ready to accept more international migrants, and, as signalled earlier, give their support to political parties with restrictive migration agendas.¹⁹ Those restrictive agendas²⁰ are mostly driven by the fact that the current debate on migration in Europe seems to be completely dominated by the discussion on how to deal with great numbers of forced migrants who try to reach Europe from various conflict zones, and with an even greater number of economic migrants who are attracted

¹⁰ European Commission, "Highly Skilled Workers Directive," Brussels, 2009, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0050&from=EN>.

¹¹ European Commission, "The EU Single Permit", Brussels, 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L0098&from=EN>.

¹² European Commission, "The Seasonal Workers Directive," Brussels, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0036&from=EN>.

¹³ European Commission, "Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive," Brussels, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0066&from=EN>.

¹⁴ European Commission, "Family Reunification Directive," Brussels, 2003, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0086&from=EN>.

¹⁵ European Commission, "Long Term Residents Directive," Brussels, 2003, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=celex:32003L0109>.

¹⁶ On Danish practices in the field of family reunification for non-EU/EEA citizens see www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/coming_to_dk/familyreunification/spouses/spouses.htm.

¹⁷ S. Carrera, E. Guild, K. Eisele (eds), *Rethinking the Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration Policies: Comparative Perspectives on the EU, the U.S., Canada and Beyond*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2014.

¹⁸ R. Münz, *The Global Race for Talent: Europe's Migration Challenge*, Bruegel Policy Brief, 2014/02, March 2014, [http://aei.pitt.edu/50116/1/The_global_race_for_talent%2D_Europe's_migration_challenge_\(English\).pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/50116/1/The_global_race_for_talent%2D_Europe's_migration_challenge_(English).pdf).

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

²⁰ For more on that see W. van der Brug et al. (eds), *The Politicisation of Migration*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2015, in which a number of national cases are discussed.

to Europe by the promise of a better life and choose to risk their lives and challenge the existing EU migration regime to reach their destinations. Many of those two categories of migrants use various legal and not so legal channels to reach Europe, and the situation developing in the Mediterranean is the best example of how those flows underline the need for a common EU migration policy and challenge the EU's cohesion, solidarity and even its security policy.²¹

The second reason why the EU has not been able to design and implement a common migration policy and may face some problems with its policy on mobility has to do with the fact that much has been left to the discretion of Member States, and they have their own particular experiences and interests in the field of migration.²² Some Member States, such as France, Sweden, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, have to cope with existing social and migratory tensions caused by the huge inflow of migrants in previous decades, and by apparent problems with the integration of some migrant communities showing signs of radicalisation. Other Member States, especially those receiving great numbers of both external migrants and mobile EU citizens, suggest that the whole policy field has to be reformed by the EU and want, like the UK, to change the agreed rules of the intra and extra-EU migratory game.²³ Other Member States face challenges caused by the outflow of migrants moving to other parts of Europe, and have to devise and implement migration policies that will help them address their specific problems, such as the question of return migration or the need to fill the demographic gap caused by migration and deal with negative demographic trends, which is, for instance, the case of Poland.²⁴

The ongoing debate and tensions between Member States and the EU, caused by plans for the resettlement of Syrian refugees and the relocation of refugees reaching southern part of Europe, is a very good illustration of how various EU Member States deal with the issue and oppose the "EU as a whole" approach to solving acute migration-related problems.²⁵ The tensions growing between Member States, sending tens of thousands of mobile EU citizens, and those receiving them, illustrates how the questions of mobility and intra-EU free movement have become contentious issues, putting the need to reform the whole field high on the political agenda.²⁶

²¹ See for instance M. Toaldo, *Migrations through and from Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge*, IAI Working Papers, Rome, 2015, and A. Lusenti, L. Watanabe, *The Challenge and Tragedy of Irregular Migration to Europe*, Centre for Security Studies, Zurich, 2014. For a good overview of the EU migration and security dilemmas in the Mediterranean area see R. Parkes, *Integrating EU Defence and Migration Policies in the Mediterranean*, FRIDE Working Paper 125, Madrid, 2014.

²² For a good overview of how migration policies have evolved in some EU countries see G. Zincone, R. Penninx, M. Borkert (eds), *Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2011.

²³ To learn more about the historical trajectory of British policy in that field see L. Cerna, A. Wietholtz, "The Case of the United Kingdom," in: G. Zincone, R. Penninx, M. Borkert (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 195–244. See also J. Hampshire, T. Bale, "New Administration, New Immigration Regime: Do Parties Matter after All? A UK Case Study," *West European Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2014, pp. 145–166.

²⁴ For more about the evolution of Polish migration policy see A. Kicingier, I. Koryś, "The Case of Poland," in: G. Zincone, R. Penninx, M. Borkert (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 347–376; H. Chałupczak et al., "Polityka migracyjna Polski wobec najnowszej emigracji Polaków po 2004 roku," in: M. Lesińska et al. (eds), *Dekada członkostwa Polski w UE. Społeczne skutki emigracji Polaków po 2004 roku*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa, 2014, pp. 307–330; M. Anacka, M. Okólski, "Migracja z Polski po akcesji do Unii Europejskiej," in: M. Lesińska et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 45–70.

²⁵ For more details on EU plans in that respect see Annex European schemes for relocation and resettlement, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_annex_en.pdf.

²⁶ For a good analysis of this specific question in the light of access to social benefits see D. Bräuninger, *Debate on Free Movement: Does the EU Need New Rules on Social Security Co-ordination?*, Research Briefing, Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt am Main, 2015.

The EU's Mobility and Migration Challenge, and New Initiatives

There is a clear need today for a more efficient migration policy at the EU level, but in order to achieve this goal the Union has to learn how to accommodate the interests of Member States by better policy coordination at the EU level. To better control external migration flows, the EU has to improve management of its external borders, and must seek closer cooperation with countries that serve as transit areas for migration flows reaching Europe, and with those from which various groups of migrants are coming in great numbers.

The EU should also devise an efficient policy to attract those groups of migrants who can fill various gaps on the labour market and help the Union to deal with its demographic challenge, to provide protection to those who have to be protected and helped due to exposure to various types of conflict, and to deter and contain uncontrolled flows of migrants who challenge the existing EU migration regime. When it comes to mobility-related issues, the EU has to devise and conduct policies that will help Member States to settle their mobility-related conflicts and to better use this untapped resource.²⁷

A recently published study on the “global race for talent” discussed challenges related to European policy on labour migration, concluding that the EU has to implement policies that will help to organise political majorities in support of more proactive migration policy that will make Europe more attractive for mobile people with talent and skills, and help the Union to move away from unilateral migration policies and towards negotiated win-win solutions.²⁸

The ongoing debate on migration, fuelled by the crisis in the south and the need to address intra-EU tensions, resulted in various proposals on how the new European Commission should address the issue of migration. One of the most comprehensive texts on this question was published by the leading European think tank Bruegel.²⁹ In this brief recommendation, questions about mobility and migration were addressed. In terms of mobility, the key problems were the mismatches between supply and demand of labour and skills, and the fragmentation of European labour markets along national boundaries. The most important obstacles to improved mobility were the way labour markets and welfare systems are organised in the EU, and the delegation of decisions in that field to Member States. A way of improving mobility was the expansion of the European Network of Employment Services (EURES). In the discussion of labour migration from third countries, the report argued that the EU has far greater problems with addressing this issue than traditional immigration countries (such as the U.S. or Australia), which manage to attract more skilled migrants.

Another issue discussed in this brief text was the question of border management and the EU's ability to cope with growing numbers of legal and illegal migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the question of intra-EU burden sharing. The new European Commission should deal with the question of public resistance to migration in general, and against intra-EU mobility in some Member States. To be able to cope with those questions and challenges, the EU should not give up the principle of free movement of labour within the EU, as this was a founding principle of European integration and thus should be non-negotiable or dissociated from the other freedoms that make up the single market. The EU should, however, take some practical steps to address some of the most controversial issues, such as welfare tourism and access to those social benefits that only have to be granted on a non-discriminatory basis to citizens of the Member State and to long-term residents, and not to short-term visitors even if they come from within the EU. The Commission and Member States should also adopt a more flexible approach to labour migrants

²⁷ M. Barslund, M. Busse, J. Schwarzwälder, *Labour Mobility in Europe: An Untapped Resource?*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2015.

²⁸ R. Münz, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

²⁹ R. Münz, “To the Commissioner in charge of Mobility, Migration, Asylum and Border Management,” <http://eu2do.bruegel.org/mobility-migration-asylum-and-border-management>.

from third countries in order to fill the existing and future gaps on their labour markets. To cope with the inflow of asylum seekers and illegal migrants, the EU should improve the credibility of its border control and asylum systems, and focus more on intra-EU burden sharing and closer cooperation with neighbouring countries that are important transit or sending areas for migration flows reaching Europe.

It is difficult to say whether the EU took those recommendations seriously, but even if not, recent developments on the ground have forced EU policymakers to take several steps to address the issue of migration in a more innovative manner.³⁰ On 23 April 2014, when he was still just a candidate for president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker presented a five point plan on immigration, and when he took office some months later he entrusted a commissioner with special responsibility for migration to work, in coordination with first vice-president Frans Timmermans, on a new policy on migration.³¹ On 23 April 2015 the European Council asked Member States to take action to save lives and to step up EU activity in the field of migration. On 13 May 2015, the European Commission presented its European Agenda on Migration, which sets out a comprehensive approach that will improve the management of migration in all its aspects.

The set of documents published by the European Commission on 13 May 2015 was an immediate response to the situation developing in the south, but the European Agenda on Migration outlines not only the measures to be taken in the short term, but also the steps that are to help the EU to better manage migration in all its aspects. Thus, in its response to the immediate situation in the south, the EU was to focus on saving lives at sea, targeting criminal smuggling networks, responding to high volumes of arrivals through a policy of relocation within the EU, adopting a common approach to protection for displaced persons through their resettlement in the EU, cooperating more closely with third countries to tackle migration upstream, and finally using various EU tools in order to help frontline Member States—such as Italy and Hungary—to cope with this migratory challenge. If those immediate actions are to help the EU cope with the current situation, the adoption of four new pillars of migration policy may have greater impact on the future of migration to the EU. Those four pillars³² were to reduce the incentives for irregular migration, to improve border management in order to save lives and secure borders, to work towards a strong common asylum policy through a full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System, and to develop a new policy on legal migration that would help the EU deal with its demographic decline and labour shortages while maximising the benefits of migration policy to individuals and countries of origin, including the facilitation of cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers.

Conflating Mobility and Migration: What Does This Mean for Freedom of Movement?

The implementation of the EU's new policy on migration as outlined in the documents presented on 13 May 2015 is not meant to have any direct bearing on EU policy on free movement. In practical terms, however, attitudes towards foreign EU citizens in Member States will very much depend on how each country is able to deal with immigration from the south. This is because free movement is conflated in the public and political debate with migration from third countries. Thus we can expect a spill-over effect—the EU's lack of success in dealing with migration in general may have a negative impact on attitudes towards intra-EU mobility, especially if politicians are willing to play the free movement card in order to get popular support. Some European societies


³⁰ For more on these steps see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5039_en.htm.

³¹ Point eight in the document on political guidelines available at http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf#page=11.

³² European Commission, "Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration," press release, Brussels, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm.

already treat mobile Europeans with a relatively high level of suspicion. More than 80% of Dutch, and 60% of French citizens, apparently believe that freedom of movement should be restricted for Bulgarians and Romanians; and the Bertelsmann Foundation found that two thirds of Germans see mobile EU citizens as a potential “extra burden” on their country’s welfare system.³³ Meanwhile, a study conducted by the German Marshall Fund found that migration from some EU Member States is often viewed as a source of concern in many others.³⁴

Figure 1. Views on migration



Source: *Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration, and Integration*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, September 2014, p. 10.

The EU’s free-movement framework is designed to make it easier to both migrate permanently across the Union and to remain mobile (i.e., to engage in so-called circular migrations that combine stays abroad and in the country of origin, or moving to different states with no clear intention of settling). Mobility is often considered the most beneficial form of migration, as shorter stays bring economic benefits to both sending and receiving countries without the necessity of more long-term investments in integration policies. However, mobile EU citizens are also relatively marginalised when it comes to integration programmes, such as language or introductory courses, in comparison to third country nationals.³⁵ Thus, the true challenge for sending countries such as Poland is to defend the rights of two groups with rather different needs, and to build a coherent narrative encompassing both of them. Here, states are facing self-contradictory policies from receiving Member States. The UK’s desire to curb migration and the spectre of “welfare shopping” has seen the British government reduce the advantages of mobility. This attitude has seen access to some welfare services limited for EU citizens, turning them into a second rank presence in host countries. This may backfire, as attempts to limit mobility may encourage mobile EU citizens to settle permanently in the host country in order to guarantee better treatment or to ensure that their situation will not deteriorate.³⁶

³³ R. Münz, *The Global Race for Talent...*, *op. cit.*

³⁴ *Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration, and Integration*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, September 2014, p. 10.

³⁵ E. Collett, *The Integration Needs of Mobile EU Citizens: Impediments and Opportunities*, Migration Policy Institute Europe, March 2013.

³⁶ R. Parkes, “Free Movement in the EU: Promoting Mobility Not Migration,” *PISM Bulletin*, no. 3 (598), 10 January 2014.

Part 2. The Dilemmas of Sending and Receiving Countries: Poles in Norway

Since the EU legal framework has been a key factor contributing to the mobility of Polish citizens since 2004, and since almost 100,000 Poles have found their way to Norway, this part of the report will deal in more detail with these issues in the Polish-Norwegian context. In order to address these questions in the bilateral context from the perspective of Poland as a sending country and Norway as a receiving country, we need first to present the background, showing the state of the current Polish and Norwegian debate on migration and migration-related challenges.

Polish Policy towards the New Polish Diaspora and Poles Abroad

Historically, in different periods, Poland was a country of substantial emigration, with especially intense movements triggered by the Second World War. Therefore, the global Polish diaspora is estimated nowadays to number around 20 million Poles and people of Polish origin.³⁷ Since 1989, Polish policy towards Poles abroad has been mainly concentrated on Polish citizens and their descendants who, due to the war, found themselves in the post-Soviet countries and the policy has been understood mainly as an obligation to support them.³⁸ Since Poland's accession to the European Union, emigration from Poland has grown substantially.³⁹ The "new Polish diaspora" in the EU and EEA countries accounts for more than 2 million individuals,⁴⁰ and Poles are the second largest group of EU citizens residing in other Member States after Romanians.⁴¹ The sheer scale of this phenomenon, and the specificity of Poles' movements under the free movement regime, has made it necessary for Warsaw to address this question both in the broader framework of cooperation with Poles abroad and through specific measures. In 2007, government strategy for cooperation with Polonia and Poles abroad recognised EEA countries with growing populations of Polish citizens as a fourth priority area for activities in the years 2008 to 2012.⁴² The same year, Poles became the largest minority in Norway.

Post-accession migration and its impact on Poland seem to be captured best by two competing hypothesis: Iglicka's hypothesis of the "migration trap loop" and Okólski's of "crowding out migration." According to the first, Poles who left the country after 2004 were mostly young and relatively well-educated people unable to realise their ambitions in Poland. However, most of them work in positions below the level of their qualifications in the host countries. After such deskilling they are unable to find better jobs after on returning to Poland. They find themselves trapped in a double marginalisation—with no prospects of satisfying jobs at home, or working in jobs for which they are over-qualified abroad. In Okólski's scheme, the outflow of a mostly redundant labour force can be used as an opportunity, and with proper investment can facilitate needed change in the structure of the labour market. Returning migrants can then be offered better jobs in new segments of the market, and use skills gained abroad. Reforms in the country of origin are crucial to the realisation of this scenario.

Source: J. Brzozowski, P. Kaczmarczyk, *Konsekwencje migracji poakcesyjnych z Polski dla kompetencji zawodowych i kulturowych społeczeństwa polskiego*, Ekspertyzy Komitetu Badań nad Migracjami PAN, Warszawa, 2014.

³⁷ Estimation available at official website of the Polish Ministry of International Affairs, www.msz.gov.pl, see also: *Atlas of Polish presence abroad*, www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polonija/atlas_polskiej_obecnosci_w_swiecie.

³⁸ A. Fiń et al., *Polityka polonijna w ocenie jej wykonawców i adresatów*, IZ Policy Papers No. 11 (I), Instytut Zachodni, Poznań, 2013, p. 36.

³⁹ See: *Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania*, MSWiA, Warszawa, 2012.

⁴⁰ Estimation available at official website of the Polish Ministry of International Affairs, www.msz.gov.pl.

⁴¹ M. Duszczyk, K. Matuszczyk, *Migration in the 21st Century from the Perspective of CEE Countries—an Opportunity or a Threat?*, Central and Eastern Europe Development Institute, Warsaw, 2014, p. 16.

⁴² *Rządowy program współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą*, MSZ, 2007 r., www.msz.gov.pl.

The New Polish Diaspora: An Opportunity or a Challenge?

Most countries' diaspora policies are concerned not only with the negative effects of emigration, but focus on opportunities and relations between the diaspora and economic development.⁴³ Such policies can include promoting the use of remittances for development, promoting investment of well-off emigrants in the country of origin, stimulating transfers of knowledge, and engaging diasporas in the promotion of state interests and cultural exchanges. In 2011, a general shift in Polish diaspora policy could be observed. Compared to the previous focus on maintaining a connection with Poland and Polish culture, more emphasis was put on Poland's international strategic aims and the promotion of Poland's image abroad.⁴⁴ In addition, the need to improve cooperation with the Polish diaspora in Ukraine and the East, and to better balance it with cooperation with new and old Polish diasporas in the West, has been underlined. Since 2012, cooperation with Polonia (the name given to the Polish diaspora) has been administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the Senate (the upper chamber of the Polish parliament). Annual funding is given to projects on cooperation with Polonia and mobile Poles, and funding has been allocated according to thematic priorities set by the Polish authorities in dialogue with representatives of various diaspora groups.

The government's latest strategy for cooperation with the diaspora, for the years 2015 to 2020, recognises mobile Poles in EU/EEA countries as one of the most important groups for Polish diaspora policy.⁴⁵ The main task identified in the strategy is to help new migrants maintain strong ties with Poland and to make their return more likely if Poland undertakes positive economic and social changes, or exploits the worsening economic and social situation in countries hosting new Polish diasporas.⁴⁶ Most importantly, more investment is to be made available for Polish language classes abroad and to promote knowledge about Poland, especially among young people, so as to raise awareness about rights under the free movement regime, to facilitate and promote returns, and to develop better cooperation across different fields, such as culture, business and local government.⁴⁷ The potential success of these policies is dependent not only on the quality of the sending state's policy, but also on the level of self-organisation and the position of diaspora in the receiving countries. These latter factors pose a hurdle for the development of Polish diaspora policy, as post-accession migrants in the EU are relatively poorly organised and only rarely engage in the promotion of their country and in other kinds of social and cultural activities.⁴⁸ They also tend to have a negative or neutral/ambivalent opinion about Polish policy towards Poles abroad.⁴⁹ Most Poles abroad do identify with their homeland and feel that their behaviour at work and in private contributes to the image of Poland,⁵⁰ but nevertheless, and despite some developments in Polish self-organisation, the social capital of Poles in countries such as Norway is assessed to be relatively low.⁵¹

The lack of social capital and the mistrust between the diaspora and the Polish state may pose a challenge for the process of true partnership-building between the Polish government and the diaspora. This has become visible over the last few years in the small but important

⁴³ A. Gamlen, *Why Engage Diasporas?*, Working Paper No. 63, University of Oxford, 2008.

⁴⁴ See: A. Fiń et al., *Jak zaangażować się we współpracę z Polską?*, Instytut Zachodni, www.iz.poznan.pl/news/839_e-poradnik.pdf.

⁴⁵ *Rządowy program współpracy z polską diasporą w latach 2015–2020*, MSZ, November 2014.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁸ See: A. Fiń et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 43–54.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

shifts in the contests for projects on cooperation with Poles abroad. In 2012, the promotion of Poland and its culture was part of the broader priority called “Communication, culture, promotion, mobilisation,” which encompassed both the preservation of contacts with Poland and the activation of Poles abroad.⁵² Separately, engagement in the protection of Polish heritage abroad was identified as both a diaspora-building exercise and a tool of increasing its status in host countries.⁵³ In 2013, the “mobilisation of Poles to activity in all areas in the host country for the promotion of Poland” was the second priority.⁵⁴ A further goal was to stimulate the involvement of Poles abroad in the promotion of business cooperation between the host country and Poland.⁵⁵ In 2014 and 2015, the promotion of Poland was again put in the broader context of supporting, strengthening and activating the Polish diaspora.⁵⁶ The same set of priorities can be found in the newest strategy on diaspora policy, for the years 2015 to 2020.⁵⁷ These developments show that, even though the diaspora is seen in terms of strategic goals when it comes to the promotion of Poland, the focus is on the core activities, namely assuring the diaspora’s relations with their homeland.

Stimulate Return or Immigration?

It will prove particularly detrimental for Poland if most of the post-accession migrants do not come back. The demographic outlook is already poor, especially due to the fact that most post-accession migrants were themselves relatively young. Although it is difficult to measure post-accession returns, initial findings suggest that its scale is small and that many returnees face problems with reintegration.⁵⁸ Although Polish policy stimulating returns seems reasonable, it must be remembered that the state has very limited instruments to effect a returns policy. Information campaigns can facilitate the process, but the previous experience of all CEE countries shows that these were not decisive factors and had a very limited effect on the scale of returns.⁵⁹ This is true of the biggest Polish campaign of that kind, from 2008, called “Have you got a PPlan to return?” The main goal was to facilitate returns, not to aggressively promote them, so the focus was on providing information and tax breaks.⁶⁰ The policy was further constrained by its conviction that emigrants ought to receive assistance but should not be offered preferential treatment in comparison to the resident Polish population.⁶¹ It acknowledged that returns are mostly dependent on the general development of Poland, on the changes in the balance of push and pull factors.⁶²

Since the prospect that many Polish post-accession migrants will decide to return to Poland seems to be rather bleak, the Polish authorities have to consider other options for coping with the increasing demographic crisis. Attracting more immigration either from third countries or from other EU Member States is considered essential in that context.⁶³ This way, under the free

⁵² “Plan współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą w 2012 r.,” MSZ, 2012.

⁵³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁴ “Plan współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą w 2013 r.,” MSZ, 2013.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ “Plan współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą w 2014 r.,” MSZ, 2013; “Plan współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą w 2015 r.,” MSZ, 2014.

⁵⁷ *Rządowy program współpracy z polską diasporą w latach 2015–2020, op. cit. Polityka migracyjna Polski..., op. cit.*

⁵⁸ M. Duszczyk, K. Matuszczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 48–50.

⁶⁰ K. Borys et al., *Kierunek + 48 Powroty do domu. Kompendium wiedzy dla osób pomagającym reemigrantom*, Stowarzyszenie Wspólnota Polska, Warszawa, 2013.

⁶¹ *Polityka migracyjna Polski..., op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁶² *Rządowy program współpracy z polską diasporą w latach 2015–2020, op.cit.*

⁶³ *Polityka migracyjna Polski..., op. cit.*

movement rules, Poland is inevitably becoming more and more inclined to change its migration policy in order to attract both third country nationals and citizens from other EU Member States and to induce them to settle more or less permanently in order to fill various types of demographic and labour market gaps.

The Polish authorities perceive migration as a broad issue with both external and domestic aspects. Due to recent migration patterns, Poland's official migration policy has to address questions that have to do with the situation of Polish citizens and ethnic Poles residing abroad, and must at the same time address problems caused by the recent migratory outflow, and the demographic crisis developing in the country, by designing and implementing a more active immigration policy. Indeed, it was in response to post-2004 developments that the Polish authorities and the expert community decided to pay more attention to a broad spectrum of migration-related questions, and embarked on the development of a new national policy on immigration.⁶⁴

This process has resulted in the adoption of several official documents describing official goals and instruments to be used in the practical implementation of the new and more active migration policy. On 31 July 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted the document *Polityka migracyjna Polski—stan obecny i postulowane działania* [Migration Policy of Poland—the current state of play and further actions].⁶⁵ Its aim is to formulate and define the directions of action and systemic solutions and recommendations for public administration in the field of migration. On 12 December 2013, a new law on foreigners was adopted, which, among other things, regulates the status of foreign citizens in the country.⁶⁶ Non-EU/EFTA/EEA nationals interested in settling in Poland can benefit from this new law, which removes several restrictions and barriers and eases procedures for those applying for residence and employment permits. The two documents provide a formal framework for national policy on migration and foreign nationals from non-EU/EFTA and EEA countries, while the broader European regulations provide the legal and political frameworks that govern the situation of EU and EEA citizens in the country.

However, the changing geopolitical and demographic circumstances may force the Polish authorities to take more concrete and active steps in the field of migration. Poland has to respond to EU calls for solidarity and burden-sharing in the context of the grave migration crisis developing in Southern Europe, and must at the same time address some domestic problems caused by emigration and the demographic crisis in the country. Although Poland remains a net emigration country, its status seems to be changing, and the transformation process into an emigration-immigration country is (slowly but steadily) becoming noticeable.⁶⁷

Poland is a country in which migration policy is conceptualised and implemented centrally, but a lot of administrative and management functions have already been delegated to voivodships, local governments and local communities. Polish migration policy has so far been carried out almost exclusively by various administrative bodies in cooperation with the expert community and some NGOs, eschewing open, public debate. However, the need to respond to the migration crisis in Southern Europe, to agree on refugee quotas, and to prepare for a possible inflow of forced migrants from war and crisis-torn Ukraine, have put the question of

⁶⁴ For an interesting study on the shape of the Polish migration policy to be developed in response to these new migratory trends see K. Pędzwiatr, A. Siewierska-Chmaj, R. Matyja, *Polska polityka migracyjna – w poszukiwaniu nowego modelu*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa, 2015.

⁶⁵ The text of the document is available at <http://bip.msw.gov.pl/download/4/13763/PMPprzyjetaprzezRadeMinistrow31lipca20122.pdf>.

⁶⁶ The text of the law is available at <https://emn.gov.pl/download/74/12047/ustawaocudzoziemcach.pdf>.

⁶⁷ M. Lesińska, "Poland: On the Way towards Becoming a Country of Immigration," in: A. Eröss, D. Karácsonyi (eds), *Discovering Migration between Visegrad Countries and Eastern Partners*, HAS RCAES Geographical Institute, Budapest, 2014, pp. 88–110.

migration and the integration of migrants⁶⁸ high on the political and public agenda. The Polish authorities and Polish public opinion will have to respond to these new migration challenges in a comprehensive and innovative manner, but it is also important to learn from the experience of others in this complex field.

Since Poland has already embarked on a more active policy of attracting new migrants, and the question of inviting or attracting migrants from non-European countries has already become a hot topic in Polish public debate, it would be instructive for the government to learn more about how other countries that have gone through a similar process dealt with these challenges. As the GoodGov project aims to make the Norwegian governance experience known to Polish decision and policy-makers, because Norway has an interesting and relatively recent history of becoming an immigration country, and due to the fact that Polish migrants were by 2007 the largest such group in Norway, the next part of the report will examine the main challenges in Norway's overall migration governance, the factors that may impact on the situation of the Polish diaspora in Norway, what Poland, as the most important sending country but with ambitions to become a receiving country, can learn from the Norwegian experience, and how the two countries, Norway and Poland, can work together to make the EU regulations and frameworks address their migration related concerns.

Norway as a Receiving Country: The Broader Context

Over the last 40 years, Norwegian society has undergone a huge transition, from being relatively homogenous in ethnic terms to becoming multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. The opening up of the Norwegian labour market to migrants from new EU Member States in 2004 also opened a new chapter in Norway's relations with the outside world, and had a huge impact on the ethnic composition of Norwegian society. According to a recent assessment, 1.2 million people—or 23.2% of the entire population in Norway—have a direct family link abroad, if we include those who either themselves were born abroad or have at least one parent or grandparent who was born abroad. The volume and geography of migration to Norway have changed over the last decade. While in 2003 most migrants arrived from Sweden, Russia, Somalia, Denmark and Afghanistan, ten years later the majority of them came from Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Somalia and Eritrea. In 2003, just under 27,000 foreign nationals moved to Norway. In 2012 the figure was 70,000,⁶⁹ and in 2013 it reached more than 75,000.⁷⁰ Those migratory movements reaching Norway have resulted in greater ethnic diversity in Norwegian society, as shown in the table below.

⁶⁸ For an interesting voice in the debate on the integration of migrants see K. Pędziwiatr, *Imigranci w Polsce i wyzwania integracyjne*, Studia BAS No. 4 (40), 2015, pp. 135–153.

⁶⁹ L. Østby, *The Population with an Immigrant Background in 13 Municipalities in Norway*, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo, 2015, p. 7.

⁷⁰ "Innvandrere og norskfødte med innvandrereforeldre, 1. januar 2014," Statistisk sentralbyrå, www.ssb.no/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef/aar/2014-04-24?fane=tabell&sort=nummer&tabell=202757.

Table 1. Origins of migrants in Norway


Migrant population	Number	Share of total population in %	Share of migrant population in %
Total (migrants and children of migrants)	759,185	14.9	
From EU/EEA, U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand	331,590	6.5	43.62
From Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania (without Australia and New Zealand) and non EU/EEA Europe	427,595	8.4	56.8
Nordic countries	75,315	1.5	10.07
Western Europe, minus Nordic	72,309	1.4	9.40
EU countries in Eastern Europe	171,406	3.4	22.82
Non EU countries in Eastern Europe	65,160	1.3	8.72
Africa	97,152	1.9	12.75
Asia, including Turkey	242,699	4.8	32.21
North-America	10,438	0.2	1.34
South and Central America	22,656	0.4	2.68
Oceania	2,050	0	0.2

Source: SSB data, as of 1 January 2014.

If we are to better understand the challenges in migration governance faced by Norway, it is important to identify the reasons for people to move to the country. According to latest available data, 49,881 migrants moved to Norway in 2014. Of these, 43% (21,367) went for work, 32.5% (16,212) moved to reunite with their families, and 14% and 10% came as refugees (6,999) and students (5,019), respectively. Some interesting short, mid, and long-term trends are discernible. In general, 2014 was a year in which immigration to Norway for all categories of migrants was lower than in the previous year—by 9.2% for those who moved for to work, by 7.1% for those joining with their families, by 5.1% for refugees, and by 14.26% for students. Yet the situation looks quite different from a medium-term perspective: between 2004—the year of big bang EU enlargement—and 2014, the number of migrants to Norway increased by 134.8%, and this increase was driven mostly by labour migrants, up by a breathtaking 425.9%. The increase was much smaller in other categories—75.4% for family reunifications, 37.7% for political refugees and by 82% for students.

In the long-term perspective, between 1990 and 2014, the registered number of people who moved to Norway was 688,229. Of these, 33.3% moved for work, 36.3% to reunite with their families, 19.1% to seek protection as refugees, 10.4% to study, and 0.5% for other reasons.⁷¹

⁷¹ All data based on: "Immigrants by reason for immigration, 1 January 2015," Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvgrunn/aar/2015-06-18#content.

Figure 2. Why people move to Norway

Source: Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvgrunn/aar/2015-06-18#content.

Any country receiving migration has to cope with a number of political, economic, social and other challenges. In order to address them it is important to put in place an efficient governance framework, and design and implement proper policies. A detailed presentation of the Norwegian institutional and legal framework regulating migration was provided in a GoodGov report published in 2014.⁷² The present report focuses on more specific questions having to do with the fact that migration governance structures of a receiving country need to address issues of dual character. All migration movements create a connection between a sending and a receiving country, and those questions belong therefore at least partly to the realm of foreign policy. But migration movements also create a number of domestic challenges in both the sending and the receiving country.

Over the last five years, diaspora-related questions have topped the Norwegian policy agenda. Anders Breivik's terrorist attack on 22 July 2011 was driven mostly by hatred of migrants and of the migration policy conducted by the previous government and the Labour Party, whose young elite was targeted. The results of parliamentary elections in 2013 gave a new boost to the debate on Norwegian migration policy, as one of the parties forming the new government, the Progress Party, has always had migration-related questions very high on its political agenda, and has taken a highly politicised approach to the issue. The so-called Norwegian Syria warriors, young people going to Syria to join the Islamic State, have put the role of ethnic and religious diasporas in Norway on the country's security agenda, as witnessed by the newly-released risk assessments presented by Police Security Service (PST). This document defines the growth of religious fundamentalism in diaspora groups in Norway and elsewhere as one of the key security challenges.⁷³ The ongoing discussion on the wisdom of allowing 8,000 Syrian refugees to settle in Norway over the next three years is related to the diaspora question, as their potential arrival is presented as posing not only an economic challenge, but also a security and societal one.

⁷² J.M. Godzimirski, K. Kasianiuk (eds), *Polish and Norwegian Governance: Closing the Gaps*, PISM Report, July 2014, http://goodgov.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17889.

⁷³ *Åpen Trusselvurdering 2015*, Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, www.pst.no/media/74351/PSTs_tv2015-2.pdf.

The late U.S. academic Milton J. Esman listed nine diaspora-related issues that may cause tensions in relations between the sending and receiving countries. These are:

1. Maintenance of transnational existence by some members of diaspora groups.
2. Diasporas' attempts to influence policies in their countries of origin.
3. Diasporas' attempts to influence their new host countries' policies, or policies of international organisations to act in favour or in opposition to the interests of the current government of their home countries.
4. Home governments' attempts to use their diasporas to support their strategic or economic goals.
5. Diasporas may seek protection from their home governments.
6. A host government may call on a resident diaspora to support its strategic or economic goals.
7. Diasporas may contribute to the development of their former homeland.
8. The home government may request the host government to restrain hostile actions by members of the diaspora.
9. Diasporas may be involved in various transnational illegal activities, such as terrorism or organised crime.

Source: M.J. Esman, *Diasporas in the Contemporary World*, Polity, Malden, M.A., 2009.

The Norwegian Military Intelligence Service, in addition to underlining the importance of Islamic fundamentalism as a security factor, has also paid special attention to Russia's actions in Ukraine and the challenge posed to the international security environment in Europe and around Norway. This also had a strong diasporic component,⁷⁴ as Russia justified its actions in Ukraine by the wish to provide protection and support to ethnic Russians living there. In 2014 and 2015, the PST registered increased Russian spying activity,⁷⁵ aimed also at the Russian diaspora in the country, and there were even some reports of Russia's security services trying to recruit members of this diaspora to work against the Norwegian state.⁷⁶

In this broader context, the situation of the Polish diaspora in Norway may seem to be unproblematic, but the sheer number of Poles who moved to Norway after 2004 may pose a challenge to Norwegian migration governance, cause some tensions in Norwegian-Polish relations, and indirectly contribute to changing the European framework regulating mobility and free movement, or the form of Norway's affiliation with the EU.

The Polish Diaspora from the Perspective of Norway as a Receiving Country

Two regional frameworks have defined Norwegian migration policy in recent decades. The first, the narrowest and oldest, is the Nordic framework.⁷⁷ The second, also playing a major part in making Norway available to Polish labour migrants, is the European, or more properly the EU framework regulating labour mobility and migration, to which Norway adheres because it signed the EEA agreement in 1992. Migration-related issues are regulated by various parts of the EEA agreement, and a detailed analysis of how Norwegian policy in the field of labour mobility and migration is influenced by this framework can be found in the Norwegian official *White Book on Norway's Relations with Europe*, published in 2012.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ *Fokus*, 2015, <http://forsvaret.no/ForsvaretDocuments/FOKUS2015-endelig.pdf>, see pp. 9–12.

⁷⁵ "PST advarer mot russiske spioner," NRK, www.nrk.no/norge/pst-advarer-mot-russiske-spioner-1.11703111.

⁷⁶ "Russisk etterretning prøvde å verve moldvarpar inn i PST," NRK, www.nrk.no/norge/russisk-etterretning-provde-a-verve-moldvarpar-inn-i-pst-1.12367698.

⁷⁷ To learn more about the origins of this cooperation see: P.A. Fischer, T. Straubhaar, *Migration and Economic Integration in the Nordic Common Labour Market: Anniversary Issue: 40 Years of the Nordic Common Labour Market*, Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen, 1996.

⁷⁸ MFA Norway, "Utenfor og innenfor: Norges avtaler med EU," Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning, Oslo, 2012, especially pp. 427–477, dealing with labour market regulations, and pp. 686–722, dealing with migration and border control.

The Polish Diaspora in Norway and Norwegian-Polish Relations

Over the last decade—between 2004 and 2015—the Polish diaspora in Norway has grown more than tenfold, from 6,536 people of Polish origin registered in Norway in 2003, to more than 90,000 in 2015. By 2007, immigrants from Poland made up the largest immigrant group in Norway. Such a dynamic development was caused primarily by the opening up of the Norwegian labour market to Polish citizens after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. This does not, however, mean that Polish migration to Norway is a new social phenomenon, or indeed that labour migration has always been the main reason for Poles to move to Norway.⁷⁹ In a broader historical perspective, Poles moved to Norway for several reasons—to seek protection from political persecution, to work, to marry, to reunite with family and to study. In the recent history of Polish-Norwegian relations, there have been at least three large waves of migration from Poland to Norway, accompanied by a steady inflow of individual Polish migrants to Norway. The first sizeable group of Poles to settle permanently in Norway consisted of those who had been sent to Norway as forced labour by the Nazi regime during the Second World War and decided—mostly for political reasons—not to return to Communist Poland in 1945. This was followed by a relatively slow and small inflow of Poles to Norway during the period between 1945 and 1980, when the second great wave of Polish political migration to Norway began. The crushing of Solidarity by the introduction of martial law in Poland in December 1981 resulted in a relatively significant inflow of Polish refugees to Norway. In the same period, during the 1980s, thousands of Poles went regularly to Norway to earn a living.

Some of those temporary labour migrants decided to settle permanently by using existing legal loopholes in the Norwegian migration system—or by applying for asylum that was, until 1989, granted to almost all Polish citizens wishing to stay in Norway. Others opted for so-called circular migration, working for some time in Norway, and moving for longer periods back to Poland.

After the Norwegian authorities introduced new, less restrictive rules for labour immigration through the so-called specialist scheme on 1 January 2002, many Poles also used this opportunity to move. But it was first and foremost the opening up of the Norwegian labour market to EEA citizens in 2004 that changed this picture, by triggering the third wave of Polish migration to Norway. In the post-2004 period, the Polish community in Norway has grown exponentially, as the table below illustrates.⁸⁰

Table 2. Number of immigrants from Poland registered officially in Norway

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Male	2,249	2,311	3,285	5,521	10,890	20,856	28,941	32,513	36,883	44,322	50,658	55,136
Female	42,87	4,486	4,811	5,417	6,857	9,780	13,530	16,796	19,995	23,017	26,004	28,868
Total	6,536	6,797	8,096	10,938	17,747	30,636	42,471	49,309	56,878	67,339	76,662	84,004

Source: SSB data from Statistikkbanken Tabell 05184: “Innvandrere, etter kjønn og landbakgrunn.”

⁷⁹ To learn more about factors making people move from Poland to Norway from a broader historical perspective see for instance J.M. Godzimirski, *Tackling Welfare Gaps: The East European Transition and New Patterns of Migration to Norway*, NUPI, Oslo, 2005. For a brief study of recent trends in the Polish-Norwegian context see: J.M. Godzimirski, “Hva får folk til å flytte på seg? Noen bemerkninger om polsk migrasjon til Norge,” in: *Polska emigracja polityczna stanu wojennego 1981 do Norwegii*, Archiwum Państwowe–Maihaugen, Milanówek–Lillehammer, 2011.

⁸⁰ To learn more about how the pattern of Polish migration has changed see J. Napierała, “Polscy wikingowie w Norwegii,” *Biuletyn Migracyjny*, no. 11, 2007, pp. 7–8, and J.H. Friberg, “The Stages of Migration: From Going Abroad to Settling Down: Post-Accession Polish Migrant Workers in Norway,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 38, no. 10, 2012, pp. 1589–1605. In addition, E. Jaźwinska-Motyłska, M. Okólski (eds), *Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu*, Scholar, Warszawa, 2001, provides interesting insights on new forms of migration in the Polish and European context.

In 2011, a group of Norwegian researchers conducted a study on the impact of ethnic diasporas on Norwegian foreign policy.⁸¹ One of the case studies presented in this report—and elaborated further in a separate article—was the possible impact of the emergence of the Polish diaspora in Norway on relations between Norway and Poland.⁸² This study drew several conclusions, looking at the issue in three temporal perspectives and reading it within the framework for the study on the link between diasporas and international relations proposed by Esman (see text box above). One conclusion challenged the assumption that the Polish diaspora in Norway has adopted a rather passive approach to both their host country and to their homeland. This is primarily due to the fact that its presence is not regulated by any bilateral agreement but by a broader European regulation that controls most of the potentially contentious issues. Contrary to the previous wave of mostly political migrants coming from Poland in the 1980s, who had a political agenda and opposed the Communist and oppressive regime, those who went to Norway after 2004 have mostly an economic agenda and engage in neither Norwegian nor Polish politics, showing in addition a very low level of self-organisation. As they went to Norway in a period of economic boom and shortage of labour, they managed to find their place in this booming economy and played a mostly positive part, helping Norway deal with some structural economic problems. Although the 2008 crisis caused the Norwegian economy to slow down, and many Poles in Norway working in the most exposed and vulnerable sectors of the Norwegian economy were hit hard, the crisis turned out to be short-lived and the upturn has continued, providing new opportunities to those who went to Norway before the crisis and the tens of thousands of those who followed after 2009.

This relatively smooth adaptation of the majority of Poles to new Norwegian realities, and the mostly positive perception of this group by the majority of Norwegians, means that the Polish diaspora in Norway could be described as an “unproblematic community.” There are indeed certain issues, such as the over-representation of Poles in Norwegian crime statistics and in Norwegian prisons, which taint this mostly positive image, but this group should be—for the time being—considered rather an important bridge between Poland and Norway, and not a problematic issue. This also has much to do with the compatibility of the political and social systems in Poland and Norway, and the relative cultural similarities and close cooperation between the two countries, which view each other as important allies and work closely both bilaterally and in various multilateral forums. The fact that Poland and Norway are close allies in NATO, with many shared concerns and following similar policies, means that Polish and Norwegian strategic foreign policy interests overlap rather than collide. This means that there is no need for the Polish authorities to use the diaspora in Norway as an instrument of foreign policy, and so the probability that the loyalty of Polish citizens living in Norway will be put to the test is very low.

Poles in Norway: Key Features and Possible Economic, Social and Political Challenges

In his recent study, published in January 2015 and based on data provided by Statistics Norway, Lars Østby analysed the situation of various diasporic groups currently living in Norway.⁸³ As Poles have been the most important element of Norway’s changing diasporic landscape since 2007, it is not surprising that a large part of this study is devoted to the situation of Polish migrants. Data presented by Østby are from 2013, as is his assessment of the numerical strength of Polish migration. By that time Poles were by far the largest group of migrants in Norway—77,000 of 593,000 migrants overall (or 83,000 of the whole migrant population, if children in Norway of

⁸¹ J.M. Godzimirski, I.B. Neumann, S. Alghasi, *Norges nye vi: Diasporaer som faktor i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Rapport til Utenriksdepartementet*, NUPI, 2011.

⁸² J.M. Godzimirski, “Polsk diaspora og norsk utenrikspolitikk,” *Internasjonal Politikk*, vol. 69, no. 4, 2011, pp. 617–643.

⁸³ L. Østby, *The Population with an Immigrant Background...*, *op. cit.*

parents born in Poland are counted). In other words, Poles living in Norway in 2013 accounted for approximately 11.7% of the whole migrant population, and almost 1.7% of the population of the entire country. According to data presented by Østby,⁸⁴ 67.7% of Poles migrated to Norway to work, 25.2% for family reasons, 1.2% as refugees, and 1% in order to study in Norway. Some, 4.6%, did not give any specific reason for their migration.

Due to the huge recent inflow to Norway, Poles are very visible in the migratory landscape. As of 1 January 2013, 40% of Poles had been living in Norway for less than two years, 39% for between three and five years, 13% for between six and ten years, and only 6% for eleven or more years.

On account of the specific gender and age structure of Polish migration, and the strong over-representation of relatively young male migrants (they form almost 66% of the whole migrant population originating from Poland, and almost 52% of all migrants are between 20 and 49 years old), the relatively new arrival of this group, and the fact that work is the main reason for Poles to move to Norway, this is a category of migrant community to which relatively few children are born in Norway, although the last few years have seen a large number of births among Poles living there. Between 2010 and 2013, 3,420 births were registered in this group of migrants, and the birth rate (births/per 1,000 members of the group) was much higher (51 compared to 37) than the average for the whole country; indeed, it was the highest among migrants in Norway from Europe and the broadly understood West, with the exception of Lithuania (73 births/1,000). Due to the specific age structure of Polish migration to Norway, deaths are relatively rare in this group (approximately 100 per year, or 4/1,000, compared with 25/1,000 for the whole country).

Table 3. Age structure of Polish migrants in Norway, 2013, in %

0–19 years	19,42
20–29 years	17,38
30–39 years	34,37
40–49 years	18,55
50–66 years	10,12
67 and more	0,17

Source: SSB Norway, Statistikkbanken.


Citizenship and Naturalisation

In 2013, more than 80% of Poles living in Norway had been in the country for less than six years. This short period of permanent settlement in Norway is a probable factor in explaining their low rates of naturalisation. In his study on the growth of the Polish diaspora in Norway, Godzimirski presented data on how the naturalisation of Polish citizens has evolved over recent decades, and what consequences this had for their formal state affiliation.⁸⁵ In the period between 1977 and 2004, 4,557 Polish citizens became naturalised in Norway, while during the recent post-EU enlargement period, between 2005 and 2013, only 854 Poles applied for and received Norwegian citizenship. In 2003, 75.7% of people of Polish origin living in Norway were Norwegian citizens, but in the following years the share of those with Norwegian citizenship fell constantly, to 53.8% in 2005, 15.5% in 2008, less than 10% in 2010, less than seven% in 2013, and to 6.2% in 2014.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

⁸⁵ J.M. Godzimirski, "Polsk diaspora og norsk utenrikspolitikk," *op. cit.*, pp. 617–643.

⁸⁶ Author's calculation based on www.ssb.no/192399/innvandrere-og-norskfodte-med-innvandrerforeldre-utenlandsfodte-og-utenlandske-statsborgere-etter-landbakgrunn-fodeland-og-statsborgerskap.1.januar-sa-92.

Figure 3. Naturalisation of Polish citizens in Norway (people per year)

Source: Statistics Norway.

Political Participation in Norway and Poland

Participation in the political life of the sending and receiving country is another key factor to be taken into consideration when the situation of an ethnic diaspora is analysed. Poles can participate in political life in Norway by voting in local and parliamentary elections. According to Norwegian law, those who have been registered as living permanently in Norway for more than three years can vote in local and municipal elections, while only those with Norwegian citizenship have the right to vote in parliamentary elections. Here the question of naturalisation is of importance, as only those members of this diaspora who have Norwegian citizenship can take part in national, parliamentary elections in the country.

Although the number of former Polish citizens who can vote in parliamentary elections increased by 68%, from 3,000 in 1997 to 5,027 in 2013,⁸⁷ the Polish diaspora in Norway does not have much political clout in Norwegian national politics. This is mostly due to three factors: their relatively short period of permanent settlement in Norway; the fact that few of those who have lived in Norway for more than seven years (the usual residence criterion for applicants for Norwegian citizenship) had chosen to become citizens of Norway; and, last but not least, the low level of participation in elections among this group. During the 2013 parliamentary elections, only 9,363 Poles aged over 17 had lived in Norway for more than seven years, and just 44% of these individuals were Norwegian citizens.⁸⁸ This may mean that the level of interest in influencing Norwegian politics is not very high among former Polish citizens living in Norway, which is not surprising, bearing in mind the low interest in political participation amongst the Polish diaspora

⁸⁷ K.S. Wiggen, V. Aalandslid, *Valgdeltakelsen blant personer med innvandrerbakgrunn ved stortingsvalget 2013*, SSB, Oslo, 2014, p. 11.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

in general. (This low interest was illustrated in 2010, during the presidential elections in Poland: of the nearly 47,000 Polish citizens who were registered in Norway on 1 January 2010, only 11%—or 5,023—registered to vote in the first round, and only 84% of those registered actually took part.)

This can be explained by the fact that recent Polish migrants to Norway have first and foremost an economic and not a political agenda. That said, the Polish presidential elections in 2015 suggest a shift of behaviour. In the first round, 9,444 Polish voters—slightly more than 10% of all Poles registered in Norway—registered to take part. Of these, 7,782 cast valid votes and 51% supported a protest candidate, former Polish rock star Paweł Kukiz, while only 15 gave their support to the incumbent president Bronisław Komorowski, who won election in 2010 (and who was the overwhelmingly favourite among Polish voters in Norway at that time). Andrzej Duda, representing the main opposition party, won 16%. In the second round more Poles registered to vote in Norway (12,209—still only slightly more than 13% of Poles living in Norway at the time), but only 54% of those who registered actually voted. Of those, 57% supported Duda, and 43% backed Komorowski.⁸⁹

Identity Issues

Although most of the Poles moving to Norway share the values of the majority of the population in the country, the question of identity may pose some challenges. In 2015, IMDI—the Norwegian Directorate of Integration and Diversity—conducted a survey that was to map attitudes of various migrant groups toward selected social and political questions, and to compare these attitudes with the attitudes of the population in general.⁹⁰ This study provides some interesting clues as to how the attitudes of Poles who have decided to settle in Norway differ from the attitudes of the population in general. Two questions are of particular interest, showing the differences in attitudes that may have an impact on Poles' integration in Norway and their relations with the Norwegian state, and the deepest differences in attitudes between Poles and the general population.

A key issue when moving to another country is what affiliation you feel for your country of origin—and to your new place of residence. The IMDI survey asked this question, and found that Poles seem to be the migrant group that feels least affiliated with Norway. While 78% of the general population felt a “very strong” affiliation with Norway, only 21% of Poles shared this view (although a further 52% did say that their affiliation with Norway was “strong”). Poles were the migrant group reporting the lowest score in the category “very strong affiliation with Norway” (compared to 45% of Danes, 42% of Swedes, 33% of Bosnians, 36% of Chileans, 37% of Thais, 28% of Sri Lankans, 55% of Pakistanis, 39% of Iraqis and 28% of Somalis). Taking “very strong” and “strong” affiliation together, Poles (73%) scored lower than all other groups of migrants except Somalis (72%).⁹¹ This might be explained by reference to Poles' relatively short period of stay in Norway. However, it is striking that Poles' affiliation with their country of origin grows stronger, the longer they stay in Norway. This was a unique factor among the whole surveyed sample of migrants.⁹²

The two tables below map the areas of difference in attitudes between Poles on the one hand and the general population in Norway on the other. The tables are extracted from the recent IMDI study (and for the purpose of clarity contain only the major points of difference between Poles and the general population). The tables show that Poles have lower trust in a number of

⁸⁹ Data on the first round of the election among Poles in Norway available at http://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/320_Zagranica/63 and for the second round at http://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/326_Wyniki_zagranica/63.

⁹⁰ *Integreringsbarometeret 2013/2014. Innvandring og integrering – holdninger og erfaringer blant personer med innvandrebakgrunn*, IMDI Integrerings- og mangfoldsdirektoratet, Oslo, 2015.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

⁹² *Ibidem*, p. 42.

important social and political institutions such as schools, the child protection service (Barnevernet), nurseries, parliament (Stortinget) and the country's legal system (the courts) than do Norwegians. At the same time, they place greater value on private institutions such as family life and personal freedom. This highlights the possibility of tension between Norwegian society in general and Polish migrants, over the role of the state in certain fields.

Table 4. Trust in institutions

Institution	Population in general	Poles	Gap between population in general and Poles
Welfare and social services (NAV)	36	43	-7
Media	29	32	-3
Police	76	70	6
Politicians	40	24	16
Health care system	71	54	17
School	78	60	18
Child protection service (Barnevernet)	46	28	18
Nursery	80	58	22
Parliament (Stortinget)	71	45	26
Courts	83	51	32

Source: IMDI, *Integreringsbarometeret 2013/2014*, p. 50.

Table 5. Perception of various values

Value	Population in general	Poles	Gap between Poles and population in general
Economic and social equality	50	67	-17
Family	64	80	-16
Personal freedom	71	86	-15
Rule of law	87	87	0
Protection of children's rights	89	87	2
Gender equality	75	71	4
Freedom of religion	59	54	5
Freedom of expression	83	75	8
Democracy	88	77	11
Respect for homosexuals	63	24	39

Source: IMDI, *Integreringsbarometeret 2013/2014*, p. 50.

The Barnevernet and the Polish Community

Due to the recent inflow of various groups of migrants to Norway, there have been several noticeable cases involving immigrant families in Norway and the child protection service (Barnevernet).⁹³ Some of them have had huge international repercussions, and a negative influence on Norway's relations with countries such as India,⁹⁴ Russia⁹⁵ and Lithuania.⁹⁶ The huge inflow of Polish labour migrants was followed by a wave of families that joined them when they decided to settle more permanently in Norway. Almost 20% of Poles living in Norway are aged 19 or under, and this group falls under the purview of the Barnevernet, the institution responsible for child welfare in Norway, and which is viewed by many Poles there—and even by the Polish policy-making community in Warsaw—as a problematic institution. According to (probably incomplete) statistics provided by the Polish embassy in Oslo, several dozens of Polish families per year have contact with the Barnevernet. Many of these families are traumatised by this experience and contact the Polish authorities asking for help, especially when their children are taken away and sent to foster families or institutions.

The Polish authorities that are responsible for the situation of millions of Poles who have emigrated to other EU/EEA countries express deep concern for the actions of the Barnevernet regarding Polish families in Norway, stating that in “in no other country with a large Polish community is the situation with respect to the operations of the national child welfare institutions as problematic as in Norway.”⁹⁷ The Barnevernet interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations are viewed as especially problematic and damaging to the overall positive climate in bilateral relations. The most controversial cases involving the Barnevernet and Polish children in Norway are also often presented in the Polish media, creating a more negative picture of Norway in Poland. Even worse, Polish families in Norway fear the Barnevernet and avoid contact with this institution, even in situations when it could help them solve real problems.⁹⁸ Such a situation can deal a heavy blow to Polish-Norwegian relations, and has already had a negative impact on the level of trust between the Polish community in Norway and Norwegian state institutions. This emerging problematic relationship between the Barnevernet and the Polish community in Norway is indeed more recent, and has been caused mostly by the dynamic growth of the Polish community in Norway on the

⁹³ Here is some information on one of the latest cases: B. Lygre, *De ble mistenkt for å mishandle sitt eget barn. Men lille Martin var bare syk*, BA, 23 January 2015, www.ba.no/De_ble_mistenkt_for___mishandle_sitt eget_barn___Men_lille_Martin_var_bare_syk-5-8-7159.html. The most publicised was, however, the case involving the kidnapping of a Polish child from a foster home by the Polish private detective Krzysztof Rutkowski in 2012. More on this and other international cases in the special programme *Brennpunkt: Barsediplomatiet*, shown on Norwegian TV and available at <http://tv.nrk.no/serie/brennpunkt/MDUP11000714/08-04-2014>.

⁹⁴ For a good overview of the India case see: “India-saka,” NRK, www.nrk.no/emne/india-saka-1.8013189.

⁹⁵ To learn how the Russian media approach this issue see: “Vlasti Norvegii vernuli shestiletnyuyu devochku rossiyskoy seme,” *Lenta.ru*, 1 November 2014, <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/11/01/back>; “Astakhov rasskazal ob izyatii rebenka u rossiyskoy semi v Norvegii,” *Lenta.ru*, 1 November 2014, <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/11/01/baby>; or A. Petrov, “Raspłata za vyrvanny zub: v Norvegii u grazhdan Rossii vlasti zabrali rebenka,” *Vesti.ru*, 16 October 2014, www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2051233. For the Norwegian popular discussion of the issue see: R. Gustad, “Han mener norsk barnevern kidnapper russiske barn for å holde opp folketallet,” *Nordlys*, 30 December 2014, www.nordlys.no/Han_mener_norsk_barnevern_kidnapper_russiske_barn_for___holde_opp_folketallet___-5-34-56610.html.

⁹⁶ See for instance J. Storø, “Norsk barnevern er i ferd med å bli ‘verdensberømt,’” *Aftenposten*, 8 June 2015, www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/Norsk-barnevern-er-i-ferd-med-a-bli-verdensberomt-8046130.html.

⁹⁷ GoodGov interview with representative of the Polish MFA, 19 February 2015.

⁹⁸ S.W. Pedersen, M. Frafjord, “Polske familier er redde for barnevernet,” NRK, 20 November 2014, www.nrk.no/rogaland/polske-familier-er-redde-for-barnevernet-1.12055410. See also M. Bivand Erdal, “Tillit til staten,” *Dagbladet*, 19 December 2012, www.dagbladet.no/2012/12/19/kultur/debatt/barnevern/innvandreretillit/24902105.

one hand and Barnevernet's problems with adapting to new social realities in Norway and Europe on the other.⁹⁹

However, in order to address this issue it is important to understand the scope of the problem. In 2011, the SSB published a report on the Barnevernet, focusing on the relationship between this institution and several of the country's migration communities.¹⁰⁰ The report was a follow up of a 2006 report covering the same topic,¹⁰¹ and both of them provide some historical data on the Barnevernet's work with minority groups. Polish children do not figure high on the lists of migrant children with contacts with the Barnevernet. Among the children with a migration background, Polish children are listed in 11th place, and constitute only around 2% of all such cases. They are even further down on the list of children born in Norway to foreign parents. The situation in 2009 should be described as even more positive, according to the rate of Barnevernet interventions per 1,000 children and young people from birth to the age of 22 with backgrounds from specific countries. These figures show Polish children to have the fewest contacts with the Barnevernet (only 17/1,000), compared with, for instance, the 163 children with Afghan backgrounds, who top the list, or the 91 with Russian backgrounds. In fact, there were only two countries from the list of the 20 with the biggest diasporas in Norway that were below Poland. These were Sweden (16 children per thousand) and Lithuania (14 per 1000). The situation was similar for Polish children born in Norway, but whose parents had both been born in Poland. They were also near the bottom of the list of 20 countries, with 19 Barnevernet interventions per 1000 children and young people from birth to the age of 22, with only Germany having a lower rate (14/1,000).

It is therefore possible that the increased focus in the public debate in both Norway and Poland on the relationship between the Polish community in Norway and the Barnevernet has more to do with the growing number of Poles in Norway and more general trends in the Barnevernet's activity, than with the latter's special targeting of Polish families. In 2003 there were only 1,008 children from birth to 17 years old living in Norway, whose parents had both been born in Poland,¹⁰² and only a small number of Polish children were born in Norway. In 2010 there were already 7,292 children in Norway who had been born in Poland, and 2,556 children born to Polish parents there. They were the biggest group in the category of migrant children in Norway, although in the category of children born in Norway with two foreign parents, Pakistanis were still the biggest group (10,466). This massive inflow, first of labour migrants from Poland, and then their families, has indeed resulted in the increase of contacts between this community and Norwegian state institutions working in the field of migration, including the Barnevernet. It is important for both parties to understand that questions related to child welfare are very sensitive at both micro and macro level. Insensitive handling of such issues may cause serious and unnecessary damage to relations between Norwegian state institutions and the Polish community in Norway, and also between Norway and Poland. A few highly publicised cases have already had a negative impact on the image of Norway in Poland. This should motivate both the Norwegian and the Polish authorities to make an effort to avoid further deterioration of otherwise good bilateral Polish-Norwegian relations. This case is also a very good illustration of the need to address issues related to migration governance, not only as a part of a domestic or foreign policy spectrum, but in a more comprehensive manner, as an issue rooted in both of those policy realms at the same time. The fact that decisions taken by Barnevernet officials in Stavanger could have such a devastating effect

⁹⁹ See for instance interview with the head of Barnevernet Mona Thormodsrud, www.nrk.no/fordypning/barnevernet-vil-ha-utenrikshjelp-1.11653141.

¹⁰⁰ T. Kalve, T. Dyrhaug, *Barn og unge med innvandrerbakgrunn i barnevernet 2009*, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo, 2011, http://ssb.no/emner/03/03/rapp_201139/rapp_201139.pdf.

¹⁰¹ L.M. Allertsen, T. Kalve, *Innvandrerbarn i barnevernet 2004*, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo, 2006, www.ssb.no/emner/03/03/rapp_200619/rapp_200619.pdf.

¹⁰² M.T. Dzamarija, T. Kalve, *Barn og unge med innvandrerbakgrunn*, SSB Notater 2004/31.

on relations between Norway and its strategic partners, which was the reality with the so-called India case in 2012, should be treated as a wake-up call by those who have the responsibility for both Norwegian foreign policy and for the situation of children in Norway.

The relationship between the Barnevernet and various ethnic communities in Norway has been studied both before and since the arrival of the last wave of migrants from Poland. In 2007, the NIBR (the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research) published a long study on how to improve the relationship between the Barnevernet and migrant communities in Norway. However, the Polish community in Norway is not mentioned in the study at all, while the issue of how to overcome cultural challenges in relations between some other minority groups and the Barnevernet was discussed in more detail.¹⁰³ In 2013, a master's student at the University of Stavanger wrote a thesis about the relationship between the Barnevernet and ethnic minorities in Norway.¹⁰⁴ The main conclusion of this study, as presented by the Norwegian media, was that there is a growing distrust between ethnic minorities in Norway and the Barnevernet, the main reason for which is the feeling of disempowerment on the part of migrants, a lack of information and communication between them and the Barnevernet, and finally a lack of understanding of the importance of the cultural context on the part of the Barnevernet.¹⁰⁵ In reaction to many of the highly publicised cases, and in response to calls from several expert milieus and NGOs working on migration and human rights,¹⁰⁶ the Norwegian authorities decided on 28 November 2014 to set up a special expert committee to examine how to improve the work of the Barnevernet, including its relations with migrant communities, which will be led by Professor Trude Haugli.¹⁰⁷ In July 2015, the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion also decided to examine the role of the Norwegian foreign service in cases involving children.¹⁰⁸ It should be expected that these measures will help the Norwegian authorities address tensions in relations between the Barnevernet and migrant communities in Norway, and that this issue might therefore become less contentious in relations between the growing Polish community in Norway and the Norwegian authorities.

Economic Factors

Poles working in Norway are employed in those sectors of the Norwegian economy (such as manufacturing and construction) that are the most exposed and vulnerable to any economic turbulence. This means that their economic situation—although much better than in the home country—is worse than that of the population in general, not to mention than that of labour migrants coming from the old EU countries, such as Germany, France or the UK.

According to one recently-published study, families of labour migrants from Poland have an income that is lower than that of the general population even after many years of living and working in Norway. The study also identified a clear connection between the economic situation of the country and the level of income in Polish families. Prior to the 2008 crisis, the average

¹⁰³ J. Holm-Hansen, T. Haaland, T. Myrvold, *Flerkulturelt barnevern. En kunnskapsoversikt*, NIBR-rapport 2007:10, www.nibr.no/filer/2007-10.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ A. Handulle, *Du vet de tenker jeg bare er en stor afrikansk mann, ikke pappa*, Universitet i Stavanger, Stavanger, 2013, <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/185061>.

¹⁰⁵ See O. Stokke, "Innvandrere frykter barnevernet," *Aftenposten*, 28 December 2013, www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Innvandrere-frykter-barnevernet-7410451.html.

¹⁰⁶ See for instance E.C. Salvesen et al., "Bekymringsmelding om barnevernet," *Aftenposten*, 10 June 2015, www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Bekymringsmelding-om-barnevernet-8049787.html.

¹⁰⁷ Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, *The Child Welfare Act Committee*, Oslo, www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/lovutvalg-nedsatt/id2342528.

¹⁰⁸ More on this is available at www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/utenriksstasjoners-rolle-i-barnevernssaker/id2426504.

income reached the level of 90% of the median income, but dropped to 87% in 2009 and 2010, to return to 90% in 2012. This lower level of family income may also be connected with the lower proportion of families with two incomes among labour migrants from Poland than among those from Western Europe. In addition, many Polish labour migrants have problems finding work in Norway—the number of unemployed Poles registered in Norway grew from 272 in the fourth quarter of 2004 to almost 5,000 in the fourth quarter of 2014.¹⁰⁹ By the end of 2014, the level of unemployment among Poles living in Norway was almost three times higher than amongst the general population.

Table 6. Unemployment among Poles in Norway and in the general population

Year	Rate of Unemployment among Poles in Norway (population between 15 and 74 years old) in %	Number of unemployed Poles registered by the end of the year	Rate of Unemployment in general population (between 15 and 74 years old), average per year, in %	Number of unemployed in general population, average per year	Share of Poles among unemployed in general population in %
2004	5.5	272	3.5	91,595	0.30
2005	4.2	265	3	83,515	0.32
2006	2.6	261	2.1	62,949	0.41
2007	1.5	296	2.1	46,104	0.64
2008	4.2	1,224	2.3	42,554	2.88
2009	9.3	3,114	2.9	69,305	4.49
2010	10.2	4,031	2.9	74,688	5.40
2011	6.6	3,101	2.4	69,413	4.47
2012	6.2	3,344	2.3	65,712	5.09
2013	7.4	4,497	2.5	69,739	6.45
2014	7.4	4,983	2.6	71,007	7.02

Source: Statistics Norway.

This bodes ill for the future. In April 2015, the general unemployment rate in Norway rose abruptly, and for the first time since 2006 it reached 4.2% of the labour force.¹¹⁰ This is widely interpreted as a strong signal of an economic downturn. Given their vulnerability to economic trends, it should be therefore expected that this will have a very negative impact on the situation of thousands of Polish labour migrants who have decided to settle permanently in Norway.

With good economic prospects in Norway, one could expect those Poles who went to Norway after 2004 to integrate easily with Norwegian society; many of them might also apply for Norwegian citizenship and renounce Polish citizenship, which will weaken their formal ties to Poland and provide the Polish authorities with less incentives and opportunities to “meddle” in questions related to the Polish-Norwegian diaspora. However, if the economic situation in Norway does indeed deteriorate, one should expect that some Polish labour migrants will return to Poland, especially if the economic situation in Poland improves. More problematically, many Poles who, after some years of working in Norway have acquired some welfare rights, may instead choose to stay in Norway. This, combined with the general worsening of the situation on the Norwegian labour market, may revive the Norwegian debate on welfare shopping, and in more general terms

¹⁰⁹ Data from Statistikkbanken, table 07117, “Registrerte arbeidsledige 15-74 år, etter landbakgrunn og kjønn. Absolutte tall og i prosent av arbeidsstyrken.”

¹¹⁰ S. Bjørnstad, Ø.K. Langberg, “Ledigheten over 4 prosent for første gang på ni år,” *Aftenposten*, 30 April 2015, www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/Ledigheten-over-4-prosent-for-forste-gang-pa-ni-ar-8001536.html.

increase the level of tension between the Polish minority and the Norwegian majority competing for a smaller “job cake.” The question of the strain that the new wave of labour migration may put on the Norwegian welfare system has already been addressed in the public debate in connection with the publication of the so-called Brochmann report, studying this issue in detail.¹¹¹

This will allow Norwegian populists to play the Polish labour card, which may in turn compel some Norwegian policymakers to try to limit the rights of labour migrants, thus straining relations between Norway and Poland. This could also force Brussels to intervene in Norway to defend the rights of labour migrants, thus reviving the debate on the country’s affiliation with the EU. Although the voices calling for Norway’s withdrawal from the EEA agreement are rarely heard,¹¹² the issue is nevertheless contentious. Any revision of the EEA treaty that limits the rights of labour migrants—or heralds the withdrawal of Norway from the EEA—would have a huge impact on the situation of Polish migrants in Norway. This would provide a huge incentive for the Polish diaspora in Norway to mobilise and organise.

¹¹¹ G. Brochmann, *Velferd og migrasjon. Den norske modellens framtid*, Velferds- og migrasjonsutvalget, Oslo, 2011.

¹¹² For two good examples see “Brygger opp til EØS-strid,” ABC Nyheter, www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/2014/09/14/ny-nei-til-eu-leder-vil-fa-eos-strid-i-fanget, and L. Molteberg Glomnes, K. Tjernshaugen, “Jeg vil gjerne at Norge skal melde seg ut av EØS,” *Aftenposten*, 2 May 2014, www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/~Jeg-vil-gjerne-at-Norge-skal-melde-seg-ut-av-EOS-7552206.html.

Conclusions

For Poles and Poland, freedom of movement is not just a cornerstone of the EU but also a logical choice for individuals who cherish freedom of choice. Such enthusiasm for freedom of choice is reflected in the sociological profile of Polish migrants in Norway, and their attachment to private rather than public institutions. Nevertheless, as a sending country Poland is also one of those EU Member States most acutely aware of the possible drawbacks of the free movement system. Poland risks demographic decline and the loss of young and skilled workers. This ambivalence forces Poland to see free movement in a holistic way, as both an opportunity and a challenge.

Poland therefore has a heavy stake in European measures to improve the workings of this regime, but without introducing new restrictions. Due to the sheer complexity of patterns of short-term mobility and long-term migration under the EU's free movement rules, an improved framework would allow European citizens to realise a range of different life strategies, and to do so in a way that helps all players involved to draw the maximum benefits from migration. To help create this system, the Polish authorities will finally have to face up to the fact that migration processes cannot be stopped and instead to engage in ensuring that citizens have the right skills and information to take full advantage of available opportunities.

In order to accrue benefits from both long-term migration and circular mobility, Poland might promote a number of policies, for instance, reducing the administrative barriers to commuting and providing true portability of social benefits, improving the integration of Poles in their new host countries in such a way that maintains links to their country of origin, improving cooperation between Poland and key receiving countries, including on the local level, mobilising Poles via cultural channels (for example, public diplomacy), and undertaking actions that reduce the pressure that leads to large migratory outflows. Public debate across Western Europe will sharpen the situation, and will compel Polish authorities to support the Polish diaspora whilst encouraging them to return to Poland.

But Poland's economic and demographic needs will not be met by the return of its citizens alone. It will also have to prepare for growing competition for skilled labour. Poland will have to make itself more attractive to both EU and non-EU nationals by simplifying procedures on work and residence permits. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the recent economic crisis across much of the EU, combined with military and political conflict along Poland's eastern borders, may actually provide an opportunity for Poland to make itself more attractive as a target country not only to migrants from developing countries, but also to those from Europe's south and east. This could and should trigger Polish debate on a more active immigration policy as a means of dealing with possible labour shortages and demographic tensions caused by recent migratory and demographic trends in the country.

Moreover, thanks to its own national experience, Poland is well placed to learn how to avoid various migration-related pitfalls, for instance by improving policy on the integration of various groups of migrants settling in the country. Poland could also profit from knowledge and governance know-how from countries such as Norway, which has undergone a similar transition to become a country of immigration. As for Norway itself, it is facing the prospect of a relative economic slowdown that may have some consequences for the situation of labour migrants working in the most exposed sectors of the Norwegian economy. It will therefore need to deepen bilateral cooperation on migration questions with key sending countries, including Poland.

Norway also faces the question of how best to integrate Poles who wish to maintain links to their country of origin. One issue here is language instruction for Poles who decide to settle permanently in Norway. Norwegian language instruction would have a positive impact on their situation on the Norwegian labour market by helping them adapt to new and changing economic

and social conditions in a country that may, in the years to come, experience some economic turmoil. Related to this is the provision of Polish language instruction for the thousands of Polish pupils in the Norwegian school system. This would help them to maintain their Polish roots and family relationships. Here there is room for cooperation between Polish and Norwegian authorities, and for the use of modern technology to address this question.

The GoodGov Delphi study on Poles in Norway¹¹³ shows that cooperation between sending and receiving countries must go beyond administrative cooperation on migration-related issues such as the fight against irregular employment. Identity issues are at play in the calls for Oslo to lower the barriers for acquiring Norwegian citizenship, so that there is no need for Poles to renounce Polish citizenship in the process. This would require a change in the Norwegian law, which does not currently allow dual citizenship and is viewed by many as very conservative and ill-suited to cross-border mobility. Such a solution should include, for instance, all citizens of countries from the EEA, and would thus have consequences not only for Poles living in Norway but also for citizens of other EEA countries.

This move towards negotiated win-win solutions aimed at reducing the costs of migration for sending countries and enhancing the welfare gains for receiving countries would help Europe move away from unilateral migration policies. This more holistic approach could allow the EU to create a system of migration governance in which migration and mobility are no longer perceived as a zero-sum game, but as a solution in which all major stakeholders win. This “triple-win” concept is one of the hotly-debated topics in the current debate on migration policy. Its proponents claim that it is possible to design and implement migration programmes that are mutually beneficial for migrants, as well as sending and destination countries. At present, however, its critics are still able to argue that this expectation does not match practical realities.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ See: M. Stormowska, “EU Mobile Citizens or Migrants? Assessing the Polish Diaspora in Norway,” *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 10 (112), May 2015.

¹¹⁴ To learn more about the “triple-win” concept see S. Angenendt, *Triple-Win Migration—Challenges and Opportunities*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Robert Bosch Stiftung, Washington, 2014, and S. Angenendt, J. Bither, A. Ziebarth, *Creating a Triple-win through Labor Migration Policy? Lessons from Germany*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, 2015.

The **Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)** is rated among the 20 most influential government-affiliated think tanks worldwide. It promotes the flow of ideas that inform and enhance the foreign policy of Poland. PISM provides independent analysis and advice to all branches of government, contributes to wider debates on international relations and houses one of the best specialist libraries in Central Europe.



The **Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN)** was founded in September 1990 as an entirely new institution within the structure of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Its activities constitute a response to the challenge to study post-communist societies from a comparative perspective. ISP PAN carries out research in sociology, history, geopolitics and political theory, linking both empirical and theoretical study of societies.



The **Norwegian Institute of International Relations (NUPI)** has more than 50 years of experience and is Norway's leading independent centre for research and information on international political and economic issues. It undertakes long-term basic research as well as short-term applied research and advisory services. NUPI has been ranked among the top international think tanks in several recent rankings.

Project GoodGov—“National and European Governance: Polish and Norwegian Cooperation Towards More Efficient Security, Energy and Migration Policies”—is a Polish–Norwegian research project conducted by PISM in cooperation with NUPI and ISP PAN.

This report completes the fourth stage of the migration project. Three earlier publications on this topic examined the governance of the free movement of EU citizens in the context of the politicisation of migration, the perception of the Polish diaspora in Norway and the EU's management of its eastern borders.

The research leading to these results has received funding from the Polish–Norwegian Research Programme operated by the National Centre for Research and Development under the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009–2014 in the framework of Project Contract No Pol-Nor/202499/39/2013.

