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Haiti:
A Political Economy Analysis

Wenche Iren Hauge

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Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

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About the report

In June 2016, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) commissioned NUPI to provide political economy analyses of eleven countries (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, South Sudan and Tanzania) deemed important to Norwegian development cooperation. The intention was to consolidate and enhance expertise on these countries, so as to improve the quality of the MFA's future country-specific involvement and strategy development. Such political economy analyses focus on how political and economic power is constituted, exercised and contested.

Comprehensive Terms of Reference (ToR) were developed to serve as a general template for all eleven country analyses. The country-specific ToR and scope of these analyses were further determined in meetings between the MFA, the Norwegian embassies, NUPI and the individual researchers responsible for the country studies. NUPI has also provided administrative support and quality assurance of the overall process. In some cases, NUPI has commissioned partner institutions to write the political economy analyses.

List of acronyms

AAA:	Haiti in Action
ADHEBA:	Democratic Action to Build Haiti
ASEC:	Communal Section Assembly
BIMs:	Brigades of Motorized Intervention
BLTS:	Brigades of Fight against Drug Trafficking
CARICOM:	Caribbean Community
CASEC:	Communal Section Council
CEEI:	Independent Electoral Evaluation Commission
CEP:	Provisional Electoral Council
CEPR:	Centre for Economic and Policy Research
CID:	Inter-departmental Council
CIEVE:	Independent Commission for the Evaluation and Verification of Elections
CIMO:	Units of Intervention and Maintenance of Order
CNG:	National Governing Council
CNSA:	National Coordination Agency for Food Security
CSDDH:	South Coordination of Human Rights
CSI:	South Coast Initiative
CSPJ:	Superior Council of Judicial Power
DCPJ:	Central Leadership of the Judicial Police
DDS:	Director of South Department
EDH:	Haiti Electricity Company
ESCANP:	Effort and Solidarity to Build a National and Popular Alternative
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FL:	The Famni Lavalas Party
GREH:	The Grand Rally for the Evolution of Haiti
HRF:	Haiti Reconstruction Fund
HRW:	Human Rights Watch
HSE:	The Haiti Sustainable Energy Programme

HTG:	Haitian gourde(s) (currency unit)
IBESR:	Institute of Social Welfare and Research
IOM:	International Organization for Migration
IRI:	International Republican Institute
KONAKOM:	The National Congress of Democratic Movements
MANDR:	Ministry of Agriculture
MCFDF:	Ministry of Women's Conditions and Women's Rights
MICIVIH:	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MINUJUSTH:	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINUSTAH:	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOCHRENA:	The Christian Movement for a New Haiti
MRN:	The Movement for National Reconstruction
MSPP:	Ministry of Public Health and Population
MTPTC:	Ministry for Public Works, Transportation and Communication
NCA:	Norwegian Church Aid
OAS:	Organization of American States
OPC:	Office of Citizen Protection
OPL:	The Organization of People in Struggle
PANPRA:	The Haitian National Revolutionary Party
PHN:	Haitian National Police
PHTK:	Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale
PLB:	The Open the Gate Party
PSDH:	Strategic Development Plan
RDNP:	The Assembly of Progressive National Democrats
RNDDH:	National Network for the Defence of Human Rights
SDPJ:	Departmental Section of the Judicial Police
SGBV:	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SIDS:	Small Island Developing State
UDMOs:	Departmental Units for Maintenance of Order
UNCTAD:	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP:	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMIH:	United Nations Mission in Haiti
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
WFP:	World Food Programme

Preface

This analysis of Haiti's political economy was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author is Wenche Iren Hauge, a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Haitian researcher Dr Rachelle Doucet has provided crucial inputs through fieldwork and interviews in the South of Haiti. The analysis focuses on how the economic elite in Haiti has managed to stay in power through alliances with central security actors in the country and with external actors, and how this pattern has affected the general population. It draws lines back to Haitian independence in 1804 and up until today, identifying the current challenges posed by this pattern.

The study is based on a wide range of sources. In 2017 a series of interviews were conducted with local authorities (mainly mayors), local leaders, and local and international NGOs based in the south of Haiti.[1] In addition, interviews have been conducted with foreign embassies in Haiti, development workers, international NGOs and researchers.[2] For ethical and security reasons, all interviewees have been kept anonymous. Further, the analysis draws on academic research on Haiti, including on the author's own research on local models of conflict prevention[3] together with Haitian researchers Rachelle Doucet and Alain Gilles. A particularly important source has been the 2015 study by Stephen Baranyi (Université de Ottawa) and Yves Sainsiné (Université d'État d'Haiti) of the Haitian National Police, with special focus on the South. Fafo's 2010 youth survey in Haiti has constituted an important source on education. The analysis also draws on official Haitian documents, plans and reports, as well as on statistics, surveys and analyses of multilateral institutions and banks, including analyses and reports from UN agencies, and reports from international NGOs.

1 In total 21 persons from the South were involved. Some participated in focus-group discussions.

2 In total 22 persons were involved from these target groups. Some also participated in focus-group discussions.

3 This research included a survey and fieldwork in several departments *(départements)* of Haiti (Hauge et al., 2015).

1. Introduction

In the course of the last decade, Haiti was hit by a series of natural disasters, with devastating effects. The earthquake in January 2010, which killed more than 220,000 people, attracted global attention. Since then, Haiti has experienced new disasters of considerable severity, not least Hurricane Matthew, which struck the south of the country in October 2016. However, Haiti has been in the eye of the hurricane not only in environmental terms, but also politically and economically. The poor and marginalized majority of the population must fight a continuous struggle for a life in dignity. The focus of this political economy analysis is on alliances between the economic elite and central security actors – alliances that have persisted throughout Haiti's history, and that today represent the greatest challenge to socio-economic development and a functioning and participatory democracy in Haiti.

Haiti is characterized by extreme poverty and inequality. There is a considerable presence of external actors, with international donors, multilateral agencies, international organizations and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (now replaced by United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)). It may seem as if Haiti is deemed to experience eternal vicious circles of poverty, environmental degradation, natural disasters, rural–urban migration, expansion of urban shantytowns and political instability. Most of these problems are interrelated and have historical roots. In addition, international actors have also helped to establish fertile ground for the current situation in Haiti. As regards this political economy analysis, it has been essential to investigate the historical roots of alliances between the economic elite and central security actors in Haiti in order to establish the background to today's socio-economic cleavages and political fault lines. The analysis therefore begins by drawing the historical line of political development in Haiti back to the moment of independence. The focus then shifts to current challenges, with the continued legacy of economic elite domination, extreme inequality and socio-economic exclusion and marginalization. This is also discussed through the lenses of changing patterns of political participation. Finally, the report analyses the consequences of the chronic lack of statebuilding and public services in Haiti, evident in key sectors like energy, food security, health and education, and in uncontrolled organized crime, not least child trafficking. Throughout, the role of international actors is integrated in the analysis.

2. Powerful actors and conflict fault lines in Haiti

Today's situation of powerful actors with economic elite alliances on the one hand, and a marginalized poor majority of the population on the other, has its roots in the Haitian past. This pattern has partly been established and reinforced through the influence of external actors. Haiti declared its independence from France in 1804. However, for several decades the country remained an international non-entity, as neither France nor any other European countries, and not even Haiti's own Caribbean neighbours, recognized the sovereignty of the young republic. Despite this, several countries competed for advantageous trade relationships with Haiti (Maguire et al., 1996). Partly in response to these external conditions, a symbiotic relationship developed between the two most powerful groups in Haiti: the military, and the merchant elites. The military, largely of African ancestry, competed for political power, whereas the merchant elite, generally of mixed French-African background, controlled commerce. The vast majority of the general populace was excluded from power.

The poor majority of the country remained permanently without power and influence up to the elections in 1990, when Jean Bertrand Aristide came to power as a representative of the Lavalas *(avalanche,* or 'cleansing flood'*)* movement. When President Aristide, only eight months later, was ousted from power in a military coup, it was the historically created symbiotic relationship between the army and the economic elite, which struck back at him.

Not until 1938 did France recognize Haiti's sovereignty and this literally at a price (D'Ans, 1987; Paskett & Philoctete, 1990). As reparations for seizing French assets during the war for independence, massive transfers of cash from the Haitian treasury to France followed. This happened even though by 1938 Haiti had already transferred more than 30 million francs to Paris. Haiti was thus doomed to become a long-term international debtor from the very beginning of its existence. Towards the end of the 19th century the United States became Haiti's most important trading partner. US merchants squeezed out most foreign competitors. With its invasion of Haiti in 1915 the USA achieved unchallenged dominance over its Caribbean neighbour (Maguire et al., 1996). During its occupation of Haiti, from 1915 to 1934, the USA disbanded what remained of Haiti's old revolutionary army and established a new armed force. The new force was established to fight those who resisted the US presence in Haiti and to ensure effective occupation of the countryside. Roads were built, as were bridges and telecommunication systems necessary for effective occupation. The United States changed the symbiotic balance between the military and the merchant elites in Haiti by electing members of the commercial elite to sit in the National Palace. Then, when the US troops left Haiti in 1934, the Haitian Armed Forces (FAdH) rapidly reinserted themselves into politics. By 1950 the Haitian Armed Forces had consolidated their power, and Paul Magloire assumed the presidency in a military coup that year.

In 1957 François Duvalier ('Papa Doc') succeeded Magloire as President of Haiti. Duvalier again turned the traditional symbiotic relationship between the military and the merchant elite in Haiti upside down by bringing a new political elite to power, the Duvalerists. He also created his own armed militia, the Tonton Macoutes, to offset the power traditionally held by the army

(Laguerre, 1994). This paramilitary organization gained control through a reign of terror. A period of violent attacks on the country's commercial and political elites followed, resulting in streams of refugees to the USA, Canada and France. The repression of traditional US allies in Haiti by Duvalier created problems in Washington. However, Duvalier enjoyed continued US support, particularly because of his role in containing communism in the area and his criticism of Cuba's Fidel Castro (Maguire et al., 1996).

When François Duvalier died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier ('Baby Doc') succeeded him as president. With Jean-Claude Duvalier, power relations changed again. He re-established the traditional relationship between the state and Haiti's old elites. He also promised an economic revolution that would bring modernity and improve the life of the people (Trouillot, 1990). During the 1970s this brought considerable international economic support to Haiti. Still, the country remained the poorest in the Western Hemisphere, and wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few.

Through the work of the clergy, lay leaders and local NGOs, Haiti's poor began organizing themselves into community self-help groups and peasant organizations in the 1980s (Maguire et al., 1996). These groups were also inspired by the visit to Haiti by Pope John Paul II in 1983, during which he stated that 'things must change'. At the same time, Jean Claude Duvalier lost support from the old Duvalerists, against whom he had pitted his own technocrats in a battle for control of the state. By late 1985 Jean-Claude was losing his grasp on power. In February 1986 he left the country, and the provisional National Governing Council (CNG) took over.

The activity of grassroots organizations now became almost explosive, with calls for justice and the removal of the Tonton Macoutes system. Technical and professional associations responded similarly. Radio stations broadcasting in Creole played an important role. Despite popular efforts to uproot all remains of Duvalerism, most of the dictator's lieutenants remained in Haiti, in the army or in other state institutions. The CNG was mandated to lead the country to elections. A new constitution, written by civilians, was approved in a popular referendum in March 1987 (Maguire et al., 1996). However, even though CNG leader Henry Namphy had pledged to support the constitutionally mandated electoral process, there was electoral sabotage in 1987. This led to strikes, demonstrations and social unrest. By 1989 it became clear that the CNG would not be able to lead the country to free and fair elections. Under increasing social unrest in Haiti and mounting pressure, General Prosper Avril, who was the provisional President of Haiti from September 1988 to March 1990, resigned (Laguerre, 1993), leaving the power in the hands of a provisional government headed by Supreme Court Judge Ertha Pascal Trouillot.

Under Trouillot's government, elections were held on 16 December 1990 and were internationally recognized as free and fair. Jean Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest, representing the Lavalas movement, won the elections (Perusse, 1995). When Aristide became President of Haiti in January 1991, the large majority of Haiti's poor were behind him. The Lavalas movement was a broad coalition of individuals and organizations, encompassing peasants, rural organizations, political representatives (spanning from Marxists to Christian Democrats), church groups, students, and some businessmen (Hauge, 2003). Although some segments of the bourgeoisie supported Aristide, the great majority of his supporters were the poor. He had strong support among the peasants who had lost their livelihood basis as a result of economic liberalization during the 1980s. During this decade, and particularly after Jean Claude Duvalier left the country in 1986, economic liberalization policies were carried out in Haiti. As a result of trade liberalization and import of heavily subsidized rice from the USA, large groups of small-scale farmers in Haiti's main rice-cultivation area, Artibonite, gave up farming and migrated to Port-au-Prince in search of work. Most of them settled in the slum areas of Port-au-Prince. (This is described in further detail in the chapter on food security.) The economic policies of the 1980s resulted in increased poverty and marginaliza-

tion, further cementing the historical fault lines in the country. With the slums of Port-au-Prince overflowing with rural migrants, Aristide had an important support base there.

Aristide was inaugurated as president on 7 February 1991, but only eight months later, on 30 September 1991, he was deposed by a military coup. It was Aristide's reform of the military which became the most important trigger of the coup. His efforts to reform the army resulted in accusations of interference in military affairs. Aristide dismissed most of the army high command and replaced them with junior officers more inclined towards democratic reform (Perusse, 1995, p.16). He also began separating the army and the police along the lines of the Constitution of 1987 (Farmer, 1994, p. 169). In addition, he dissolved the institution of rural section chiefs in Haiti, which had been the pivotal representative of state power in village Haiti. Above all, it was Aristide's creation of a 50-man presidential guard, trained by the Swiss, which frightened the military, particularly non-commissioned officers, who accused him of trying to set up his own army (Perusse, 1995, p. 16). In his autobiography Aristide later pointed to the importance of the military reform as a trigger of the coup (Aristide, 1993, pp.158–159). In his speeches Aristide often challenged the morality of the economic elite, and made clear what he expected of them: 'The bourgeoisie should have been able to understand that its own interest demanded some concessions. We had recreated 1789. Did they want, by their passive resistance, to push the hungry to demand more radical measures? *'Pep la wonfle jodi-a li kapab gwonde demen'* ['the people who are snoring today may roar tomorrow']!' (Aristide, 1993, p. 139). There have been allegations and indications that some businessmen helped to finance the coup, but no clear evidence has been put forward (Ridgeway, 1994). In this coup, key Haitian militaries were the most active, but there was a clear connection between the military and the economic elite in Haiti striking back on Aristide and his efforts.

Haiti's difficult relationship with the Dominican Republic also played a role in the coup. The Dominican Republic has harboured several of the disgraced Duvalerists and military officers from Haiti (Fauntroy, 1994, p. 37). Relations between the two states worsened further when Aristide criticized the Dominican Republic for its treatment of Haitian sugarcane workers in July 1991. This resulted in the abrupt repatriation of thousands of Haitian and Dominican-Haitian agricultural workers to Haiti in July. UN agencies and NGOs assisted with emergency and resettlement programmes, but the strain on the Haitian economy was enormous. A senior Aristide official has referred to this as the time 'when the coup really began' (Maguire et al., 1996, p. 27). The coup was led by Major Michel François, chief of the Haitian police, and Raoul Cédras, commander-in-chief of the Haitian army. According to Aristide, bands of Macoutes, coming from the Dominican Republic, assisted Cédras and François during the coup on 30 September 1991 (Aristide, 1993, p. 157).

Aristide fled to Venezuela, and then in October he moved to Washington, DC (Aristide, 1993). The coup was condemned by the UN, the OAS and the USA. Already on 2 October there was an emergency meeting in the OAS, on sending a mission to Haiti. A long process began, involving the OAS, the UN and the USA and lasting until October 1994, before Aristide was reinstalled as the President of Haiti. The boxed text shows the most important events up to October 1994.

Throughout the process, Aristide had strong support in the US African-American community and in the Congressional Black Caucus. From 12 April to 9 May 1994, Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica and an internationally respected figure in the African-American community, carried out a well-publicized hunger strike as protest against US policies towards Haiti. This, together with the arrest of six US Congressmen, five of them from the Congressional Black Caucus, who had chained themselves to the White House fence in protest, resulted in growing pressures on the US administration to change its Haiti policies (Maguire et al., 1996). Meanwhile, the UN revised its thinking on Haiti,

The Road to Aristide's Return to Haiti

3 February 1992: The Washington Agreement, setting out the conditions for Aristide's return, is signed by provisional Prime Minister of Haiti René Theodore and Jean Bertrand Aristide.

4 May 1992: US President George W. Bush orders the direct repatriation of Haitian refugees headed for the United States, provoking outrage in human rights organizations, among Members of Congress and the Haitian diaspora. His successor, Bill Clinton, later continues the policy.

February 1993: The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) is established by the OAS and the UN, to ensure respect for human rights in Haiti.

June 1993: The UN Security Council imposes a worldwide fuels and arms embargo against Haiti.

11 October 1993: The US Navy tank landing ship *Harlan County,* carrying approx. 200 US troops on a non-combat mission to prepare the return of Aristide, is prevented from docking by Haitian Army-backed toughs.

15 October 1993: The UN orders the evacuation of all personnel, including MICIVIH and humanitarian agencies, from Haiti.

30 October 1993: The Governor's Island Agreement is signed, containing a ten-point accord for the return of Aristide.

23 March 1994: A nearly full-page advertisement addressed to President Clinton appears in the *New York Times.* Signed by 95 prominent US liberals, it denounces Clinton's policies towards Haiti, especially as a reaction to his refugee policies.

6 May 1994: The UN Security Council approves a comprehensive embargo against Haiti, effective as of 21 May, barring the entry of all goods except food, medicine and cooking oil.

31 July 1994: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 940 approving a US plan to raise a multilateral force to use 'all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military dictatorship'. (Malone, 1998, p.109).

9 September 1994: US-led forces land unopposed at the international airport of Port-au-Prince.

15 October 1994: Aristide returns to Haiti.

Sources: Malone, 1998; Perusse, 1995.

and international dissatisfaction with existing strategies increased.

Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October 1994. One of the first things he did was to dissolve the Haitian Army. From that point, throughout the 1990s and onwards, it is possible to identify a pattern where the economic elite in Haiti made efforts to regain its position, finally resulting in the ouster of Aristide in 2004. The economic elite and ex-militaries cooperated on this, as can be seen from the events of 2004 (see below). The economic elite in Haiti enjoyed considerable economic and political support from the Republican Party in the United States, mainly through the International Republican Institute (IRI). The only strong political support for Aristide in the United States came from the Congressional Black Caucus. Although Aristide had lost several years of his presidential period in exile, he was under pressure, particularly from the USA, to hold elections in 1995, This he did; and René Préval from the Lavalas Party won the presidential elections in December 1995.

In November 2000, Aristide was elected president for a second non-consecutive term. After Aristide assumed power in 2000, the Bush Administration effectively blocked more than USD 500 million in loans and aid to Haiti (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2004). This included a loan package of USD 146 million

from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) intended for healthcare, education, transportation and potable water. Following intense pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus, the Caribbean nations and solidarity groups worldwide, the G.W. Bush administration finally signed an agreement brokered by the OAS, to release the funds in September 2002. However, the Haitian government was asked to pay USD 66 million in arrears – incurred primarily by Haiti's US-supported dictatorships and military juntas – before receiving the loans in the autumn 2003. In contrast, throughout the bloody Duvalier regimes and previous military juntas, aid had flowed freely to Haiti.

During this period, Aristide lost support among some of his own supporters – one reason being that he was not able to deliver the economic development that the population expected. Towards the end of Aristide's second presidency, criticisms grew stronger, in particular from the Convergence Démocratique and the Group of 184[4] (Jadotte and Pierre, 2008). The former was established during the summer 2000 as a Haitian political movement in opposition to Jean Bertrand Aristide and the Famni Lavalas party. The International Republican Institute (IRI) strongly supported the Convergence Démocratique; indeed, some critics hold that the Convergence Démocratique had been crafted by the IRI (Dupuy, 2005, p. 190). When Aristide was re-inaugurated as president in February 2001, leading figures from the Convergence Démocratique openly called for a US invasion of Haiti, to oust Aristide and rebuild the disbanded Haitian Army (Hallward, 2007). As this did not happen; representatives from the same group later declared to the *Washington Post* that 'the CIA should train and equip Haitian officers exiled in neighboring Dominican Republic so they could stage a comeback themselves' (Cody, 2001).

As had been the case during President Aristide's exile 1991–1994, the US Congressional Black Caucus actively supported him also during the period 2001–2004. On 26 February 2004 the Black Caucus had an emergency meeting with President Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell. During the meeting, the representatives of the Black Caucus requested the president to lead an international effort to keep the peace and to preserve the government of Haiti's first democratically elected president: Jean Bertrand Aristide. However, they were disappointed. In a press release on 1 March 2004, Black Caucus member and US Congresswoman Maxine Waters stated:

> I have visited Haiti three times since the first of the year and was able to provide first hand information about what was going on in that country. I explained that the so-called opposition was a conglomeration of former supporters of the dictatorial Duvalier regime. Andre Apaid, an American citizen in charge of the group of 184 started this coup three weeks ago. Guy Philippe, who was exiled to the Dominican Republic after he tried to stage a coup in 2002 was leading a band of exiled military criminals, thugs and murderers- some convicted in absentia for killings they committed in ousting Aristide from office when he was first elected. These were the people pursuing a coup d'etat to return Haiti to the corrupt dictatorial rule of the past…… We pointed out that the obstacle to a peaceful solution was not Aristide. I was in Haiti when Aristide signed off on a peace proposal worked out by CARICOM (the Caribbean Community) and others in the international community. It was the opposition that rejected the proposal and refused to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. (Waters, 2004)

At that time, also Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry castigated President Bush's Haiti policy, stating that Bush 'essentially empowered the anti-Aristide insurgents by calling for both sides to reach a power-sharing agreement' (Miller, 2004). The situation was particularly critical in Artibonite, where, *inter alia,* former police officer, Guy Philippe, who has been accused not only of extrajudicial killings by Human Rights Watch, but also of drug traffick-

4 The Group of 184, established in 2002, consisted of organizations and associations in opposition to Aristide (Jadotte and Pierre, 2008)

ing and money laundering, was one of the key organizers of an uprising against Aristide (Clavel and Dudley, 2016). Philippe later featured on the most-wanted list of the Miami Division of the US Drug Enforcement Administration. In 2004 Aristide was finally ousted, and was flown out of Haiti in a US plane to the Central African Republic. Shortly after, he was granted asylum in South Africa.

When the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) arrived in the country in June 2004, deployment took place in a context where it was seen as being part of the conflict and not neutral – by many Aristide supporters, and more generally by many of the poor and marginalized in the slum areas of Port-au-Prince. The literature on Aristide's second period in office (2000–2004) is rich, and his ouster is much disputed (see Deibert, 2017; Fatton, 2014b; Lehmann, 2007; Nicolas, 2005). However, it is clear that the economic elite in Haiti received considerable support from the United States and that there was little international protest against the interim government that took over after Aristide, although it contained ex-militaries and criminals. Likewise, there have been lukewarm reactions to the exclusion of the Famni Lavalas Party and some other political parties in later elections.

The next chapter examines the economic elite in Haiti and its support by external actors. as background for understanding the current political and economic situation. Also the role of MINUSTAH will be analysed within the framework of existing fault lines in the country.

3. Economic elite and security actors

Consolidation of the Economic Elite's Position in Haiti

Today, the economic elite in Haiti has firmly consolidated its power and a new Haitian Army has been established. The situation is indeed reminiscent of the historical power symbiosis between the economic elite and the army, with little or almost no influence on the marginalized majority population. The first general elections after Aristide left the country took place in 2006, and were won by René Préval. Towards the end of his presidency, the earthquake in January 2010 came to mark the beginning of a new era: one deeply marked by the devastating effects of the earthquake, several new natural disasters and the extremely heavy presence of external actors in Haiti. All these factors influenced the presidential elections in 2010/2011, won by Michel Martelly, and in 2016/2017, won by Jovenel Moïse. Both men were elected in the context of disasters and the cholera outbreak, and with very low voter turnout. Both were also supported by the country's economic elite. However, before going into detail on these elections and the period after 2011, an outline of the role of the economic elite in Haiti and its external support is in order.

For the average Haitian, achieving economic mobility is almost impossible. According to the World Bank:

> Though publicly available information on privately held businesses is limited, many of the same families who dominated the Haitian economy during the era of Duvalier in the 1970s and the 1980s seem to remain in control of large segments of the economy today, resulting in high concentration in a number of key industries, distorted competition, and non-transparent business practices in many instances. Several of the most important food products in the Haitian consumption basket are sold in concentrated markets, and a preliminary analysis indicates that the prices of these products are on average about 30 to 60% higher in Haiti than in other countries from the region. (World Bank, 2015, p. xi)

The reason is the monopoly control over essential foodstuffs exercised by a few extremely rich and powerful families and individuals. Some of the most important figures are Gregory Brandt, Clifford Apaid, Marc-Antoine Acra, Reuven Bigio, Fritz Mevs and Michael Madsen (see boxed text).

The support that the economic elite in Haiti has enjoyed from the United States also before the 1991 coup against Aristide was emphasized by US Congressman Walter Fauntroy in 1989. Fauntroy, a Democrat who chaired a US Congressional Task Force on Haiti, wrote a letter to President Bush in which he identified the most powerful families in Haiti and denounced them and their alliances within the US apparatus. Fauntroy called these families 'economic barons' and argued that they 'constitute the brains and wealth behind the unrest and anti-democratic agitation carried out by thugs at their service' (Fauntroy, 1994, p. 35). Fauntroy singled out five families – the Brandts, the Mevs, the Accra, the Bigios and the Behrmans –as the 'major players in blocking change in Haiti. In the past these families gave financial support to General Henry Namphy[5] (Fauntroy, 1994, p. 36). Of the five, the Brandts and the Mevs are the most

5 Lieutenant General Henry Namphy was Provisional President of Haiti from 19 June 1988 to 18 September 1988 (Laguerre, 1993).

Haiti's Economic Elite – Some key names

Gregory Brandt runs an important part of the soap and oil sector in Haiti and is the president of the French-Haitian Chamber of Commerce.

Clifford Apaid owns AGA, a textile company that runs seven factories and has almost 10 000 Haitians workers. The company serves as a daughter company/sub-contractor for several US textile producers. Haiti's sub-contractor industry currently employs around 30 000 persons; 1/3 of this industry is in the hands of the Apaid family, a finance dynasty of Lebanese background that settled in Port-au-Prince in 1930.

Marc-Antoine Acra, together with his family, runs Acra Industries, producing metal sheeting for the construction sector, paper and plastic packing and plastic tubes for plumbing. They are also Haiti's biggest importers of rice and sugar. Recently the work of Quisqueya, the state-appointed bilateral economic council, began. The objective of the council is to improve relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and to stimulate economic activity, particularly in the border areas. The Haitian delegation is led by Marc-Antoine Acra.

Reuven Bigio has a dominant role within financing. His GB Group is an industry and trade company involved in the steel, telecommunications, bank services, oil industry and the food sector, active in Haiti since the 1980s. The GB Group owns DINASA, the largest importer of goods to Haiti, and also hold majority shares in 16 of Haiti's largest companies. Bigio is Israel's Honorary Consul in Haiti.

Fritz Mevs and the Mevs family are in charge of the production of cooking oils, industrial parks and baseball manufacturing under the WIN Group, one of the Caribbean's largest conglomerate with stakes in diverse industries such as warehousing and storage, port operations and ethanol processing. In the mid-1990s they headed a group for developing a 10 USD million cement plant in Haiti. WIN holdings include SHODECOSA, the largest privately-owned industrial and commercial park in Haiti, Varreaux terminal, the country's largest privately-owned general cargo-shipping terminal, and WINECO, the largest liquid bulk storage facility. Now under construction is the West Indies Free Zone, a 45 USD million, 1.2 million square foot manufacturing park in northern Port-au-Prince, among other enterprises.

Michael Madsen is a brewer of Prestige Beer in Haiti which controlled 98% of the Haitian market. However, it was bought by Heineken in 2011. The transaction was estimated to 10 million USD in annual revenues.

Sources: Arnaud, 2017; Blomberg, 2017; Prøis, 2017; Interviews.

powerful (Ridgeway, 1994). Fauntroy also noted the linkages between Haiti's powerful families and US business interests (Fauntroy, 1994, p. 36):

> […] many of these same families and/or lesser economic actors associated with them dominate the assembly industry subsector. Representative of this group is Jean Edouard Baker and the D'Adesky family. With a few exceptions this sector on which the US relied for modernization deserted that very process in the last eighteen months working hard at apologizing for the Namphy dictator.

Fauntroy also pointed to another aspect of the outreach of these economic elites: not only did they control sizable shares of the Haitian economy, but they also used this control to establish a network throughout the country, which extended to voodoo priests, secret societies and military commanders in the countryside. He cited the example of the network of coffee speculators and military personnel in rural areas, and how their financial control was easily translated into terror. 'Most importantly, this financial network gives access to the Chief of Section, a body

of 555 appointed officials who are the arbiters of the life in the rural sections of Haiti' (Fauntroy, 1994, p. 37). Further, he explained that those five families had Macoutes directly at their service and that a list of Macoute personalities, still active, existed, compiled on the removal of Jean Claude Duvalier from power, and that it should be monitored.

It has been alleged that the two most financially powerful families in Haiti, the Brandts and the Mevs, helped to finance the coup against Aristide in 1991 (Ridgeway, 1994). These allegations have not been proved, but the networks and political involvement of these families clearly indicate that they sought to oust Aristide from power. Constituting the core of the national economic elite, these families had shared interests with the military in maintaining the status quo as regards the economic and political situation in Haiti. This is clearly revealed through their contacts in the United States, who were paid to weaken Aristide's position in the negotiations after the coup. In Washington, one member of the Brandt family, Gregory Brandt, contributed financially to the work of the US lawyer Robert McCandless, who had important contacts in Washington and was a member of Clinton's Business Leadership Council, which raised money for Clinton-Gore. McCandless wrote to President Clinton, giving him advice on Haiti, and also sent a detailed memo to US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, with advice on what to do in Haiti. McCandless represented a group of businessmen headed by Gregory Brandt, and after the 1991 military coup in Haiti, he also represented the military-installed president, Joseph Nerette, and subcontracted public relations work for the coup government to a conservative PR firm, Craig Shirley Associates, in Alexandria, Virginia. McCandless claimed that Aristide was responsible for a reign of terror, 'inciting mob violence and embezzling funds' (Ridgeway, 1994, p. 32). The Mevs family also had their attorney in the Washington, DC, area: Greg Craig. Through Craig, the Mevs family in 1992 established a back channel for handling Haitian matters (Ridgeway, 1994, p. 31).

When Convergence Démocratique was established in 2000, this platform and the Group of 184 became the basis of political work for the economic elite in Haiti. As mentioned, these organizations enjoyed strong economic and political support from the IRI. As for Aristide and Famni Lavalas, their support in the United States was mainly within the Congressional Black Caucus and from parts of the Haitian diaspora. Under President Obama, the Clinton family still had considerable influence over US Haiti policies, with Hillary Clinton as US Secretary of State and Bill Clinton as UN special envoy to Haiti after the earthquake. Aristide himself had been out of the game since 2004, but the Clintons' poorly concealed dislike of Aristide's old supporters and of the Famni Lavalas Party in general became evident during the 2011 elections in Haiti.

In the following outline of the political system and elections in Haiti since 1990, the main emphasis is on the post-earthquake period. This section serves to explain how the economic elite has been able to consolidate its power through elections with extremely low political participation and with strong influence exerted by the United States and some other international actors.

Political Parties and Political Participation

Haiti is a semi-presidential republic, where the president, who is the head of state, is elected by popular vote to serve a five-year term. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and selected from the majority party in the National Assembly (République d'Haiti, 1987). He acts as Head of the Government. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers of his government, subject to ratification by the National Assembly. The bicameral National Assembly of Haiti consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The 99 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected by popular vote for four-year terms. The 30 members of the Senate are elected by popular vote to serve six-year terms, with one third of the Senate elected every two years.

Political parties in Haiti tend to be organized under the banner of specific personalities. With no permanent base, several political parties have short lifetimes, often only of a few years (Midy, 2014). New parties and alliances also emerge prior to elections. For instance, the 2015 elections showed an almost complete reshuffling of the political parties that had competed in 2006. Also many political crises in Haiti have been rooted in the lack of a political culture of cooperation or consensus-building.

However, a few parties have had a longer trajectory: these include the RDNP, the MRN, MOCHRENA, Famni Lavalas and OPL. The RDNP (the Assembly of Progressive National Democrats) is a Christian Democratic Party created in 1979 (Hurbon, 2014), with Leslie Manigat as its Secretary-General. The MRN (the Movement for National Reconstruction) was founded in 1991, headed by Jean-Enol Buteau. MOCHRENA (the Christian Movement for a new Haiti), a centre-right party, was founded in 1998 by evangelical churches, with Luc Mésadieu and Gilbert N. Léger sharing the leadership of the party (ibid.). Famni Lavalas (FL) was founded in 1996, by former president Aristide. It was created when the *Organisation Politique Lavalas* split into two rival factions, Famni Lavalas and Organization of People in Struggle (OPL), following strong opposition to the economic reforms proposed by then-President René Préval.

Several other political parties emerged prior to the 2006 presidential elections, among them, Fwon Lespwa, PFSDH, FRN and ADHEBA. Fwon Lespwa (Front of Hope, in standard French *Front de l'Espoir*) was established in 2005, to support the candidacy of René Préval in the 2006 presidential elections (Hurbon, 2014). It was an alliance of ESCANP (Effort and Solidarity to Build a National and Popular Alternative); PLB (Open the Gate Party) and grassroots organizations like the Grande-Anse Resistance Committee, the Central Plateau Peasants' Group, and the Southeast Kombit Movement. Another important party created in 2005 was PFSDH, a fusion of the three social-democratic parties Ayiti Capable, KONAKOM (National Congress of Democratic Movements) and PANPRA (Haitian National Revolutionary Party). PFSDH was headed by Serge Gilles, and is often referred to as FUSION. A group of former rebels under Guy Philippe also established its own party in 2004, the MRN (National Reconstruction Front), headed by Buteur Metayer, but its secretary-general was Guy Philippe. Another party established in 2004 was ADHEBA (Democratic Action to build Haiti), led by Camille Leblanc.

The increasing number of small political parties registered for elections in Haiti since 2006 is indicative of the problems of poor political dialogue, cooperation and alliance building. In November 2005, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) published a list of political parties and presidential candidates with approved registration. In all, 35 presidential candidates and 44 political parties had been accepted (Warsinski, 2006, p. 15). By 2015, the number of political parties had more than doubled. In accordance with Article 102 of the Electoral Decree of 2 March 2015, CEP published the list of political parties and 'groups' properly registered and entitled to participate in the upcoming elections: there were 105 (Haiti Libre, 2015). Moreover, there were 54 presidential candidates for the October 2015 elections (Taft-Morales, 2015b).

Since Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti in 1990, the country has seen several elections. Some of these have been overdue, and many have involved irregularities and violence. The international community has been quite concerned about seeing elections held in Haiti – almost regardless of the circumstances – but there has been less concern about the level of political participation in the elections, and about their legitimacy.

Examination of the participation level in the elections in Haiti from 1990 – the year when President Aristide was elected – and up until the latest elections in November 2016 reveals an alarming trend. Whereas voter turnout to the first free elections in 1990 was 50.2% (by the lowest estimate), the presidential elections in November 2016 had a turnout of only 17.3% (NLG and IADL, 2017, p. 9). In the period between first free and fair elections

Decreasing Turnout in Presidential Elections in Haiti

Date of Election	Valid Votes (N)	Registered Voters (N)	Participation	Winner's share of registered voters
16 Dec. 1990	1,640,729	3,271,155	50.2%	33.8%
17 Dec. 1995	1,140,523	3,668,049	31.1%	27%
26 Nov. 2000	2,871,002	4,759,571	60.3%	55.3%
7 Feb. 2006	1,938,641	3,533,430	54.9%	28.1%
28 Nov. 2010*	1,074,056	4,660,259	23.0%	7.2%
20 Mar. 2011**	1,053,733	4,712,693	22.4%	15.2%
25 Oct.2015***	1,553,131	5,871,450	26.5%	8.7%
Nov. 20, 2016	1,069,646	6,189,253	17.3%	9.6%

** More than 10% of voters/ votes never registered at tabulation centre*
*** Second round presidential election*
**** Results discarded due to fraud*

Sources: IFES, CEPR, IRI, Franklin Midy. Table assembled by NLG and IADL.

in 1990 and up to the elections in 2010, participation was generally good, with some variations. The 1995 presidential elections that were won by René Préval had a voter turnout of 31.1%, (ibid). Then, in 2000, participation peaked at 60.3%: Aristide was running again and was elected president (NLG and IADL, 2017, p. 9). In the elections in 2006, two years after Aristide had been ousted in a new coup, and after an interim government had ruled the country, voter turnout was also relatively high, at 54.9%, with Préval elected president once more (NLG and IADL, 2017, p. 9). However, in the presidential elections in 2010/2011 and 2015/2016, voter turnout fell dramatically: 23%, in the 28 November 2010 elections, and 22.4% in the March 2011 (second round of) presidential elections, with Michel Martelly elected. Then, in new elections some four years later, on 25 October 2015, voter turnout was 26.5%. In the second round of the elections on 20 November 2016, participation fell to a record low, of only 17.3%. Jovenel Moïse was then elected president (NLG and IADL, 2017, p. 9).

This decrease in voter turnout since 2006 deserves closer attention. It means that the two most recent presidents, Martelly and Moïse, have been governing with very low political legitimacy. It also means that the majority of Haiti's poor and marginalized population have remained outside of the sphere of political influence.

The decrease in electoral participation since 2010 may be explained by various factors – not least by the exclusion of political candidates and of the Famni Lavalas party from participating in some of the elections. Also important is the timing of elections – particularly those in November 2010, only 11 months after the devastating earthquake; and the elections on 20 November 2016, only one and a half months after Hurricane Matthew struck. Whereas some political parties have had the support of the economic elite, others that have traditionally appealed to the poor have been running out of resources. The roles played by several international actors in strengthening the possibilities of the elite–supported parties and presidential candidates also appear to have discouraged marginalized voters from participating (NGL and IADL, 2017). These factors are examined in greater detail below.

Elections in 2010/ 2011: The Context of President Martelly's Rise to Power

In 2010, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) banned 15 political parties from participating, including Famni Lavalas [6] (Johnston and Weisbrot,

6 The participation of Famni Lavalas was first banned by CEP in February 2009, prior to the legislative elections in April that year. The decision was arbitrary, and the CEP resorted to a technicality, claiming that it could not adequately verify Aristide's signature, sent while he was still in exile in South Africa and head of the party (Déralciné and Jackson, 2015, p.360).

2011). In a report on the elections, Johnston and Weisbrot characterize the exclusion of Famni Lavalas as follows: 'The ban of Famni Lavalas was analogous to excluding the Democratic or Republican Parties in the United States' (ibid., p.3). Famni Lavalas was barred from participating in both the presidential and the legislative elections in 2010.

The elections were held on 28 November 2010, only eleven months after the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010. Efforts to provide accessible voting centres for internally displaced people (IDPs) – approximately 1.5 million – were grossly inadequate. The elections were heavily disputed; moreover, they were held in the midst of the cholera epidemic that had broken out in October that year. Between October and December 2010 the epidemic claimed some 3,500 persons; by July 2011, the death toll had risen to 6,000 (Johnston and Bhatt, 2011). The elections brought large numbers of people together at a time when the epidemic was spreading virulently throughout the country (ibid). The announcement of inconclusive provisional results of the presidential elections in December triggered violent protests. Moreover, the protests 'restricted distribution of critical health supplies and prevented the roll-out of health promotion campaign' (PAHO 2010). These elections were indeed ill-timed.

The preliminary results published by CEP after the 28 November 2010 elections put Mirlande Manigat from RDNP[7]in first place with 28.83% of the vote, Jude Celestin (the government-supported candidate) second with 22.49%, and Michel Martelly third with 21.83%. Michel Martelly, also known as 'Sweet Micky' from his role as a singer and keyboardist, and his political party Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK), had been the favourite of the economic elite. The difference between the second and third place, which determines who will participate in the run-off elections, was of only 0.6% of the vote. There were also several problems related to the counting of votes. The tally sheets for some 1,365 voting booths (representing 12.2% of the total) were either never received by the CEP (1053) or quarantined for irregularities (312) (Johnston and Weisbrot, 2011, p.3). In its preliminary report issued the day after the elections, the OAS-CARICOM Joint Observation Mission acknowledged serious problems with the election. All the same, the mission concluded that it 'does not believe that these irregularities, serious as they were, invalidated the process' (OAS, 2010). The Haitian Government then accepted the OAS's view and Martelly and Celestin switched places, leaving Celestin out of the second round of elections (Johnston and Weisbrot, 2011). The second round, between Michel Martelly and Mirlande Manigat, took place on 20 March 2011. Martelly won 68% of the votes cast, but turnout was extremely low: only 15.2% of all registered votes (NGL and IADL, 2017; Taft-Morales, 2012, p.4).

By early 2015 the stage was set for an electoral crisis, as the terms of 10 senators and 99 deputies expired, leaving the country without a functioning legislature (NGL and IADL, 2017). The parliament had been gridlocked for years, partly over Martelly's attempts to appoint unconstitutional electoral councils. According to his opponents, these were also politically biased (ibid). This conflict had prevented constitutionally scheduled elections for mayors and one-third of the Senate from being held in 2012. As President Martelly began to govern without legislative oversight, anti-government protests increased. Under pressure, Martelly finally appointed a new electoral council in February 2015. Elections were then announced for 9 August and 25 October, to elect a new president, two-thirds of the Senate, all 119 members of the House of Deputies and all local mayors (NGL and IADL, 2017, p.4). President Martelly had selected Jovenel Moïse as his successor. Moïse's business company, Agritrans, runs an export-oriented banana plantation in Trou-du-Nord. This production was set up with government financing under Martelly's administration. During the election campaign, Moïse branded himself as the 'Banana Man', promising to revitalize Haiti's agriculture.

7 Mirlande Manigat was the wife of Leslie Manigat, former President of Haiti and Secretary General of the RDNP.

Elections in 2015/2016: The Context of President Moïse's Rise to Power

The legislative elections on 9 August were characterized by widespread fraud, violence and voter intimidation. Nearly a quarter of the voter tally sheets were either lost, or excluded from the final results as a consequence of violence, irregularities or logistical shortcomings (NGL and IADL, 2017). The first round of presidential elections on 25 October was less violent, but fell short of minimum standards for fair elections. One problem was that voting centres were crowded with political party observers who cast multiple, fraudulent votes through the use of blank accreditation cards.[8] Massive protests erupted, calling for an investigation into the fraudulent elections. This crisis culminated in the suspension of run-off elections on 22 January 2016 and in the formation of an interim government under Senator Jocelerme Privert, with a mandate for 120 days. With strong support from civil society organizations, local election observers and a wide range of the political spectrum, President Privert then established two independent investigation commission to examine claims of fraud and restore confidence in the electoral process before continuing with the vote: the Independent Electoral Evaluation Commission (CEEI) and the Independent Commission for the Evaluation and Verification of Elections (CIEVE) (NGL and IADL, 2017). However, this decision was opposed by Martelly's Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK) and its political allies (who were well represented in the recently seated parliament), but also by several actors in the international community, including the EU and the USA (Johnston, 2016b, p.9).

CIEVE found that *mandataire* votes and votes cast without proper documentation accounted for 40% of the total vote, and that this had had a decisive influence on the presidential, legislative and municipal elections. It therefore concluded that the presidential race should be re-run. The new CEP accepted CIEVE's findings and set the date for new presidential and legislative run-off elections for 9 October 2016. However, the OAS and the EU electoral observation missions ignored the strong evidence of widespread fraud, describing both elections as 'successful exercises of democracy' (NGL and IADL, 2017, p.45). The EU observation team pulled out of the country and the USA withdrew election funding (Johnston, 2016b, p. 9), whereupon the Haitian government announced it would fund the elections itself.

In the run-up to the new elections, the USA and the Core Group expressed worry that the new elections might give the Lavalas candidates Maryse Narcisse and Moïse Jean-Charles a better chance at the presidency. A US Congressional source told Reuters, 'They're not thrilled with Aristide's forces coming back', referring to the Obama administration's reaction to the antifraud protests (Daniel, 2016).

The next presidential elections were held on 20 November 2016, only about one and a half months after Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti on 4–5 October, with devastating effects in the south of the country. The hurricane caused great damage to the infrastructure, and flooding in parts of the country may also have dissuaded voters from going to the polls. Many voters also lost their ID cards: in the areas affected by Hurricane Matthew, 6,000 people applied for new ID cards (NGL and IADL, 2017, p.12). Thousands of other eligible voters may well have lost their ID cards along with other belongings in the storm, but did not re-apply and could therefore not vote (ibid). A survey conducted by IOM found that 25% of heads of displaced households living in shelters did not have ID (CIN) cards (IOM, 2016). It is estimated that between 10 and 15% of registered voters were living in the storm-ravaged southern peninsula; in addition, also many in the northern departments (*départements)* had just been affected by heavy rains and flooding. Elections in these areas were significantly impacted by the consequences of the hurricane – so the elections served to reinforce the centralization of power and politics, further isolating rural provinces and towns that had long

8 Prior to the elections, CEP had distributed 915,675 blank *mandataire* cards and several thousand blank observer cards. However, CEP failed to put in place safeguards against accreditations being illegally resold or used to cast multiple votes at different polling stations (NGL and IADL, p.4).

felt disconnected from the political and economic elite in the capital.

The lengthy duration of the election process in 2015/2016 also took its toll on less well-funded parties, whereas the consolidation of private-sector funding behind the PHTK, established by former president Martelly, certainly helped this party to benefit from the time available to conduct campaigning and build support. It takes significant money and other resources to have party staff across the entire country; PHTK's more extensive resources and outreach – according to local observer organizations – made possible a wider national presence of representatives than other parties (Johnston, 2016a, p. 3). Moïse's campaign had been financed by the business community and by the same Spanish firm, Ostos and Sola, that had helped Martelly to win the elections in 2010 (Charles, 2016). Most of those constituting the 'civil society' group in 2004, which called itself the Group of 184 and advocated the ouster of Aristide at that time, had become political allies or financiers of PHTK. (This group was led by Evans Paul, Andy Apaid and Reginald Boulos, among others). With its good access to economic resources, the PHTK was able to campaign also in the hurricane-hit South, where the presidential candidate from PHTK distributed aid to victims, and moved to back a cadre of international election advisers.

In the elections on 20 November 2016, Jovenel Moïse, the PHTK candidate, emerged as the winner with 55.6% of the votes. However, the extremely low voter turnout caused political analyst Fritz Dorvilier, who taught sociology at the State University of Port-au-Prince, to express worries that Moïse's win would 'plunge Haiti deeper into political instability' (Charles, 2016, p. 2). CEP members were split over the results, and 10% of the votes were disregarded. Seven senators wrote to the CEP denouncing a 'set of irregularities and fraud' during the balloting. Famni Lavalas also complained, arguing that 'only signatures or digital prints' could guarantee the authenticity of the votes (Charles, 2016, p. 3).

After Jovenel Moïse from PHTK was elected President of Haiti in 2016 there has been a wave of protests and demonstrations in the country. Senator (and former presidential candidate) Jean-Charles Moïse, who earlier served as the Lavalas Mayor of Milot in the North Department, has led charges of corruption and repression against President Jovenel Moïse and his government. Jean-Charles Moïse currently heads the *Plateforme Pitit Desalin,* which has played a leading role in many of these demonstrations. Also Famni Lavalas (FL) has been active, but according to some sources, relations between Jean-Charles Moïse and the FL have been strained, as Moïse earlier criticized the FL for not being firm and clear enough in its criticism of the Martelly government, and for taking wealthy members of the bourgeoisie into the party (Ives, 2013). An important trigger of Pitit Desalin's active line came when attempts were made to arrest its leader Jean Charles Moïse on 13 September 2017, provoking spontaneous demonstrations in his support in Port-au-Prince the next day (Alterpresse, 2017). Then followed several days of street protests directed against President Jovenel Moïse and Prime Minister Guy Lafontant's unpopular budget for the fiscal year 2017/ 2018.

Pitit Desalin and Famni Lavalas were not the only political parties to express dissatisfaction with the budget. Also other parties from the opposition, including FUSION, VERITÉ, INITE and Mopod, were critical, with FUSION being particularly vocal. On 14 September 2017, President Jovenel Moïse gathered political parties to discuss the institutionalization of political life and the financing of political parties. This meeting seemed to function as a catalyst, as representatives of the parties close to the government – OPL, PHTK, Respons Peyizan, Grand Rassemblement pour l'Evolution d'Haïti (GREH) and Ayti an Aksyon (AAA) – were present, whereas several political parties from the opposition rejected the meeting with the head of state, among these Pitit Desalin, Famni Lavalas, FUSION, VERITÉ, INITE and Mopod (Haiti Libre, 2017e).

For VERITÉ, the president's initiative on the financing of the political parties proved particularly problematic. With its 18 deputies, 3 sen-

ators, 17 municipal cartels and more than 500 CASEC, ASEC and village-elected delegates, the VERITE platform is the second-most important in political structure after the PHTK, and the party was entitled to considerable sums of money. However, the possibility of economic support divided the party: one wing, supporting Joanas Gué, was in favour of financing, while the general coordinator of the VERITE platform, Génard Joseph, and several influential members of the party were opposed. According to one of its deputies, Jerry Tardieu, the government's decision on the financing of political parties was taken in haste, without emplacing necessary measures to safeguard the arrangement against corruption (RTVC, 2018).

During new protests organized by the opposition on 14–17 October 2017, the leader of Pitit Desalin, Jean Charles Moïse, declared that this was the last phase of mobilization to overthrow the team in power, and asserted that 'the opposition clearly knows where it is going' (Haiti Libre, 2017d). He stated that after the 'resignation ' of President Jovenel Moïse, the opposition would set up a Council of State composed of 11 members, one for each *département* and one for the diaspora (ibid). The Council would then be entrusted with the task of assessing the general state of the nation, with a view to solving the real structural problems.

Also in 2018, Pitit Desalin has continued to play a leading role in many demonstrations. In his speech on 8 March 2018, its leader, Jean Charles Moïse announced the resumption of anti-government demonstrations in the South (Cayes), North (Cap Haitien) and in the capital Port-au-Prince (Haiti Libre, 2018).

This review has revealed how presidential candidates and political parties with links to the economic elite in Haiti have been able to gain power and consolidate their position through elections in which the majority of poor and marginalized Haitians have scarcely participated. Despite fraud and the many problems related to the elections through which the two most recently elected presidents, Martelly and Moïse, came to power, important actors of the international community – the USA, the EU and the OAS – have characterized the elections as successful. The combination of the extremely harsh situation and the daily struggle for survival among the poorest after the earthquake and then Hurricane Matthew, and the exclusion of opposition parties like Famni Lavalas, made the elections very difficult and almost irrelevant for many poor Haitians. Viewed in that light, the international community's focus on the need for 'democratic elections' in Haiti seems extremely shallow. One must ask: democracy for whom? As will be shown in the remaining part of this political economy analysis, that reality has repercussions for all aspects of Haitian policies today.

Security Actors in Haiti, post-2004

The Arrival of MINUSTAH and Gang Activity

When Michel Martelly became President of Haiti in 2011, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had been present in the country since 2004. After Aristide left Haiti in 2004, the political conflict took on new dimensions. MINUSTAH, authorized through Security Council Resolution 1542, arrived in Haiti in June 2004, shortly after Aristide had been ousted from power. MINUSTAH's attention was directed especially at gang activity in the slum neighbourhoods of Cité Soleil, where Aristide had enjoyed strong support, as violence now had increased in these areas. Since 1993 Haiti has had eight different UN forces deployed, mandated for various types of security, human rights observation and peacebuilding work in the country (see boxed text).

However, the context in which MINUSTAH was deployed to Haiti was different, as the country was characterized by conflict and open wounds after Aristide had been ousted, and many of his supporters were furious. This took on stronger dimensions when MINUSTAH focused much of its activity on the slum areas. Many Haitians simply did not consider MINUSTAH to be neutral. Gang activity exploded in the slum areas of Port-au-Prince. Around 2004/ 2005 the most highly-profiled gang leaders in Cité Soleil

UN Missions in Haiti 1993–2017

MICIVIH (February 1993–): International Civilian Mission in Haiti

UNMIH (September 1993–June 1996): United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNSMIH (July 1996–July 1997): United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNTMIH (August November 1997): United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti

MIPONUH (December 1997–March 2000): United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti

MIF (February–June 2004): Multinational Interim Force

MINUSTAH (June 2004–October 2017): United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MINUJUSTH (October 2017–April 2018): United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

Source: UN Security Council, 2017.

area were the five figures called Amaral, Tu-Pac (2Pac), Bily, Labanye and Dread (Dred) Wilme (Beer, 2016).[9] They were known to fight together against the police, the international force and rival gangs, but were also fiercely competitive and threatened one another. In Gonaïve, Ti Will was a well-known and dominant gang leader along with Ravix Ramissainte, a former FAdH sergeant with influence in Cap Haïtien (Gilles, 2012). At that time, these were the best-known gang leaders in all Haiti. The leaders, born and raised in these neighbourhoods, were well-known to the local population and often identified by nicknames acquired already in childhood. However, the gangs also had many young criminal deportees from the USA, who, after having grown up there, came to Haiti without economic means, and without French or Creole language skills or family ties. They were easily recruited to the gangs (Beer, 2016).

The location of Cité Soleil is important. It borders the Port-au-Prince industrial-commercial zone, and is home to the city's poorest people and to rural migrants who gravitate towards Port-au-Prince to find work. Lying near the national highway, the port and the international airport, it is of real tactical importance. In the first years after the ouster of Aristide, violence peaked in the slums, including also other areas like Bel Air and Martissant. Many of Aristide's supporters saw MINUSTAH as an invading and occupying force, fundamentally anti-Lavalas and supporting the economic elite and the interim government. Thus, MINUSTAH and the international community in general became important targets of the gangs. In comparison, the earlier UNMIH presence in Haiti (1991–93) had gone largely unopposed by the gangs, as its mission was different. Before 2004, gangs almost never molested the international community (Beer, 2016, p. 76; Burt et al., 2016).

In January 2007 MINUSTAH mounted a large-scale coordinated offensive action against the gangs in Cité Soleil – an operation subject to much criticism, as it also resulted in the deaths of several uninvolved civilians. By March 2007 the UN had gained control over Cité Soleil. The gangs were flushed from their sanctuaries with support from UN police and the Haitian National Police (HNP), and some 800 'gang members' were eventually arrested. All but one gang leader were either arrested or killed. However, as noted by Beer (2016, p. 92):

> This is impressive in terms of operational success against the gangs, but the number alone is cause for reflection. By any accounting, there were certainly not 800 gangsters attacking UN security forces and killing HNP officers in 2005. So how many of these 800 were merely unemployed, uneducated, poverty-stricken young men with no prospects, who were 'going along' to get along with the gangs on the brutal streets of Cité Soleil? Moreover, how many of the gang

9 The author of the reference, David Beer, is a former UNMIH Police Commissioner.

> members had in fact been deported from the United States or Canada? How many of those arrested and jailed were actually charged with a crime? And how many were ever convicted?

Since 2006 (before this operation), there had been some decline in violence in the Port-au-Prince slum areas, following reconciliation and violence reduction strategies by NGOs and MINUSTAH. However, after the earthquake in 2010, violence again surged, not least because of the 6,000 prisoners who escaped from the central prison in Port-au-Prince during the earthquake (NCA and Actalliance, 2014, p. 5). Closer study of Bel Air reveals important changes in the organization of criminal activities in the area, and shows that the negative stereotype of 'Haiti's gangs' often do not correspond with how these groups have been established, or how they see themselves and are viewed by the population. The term 'gang' has been applied to everything from criminal networks and insurgent groups to neighbourhood associations and private militias. However, in the study conducted by NCA/Actalliance many of their respondents described a 'new generation' of armed groups, created after the earthquake. These more recent armed groups are frequently referred to as 'criminal groups', distinguishing them from the local groups known as bases (*baz*) (ibid). Further, this study revealed that 'a 'generational gap' between the old and new armed groups, with the latter described as opportunists aligned to 'whichever political and economic elite best serve their interest' (NCA and Actalliance, 2014, p. 5). A conflict between the members of the *baz* historically linked to Aristide's Lavalas Party and the younger generations struggling to find space and gain recognition within the *baz* could be observed. Several *baz* leaders had died in the earthquake and many of those active within the new generation were among those who escaped from prison during the earthquake.

The local-level violence has longstanding linkages to national-level politics. Although these linkages are sometimes formal, as with *baz* leaders who are employed by the local mayor's office or as security personnel in the national palace, most often they are informal. Deaths on both sides and the change of government in the post-earthquake elections influenced the linkages between the *baz* and national-level leaders, upsetting the balance of power and leading to shifting alliances. In past decades opposing elites have co-existed with armed groups that collaborate with the elites in exchange for the opportunities offered them. High-level political and economic actors within these elites have connections to globalized trade systems or illegal transnational networks like the drug trade (NCA and Actalliance, 2014, p. 6).

During the presidency of Martelly, organized crime was again on the rise (RNDDH, 2014). The human rights organization RNDDH has also accused Martelly of using the Haitian National Police (HNP) for his own political purposes, cracking brutally down on demonstrations by the opposition – with the implication that the HNP has been involved in violations of human rights (RNDDH, 2014, p. iv). Also in 2016 and 2017 under President Moïse, violence and organized crime have continued. Some violent actions have clearly been targeted at the rich elite, such as on 25 June 2016, when six men on two motorcycles fired indiscriminately at major businesses in the downtown and Delmas areas of Port-au-Prince, at businesses like Natcom, Digicel, Marriot, Behrman Motors, Automeca and Sogebank (US Department of State, 2017, p. 3). In the south, one operation in 2016 has been attributed to Senator-elect and drug-accused Guy Philippe, who masterminded an attack on the HNP commissariat in Les Cayes. Philippe was arrested on a US drug warrant, awaiting federal trial in the USA. He has since pleaded guilty. Also in 2017 there came warning signals, with several days of gang warfare in Martissant in the neighbourhood of Grand-Ravine (Haiti Libre, 2017c).

Despite the criticisms of MINUSTAH, many actors have wondered if the Haitian National Police will manage their role and tasks now that MINUSTAH is no longer present, having left Haiti in October 2017. Will the HNP encounter many of the same problems as MINUSTAH when it has to deal with crowd control and the quelling of protests? And will it be able to han-

dle the security challenges that may emerge? The following pages discuss the role and development of the HNP as another important security actor in Haiti.

The Haitian National Police (HNP)

The Haitian National Police was established in June 1995, based on a law from 29 November 1994. It was intended to substitute the Army, which Aristide had dissolved in 1994 (République d'Haiti, 2017). The HNP has since been trained and strengthened considerably, thanks not least to MINUSTAH. A large-scale study by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and CERDECS, Haiti, based on surveys and fieldwork from several of Haiti's *départements*, reveals that Haitians in general have positive perceptions of the HNP (Hauge et al., 2008; Doucet, 2014; Gilles, 2012), although this reputation has become somewhat tarnished lately (Hauge et al., 2015; Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015). Despite the existence of this new police force in Haiti, which increased in size and was modernized from 2006 on, President Martelly began planning for the establishment of a new Haitian army in 2012, as further discussed later in this chapter. Against the background of MINUSTAH leaving Haiti in 2017 and with a newly re-established Haitian Army, questions arise concerning the current role of the HNP and its future potential and destiny.

During the HNP's formation phase, 1995–2004, structures were gradually established and the first specialized agencies for public security were put in place. In June 2004 a phase of strengthening, modernizing and professionalizing the HNP began, assisted by MINUSTAH, and a first Plan of Reform and Strategic Development for the period 2006–2011 was issued. However, it was during the implementation of the development plan for the period 2012–2016 that real progress was seen (République d'Haiti, 2017, p. 8).

The plan for decentralization of the Haitian National Police is an element in larger plans for political, administrative and economic decentralization in Haiti. The decentralization of HNP may be divided into three parts: concerning the specialized units, the regular police, and finally administrative support (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p, 5). The decentralization of the specialized units made some progress in 2012 and 2013 with the establishment of a maritime base in Cayes in the South, and a police base /station ('garage') in Port-au-Paix in Northwest *Département*; the deployment of brigades of fight against drug trafficking (Brigade de la Lutte Contre le Trafic des Stupefiants (BLTS) in Ouanaminthe and Cap; and the assignment of a focal point for INTERPOL in each *département* of the country. A new BLTS brigade was deployed in Cayes and the units of Intervention and Maintenance of Order (Corps d'Intervention et de Mantien d'Ordre (CIMO) were strengthened in several *département*s, particularly in the south (ibid). However, the number of police officers in the provinces remained limited. In August 2014 two thirds of the active police officers were deployed in the Ouest *Département*, leaving a ratio of about one police officer per 2000 inhabitants in the provinces, well below the UN norm of one police officer per 1000 inhabitants (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p, 5). However, in its strategic plan for 2017–2021, the HNP reported that the *general level* now had increased to one police officer per 706 inhabitants (République d'Haiti, 2017, p. 9).

In the third report from HNP/MINUSTAH (2014) various kinds of progress with regard to the specialized agencies were noted, such as improvement in their skills training, better buildings and equipment, and increased numbers of police officers. Particularly in Ouest *Département*, the Brigades of Motorized Intervention (BIMs) had become more proactive in several zones. Actually, the HNP drew less on MINUSTAH in crowd control operations, in spite of 31% increase in protests in 2013 (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.7). However, in their research, Baranyi and Sainsiné find reason to question some of this claimed progress. They note the reports from human rights organizations that complain of excessive use of force by the specialized forces of the HNP, particularly in Ouest, Nord and Artibonite *départements*. In the South, they point

out that the agents of the Departmental Units for Maintenance of Order (UDMOs) and BIM were accused of using excessive force against the demonstrations in Ile à Vache in early 2014. (Baranyi and Sainsiné , 2015, p.7)

Some progress in community policing was noted in the third report on the implementation of the development plan for the police (HNP/ MINUSTAH, 2014). Training of the community police in the Police Academy had improved and several pilot projects had been launched: particular mention was made of bicycle patrols and cultural events organized in certain areas of Port-au-Prince, such as Croix-des–Bouquets, Delmas and Pétion-Ville, and in Cayes and Jacmel. However, in their report Baranyi and Sainsiné (2015) point out that experiences with community policing in Haiti are still moderate, limited and poorly institutionalized. Despite the various projects in Port-au-Prince, no common doctrine on community policing had been elaborated or validated by the HNP leadership. No central unit had been put in place to coordinate the pilot experiences (except from in Ouest *Département*), no budget had been approved to make use of the experiences, and there were no plans for follow-up or greater institutionalization. Several pilots, for example in the South, had even been suspended, because the trained personnel had been moved to other *département*s (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.6). Diplomats interviewed for this study have confirmed this reason for worry about the slow progress of community policing.

The HNP has also integrated goals for gender equality in its plans. In its development plan, the HNP in 2012 committed itself to increasing the share of women from 7.5% in 2012 to 11% by the end of 2016. However, as of June 2016, female police personnel constituted only 8.5% – 1199 out of 14170 (République d'Haiti, 2017, p. 9). The development plan also had a qualitative focus, and here there has been some progress since 2012. An office for Gender and Coordination of Women's Issues was established under the direction of the HNP. Related to this office a programme to fight gender-based violence was launched at the national level with the assistance of MINUSTAH and Norway (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p. 9). Towards mid-2014, at least 1 150 police officers (about 10% of the force) had received some type of training on SGBV. In 2013/2014 the Gender Office and MINUSTAH helped to establish a network of women within the HNP. A common working group linked to the Ministry of Women's Conditions and Women's Rights (Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes, MCFDF) and to the Ministry of Public Health and Population (Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population, MSPP) was also established (Baranyi and Sainsiné , 2015, p.9). According to several observers contacted by Baranyi and Sainsiné (2015) the actions of this group – or working cell – have strengthened the capacities of the HNP in its work against SGBV (ibid).

The relationship between the police and the justice system in Haiti has long represented a challenge. According to the 2014 report of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, this has remained problematic, despite some improvements (UN Security Council, 2014). The Secretary General noted the historic importance of the establishment of the Superior Council of the Judicial Power (Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire, CSPJ), as this is central to strengthening the independence of the judicial system. However, he also mentioned the gap between the progress of the PHN and the slow progress in the judicial system, which contributes to blocking the rule of law in Haiti (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.10). Police officers have difficulties in carrying out detentions, as there is often no judge in place to provide them with the mandate required by law to conduct an arrest. This is often the case in the South, as explained below.

The Security Situation in the South[10]

The South has seen many kinds of security problems, from organized crime, drugs, violence

10 This section draws heavily on Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015.

against women and minors[11] – including rape and sexual abuse, – murder, prolonged preventive detention and generally lengthy detention in police stations (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015). Of these problems, drug trade and organized crime are the most challenging. Boats and sometimes also small planes loaded with drugs – particularly marihuana and cocaine – from Colombia and Jamaica arrive quite regularly in one coastal village or another, the most severely affected places being Port-Salut, Ile-a-Vache, Aquin and St-Louis du Sud. The proximity of Jamaica (about five hours by motorboat) and of Colombia (ten hours by speedboat) can explain much of this.

Lack of prison capacity also represents a major challenge. The prison in Cayes was constructed with capacity for about 100 prisoners, but the number of persons detained there had mounted to 692 by February 2015. Most of these remained in detention for lengthy periods due to slow processing of their cases.

A basic problems in the South is that the Haitian National Police do not have sufficient facilities, equipment and police officers deployed in the area to conduct their work satisfactorily. In 2015 Sud *Département* had 18 police stations and four sub-offices. The Department consists of 18 *communes*, and should have at least one police station per *commune*. However, most police stations do not have appropriate buildings or facilities. Some do not even have a toilet. Even though most police stations have vehicles, these are often not functioning and lack of access to fuel is a frequent problem.

Haiti's main maritime base is located in Sud *Département*, in Cayes. This base, constructed by Canada, is the only one with a modern structure and with sleeping facilities and a cafeteria. However, it is not sufficiently equipped otherwise, as the Haitian government has not been able to contribute its budgetary part. In 2015, the USA became involved in financing the running costs of the base, linked to US support to the drug-fighting brigade (BLTS) deployed there, but that was not a sustainable solution (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.14).

The South *département* has a population of about 800,000. According to a 2015 survey, the total number of police deployed here was 240 (including inspectors, agents and police officers). Of these only 75 (30%) were deployed in the periphery and 165 (70%) remained in the city of Cayes. The worst example of understaffing was Port-Salut, with a police station of eight officers for a population of 63,278, or one police officer per 7,910 residents (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.15). The rural sections that, according to the 1987 Constitution and the National Police regulations. should have sub-offices, have none. Thus, many local rural authorities are not able to respond to the security needs of the population.

Only 10 out of the 240 police officers are female, and all are stationed in Cayes. However, the authorities have been making some efforts to recruit female leadership to the zone. The departmental unit of Maintenance of Order (UDMO) and the unit of Fight against Gender Based Violence (VBG) are headed by a female police officer. The role model of this woman (and the female inspector working with her) may prove important for the integration of women in the PHN at the *départmente* level. However, even the units that work on gender-related issues and are led by women have in some ways been neglected. For example, the SGBV unit is the only unit with no vehicle at its disposal, which obstructs the unit in performing its duties.

The Haitian National Police also faces constraints linked to the centralization of some types of administrative decisions. According to MINUSTAH, functionaries in the Departmental Section of the Judicial Police (Section Départementale de la Police Judiciaire, SDPJ) have very good investigators, but these need modern equipment to work efficiently. France has provided new laboratory equipment for the Central Leadership of the Judicial Police (Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire, DCPJ), but little of this has arrived in the South. Indeed, officers in the South do not even have equipment for gathering finger-

11 With regard to violence against women and minors, some *communes* in the South are more heavily afflicted, such as Camp-Perrin, Aquin, St-Louis du Sud, Coteaux and Les Anglais (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.12).

prints and comparing these against the national dossiers/documents on registered criminals: they only have cameras to take photographs of the accused. The DCPJ stores all material of this type in Port-au-Prince, without sharing it with some SDPJs (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.16).

Another example of the problems with this type of centralization concerns the relations between the Coast Guard and other units of the HNP in the South. Members of the Coast Guard are not under the command of the Departmental Director of the South (DDS), but are directly under Central command at Bizonton in Port-au-Prince, far distant. This makes ocean/land coordination difficult in the South, by preventing the two structures from undertaking common actions in the fight against drug trafficking. In addition, a group of 12 agents from BLTS was added to the maritime base in 2015. They were trained, equipped and well paid by the USA, but they do not cooperate readily with members of the Coast Guard, due to lack of trust between the two groups. Moreover, members of the BLTS are under the command of the Central BLTS in Port-au-Prince, whereas, as noted, the Coast Guard is under the command of the Coast Guard in the capital (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p. 16).

One tendency that has worried human rights organizations is the increase in – and the behaviour of – the 'Unité Départementale de Maintien d'Ordre (UDMO). Out of 240 police officers present in *Département* Sud, 64 (25%) are agents of UDMO. Moreover, of the 60 agents that the DG Pol further has promised to deploy there, 36 (50%) will be UDMO agents. This will increase their total to 100 (or 33% of the HNP in the zone) (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p.17). Human rights NGOs are concerned about the UDMO tendency to use force. For example, the measures that the UDMO and the brigades of motorized intervention (BIM) applied during the socio-economic protests at Ile à Vache in February 2014 are seen as a sign of the absence of more peaceful, preventive measures in approaching the population, and indications that the UDMO and the BIMs exceeded the legitimate use of force (RNDDH, 2014a, p. 17).

After the arrival of the new departmental director in the South in 2014, the HNP has developed constructive relationships with human rights organizations and also with some national public institutions working there.[12] According to an interviewee responsible for one of the state institutions in the region, contact with the HNP takes place primarily through the Unit to Combat Gender-based Violence (VBG) and the Working Group for the Protection of Minors. The latter includes the VBG unit of the HNP, the MCFDF, the OPC and local women's organizations like GADESS, and MINUSTAH. In cases of violence against minors and women, these departmental institutions inform the HNP via the VBG unit and help them to react appropriately by sharing their information from, and contacts with, the population. Thanks to these working relations, the majority of the cases have been resolved rapidly.

The relationship between the local police and the justice system remains quite complex. The judges do not always act, and they allow the accused to remain in detention much longer than the maximum 72 hours stipulated by Haitian law. The slowness of the judges, combined with aspects of Haitian law, may directly obstruct the work of the police. The Haitian police may not start an investigation unless they witness and can characterize an act as a flagrant violation of the law (Baranyi and Sainsiné, 2015, p. 19) In other cases, the investigation must be undertaken by a judge *de première instance*.

These inter-institutional anomalies also affect the work of the Coast Guard. According to a MINUSTAH interviewee who worked with the Coastal Guard, the Haitian norm – according to which the police must catch the criminal *in flagrante,* or have a judge in place who can instruct, before they are allowed to arrest/detain the person – is almost impossible to follow when things

12 Among the units that the HNP has contact with, especially prominent are the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), the Ministry on Women's Conditions and Women's Rights (MCFDF), the Office of Citizen Protection (OPC), the South Coordination of Human Rights (CSDDH) and MINUSTAH.

happen at sea. This often gives drug dealers an opportunity to escape (ibid).

MINUSTAH's mandate expired on 15 October 2017, and a smaller follow-on peacekeeping mission, MINUJUSTH, has started its work. The mandate of MINUJUSTH is to assist the Haitian government in strengthening the role of legal institutions, and to engage in human rights reporting and analysis. It remains to be seen whether this will also contribute to ending impunity for past crimes committed by ex-militaries and other criminals. Most respondents interviewed for this study also questioned the capacity of the HNP to take charge of the security-related work that MINUSTAH has performed. This will depend not least on the trust, financing and further strengthening given to MINUJUSTH (or withheld) by the current regime in Haiti.

A New Haitian Army

When he became president, Martelly proposed to re-create the Haitian army in order to replace MINUSTAH within a few years. As discussed earlier, the Haitian army had committed gross human rights violations in the past, and had been disbanded by President Aristide in 1995. The initial plan of President Martelly was to create a 3,500-member army to be built up over three and a half years, at the approximate cost of USD 95 million, including USD 15 million to compensate former army members who had been discharged (Agence France Press, 2011). In January 2012 he seemed to acknowledge that a new army was unrealistic, and instead pledged to build a new security force of 3,000–5,000 soldiers. Ecuador had already trained 41 Haitian military recruits – 30 soldiers, 10 engineers and one officer – in 2013 for this force (Taft-Morales, 2015a, p. 40).

The initial plan for a new army has picked up speed under Haiti's current president, Jovenel Moïse. On 11 July 2017 the Haitian Ministry of Defence informed the public that those interested in being recruited for the new army were to present themselves during the period 17–21 July at the Ministry's training centre located near Gressier and Léogañe (Haiti Libre, 2017a). On the morning of the 17th hundreds of young jobless Haitians turned up and waited in line, motivated by the scarcity of jobs (Brice, 2017). The initial budget of the Minister of Defence, Hervé Denis, had been 1 billion gourde, but was scaled down to 512 million (Haiti Libre, 2017a). According to the Minister of Defence, the new army would patrol the border with the Dominican Republic and to help rebuild after natural disasters in the country. However, he also said that the army would fight terrorism (Brice, 2017). With plans for recruiting 500 young members – and the budget cut half – there were speculations about how young these recruits might be. The Minister of Defence also indicated that he would check among former senior officers of the FAdH to try identify persons who could train the new recruits (Haiti Libre, 2017a). Although Hervé Denis emphasized that these would be subjected to a background investigation first, there have been many worries and criticisms of these policies, with fears that such a new military force could quickly become politicized, becoming a weapon in the hands of whoever is the president or prime minister – as in the past (interviews; BBC, 2017). The Minister of Defence also wished to recruit some of the old FADH members to join the high-level staff of the new defence force in Haiti.

On 13 March 2018 this became reality. President Jovenel Moïse appointed six persons to the high command of the reinstated Haitian armed forces (FAdH) (IADL and IJDH, 2018). All the appointees, who are now in their sixties, were majors or colonels in the former FAdH, disbanded in 1995, due to a continuous history of involvement in coups, violent repression, and drug trafficking. At least three of the officers have held senior positions within the early 1990s coup regime. The office of International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti wrote in a press release:

> Mr. Jovenel Moïse assumed the responsibility of naming a 'haut Etat Major' composed of individuals with a sulfurous history, including Colonel Jean Robert Gabriel, army torturer, convicted *in absentia* at the

> Rabouteau massacre trial in Gonaïve on November 16, 2000. The Moïse/Lafontant Administration and in particular, the so-called Minister of Defense, Mr. Herve Denis, cannot claim ignorance of the judgement and sentencing *in absentia* of Colonel Jean Robert Gabriel since the judgement was published in the official journal of the Republic, namely in the Thursday, November 23, 155th year, number 92, issue. (IADL and IJDH, 2018)

In summary, there are deep concerns related to the establishment of the new army in Haiti, among ordinary Haitians and international actors. An additional worry is that the new army will drain budget money away from the HNP – and the HNP has been trained under the ideals of human rights and neutrality. The 2017–2021 plan for the HNP emphasizes police values, stating that the HNP is based on values of loyalty, solidarity, being apolitical; and integrity, including transparency and impartiality (République d'Haiti, 2017, p. 12). Several conditions related to engagement and professionalism are also mentioned, including respect for Haitian values and universal human rights. The document states that the vision of the HNP is to do its work with strict respect for Haitian laws and international conventions. Although the HNP has had its weaknesses, as noted, there seem to be good chances for improvement within the HNP. By contrast, the path of the new Haitian Army appears dark and dubious, with many threatening clouds in the sky.

4. The phantom state and post-earthquake policies

Ordinary Haitians often refer to their country as a 'phantom state', unable to deliver core public services like health, housing, sanitation, energy, education, essential infrastructure, security and the rule of law. It also lacks a working bureaucracy, and staff turnover is high. About 50% of all health services in Haiti are provided by NGOs (World Bank, 2015, p. 4), mainly in primary healthcare. In the education sector, NGOs, or private for-profit institutes run more than 80% of primary and secondary schools (ibid). Most state businesses in Haiti were privatized under structural adjustment programmes in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s (Hauge, 2003).

Historically Haiti has not been particularly dependent on international aid,[13] but this has changed in the past two decades, particularly after the 2010 earthquake. In March 2010, the World Bank established the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations and 19 contributing donor countries (World Bank, 2017b, p. 2). The World Bank has also served as the Fund's trustee and secretariat, and has supervised some of the activities financed by the HRF. The HRF has been the largest source of finance for reconstruction. However, the dependence on international aid has provided Haiti with scant leeway for making its own long-term plans and prioritizing these through detailed programmes. After the earthquake in 2010, with Préval still in the presidency, the Haitian government was largely bypassed by the international community, which worked according to its own plans. Most assistance went through UN agencies and through donor agencies and private organizations. In her report to the US Congress in June 2012, Taft-Morales stated, 'The Haitian government is frustrated that U.S and other donors' foreign aid is provided mainly through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than directly through the government' (Taft-Morales, 2012, p. 13).

It was against this background that Michel Martelly was installed as president in 2011. The state was already weak, and the country was inundated with international NGOs, foreign donors and multilateral agencies. However, Martelly focused on the role of business and the private sector, without contributing much to strengthening the Haitian state. With most international assistance channelled through multilateral agencies and international NGOs, and a president mainly interested in the private sector in Haiti, this did not bode well for the future possibilities of establishing even a minimum of social welfare and public services. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and indeed one of the poorest countries in the world. Some 2.5 million Haitians live in extreme poverty (below $ 1.25 per day) mainly in rural areas; as of 2012, 70% of workers was earning less than the minimum wage (World Bank, 2015, p. 26). When Martelly became president, the country was still recovering from the worst effects of the earthquake, and he was thus faced with a daunting task. However, his strategy was contradictory in terms.

The Strategic Development Plan for Haiti that President Martelly launched in 2012 rests on four

13 Compared with many poor African countries, Haiti has not received large amounts of development aid; official development assistance to Haiti 1981–86 averaged 7.8% of its GDP (UNCTAD, 1995). In 1991 it was 8.2% of GNP (UNDP, 1993).

main pillars – aiming to re-establish the territorial, economic, social and institutional legs of the state, so as to make Haiti an 'emerging state' by 2030 (Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, 2012). For this purpose, Martelly singled out the private sector as the primary agent for creation of wealth and employment, under the slogan 'Haiti is open for business' (ibid). Martelly followed much of the same policies as during the economic liberalization of the 1980s, favouring agribusiness and the establishment of special economic zones, with new investment flagships like the CARACOL Industrial Park in the North-East at the border with the Dominican Republic, and the Nourribo agricultural special economic zone in the North East (Thomas, 2014). He also launched a large-scale tourism project in Île-à-Vache in the South-West, and mining projects in the North. All these projects have been highly controversial, leading to the eviction of peasants from their agricultural land, violence and marginalization.

Martelly's strategy has also affected the ability of the Haitian government to make detailed long-term plans. Whereas the current Strategic Development Plan (PSDH) provides clear guidance on government priorities, it lacks sectoral guidance as to the prioritization of the projects. According to the World Bank, 'this leads to a Public Investment Program composed of projects that are neither fully assessed nor prioritized' (World Bank, 2015, p.4).

The following chapters on resource management and health and education will shed light on the consequences of Martelly's policies, and what has been seen so far of those of President Moïse. Keywords here are the marginalization of small-scale farmers and rural areas in general, increased food insecurity, lack of public and affordable health services, and largely uncontrolled private actors profiting from child trafficking and organized crime.

Rural areas and areas far from the capital Port-au-Prince and the West Department in particular suffer the consequences of a weak state and the lack of public welfare services. As will be seen in the chapter of health and education, international NGOs tend to concentrate their health services in *Département* Ouest and in the capital. In fact, the only visible state institution in some of the more remote areas is the HNP. In a PRIO project based on a survey and on fieldwork in several *departments,*[14]conducted 2007–2014, most interviewees said that they saw the HNP as the representatives of the state, and that they felt considerable trust in the police. The HNP is the most visible state institution in remote areas – in the North and South *départmentes* – and in rural areas. Although the police are, as noted, often poorly staffed in these areas, lacking adequate localities and equipment, the PRIO project found positive attitudes among the population.

As sector planning within development is weak, and much depends on the quality of each project, relations between national and local authorities become particularly important – as do the relations of international NGOs and foreign donors with the local authorities. Haiti's local governance system is quite complex. The 1987 Constitution 1987 divides the country into 10 *départmentes*, 140 *communes* (often referred to as 'municipalities') and 570 communal sections[15] (Laurent and Pierre, 2012, p.7). Participatory assemblies were created at all levels of government. In defining various different territorial collectivities, such as the communal sections, the *communes* and the *département*s, the Constitution made provisions for local executives and assemblies at the different levels, including the Communal Section Council (Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communal (CASEC) and the Communal Section Assembly (Assemblé de la Section Communal (ASEC) at the section communal level; the Municipal Council and the Municipal Assembly at the communal level,

14 The survey was conducted in 11 towns and middle-sized villages across the country in Artibonite, the South-East, Nippes, the South and Grand'Anse (with 3253 respondents) and fieldwork with interviews, focus-group discussions and observation. Fieldwork was carried out in 12 communities across the country in the North-East, Centre, Grand'Anse and the West (Port-au-Prince: Cité Soleil, Martissant), with altogether 1187 participants.

15 The communal sections, designated by the 1987 Constitution, represent an average constituency of fewer than 20,000 residents, and are the country's smallest administrative territorial units (Donais, 2015).

and the Interdepartmental Council (Conseil inter-départmentale (CID) with no corresponding assembly at that level[16] (Laurent and Pierre, 2012) (See Appendix for details.)

During fieldwork in *Département Sud* conducted by Haitian researcher Rachelle Doucet, interviews were carried out with several local members of political parties sitting on municipal councils, mayors, *département* delegates and local NGOs. Interviewees voiced many complaints regarding the work of senators and deputies from the South, as well as the lack of cooperation between locally elected members and the central government. As one respondent put it: 'Senators and deputies are looking for visibility, and they are implementing projects, whereas this should be the task of local authorities (municipalities are bypassed)' (interview, member of a municipal council in *Département Sud*). Or: 'The department delegates have no political or development priorities and are only busy with their own personal interests' (interview, mayor in *Département Sud).* There were also complaints that the senators and deputies from the South (as in other *départements*) make interventions only at election time, to gain support. 'Their priority is only to stay in power' (interview, member of a local NGO in *Département Sud*). 'Their objective is to maintain power during three mandates, so that they can be eligible to retire as senator or deputy. The money they could invest in the development of the municipalities is used to give arms to people, to organize armed groups called *baz*, which will in turn become gangs, which increase insecurity in the country' (interview, member of a local NGO in *Département Sud*).

As to relations between central and local authorities, almost all interviewees complained about the lack of communication and lack of decentralization. As one noted, 'Often some development activity is carried out in a community, but the local authorities are not aware, and they do not participate in the decisionmaking process. For that reason, often the needs of the population are not met, because the population is not consulted when making the decision' (interview, environmental worker in *Département Sud*). However, some nuanced their expressions. One interviewee said, 'It depends on the leadership of the local authorities. For example the mayor of Les Cayes has developed a lot of contacts with the central authorities' (interview, member of a local NGO in *Département Sud*).

Another challenge – and one mentioned by all those interviewed – is that international NGOs too often design their projects without consulting the municipalities, resulting in poorly adapted projects According to one interviewee 'The donors and NGOs do not communicate about their projects. Neither the authorities nor the population are aware of the activities until the project starts, projects are not designed from the bottom and up (interview, environmental worker in *Département Sud*). All interviewees offered advice to donors and NGOs, and all emphasized the same points: 'The donors should ask the NGOs to meet with the local authorities before designing and implementing their projects. They should get information about the real problems faced by the population and avoid imposing their vision on the communities!' (interview, mayor in *Département Sud*). 'The donors should ask the NGO to present an authorization given by the local authorities, showing that these authorities participate in the design of the project and validated its implementation' (interview, member of a municipal council in *Département Sud*). 'Establish dialogue with the local authorities before doing anything' (interview, local politician in *Département Sud*).

The lack of state presence and of a consistent government policy focused on key sectors and issues (and their implementation down to the local level) create many problems and challenges, also leaving the local populations with the impression that they do not count. The tendency of donors and NGOs to bypass the local authorities further strengthens such perceptions in the

16 The departmental-level governance structures envisioned in the Constitution were never established. This means that although the Interdepartmental Council (CID), which is constitutionally mandated to work with the Council of Ministers on national policies related to local governance, only exist on paper (Laurent and Pierre, 2012).

local population. A participatory dialogue process involving local authorities, donors and NGOs around projects and programming could help to strengthen the local authorities and improve contacts between the local and national levels. As yet, this has generally not been achieved.

As some interviewees pointed out, Haiti has a considerable corruption problem. Its Corruption Perceptions Index averaged 18.25 points from 2002 until 2017 (with 0 being 'very corrupt' and 100 'very clean'), reaching an all-time high in 2002 and a record low of 14 points in 2008, during the presidency of René Préval (Transparency International, 2018). In 2017, the Index stood at 22 points.

In November 2017 a Special Haitian Senate Commission issued a 656-page report on the management of USD 2 billion in loan received by Haiti as part of Venezuela's PetroCaribe oil programme. The investigation accused 15 former government officials, including two former prime ministers and current President Jovenel Moïse's chief of staff, of corruption and poor management (Sénat de la République de Haïti, 2017). Under the 2007 PetroCaribe agreement, Haiti was to pay only from 40% to 70% of the bill up-front, with the remainder going into a fund to be repaid over the next 25 years at 1% interest. The Senate report covers 2008–2016, a period that includes four hurricanes in Haiti in 30 days, the 12 January 2010 earthquake and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. In response to these disasters, then-Presidents René Préval and Michel Martelly declared states of emergency, and allowed their respective prime ministers Jean-Max-Bellerive and Laurent Lamothe to approve projects drawing on the PetroCaribe Fund. Bellerive and Lamothe are named in the report, as is former Minister of Commerce Wilson Laleau, currently serving as Chief of Staff for President Jovenel Moïse (Sénat de la République de Haïti, 2017), and several private firms, including one that, according to the Commission's president, Senator Evalière Beauplan, is owned by President Moïse.

The Martelly government 'borrowed' from the Fund for various 'poverty alleviation programmes' with catchy name like *Ede Pèp* (Help the People), *Ti Manman Cherí* (Dear Little Mother) *Aba Grangou* (Down with Hunger) and *Banm Limyè, Banm Lavi* (Give me Light, Give me Life) (Péan, 2015, RNDDH, 2013). However, the real beneficiaries turned out to be Martelly supporters and family members, like his wife Sofia and his son Oliver, who took out millions in salaries for supposedly running these programmes (Péan, 2015).

5. Resource management

The Environment and Energy Challenges

The Environment

A history of exploitation and poverty has taken its toll on the environment and represents an enormous challenge that Haiti has to struggle with today. Already in 1998, UNDP reported that Haiti was losing some 15,000 hectares of arable land every year due to soil degradation (UNDP, 1998b, p. 163). It is estimated that for the loss of between 6,000 and 10,000 of these hectares, deforestation is the major cause (USAID, 1986). In recent decades, forest cover across Haiti has continued to decline dramatically, largely as a result of widespread dependence on traditional sources of biomass for primary energy: this is currently the most important cause of the annual loss of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 hectares of once-fertile land (*New Agriculturalist*, 2013). The deforestation worsens the impact of flooding and heavy rain. Haiti's serious land degradation has its roots in the past. During the colonial period, land clearing, in particular the removal of forest cover for plantation crops such as sugar,[17] tobacco, indigo and coffee, resulted in catastrophic soil erosion (Paskett & Philoctete, 1990). Then the process of repaying the 'debt' to France after independence in 1804[18] continued the deforestation and soil degradation, as foreign exchange was earned through the export of timber and dye woods, particularly mahogany and logwood (ibid).

Forest cover in Haiti has decreased from 20% of total surface in 1956, to less than 2% today according to several sources (UNDP, 1998b; Worldwatch Institute and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports, Energie et Communications, 2014). However, some studies based on analysis of high-resolution satellite images hold that the share of remaining forest is higher, closer to 30% (Churches et al., 2014, Tarter, 2016). According to Churches et al. (2014, p. 203),'at coarse resolutions, the segmented and patchy nature of Haiti's forest resulted in a systematic underestimation of the extent of forest cover'. An important cause of the deforestation is, as mentioned, the energy supply situation. Amid extreme poverty, fuelwood and charcoal account for more than 77% of the country's primary energy supply (Worldwatch Institute and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports, Energie et Communications, 2014). The production and sale of charcoal is a valuable source of income for poor people – indeed, one of the few such possibilities that exist in Haiti. The northwest peninsula has traditionally pro-

17 In 1740 Haiti had 3,000 sugar mills servicing about 30,000 hectares of cane (D'Ans, 1987).

18 During French colonial rule, Haiti exported more wealth to France than the combined total of France's overseas dominions (Di Chiara, 1988). The flow of resources continued also after independence in 1804. Continued French military intimidation forced Haiti to negotiate French recognition in 1825. However, the price was a debt of 150 million gold francs (D'Ans, 1987). Although this debt was reduced to 90 million francs in 1838, it took Haiti 70 years to pay. In the 19th century the price of sugar cane, Haiti's principal commodity, fell, and Haiti had to earn foreign exchange by selling timber and dye woods, as noted. This process resulted in massive increases in soil erosion (Paskett & Philoctete, 1990).

duced about half of the charcoal for the Port-au-Prince market (Pellek, 1990). This is not because the area has large reserves of charcoal-producing trees and shrubs, but because in the semi-arid northwest the production of charcoal is one of the few sources of income. The highest levels of poverty are found in the northern region, where the extreme poverty rate exceeds 40% in the North East and North West, compared to 5% in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince (World Bank, 2015, p. 21).

Energy Challenges

In 2000, biomass fuel (fuelwood and charcoal) accounted for the greatest share (75%) of Haitian energy consumption, followed by motor fuels (15%), fossil fuels (5%), electricity (4%) and feedstock (1%) (Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Bureau of Mines and Energy and Electricity of Haiti, 2006, p.2). In that year, annual final electricity consumption in Haiti was only 84 kWh, the lowest in the Caribbean area; only 12.5% of the population was connected to the grid (ibid). In terms of sectors, industry was responsible for 19% of energy consumption, transport for 12%, households for 65% and services for 4%. By 2011, biomass' share of energy consumption had increased to 77%. (Worldwatch Institute and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports, Energie et Communications, 2014). Fuelwood and charcoal are used mainly used in the household sector (about 80%), primarily for cooking. Stove efficiency is very low, and the intensive use of the fuelwood as energy source for cooking represents a major environmental challenge (Ministry for Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Bureau of Mines and Energy and Electricity of Haiti, 2006, p.3).

Since 2000, industrial energy consumption has increased. Despite accounting for only 10% of Haiti's GDP, industry now consumes 43% of the country's electricity (Worldwatch Institute and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports, Energie et Communications, 2014). Haiti's industrial energy intensity is six times the global average. The textile industry, agribusiness and other sectors are big energy consumers, and energy-efficiency improvements are necessary (Business in Haiti, 2010). However, it should also be borne in mind that access to electricity in Haiti is quite unstable, a challenge which creates various problems with regard to energy efficiency. Thus, even though Haiti was self-sufficient for about 80% of its energy in 2006, the Haitian Ministry for Public Works, Transportation and Communications in its plan for 2007–2017 warned that the country was facing a severe energy crisis, as biomass fuel was the main energy source. In its National Energy Development Plan, the Ministry therefore proposed several new energy policy instruments for changing this situation. Considerable emphasis was put on developing the electricity sector, and particularly through supporting and investing more in the national electricity company *Électricité d'Haïti (EDH)*, which had been underfinanced for decades and needed fresh capital as well as modernization and management improvement. In addition, several measures for improving grid access were proposed, as well as tackling the technical losses of energy and losses due to fraud and theft of electricity (Ministry for Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Bureau of Mines and Energy and Electricity of Haiti, 2006, p. IV). In general, the plan emphasizes the need for better regulations and state control, also concerning the many private firms operating in the energy sector, including within electricity generation. However, there are several challenges related to electricity generation in Haiti and the role of the EDH. The company has a generation capacity of 245 MW, of which about 80% from diesel generators, and the remainder mainly supplied by the Péligre Hydroelectric power station in Artibonite. The challenges of the use of contaminating sources for electricity generation, old infrastructure and technical losses, give rise to questions about electricity production and the role of the EDH in the future.

However, more recent assessments have highlighted the viability of the country's significant renewable energy potential. Haiti has strong solar irradiance throughout the country, many areas with significant wind potential and an under-

utilized potential for small hydropower and biomass facilities (Worldwatch Institute and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports, Energie et Communications, 2014, pp. 27–28). Little of this has yet been developed, although there are some signs of expansion.

One example is the Côte Sud Initiative (CSI), a coalition of UN agencies launched in January 2011, to support the sustainable recovery and development of southwestern Haiti. The Haiti Sustainable Energy Programme (HSE) is a key component of the CSI, led by the Government of Haiti and funded primarily by the Norwegian Government and the IDB (UNEP, 2015, p. 3). Haiti's rural poor – also in *Département Sud* – live mainly in remote areas beyond the national grid, and depend on expensive, dirty and unsustainable solutions, such as burning wood or kerosene. In these areas the best solution can be to promote mini-grids that can provide electricity for both households and businesses. A 3.8 million USD project aims to improve access to modern energy in three coastal towns in *Département Sud* – Roche-a-Bateaux, les Côteaux and Port-a-Piment[19] – through the construction of a solar-diesel hybrid mini-grid system, intended to provide reliable and affordable electricity for up to 1600 households (or 8000 people) (UNEP, 2015, p. 15).

Although President Martelly made energy development one of five key pillars in his administration's strategic agenda, he was not able to follow up on this. The 2012 draft of a National Energy Policy articulated a vision for expansion and improvement of energy services by reforming the country's regulatory and institutional framework and developing renewables alongside fossil fuels (MTPTC, BME and EDH, 2012). However, this policy was never enacted, and therefore has no official influence over energy development. The lack of consistency between plans and the continued absence of a official national energy strategy with clear objectives and deadlines for development have brought considerable uncertainty, representing a major obstacle to progress.

This situation has continued under President Jovenel Moïse. Due to continuous overload and the extremely low stability of the state utility network, there is now a growing demand for solar energy, and local micro-grids and individual installations are becoming increasingly important. However, solar companies operating in Haiti complain of lack of political and legislative support from the state (Wüllenkemper, 2017). At an international conference in Port-au-Prince in August 2017, Nicolas Allen, responsible for the Haitian Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Communications, emphasized the government's intention to promote renewable energy through terms of feeding into the state utility and creating micro-grids (ibid). Upgrading the infrastructure to extend national grid capacity remains a major challenge. The declared goal is also to develop 600,000 micro-grids, drawing power from renewable sources across the country (Wüllenkemper, 2017). However, developments in the energy sector have remained slow.

Assessing the Haitian energy sector in October 2017, President Jovenel Moïse stated that he intended to 'make universal and reliable access to energy a key factor of economic development', highlighting Haiti's potential to use and develop clean and renewable sources of energy (Haiti Libre, 2017). He also called for innovation and investment in the production and distribution of energy. This is a positive signal, but it remains to be seen whether the president's policies will reflect his words. He added, 'We also have to collect revenue. Energy cannot be free' (ibid). That is of course obvious – but, in a country with such high levels of poverty and marginalization, the question is how much, and for whom?

Food Security and Socio-economic Effects of Recent Disasters

Haiti is a Small Island Developing State (SIDS), and such countries are particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate changes, including water shortages, reduced food production, increased storm intensity and rising sea levels. Maplecroft's

19 Funded primarily by the Government of Norway in addition to USAID, IDB and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) International Foundation (UNEP, 2015, p.15).

2014 Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas ranks Haiti as number four in the world in vulnerability to climate impacts[20](Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics, 2014). Poverty, low agricultural production, environmental depletion and limited national capacity to respond to crises have made Haiti especially exposed to natural disasters. 'Even in the case of moderate shocks, there is often the need for WFP to respond' (WFP, 2016, p.2). In 2008 no less than four major hurricanes (Ike, Fay, Hanna and Gustav) struck the country within a period of 30 days, resulting in devastating damages, and displacing some 800,000 people (UNICEF, 2009). Haiti straddles several fault lines; one of these resulted in the devastating earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince, Léogâne, Jacmel and Petit Goâve on 12 January 2010. The earthquake caused more than 220,000 deaths, with long-term effects that have lingered on. It resulted in an estimated USD 7.8 billion in damages (Republic of Haiti, 2010). Since then, Haiti has faced new disasters, like the drought in 2015, Hurricane Matthew (category 4) in October 2016 – which hit the South hard – and two major hurricanes in September 2017 – Irma and Maria (categories 5 and 4 respectively) – that passed north of Haiti (WFP, 2016; FAO, 2017). These disasters have resulted in food shortages and emergencies, but food insecurity in Haiti has deeper roots. The disasters only serve to exacerbate a structurally based problem that Haiti has been struggling with for a long time.

Haiti is heavily dependent on food imports: in 2011 imported foods represented 44% of total food available in Haiti, compared to 19% three decades earlier (FAO, 2015; 2016). Rice is the main staple. Despite the history of dictatorships of François Duvalier (1957–71) and his son Jean Claude Duvalier (1971–86), Haiti was self-sufficient in rice during this period. However, with the structural adjustment and trade liberalization of the late 1980s, Haiti became increasingly dependent on imported rice. This development began in 1981, when the World Bank prepared a new medium-term economic plan for Haiti, presented in an Economic Memorandum in 1982. The World Bank's strategy involved exploiting Haiti's comparative advantages by developing the export potential of agro-industry and the assembly industry (World Bank, 1982, p.40; USAID, 1982, p.122). Larger tracts of flat land were to be reoriented towards the production of export crops like fruits and vegetables for the US winter market. In this process, USAID proposed shifting 30% of all cultivated land from food production for local consumption to production of export crops (USAID, 1982a, p. 172). USAID also sold and distributed freely millions of dollars of low-cost foods in the Haitian local market, thereby depressing the incomes of peasant producers (DeWind & Kinley III, 1988, pp. 98–100). This economic policy resulted in land sales in Haiti, increasing the concentration of landholdings among the better-off farmers and absentee landlords. This was a heavy blow to the rice farmers in the Artibonite. Many peasants were unable to sustain their families by farming and increasingly migrated to Port-au-Prince and to other cities.

In 1986 Haiti embarked on a structural adjustment programme that called for changes in agricultural pricing and trade liberalization (World Bank, 1992). In accordance with the programme, all but 7 of 111 quantitative restrictions were eliminated. The remaining products represented less than 20% of imports and became subject to import licensing without formal ceilings. The general level of protection was drastically reduced and the export tax on coffee was phased out. US exporters benefited from the new economic policies, especially the removal of control on imports. The value of US agricultural exports to Haiti soared, from USD 44 million in 1986 to USD 93 million by 1989. With the Haitian markets liberalized and protective tariffs greatly reduced, rice imports from the United States shot up from 7,400 Metric Tons (MT) in 1980–82 to 109,200 MT in 1990 (World Bank, 1998a, p.11). These developments during the 1980s caused fundamental and permanent damage

20 This is calculated as the product of Haiti's exposure to climate-related events, the health of the population, educational status and the country's overall adaptive capacity (Maplecroft, 2014).

to Haiti's agriculture. Agricultural production declined, irrigation and drainage systems stopped working, and small-scale farmers still producing for domestic consumption found it difficult to survive. The Haitian population is still feeling the consequences of these economic liberalization policies, being at the mercy of import and international prices on their major staple foods.

Rice and wheat account for one-third of the Haitian population's calorie intake:

> Rice is staple food for a majority of Haitians. Although previously self-sufficient in this area, eighty percent of rice now consumed in Haiti is imported. The U.S. is especially competitive in medium quality (10 to 20percent broken) milled rice and in best quality (2 percent) broken rice. The total amount of rice imported was valued at $ 196 million in 2016, which represented a 0.48 percent increase over 2015. Of that amount, $ 190 million of the imported rice came from the U.S. […] The U.S. remains Haiti's largest supplier for wheat, sorghum and millet as well as rice, while the Dominican Republic has become Haiti's largest corn provider. (U.S. Department of Commerce, June 2017, p.1)

This exposure to international markets makes Haiti vulnerable to increasing food prices and to price shocks on the world market. Sudden price increases on imported food have also led to political instability and protests, as in 2008, when large-scale protests against the rise in food prices erupted in Port-au-Prince.

Haiti's first policy and institutional responses to the food-security challenge date back to 1996, when the National Coordination Agency for Food Security (CNSA) was established in Haiti, and a National Plan for Food Security was developed for the first time.[21] The CNSA was established with the task of formulating and coordinating important food-security policies and programmes under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture (MANDR). In addition, the CNSA is responsible for overseeing the use of foreign aid and food-security activities and providing a framework of action for responding to food-security crises (FAO, 2015, pp. 2–3). In 2013, a three-year special Agricultural Recovery Programme was established (PTRA 2013–2016), based on the Agricultural Development Policy plan for 2010–2025, established during the presidency of Preval. A main target of the Agricultural Recovery Programme is to support family farmers, through access to necessary inputs and services for agriculture. However, there is little coherence between the Agricultural Recovery Programme and the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti launched by President Martelly in 2012 (Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, 2012). Martelly's slogan was 'Haiti is open for business', and his economic policies favoured agribusiness and special economic zones (ibid).

As a part of this strategy, CARACOL Industrial Park in the North-East was inaugurated on 22 October 2012. It was established on fertile agricultural land, and peasants who were evicted from their land as well as workers from the zone protested, some of them organized in peasant organizations and in the trade union *Batay ouvriye* (Thomas, 2014). However, they were not heard. Another of Martelly's prestigious projects was the establishment of the first agricultural special economic zone, Nourribio, in the northeast of Haiti, about 30 km from Cap-Haïtien. This zone is run by the Haitian company Agritrans, owned by current President Moïse, growing bananas of which at least 70% are targeted for export. Several peasant organizations and movements have accused the state of confiscating agricultural land that they had acquired legally from the state earlier. Threats and violence against peasant families related to the confiscation of their land have been presented by *Momentum*, the economic journal of the Chambre de Commerce et de l'industrie de l'Ouest de Haïti, as 'une quelconque affaire litigieuse relative au titre de propriété ('a rather

21 The National Plan for Food Security was revised by CNSA in 2010 (FAO, 2015, p. 2). The objectives are to eradicate hunger by 2025, and to guarantee the right to food through various measures to address the many different dimensions of food security. The plan emphasizes the importance of agriculture and productivity growth, aiming to increase the availability of domestically produced food while also generating employment and income in poor rural areas where food security is most severe.

contentious deal related to property titles') *(Momentum,* 2014, p.55).

Many critics speak of 'a war against the peasantry in Haiti' 'anti-peasant development policies', 'development with anti-rural bias' or *'dépaysanisation'* (Dufumier, 1988; Fatton, 2014a; Thomas, 2014; Oxfam, 2012; interviews). Agriculture (mainly small-scale and family plots) still accounts for 80% of employment in rural areas in Haiti and about 50% of employment nationally. And yet. the government neglects this potential in seeking to create employment, choosing to focus on the private sector and the special zones. The Industrial CARACOL Parc had as its goal to create employment for 65 000 persons: as of 2014 it employed only 4 000 (Thomas, 2014, p. 16). Martelly's emphasis on agribusiness and special economic zones has brought greater marginalization of peasants and small-scale agriculture, increased dependency on food import as well as more rural–urban migration, as in the 1980s. Agribusiness is characterized by production of agricultural products for export (to the United States in particular), and tends to consume arable land and most of the access to credit. This leaves small-scale peasants in a squeeze, often resulting in their abandoning agriculture and increasingly migrating to urban areas.

Hurricane Matthew and the South

On 3 and 4 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti with devastating winds and heavy rainfall, causing widespread damage in the southwest of the country. The departments hardest hit were Grande-Anse, Sud, Sud-Est and Nippes (FAO, 2017). Hurricane Matthew caused damage to crops, livestock and fisheries, as well as to rural infrastructure like marketplaces and irrigation systems. In the most-affected areas, up to 100% of the crops were damaged or destroyed; pastures used for livestock grazing were also affected (FAO, 2017, p. 2). Subsistence agriculture, the primary food source for most Haitians was particularly hard hit. The hurricane aggravated the effects of the 2015 drought, and the combined effects of these disasters further reduced peoples' ability to purchase food to feed their families and efforts aimed at resuming production.

Less than a week after Hurricane Matthew struck, the United Nations launched an emergency appeal of USD 120 million. Some 60 million USD (50%) of the total requirements concerned food security, nutrition and emergency agriculture sector (Johnston, 2016c, p. 3). However, most of the funds, USD 46 million, went to short-term food assistance through the WFP, with only about USD 9 million for 'restoration' of rural 'productive capacity.' Moreover, some 85% of the requested funding was for UN agencies, while the remaining 15% was overwhelmingly allocated to large foreign NGOs like CARE and Save the Children. Haitian institutions and organizations appear to have had an extremely limited role (Johnston, 2016c, p. 2). On the whole, the actual contribution to restoring rural productive capacity and to statebuilding and control of the assistance seems to have been quite limited.

In March 2017, nearly half a year after Hurricane Matthew struck, FAO stated that, although food insecurity had been halved in the hardest-hit areas through various types of assistance, 1.55 million Haitians were still food-insecure – 280,000 of them severely affected (FAO, 2017, p1). Furthermore, two out of every three farmers had lost their stock of grain and livestock. The UN and a few donors have some small-scale programmes for assisting farmers, but these are inadequate for helping people out of the crisis. Recently, the situation has become even worse. President Moïse, who had pledged to support the country's agricultural sectors, assigned only 6.9% of next year's budget to assist communities desperately in need of assistance (Bo, 2017). This, in combination with a tax hike that affects the poorest very hard, has led to large protests in Port-au-Prince.

6. Health and education

Health

The poor and marginalized majority in Haiti also suffer the consequences of lack of access to affordable health services and education. Since Aristide's presidency ended in 2004, budget allocations for health in Haiti have decreased sharply. Whereas domestic allocations for health were 16% in 2000 and 16.6% in 2004, they dropped to 8.2% in 2005, followed by a steady downward trend, only 6.1% in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a, p. 8). The Haitian national health system was weak even before the 2010 earthquake, which destroyed 60% of the already dysfunctional health system; 10% of Haiti's medical personnel were killed, or left the country soon after the quake (Doctors without Borders, 2015).

NGOs currently provide about half the health services in Haiti (World Bank, 2015, p.4). As much as 90% of external funding for health is off-budget and thus difficult to track; most of it is channelled via NGOs. Health issues are a central concern for the Haitian population, and four challenges in particular stand out: First, the country simply does not have enough *health professionals*. As emphasized by USAID, 'attracting and retaining qualified health professionals is a chronic struggle, with as few as four health professionals per 10,000 people' (USAID and Government of Haiti 2016, p.1). As much as 80% of all physicians educated in Haiti leave within five years of graduation, to practice abroad (Partners in Health, 2013). Of those who stay in Haiti, most practice in Port-au-Prince, which makes it difficult for people in rural areas to get access to health care. Second, *poverty* exacerbates the problems of inadequate healthcare, particularly for women, children and youth. Haiti has a very high percentage of teenage pregnancies. Third, *environmental disasters*, like the 2010 earthquake, have increased the occurrence of vector-borne diseases like dengue and malaria, and now also zika. Fourth, large segments of the population, particularly children in the most marginalized areas, suffer from *poor nutrition*.

Much foreign assistance within the health sector has followed after natural disasters and has been aimed at emergency operations. This type of post-catastrophe responses has frequently taken the form of construction or rehabilitation of hospitals – however, without any planning for how running costs will be covered after the initial emergency has passed (World Bank, 2017a, p.4). According to Doctors without Borders, many of these new hospitals, like the one in Carrefour, stand 'as empty shells because of inadequate planning to ensure proper trained staff, sufficient drugs, money, guaranteed maintenance, and medical material to run them' (Doctors without Borders, 2015, p. 1). External financing has also been volatile, surging in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, but declining sharply afterwards, with the health sector among the most affected. Moreover, this type of funding has meant that little resources have been invested in primary and preventive health care. Currently, only 19% of expenditures on health go to preventive care, while 54% is allocated to curative care. This has negative consequences for women in particular (World Bank, 2017a, p.11)

The greatest obstacles to healthcare for the poor in Haiti are financial and geographical. Almost all health facilities (93%) charge user fees (World Bank, 2017a, p. 9) – a great burden for the poorest populations. A survey showed that 63% of households in the lowest wealth quintile did

not consult a health provider when they needed it, because they could not afford it (ibid). Secondly, after finance, transportation was the most common factor that prevented women aged 15–49 from accessing health services.

Women and girls in particular suffer from insufficient health services in Haiti. This group is also very vulnerable to Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV). Official statistics on the scale of violence against women and girls in Haiti do not exist, but available evidence indicates that 28% of women aged 15–49 reported having experienced physical violence, and that more than one out of every 10 Haitian women has experienced sexual violence at some point in life (Cayemittes et al., 2012). Evidence from the clinic of Doctors without Borders in Port-au-Prince, *Pran men'm,* shows that the victims are also quite young: between May 2015 and March 2017 patients under 25 represented the vast majority of all survivors of SGBV that the MSF treated (Doctors without Borders, 2017, p. 7). Of these, 53% were below 18 years of age. More than 83% of the patients were rape survivors. Although 97% of the clinic's patients were female, SGBV also affects men and boys. Of the 33 male SGBV survivors treated in the clinic in this period, 23 patients were minors (77%) including 13 under the age of 10 years (ibid). Men and boys are also less likely to report, because of the associated social stigma. Follow-up of patients/victims also represents a pressing challenge. As noted in the MSF report 'Longer-term, safe and secure shelter solutions remain one of the greatest and most urgent needs for our patients' (Doctors without Borders, 2017, p. 20).

Most of the private health institutions and most of the state ones are found in the west of the country. It is the Haitian state and in some cases a few mixed private/public institutions that cover the most marginalized areas (MSPP, 2011). The lack of qualified health professionals and the generally weak health system tend to affect the poorest and marginalized areas the most, particularly vulnerable groups like women, children and youth. Some of the most marginalized départements, like Nord-Est, Nord-Ouest and Nippes, have particularly low coverage of health services related to pregnancy, births and complicated abortions. Of the 35 medical institutions in Nord-Est (including polyclinics and dispensaries), only two are able to provide this kind of maternal care; the figure for Nippes is four out of 26 (MSPP, 2011, p. 65).

In Grand'Anse, user fees have been removed for maternal and child health services in several facilities. This brought a 200% greater attendance level there than in other health facilities where the existing cost-sharing scheme is applied, and reveals the unmet needs of the poor (World Bank, 2017, p.16). Removal of user fees is one possible way of improving the access of the poor to health services in the future, but since user fees constitute an important part of health facilities' operating budgets, this move would have to be carefully assessed, so as not to affect the availability or quality of services.

Only through medical cooperation with Cuba has Nippes been able to cover most of its *communes.* Indeed, Cuban doctors have been working in all the *départements* of Haiti, assisting directly in keeping the national system functioning in the most marginalized and difficult areas (Cantón Otaño, 2013). In addition to sending doctors to Haiti and being at the forefront in the struggle against Cholera in the country, Cuba has for decades offered free education to Haitian medicine students studying in Cuba. Since 1999, the University of Medicine in Santiago (eastern Cuba) has trained more than 900 Haitian physicians and other medical personnel. Whereas there is a general tendency for Haitian doctors trained in Haiti (about 80%) to seek work in other countries, those trained in Cuba are more likely to return to Haiti and become part of the national health system. Out of 625 Haitian medicine students that received their medical diplomas in Cuba in 2010, only 1/6 left to work outside of Haiti[22](Cantón Otaño, 2013).

22 Of the remaining medical students with diplomas, 213 obtained work in public health institutions in Haiti, another 125 in the medical brigades fighting cholera in Haiti, 72 in private institutions or with NGOs in Haiti, 41 continued specializing in Cuba, 27 were in Haiti, waiting to start working, and 14 in diverse situations (pregnancy leave, etc) (Cantón Otaño, 2013). The 104 who left Haiti obtained work in the USA or Europe.

In summary, there is a deep need for more long-term investment in the Haitian health sector, and particularly in primary and preventive healthcare. There is also a need for greater government control of the use of resources for health, and coordination of donor funds to ensure that they adhere to the MSPP's prioritized *Plan Directeur* (World Bank, 2017, p.15).

Education

NGOs or private-for profit institutions run more than 80% of primary and secondary schools in Haiti (World Bank, 2015, p. 4). The 2010 earthquake took a heavy toll, but even before that, the school system was poor. The lack of government investment in schools had opened up a huge market for the private sector. The majority of Haitian schools did not receive any subsidies, making basic education an expensive privilege that depended on the socio-economic status of the family. According to a 2009 Fafo survey, 'Almost half of Haitian students enrolled in schools were attending commercial, private schools, while an additional 21% were attending other non-public schools…A third of those enrolled were attending public schools' (Sønsterudbråten, 2010, p. 67). Fafo also noted slow progress among many of those enrolled. Primary school completion rate was only 29, meaning that only 29% of young people aged 12–18 had started and completed their education (Sønsterudbråten, 2010, p. 74). The explanations included delayed entry into primary school, particularly among the poorer segments of the population, widespread class-repetition (due to failed exams) and high drop-out rates. Over 80% of enrolled youth aged 16 or older had repeated at least one class, and over 50% had repeated several times (Lunde, 2010, p.14). Drop-out rates were also closely related to costs, as school costs were high, particularly in the dominant private sector and in higher grades (Sønsterudbråten, 2010, p. 89). In general, primary school enrolment rates increased from less than 50% in 2005/2006 to 77% of all children aged 6–11 in 2012, but only 12% of the total stock came from the public education sector (Government of Canada, 2015; SDC, 2015).

Another factor that influences educational attainment is location. Rural areas have been clearly disadvantaged in this regard, and students from such areas have performed worse on all indicators. 'While 13% of rural youth aged between 12 and 24 had no formal education, this was true for 7% in urban areas (Sønsterudbråten, 2010, p.76).

Schooling costs play an important role in education attainment. These vary greatly according to place of residence, education level and type of school. Public primary schools in rural Haiti are the cheapest, where the mean total annual costs amount to HTG 1,830 (USD 47).The most expensive option is private university education in the capital, which has a mean annual school cost of HTG 22, 603 (USD 5,656) (ibid, p.84). Even public schools are not free, as pupils must cover cost of books and other equipment. Fafo found that 99.7% of all enrolled youth reported that they had to pay school-related expenses (ibid, p.83). Further, the percentage of children completing primary school within the normal four-year cycle was low across all the socio-economic divides – except for the wealthiest: 'The richest 20%, however, had a significantly higher share of children completing primary school compared to the rest of the population' (ibid, p.86).

In its report, and based on the finding from the survey, Fafo emphasizes that merely getting children enrolled is not sufficient. The report recommends '1) ensuring the content and quality of education, and 2) that children proceed and graduate, rather than focusing solely on enrolment' (Lunde, 2010, p. 15).

Natural disasters have taken a heavy toll on schools and education in Haiti. According to the UN, some 5,000 schools were damaged by the 2010 earthquake (OCHA, 2010, p.6), and over 1,500 teachers and personnel lost their lives (Sønsterudbråten, 2010, p.65). The Ministry of Education was one of the buildings that collapsed in the earthquake, and many of its personnel died.

After the 2010 earthquake, other natural disasters have followed, several affecting the education sector. When Hurricane Matthew struck in October 2016, it caused severe damage to

schools and education throughout the country; an estimated 490,000 children had their schooling interrupted due to the impacts of the hurricane (UNICEF, 2017a, p. 3). In October 2017, UNICEF reported that since Hurricane Matthew struck in October 2016, altogether 120 schools that sustained only roof damage had been repaired, facilitating the return of more than 30,000 pupils and the school personnel in the four départements hardest hit by the hurricane – Grand'Anse, Nippes, North-West and South (UNICEF, 2017b, p. 3).

During and after the hurricane, 86 schools had been used as temporary shelters. By October 2017 altogether 43 of these schools had received school furniture, and sanitation had been rehabilitated in 40 schools (UNICEF, 2017b, p. 4). However, UNICEF's support represents only some 60% of the sector's total response in terms of rehabilitation, and in October 2017 UNICEF reported that about 30% of all affected schools still needed to be repaired. This will require additional financial resources (UNICEF, 2017b, p. 3).

In addition, two major hurricanes passed north of Haiti on 7 and 22 September 2017 – Irma and Maria, categories 5 and 4 respectively. The most exposed *départements* were the North, North-East and Nord-Ouest where there were heavy rains and flooding. Three schools were destroyed in Nord-Ouest, and 21 were severely damaged (UNICEF, 2017b, p. 2).

The education sector in Haiti remains weak in many aspects. According to the IDB, educational reform in Haiti has in general not progressed, and the Government of Haiti has been unable to leverage resources to finance a programme of free education (IDB, 2016).

7. Organized crime

Several mechanisms for fighting drug use and trafficking in Haiti were established during President Aristide's second term. On 31 May 2002 the National Commission for the Fight against Drugs (Commission Nationale de la Lutte Contre la Drogue, CONALD) was established (OAS, 2004, p.1). Then, on 4 November 2002, the National Drug Observatory (Observatoire Haitien des Drogues, OHD) was established with assistance from the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), and began several surveys, including on the use of different types of drugs in Haiti. Haiti participated in CICAD's Uniform Statistical System on Control of the Supply Area (CICDAT) and reported statistics on quantity of drugs seized, number of seizures by drug type and persons arrested (ibid, p.3), and submitted statistics to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on a regular basis.

Haiti has a law from 21 February 2001 that criminalizes money laundering. This law includes illicit drug trafficking, trafficking firearms, human beings and fraud 'as predicate offences' (OAS, 2004, p.8). In December 2003 the Central Financial Information Unit (L'Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers, UCREF) became operational. UCREF is placed under the National Committee to Combat Money Laundering and has its own budget. It conducts analyses, reports findings and investigates and transmits relevant cases to the Government Commissary for Judicial Prosecutions (OAS, 2004, p.9). During the 2016 presidential elections, UCREF produced an investigative report on the-then presidential candidate Moïse, raising questions of possible money laundering. Shortly after being installed as president, Moïse (on 19 April 2017) replaced UCREF Director Sonel Jean-Francois, only one year into his three-year term (Clavel, 2017; Johnston, 2017). Reactions from human rights organization soon followed. Pierre Esperance of the Human Rights Defence network pointed out that the law governing the UCREF established a clear process for selecting a new Director General, and that Moïse had violated the law. Esperance referred to this event as 'an extremely serious matter' *(Le Nouvelliste,* 2016). Only a few weeks later, the Haitian Parliament approved a new law on UCREF. Whereas the UCREF Director General had previously been selected in a process directed by five representatives from independent bodies, the new law enabled the president to approve three of the five representatives, thus granting the executive *de facto* control over the entity. Some MPs raised their voices in opposition, but there was little serious resistance to Moïse's agenda within the Parliament (*Le Nouvelliste*, 2017). As noted, these elections took place in a process tainted by violence and fraud without safeguards against candidates with criminal records. Several MPs are themselves subject to allegations about money laundering and drug trafficking.

Haiti is often referred to as a frequently used trans-shipment point for cocaine originating in Colombia and Venezuela and destined for consumer markets in the United States and Canada. However, a 2015 report of Public Safety Canada points out that the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) holds that Haiti is not a major source country for drugs that end up on the Canadian market: 'Neighbouring Dominican Republic is the largest source of cocaine to Canada, arriving by commercial aircraft and mari-

time cargo. …The Dominican Republic is thus a hub for drug shipments arriving in Canada both by commercial air (smaller quantities of cocaine at more frequent intervals) and marine cargo (larger quantities at a time)'(Burt et al., 2015, p. 16). The report finds evidence of this in a 2009 Criminal Intelligence Report which stated 'There has been an increase in cocaine seizures made in the airmode that transited the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic' (RCMP, 2009). However, the report also states that if interdiction efforts off the coast of the Dominican Republic gain traction, drugs could be shipped into Haiti, then trafficked across the border and shipped from the Dominican Republic to Canada. While keeping open this possibility of a changing pattern, the report states that the Dominican Republic has remained the country of focus of the CBSA (Burt et al., 2015, p. 17).

Almost as if in response to the Canadian report, officials in the Dominican Republic in November 2015 stated that drug traffickers were now diverting shipments to neighbouring Haiti. According to a press release from the Dominican Republic's National Drugs Control Agency (DNCD), drug traffickers were now landing drug shipments from South America in Haiti and not the Dominican Republic, due to strengthened efforts by the DNCD (Daugherty, 2015, p. 1). Recent seizures of 'significant' amounts of drugs near the Haitian border were cited as evidence of this trend (ibid). The DNCD responded, in coordination with the Dominican Republic's military, by stepping up land, sea and air patrols near Haitian waters and along the shared border, the release informed. However, an InSight Crime Analysis points out that there are reasons to doubt these statements from the Dominican Republic and that essentially the DNCD seems to be 'congratulating itself on a job well done' (Daugherty, 2015, p.1). On the other hand the InSight Crime analysis also notes that there may be a resurgence in Caribbean trafficking routes, as several Central American nations have installed radars and have passed laws that allow suspected drug flights to be shot down (ibid). Traffickers may be reviving Caribbean routes to the US drug market (a favoured route during the 1980s) or trying to establish new ones, which could lead to greater use of Hispaniola as a key trans-shipment point.

According to documents tracing various types of trafficking, Haiti is also referred to as a source, transit and destination country for forced labour and sex trafficking (US Department of State, 2016, 2017; Lumos, 2017; Walk Free Foundation, 2016). The Global Slavery Index ranks Haiti as number eight globally for modern-day slavery, where human trafficking is a defining factor (Walk Free Foundation, 2016). Every year the US State Department issues a congressionally mandated report on human trafficking, categorizing countries into four 'tiers' according to their governments' efforts to combat trafficking. The 2016 report placed Haiti on Tier 3 – countries that do not cooperate in the fight against trafficking. However, in the 2017 report Haiti has been moved to Tier 2 – Watch List; 'the Government of Haiti does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so' (US Department of State, 2017a, p.1)

Child trafficking represents a considerable problem in Haiti. According to a report by LUMOS, [23] children living outside families – in residential institutions or on the streets – are at increased risk of trafficking. A growing body of evidence, including research and case studies undertaken by LUMOS, indicates that the governance of such institutions is so poor and tracking of children in the care system so weak, that these children are at high risk of being trafficked 'This makes institutionalized children in Haiti one of the most vulnerable groups in the community' (LUMOS, 2017, p. 13).

23 LUMOS is founder and member of the European Expert Group on the Transition from Institutional to Community Based Care (EEG). LUMOS has been instrumental in the development of guidelines and toolkits in 13 European languages in order to guide national governments through the process of deinstitutionalization and transiting to community-based care service.

An estimated 32,000 children in Haiti live in approximately 760 residential institutions or 'orphanages' (L'Institut du Bien Etre Social et de Recherches (IBESR), 2013). In 2013 the government department responsible for children, IBESR (the Institute of Social Welfare and Research), conducted a study which revealed that less than 15% of the institutions are registered with Haitian authorities and that more than 80% of these children have at least one living parent (IBESR, 2013). The study also revealed that the primary reasons for admission to institutions are poverty and lack of access to basic health, education and social services. The government has classified orphanages as 'green' (meeting minimum standards), 'yellow' (meeting some of the standards but requiring improvement) and 'red' (failing to meet any standards, and thus requiring immediate closure) (IBESR, 2013).

Case evidence from LUMOS' research indicates a trend where Haitian orphanages engage in child trafficking, a consistent pattern where

> [...]orphanage 'directors' pay 'child-finders' to recruit children for the orphanage. In some instances, families are paid to give their children away. In others they are deceived into believing their children will receive an education and have a better life. The orphanage uses the children to persuade donors to give them money. The sums received are far in excess of the money spent on looking after children. In many cases, children are neglected and abused in the orphanage. There is witness evidence of children disappearing or dying without record. Criminal investigations and prosecutions of such cases are rare. (LUMOS, 2017, p.5).

In its report LUMOS cites six cases where international and Haitian volunteers, social workers, child-protection professionals, and others who have visited, worked in, or intervened in orphanages in Haiti have witnessed child trafficking and abuses. In one case, representatives from LUMOS visited an institution classified as 'red' by IBESR. Finding appalling living conditions there, they provided the children with drinking water and fresh food, and ensured that each had medical examination and treatment. Eight girls, aged 10 to 15, had vaginal infections. In early 2016 a social worker visited this same institution and found that a 17-year old girl had gone missing. The pastor in charge of the institution explained that she had gone home to her parents. The social worker visited the family and found the girl there, pregnant. She told the social worker that she had been raped by a member of the staff in the institution, and that, when the pastor found out, he tried to force her to marry the rapist. (LUMOS, 2017, p.24) Such examples indicate that considerable abuse of children may take place in these institutions, with only the tip of the iceberg revealed so far.

In its report, LUMOS finds that what happens in many of the Haitian orphanages fits the international definition of 'child trafficking':

> the child has been moved within the country – sometimes by coercion, often by deception – with the purpose of exploitation. Some of the cases involved hard labor and sexual exploitation. However, in others, the exploitation is more subtle: the orphanage existed, and children were recruited, not with the purpose of providing care and protection for the vulnerable. Instead the primary motivation was financial profit. (LUMOS, 2017, p. 27).

LUMOS concludes with a series of recommendations to various actors in Haiti, including international donors. Currently LUMOS is working together with IBESR and other organizations to draft a plan for some 140 institutions where children are at severe risk; they conclude that it is essential to scale up and accelerate efforts to address orphanage trafficking in Haiti. Diplomats interviewed for this study have also confirmed the importance of LUMOS' work. LUMOS notes that the Haitian government has demonstrated political will to address child trafficking, but that limited capacity and lack of resources mean that committed civil servants are overloaded for addressing problems of this scale (LUMOS, 2017).

LUMOS' work in cooperation with IBESR shows that it is possible to reunite children from

the orphanages with their families, and to follow up and contribute with support packages to the families, enabling them to care for their children and to send them to school (LUMOS, 2017, p. 32). This is possible at reasonable cost per child – particularly if compared to costs in the orphanages, where the money in several cases has been spent by criminals who abuse the children.

The orphanages in Haiti are predominantly privately run, and generally funded by foreign donors – often by small foundations, NGOs, churches and individuals (LUMOS, 2017). These contributors may have the best of intentions, unaware of what is actually going on. It is difficult to get a full overview of the funding of the orphanages, as 85% of them are private. However, LUMOS reports that, in 2015, charitable organizations received 373 billion USD from the United States (LUMOS, 2017, p.8). Not all these donations are used for orphanages, although the share is probably large. There is no reliable research evidence available to enable estimation of the amounta donated to orphanages.

LUMOS' recommendations to international donors:

- Ensure that none of the donors' own funds are used to build, renovate or support orphanages.
- Prioritise investment in the strengthening of health, education and *community-based support services* that make it possible for families to care for their own children.
- Prioritise investment in IBESR to implement the goals of their Child Protection Strategy.
- Prioritise investment in the Anti-Trafficking Committee in the development and implementation of its National Strategy and Plan of Action.
- Support the implementation of the strategy to close approximately 140 orphanages where children are at the greatest risk of harm, abuse and trafficking (LUMOS, 2017, p.36).

8. The regional situation

The United States, the Dominican Republic and Cuba have been of particular importance for Haiti's political and socio-economic development, albeit in differing ways. Relations with these three countries has been referred to throughout this analysis, with most emphasis on the role of the USA. In the following, Haiti's relations with these countries is summarized, with some new aspects included.

The United States

This political economy analysis has revealed the various facets of US influence over Haiti ever since the US occupation 1915–1934. At that time the USA contributed to shape and consolidate the role of the Haitian Army. The economic elite in Haiti has, as discussed, also had considerable support from the United States, particularly from actors on the Republican side, whereas Aristide and the Lavalas movement have had support from the Black Caucus in Congress and from some Democrats and personalities within the Haitian diaspora. The US government has had considerable influence over Haitian elections. When Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State, pressure was put on the CEP and support for elections withheld when the CEP wanted to establish commissions to investigate electoral fraud.

It is not only with regard to security actors, the economic elite and elections that the USA has influenced Haiti. US export and trade policies have been of great importance. Haiti has been a place where the USA could dump its surplus of heavily subsidized domestic rice production. These policies became possible in the 1980s and later when the international financial institutions and US actors cooperated in pressuring Haiti to liberalize its economy and remove almost all import barriers. These policies have destroyed much of Haiti's agricultural production and have made the country almost completely dependent on the import of US rice.

Shortly after the 2010 earthquake, the USA sent 10, 000 soldiers to Haiti. They occupied the airport in Port-au-Prince and controlled other strategic sites: the harbour, the Presidential Palace and the main hospital. In the disastrous situation after the earthquake, with extreme humanitarian emergency assistance needs, the USA gave priority to granting landing permits to its own military airplanes. On Sunday 18 January 2010, Jarry Emmanuel, in charge of WFP air transport logistics, stated: 'There are 200 flights going in and out every day, which is an incredible amount for a country like Haiti. But most flights are US military' (Naiman, 2010, p.1). Flights with essential emergency equipment were refused permission to land in Port-au-Prince, including several flights from Médecines sans frontières, outraging many humanitarian organizations.

Many Haitians, not least within the Haitian diaspora in the United States, dislike the Clintons for several reasons. One is that they have issues with Hillary and Bill Clinton's work in Haiti, from the way the Clinton Foundation spent money after the 2010 earthquake. Another concerns how the USA influenced the Haitian elections while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State (discussed in chapter three). When Donald Trump visited 'Little Haiti' in Miami on 19 October 2016 during his election campaign, he declared: 'I want to tell you, they hate the Clintons, because what's happened in Haiti with the Clinton Foundation is a disgrace. And you know it and they know it and everybody know it' (Buteau, 2016, p.1). However, if many Haitians

had been disappointed with the Clintons, they were to be equally disappointed with Trump. Already in November 2017 the Trump administration gave nearly 60,000 Haitians with provisional legal US residency 18 months to leave, announcing that the administration would not renew the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that had allowed them to remain in the United States for more than seven years (De Young and Miroff, 2017). Trump has also been accused of racism and stigmatization, commenting in June 2017 that 15,000 USA-bound Haitian immigrants 'all have AIDS', stirring up anger and disappointment among Haitians (Charles, 2017, p. 1).

In this summary of US–Haitian relations, it should be added, that apart from the US government, the Republican Party and US businesses, there have been US actors and organizations operating in Haiti that have done an excellent job in assisting the population where the need has been great. One example is Partners in Health, which has contributed much-needed health services and investments in the health sector in Haiti.

The Dominican Republic

Relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have often been strained and difficult, for various reasons. First, the Dominican Republic has tended to become the place of refuge for Haitian ex-militaries involved in coups and shady criminal activities. Secondly, this bilateral relation has been very important for Haiti, as Haitians traditionally have migrated to the Dominican Republic in search of work – often on slave contracts, with hard work on the sugar plantations, long working days, very bad living conditions and low wages. In addition, recent developments in the Dominican Republic's law regulations have made life very difficult for Haitian migrants who have lived in the Dominican Republic for many years.

After the 2010 earthquake, migration to the Dominican Republic peaked slightly. However, a 23 September 2013 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) of the Dominican Republic made big changes to the lives of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. According to this ruling, Juliana Deguis Pierre, born in the Dominican Republic in 1984, had been wrongly registered as a Dominican at birth. According to the CT, her parents could not prove that their migration status in the Dominican Republic was regular and therefore must be considered as 'foreigners in transit' by Dominican legislation (Gamboa & Ready, 2014, p. 53). In consequence, Pierre was not entitled to the citizenship granted her at birth, and she would be de-nationalized. Following this, the CT also ordered the Dominican Civil Registry Agency to review all births registered after 1929, and to remove from these registries all persons who were deemed wrongly registered.

This 2013 CT ruling has had enormous consequences for Haitian migrants and their descendants in the Dominican Republic. After a new controversial regularization plan for foreigners in the Dominican Republic in 2015, streams of Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent began to flow back into Haiti. Between July 2015 and August 2016, at least 135,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants working in the Dominican Republic re-entered Haiti (HRW, 2017, p. 6). Dominican officials deported more than 27,000 people; a further 24,254 were deported without official documentation, while others fled under pressure or threat (ibid). According to HRW, many of these deportations did not meet international standards, and people were swept up in arbitrary, summary deportations without any type of hearing.

Some of the poorest and worst off arrived in unofficial camps in the Anse-a-Pitre area in Haiti, with harsh conditions and with little or no access to basic services (HRW, 2017). In April and May 2016, some 580 families from these camps were relocated into housing by humanitarian organizations.

Cuba

Relations between Haiti and Cuba have generally been good, except for during the Duvalier dictatorships. There are several reasons for this positive bilateral relationship. One concerns the cultural

and historic ties between Haiti and Cuba. For example, in Cuba's Camagüey province more than 40,000 residents are descendants of Haitians who migrated to Cuba in the early 20th century in search of work on the sugar and coffee plantations (Cantón Otaño, 2013, p. 157). This Cuban province has often hosted cultural festivals with participation at the ministerial level from both countries, with dance, music, art exhibitions and seminars.

It is Cuba's assistance to the Haitian health sector that stands out. As noted, Cuba has provided free medicine education to over 1000 Haitian doctors, most of them at the University of Medicine in Santiago de Cuba on Cuba's east coast, quite close to Haiti. Cuban doctors have been at the forefront in the fight against cholera, with several medical brigades dispatched to Haiti for this purpose. Health-sector cooperation assumed important dimensions from 1998 and onwards, during René Preval's presidency in Haiti, and after Hurricane George (ibid). Cuban medical brigades in Haiti were already present when the earthquake struck in January 2010, and were among the very few foreigners able to work and save lives in Port-au-Prince during the first critical 48 hours after the disaster. The Cuban doctors were particularly efficient, as they were accustomed to working with few resources and under difficult conditions.

In addition, there has been cooperation between the two countries within several other sectors, including (ecological) agriculture, fishery and education. In 1999 the Haitian government formally asked Cuba for assistance to combat illiteracy in the country. The first literacy campaign with Cuban educators in Haiti began in 1999, using radio emissions to reach out (Cantón Otaño, 2013, p. 158). Cuba is well-known worldwide for the successful method *Yo sí puedo* ('Yes, I can do it') which has helped to eliminate illiteracy in several countries in South America. This programme was introduced in Haiti in 1999, with initial efforts to provide material in Creole for the first phase and French in the second phase. The programme has since continued.

9. Conclusions

The history of Haiti is one of colonialism and occupation, of extreme inequalities and the persistence and consolidation of a small economic elite kept in power with the support of Haitian security forces and external actors. Given the massive challenges after the devastating earthquake of January 2010, the eyes of the world have been on Haiti. The country has seen a very heavy presence of external actors, including donors, multilateral agencies, the UN force MINUSTAH (with extended mandate), and international NGOs, many of them with very different agendas. The president elections of Michel Martelly in 2011 and of Jovenel Moïse in 2016 were characterized by irregularities, fraud, protests, violence, and very low voter turnouts. They were also characterized by the support provided by Haiti's economic elite to the candidates and by the heavy influence of external actors, the United States in particular. In consequence, after the 2010 earthquake, Haiti has been governed by two presidents with very low political legitimacy. This leaves the majority of poor Haitians with an all-too-familiar challenge: how to handle marginalization and lack of influence over national policies? This may easily erupt in new and violent protests – indeed, it already has. Recognition of the importance of listening to the opposition, and seeking to facilitate dialogue, should therefore be of primary concern to donors and NGOs working to promote the development of Haiti.

This report has analysed Haiti's socio-economic structure and explored the development within sectors, such as environmental protection and energy production, agriculture, disasters and food security, health and education – and, not least, with regard to security and organized crime. The analysis has been conducted within a framework of continued focus on the importance of statebuilding and the local dimensions the developments within different sectors, particularly the South.

The challenges to statebuilding have been two-faceted. On the one hand, the Haitian government has had little influence over most of the international assistance that was brought to the country after the 2010 earthquake, as much of it was channelled via multilateral agencies and NGOs, and as the Haitian authorities had little leverage over the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). On the other hand, post-earthquake Haitian presidents Martelly, and Moïse, have mainly sought to strengthen the private sector, with little progress in institution building, decentralization or local participation.

During the presidencies of Martelly and Moïse, there has been strong emphasis on agribusiness and the establishment of special economic zones, with project flagships such as CARACOL industrial park, the Nourribo banana production zone and tourism investments in Île-à-Vache, in addition to mining concessions in the north. With little investment in production for domestic consumption, imports of food – particularly rice from the United States – have increased, making Haiti even more dependent on world market prices, and further exacerbating food insecurity. Although some donors have had projects targeted at small-scale agriculture, the Haitian government has done little to support this target group. The special economic zones failed to yield the targeted figures for employment. Moreover, agriculture currently employs 80% of Haiti's rural population, and many peasants were evicted from their land in connection with the prestigious special economic zones project. Many critics, including OXFAM and several persons interviewed for this study,

term these policies anti-rural and anti-peasant. As a further negative side-effect, these policies have tended to increase rural–urban migration, a very unwelcome development in Haiti.

Haiti faces major challenges in transforming its reliance on biomass energy (mainly charcoal and fuelwood) into the production and use of more sustainable forms of energy. There has been some progress, with the IDB and some donors restoring and preserving the hydroelectric power station Peligré in Artibonite, and with UNEP and some donors, including Norway, investing in a combination of alternative energy sources, particularly in the South of Haiti. In October 2017 the World Bank approved new grants for renewable energy. Research has shown the large and unused potential for the production of alternative forms of energy, particularly solar and wind energy. President Martelly failed to follow up on the long-term energy plan with concrete policies. President Moïse has energy as an important point on his political agenda, but it remains to be seen whether he will be able to convert this into concrete political priorities and actions.

Health and education are two more sectors that represent huge challenges in Haiti. Government allocations for health have diminished continuously after Aristide's ouster in 2004 and are now at a record low of 6.1%. About 50% of the health services are private; most health institutions demand user fees, but private health services are more expensive, beyond the reach of many poor Haitians. Most international assistance has also been post-catastrophic, focusing on curative rather than primary and preventive health services. The situation in the education sector is even worse than in the health sector. NGOs or private for-profit institutes run more than 80% of Haiti's primary and secondary schools. Education is expensive, and even the few public schools that exist are not completely free, so many poor families have problems keeping their children in school, and dropout rates are high. It is essential to focus not only on enrolment, but also on establishing conditions that can facilitate quality and affordability in the education system.

Haiti has had seven different UN forces deployed since 1993. The last one, MINUSTAH, ended its mandate on 15 October 2017, to be replaced by a smaller follow-on peacekeeping mission in Haiti, MINUJUSTH, mandated to assist the Government of Haiti in strengthening rule-of-law institutions, to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis. Part of MINUSTAH's work has been to train the new HNP, established in 1995, after President Aristide dissolved the army. This work has been relatively successful, and in general the HNP enjoys more popular support than MINUSTAH ever did, despite the challenges and problems. A current challenge for the HNP is to strike a good balance between preventive community policing and maintenance of order; another is to recruit more women. A great overall challenge is the weak justice system and the relationship between the work of the HNP and the justice system. President Martelly and President Moïse worked to re-establish the army, which has now become a reality, against the protests of ordinary Haitians and human-rights workers in Haiti, as well as external actors. This represents a step backwards, and a threat to the respect for human rights and neutrality in the practice of rule of law in Haiti.

Among many Haitians, the HNP is perceived of as the state itself. Particularly in rural areas, a police station and a few police officers may represent the only presence of any state institution. The lack of visibility of the state is overwhelming in other sectors, not least in welfare and education. Also with regard to decentralization and contact between local authorities and Port-au-Prince, contacts between the local police structures and government agencies in Port-au-Prince are sometimes better than contacts between local authorities and government agencies. The lack of statebuilding and state control over many sectors represents a danger also with regard to organized crime, particularly in child trafficking and abuse of children and youth. The many orphanages run by private agencies and motivated by profit, often with severe cases of child abuse, bear testimony to the overall need for a stronger Haitian state that can take control.

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Appendix

Haiti: Local government levels and governing bodies

Level	Decentralized Government Entity	Composition and Tasks
Section Communal 570	Communal Section Council (Conseil d'administration de la Section Communal (CASEC)	• Each CASEC is constituted by three councillors that are responsible for the administration of the Communal Section. • They are directly elected for a term of four years.
	Communal Section Assembly Assemblé de la Section Communal (ASEC)	• According to the population of the Communal Section, the number of ASEC members varies from 6 to 11. • According to the Constitution of 1987, they are responsible for «assisting the CASEC in its work». • The members are directly elected to four-years terms, with elections running concurrently with the CASECs.
Commune 140	Municipal Council (Conseil Municipal)	• Each Municipal Council is constituted by three councillors. • The president of the council has the title Mayor, and is assisted by two Deputy Mayors (Maires Adjoints). • These persons are responsible for the administration of the entire commune, and are directly elected by commune citizens for a four-year term. • Each Municipal Council has the possibility to receive assistance from a Technical Council (Conseil Technique) provided by the Central Government.
	Municipl Assembly (Assemblé Municipale)	• According to the Constitution from 1987, each Municipal Assembly is composed of one representative from each of the Communal Sections (CASEC) in the Commune, elected indirectly by the ASECs from among their members. • The Municipal Assembly is responsible for «assisting the Municipal Council in its work» • These elections run concurrently with those of the Municipal Councils. • The Municipal Assemblies submit lists of candidates for Justice of the Peace Courts (Juges de paix).

Level	Decentralized Government Entity	Composition and Tasks
Département 10	Departmental Council (Conseil départmental)	• Each Departmental Council has three members. • These are elected by the Departmental Assembly. • The Council members may or may not be drawn from the Assembly itself. • The Departmental Councils are subject to oversight by the Departmental Assemblies (These are in turn responsible to the Central Government). • The Departmental Councils collaborate with the central government in drawing up departmental development plans.
	Departmental Assembly (Assamblé departementale)	• According to the Constitution, each communal Assembly appoints one representative to the Departmental Assembly. • Senators and Deputies from the department, the central government's Departmental Delegate and Directors of public service entities can participate in the meetings of the Departmental Assemblies. • The assemblies also submit lists of candidates for 10-year terms to the Appeals Courts (Cour d'Appel) and for seven-year terms on the Tribunals of First Instance (Tribunaux de Première instance). • Haiti's President chooses the judges from these lists. • Each Departmental Assembly should submit three candidates for nine-year terms on the Permanent Electoral Council (CEP). • Thus, the nine-member CEP is chosen by three branches of National government – three each by the executive, the Parliament (and the high court (Cour de Cassation).
Nation	Departmental Assemblies.	• However, these have never functioned. • There is no specific law or decree in force that governs the operations of the Departmental bodies.
	Inter-departmental Council Conseil inter-départementale (CID)	• The Constitution says that each Departmental Assembly should appoint one member to the ten-member Inter-Departmental Council (CID). • However, in the absence of Departmental Assemblies, the CIDs have never yet been formed. • According to the 1987 Constitution, the CIDs have been assigned a potentially important role as the liaison between the central government, executive, and local governments. • The Constitution gives the CID members right to participate, with voting rights, in Cabinet meetings that touch on decentralization or development. • It works with the executive to study and plan development projects. CIDs are set to work with the executive to draft the portion of Haiti's annual budget that determines the portion and nature of public revenues that will be allocated to to local government entities.

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