Technocracy, the local and the EU

Roger Mac Ginty, University of Manchester
Roger.macginty@manchester.ac.uk

Abstract
This piece is the conclusion to the special issue and reviews the articles therein. It argues that technocracy – particularly EU technocracy shapes – the extent to which local actors can hope to achieve ownership of externally funded and directed peace support projects and programmes. The conclusion draws together the various contributions to the special issue.

Conclusion to Special Issue

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Introduction

A few years ago, the author had the good fortune to participate in a conference at a university in the regional capital of an Asian country. The country in question is conflict-affected and struggles with issues of diversity. What made the conference particularly interesting was that along with the usual academic presenters, activists from local NGOs were present. Also present was a representative from the EU delegation to the country. The conference proceeded as normal: a welcome address from the Dean of the Faculty who left immediately after his warm words, panels with four papers of fifteen minutes each, and the usual self-serving question from the western academic in the front row who was somewhat aggrieved that he hadn't heard the sound of his own voice for at least thirty minutes. So far, so normal. But then something fascinating happened. The representative of the EU delegation had just given a presentation on the work of the EU in the country. This prompted the local activists to start asking him questions. The activists explained that many people in the local community made their living through the small-scale manufacture of textiles using handlooms. They complained that the EU was dumping cheap textiles in the country and that local cottage industries were struggling to survive.

One of the activists asked how he, as a representative of local handloom weavers, could meet with the EU to discuss the plight of local artisans. The answer from the EU representative was revealing. The way to meet the EU was quite simple: the EU delegation held a monthly meeting with an umbrella organisation of NGOs during which they could raise any issue they liked. For the EU this seemed like an effective way to listen to local concerns, it was proof that the EU was a listening organisation that took seriously bottom-up issues. It had a permanent platform through which local concerns could reach the in-country diplomatic team. For the local activists, however, the answer showed just how far out of touch the EU was. The route to a hearing from the EU delegation would compel the local activists to firstly form an NGO (a legally enshrined entity in the country in question). Then they would have to join the umbrella organisation of NGOs. This, the local activists explained, was unlikely to be straightforward. The country in question contained a number of divisions and the umbrella organisation was likely to employ gatekeeping that would deem some NGOs legitimate and others not. And even if the local NGO could become a member of the umbrella organisation, there was no guarantee that its issues would be chosen to be discussed at the monthly meeting with the EU. Finally, since the monthly meeting was held in the country's capital city, attendance would be very expensive for the local organisation in a small far-away regional city.

The exchange at the conference provides an interesting commentary on how the EU and local communities might communicate in conflict-affect countries. On the one hand the EU was well-intentioned but its mechanism for listening to local voices required these voices to transform into a format that the EU could "read". The local voices had to be channelled through approved NGOs that were part of an approved

umbrella organisation of NGOs. It was a case of forced institutional isomorphism whereby a prescribed technocratic format was the preferred route for local communities to contact the EU (Boli & Thomas 1997). On the other hand, a platform for local-EU interaction did exist, but the local activists attending the conference felt that the EU had erected a firewall that rendered local-EU contact difficult and expensive.

None of the above is to suggest that EU representatives do not have alternative routes of contacting the local and being contacted by the local, although many of these routes are informal, inconsistent and do not have the weight of official encounters. Nor does it suggest that EU representatives do not have the commitment to meet with local communities. It does reveal, however, the extent of obstacles, many of them structural, that complicate local-international encounters.

Writing a conclusion to a special issue as rich and varied as this is a difficult task. A large number of insights contained in the articles in this special issue strike this author as fascinating and invite follow-up and elaboration. Aside from the meta conclusion (the EU is increasingly aware of the need to pay attention to the local but its actions lack consistency, especially in relation the inclusion of local voices in project and programme design) a number of sub-conclusions stand out. For example, Ejdus reminds us, in relation to Somalia, that the concept of local ownership rests on a profoundly western political rationality (Ejdus, 2017), Gippert focuses on the centrality of power, and how local and international power operates on different planes and according to different logics (Gipper, this issue) Articles by Mahr and by Muller and Zahda explain how contestation and opposition to EU mandates is often caught up in the intricacies of local politics and wider issues of sovereignty (Mahr; Muller & Zahda, this issue). They also show how mandates that look coherent on paper may be compromised by real world contexts. It is impossible to discuss each of these insights, and others from this special issue, in the confines of a single concluding article so this conclusion will concentrate on a single trope that ties together many of the insights in the special issue: technocracy. The bureaucratic orientation of the EU *and* the local shapes and limits many EU-local interactions in conflict-affected areas.

By concentrating on technocracy, we draw attention to a crucial but often unseen dynamics of conflict. The life of institutions, and how they interact or do not interact with people opens a window on the structural dimension of conflict and peace interventions. The dull routines of bureaucracies constitute lifeworlds, and offer glimpses of competing and hybrid modernities. While the EU and its proxies, many of whom are local actors, have service delivery and operational dimensions, they also exercise and are prone to embedded and structural forms of power. This structural nature of power and politics is worth foregrounding in discussion of EU-local dynamics.

Technocracy connects with the three themes that run through this special issue: effectiveness, ownership and resistance. One of the narratives assumed or told by technocrats and supporters of technocratic methods is that technocracy enhances effectiveness. According to this narrative, an advantage of bureaucratic processes that operate according to objective and standardised criteria, is that they will be efficient and have reach. They can cut through sectarian or clientelistic systems that might

bedevil conflict-affected contexts and help with public service delivery, good governance, and state reform – all thought to be key pillars of peacebuilding. Technocracy is also relevant to discussions of (local) ownership in peacebuilding in that technocratic approaches may – conceivably – prove to be a barrier to a sense of ownership. For example, peacebuilding programmes and projects that are managed through technocratic systems may struggle to gain traction among communities. Members of these communities might not feel "ownership" of peacebuilding related schemes that are enacted in their name if those schemes have scant human interfaces, are administered or managed remotely, or involve very standardised systems. As Ejdus explains in his "Local Ownership as International Governmentality" contribution to this special issue, much energy is invested by the EU into "responsibilisation" (Ejdus, 2017). This often takes the form of a socialisation, or an acceptance – implicit and explicit – on preferred approaches to peacebuilding. Coversely to this "technocracy as a barrier to local ownership" view, is the point that technocratic approaches might be more inclusive than those based on exclusion according to sect, tribe or another identity marker. Objective criteria and technocratic systems might be able to give people faith in governance systems.

Technocracy may also have a bearing on the third theme to run through this special issue – resistance. Technocratic approaches to peacebuilding may prompt resistance or non-participation in peacebuilding by communities and other actors in societies undergoing transition. Important to note here, however, is that technocratic systems might not always be able to "see" resistance. They can be unresponsive and insensitive. A technocratic system may continue and be judged a success even if many people withdraw from it. In a sense, the perfect technocratic system would not involve people and actors with the capacity to dissent and provide alternatives.

The issues of effectiveness, ownership and resistance are well chosen cross-cutting themes in this special issue as they connect with the EU agendas in societies emerging from violent conflict. At the heart of these three issues lie agency: the power of the EU to effect its will in relation to peacebuilding, and the ability of national and sub-state actors to comply, resist or modify interventions by the EU and others.

All the Caveats
Before proceeding to discuss how the technocracy can connect with the local it is worth foregrounding a number of caveats pertaining to any discussion of the EU and the local. Three caveats relate to the EU and three to the local and they form the basis of how the author understands both entities.

The first caveat to flag in relation to the EU is the question: "Which EU?" The EU is a complex organisation with multiple institutional faces. Even for EU citizens, it can be a bewilderingly complicated organisation with its Parliament, Council, Commission, delegations, missions, and programmes. Not all parts of the institution act in harmony and with consistency, and so while the term "EU" may give the impression of an coherent and unified institution, this is not the case. A second point is that the EU rarely acts alone in its out-of-area interventions. Areas experiencing, or coming out of, violent conflict are often the site of multiple interventions by multiple international, bi-lateral and INGO actors. Such areas often witness what might be described as a humanitarian and peacebuilding "caravan" (the unkindly might be tempted to say "circus") as a range of organisations set up camp and initiate

programmes and projects. Often there is coordination between these organisations, but often there is not leading to a jumble of competing offerings. A third caveat is that the EU often uses client organisations for its end-user work. This is usually to minimise costs and increase effectiveness. The result might be that the EU, although the funder and possibly the initiator of a lot of peacebuilding and humanitarian work, does not have a visible footprint on the ground. What in-country presence that does exist is usually in the capital city and restricted to relatively high-level representations, and to audit-type work to ensure the delivery of EU funded programmes. People in need are quite understandably interested in service providers who bring in resources and help satisfy basic needs. If the EU is not a point of delivery service provider then it is unreasonable to think that people on-the-ground would pay any attention to the EU.

The chief point to take from all of these caveats on the EU is that it may not be obvious to people on-the-ground that the EU is operating at all. Peace support intervention might be a blur of 4x4s and banners proclaiming projects. The EU logo might just be one of many different logos that can be seen everyday. In such cases, the EU-local interface is already constrained. The extent to which the EU presence is visible will vary from context to context. In cases such as Kosovo, the EU has been interventionist and visible and so has been part of everyday political discourse. In other cases, such as the EUAVSEC (aviation security) mission in South Sudan, the EU's role was highly technical and so its footprint among the South Sudanese population was negligible. In many cases, the EU may be visible to those in the INGO and NGO worlds – especially in the capital city or a staging post for humanitarian or peace support work, but may not be on the radar of the vast majority of people.

The first of the three caveats on the local is to make the point that the local is not one half of a local-global binary. The local is a complex set of interactions that deserve to be seen in their own right and not merely as a site justified and categorised by the existence of the international and the global. Seeing the local in its own right is an extraordinarily difficult task that requires us to shake off a series of binaries that shape how we think about the local/international divide: traditional/modern, uncivilised/civilised, unconnected/connected etc. (Weber 2016, chapter 5). Anthropological and sociological methods can help in seeing the local as a set of networks that have their own rhythms, pace and reach (Millar 2014).

The second caveat is the need to deterritorialise the local (Mac Ginty 2015). As well as seeing it as a place (that is a physical site) we also need to see it as a verb. It is enlivened and given meaning through human activity (and, of course, shapes human activity through its material nature). By understanding the local as a verb as well as a noun, we can move away from conceptions of the local as a single physical site, perhaps relatively cut-off from the rest of the world. In such a typical view, the local is a village in the mountains or some other relatively inaccessible site. Yet, if we see the local as a verb then we can see it as transnational and multiscalar. Crucially, in this view, it can take the form of networks that are not inextricably bound up with a single physical site (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Instead, the local can be a complex set of interactions and associations that stretch across time and space.

The third caveat in relation to the local is the requirement that we do not romanticise it. The local can be a scene of exclusion, discrimination, and violence. The case

studies in this special issue make clear that the local can be exclusive, authoritarian and violent. Our assessment of communities, and peace interventions in them, must be fair-minded and based on an analysis of the motivation, effectiveness and legacy of the peace intervention. Analyses that lapse into caricature of the innocent local and the evil international do a disservice to scholarship. The potential advantages of local approaches to peacebuilding include their ability to be in sync with cultural mores and expectations, as well as the possibility of greater cost effectiveness. But approaches to peacebuilding that foreground the local also carry risks that they perpetuate patriarchy and discrimination, and reinforce actors that are violent.

The chief point to take from the caveats on the local is that we need to highlight the questions: where and what is the local? Without an adequate explanation of what we understand by the local, it seems difficult to have a serious interrogation of the implications of EU-local interactions. What constitutes the local is complex and multi-scalar. There is not a singular local in conflict-affected contexts. Instead, the sub-national level is likely to be riven with divisions and stratifications. The local will be gendered, contain elites and non-elites and is likely to have minorities. As Gippert's coverage of police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina reveals (Gippert, this issue), local and non-local perceptions of power operate according to different rationalities. As a result, our analyses must be alert to the need for tailored methodologies.

Technocracy, the EU and the local
Technocracy can be understood as the prioritisation of bureaucracy in an organisation's operations. It is, however, much more than a set of operating procedures. Technocracy amounts to a belief system – an ideology no less – that is mainstreamed and internalised to the extent that the privileging of bureaucratic systems and justifications is axiomatic (Abbinett 2006; Box 1999; Centeno 1993). It works well alongside neoliberalism and new public management in producing an often unassailable narrative of value for money, objectivity and transparency (Prince 2016). The supposed advantage of technocratic institutions in ethically contested contexts such as Kosovo is that they can treat populations objectively. As Mahr's contribution to this special issue makes clear, issues of sovereignty and identity meant that EULEX's actions and mandate were constantly scrutinised by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs for signs of favouring "the other" (Mahr, this issue). Theoretically, technocracy offers no favours to specific groups and allows intervening actors to claim neutrality. Certainly technocracy, in theory at any rate, promises efficiency (one of the key threads found in this special issue) but, at the same time, it threatens ownership (another one of the key threads). As Muller and Zahda's exploration of security sector reform in the Palestinian Authority shows, a Palestinian sense of ownership of EU initiated, directed and funded programmes is difficult to find (Muller & Zahda, this issue)

A key assumption in narratives that support technocratic approaches is that alternative systems (including those understood at the local level) are delegitimised. Even organisations with explicitly humanitarian and ethical origins find themselves increasingly beholden to technocratic imperatives as the peacebuilding and humanitarian sectors become professionalised and standardised (Walker 2010). There are, of course, limits to the extent of technocracy, especially in highly politicised environments. As is clear from the Tartir and Ejdus consideration of the EU Police

Mission in the Palestinian Territories (Tartir & Ejdus, this issue), supposed technical tasks were caught up in politics. As one Israeli interviewee said "… our Minister of Defence… hates the EU … hates to see their activity in this area". In other words, technocratic systems that may well look well on an organogram must operate in highly politicised contexts.

There can be no doubting that the peacebuilding sphere has undergone interlinked processes of technocratrization and professionalization over recent decades (Mac Ginty 2012). This "technocratic turn" is visible through the professionalization of peacebuilding INGOs and NGOs that adopt corporate vernacular and structures. This has been reinforced through the work of international organisations, INGOs and NGOs as they pursue Sustainable Development Goal 16 to "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels." This SDG, in keeping with the others, has set in train an enormous amount of measurement activity aimed at capturing progress towards attaining the goal. Multiple actors, including some of the major global accountancy firms, have developed complex metrics aimed at capture progress on the goal (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017). A measurement industry has been created which – it is fair to say – is quite removed from the day to day realities of people living in conflict affected contexts. For many aboard the caravan, measurement seems more important than what is being measured. The key point is that technocracy tends to reinforce technocracy. There is a risk of epistemic and methodological closure whereby those within technocratic institutions risk being caught up in the logic of weekly and monthly reporting, workload allocation models, log-frames, theories of change, and numerous other management-led activities that may be removed from original crisis management or humanitarian goals.

The European Union is, quite clearly, a technocratic institution. The essay by Juncos in this special issue makes clear that the EU project is very much about promoting norms and standardization (Juncos, 2017). The organisation is comprised of legal statutes that empower a series of institutions to operate along prescribed lines. Its member states make sure that multiple systems of accountability and transparency are in place to regularise operations and ensure that its supranational interventions do not exceed its mandate. It operates in a prescribed manner, constantly mindful of the dangers of overlap with the sovereignty of member states. By its very nature, the EU has difficulty operating in ways that are *ad hoc*, fast-reacting and outside of technocratic parameters.

This sketch of the EU as an extremely technocratic entity begs a question: Can an organisation like the EU ever connect with the local? The question is posed despite the very obvious declaratory emphasis that the EU places on the local. Indeed, the word "local" is peppered throughout EU documents on peacebuilding. For example, as far back as June 2001, the Council of the European Union noted that "the principles of local ownership are of particular importance" in conflict prevention work (Council of the European Union 2001). The emphasis in more recent documents has been on comprehensive approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding that are able to operate simultaneously at multiple levels, including the local. Numerous funding calls that are explicitly aimed at engaging with the sub-state level show that the EU interest in the local is not just declaratory. Large amounts of resources are being devoted to localised peacebuilding and engagement.

To answer the question "can a large technocratic organisation connect with the local?" it is worth discussing at least three issues: the ability of organisations to "read" the local; the optimal size and shape for organisations to access the local (and the local to access the organisation); and the time necessary to establish meaningful links with the local level.

Organisations rely on various data sources in order to understand the world around them. Advanced technocratic institutions like the EU will have established reporting systems whereby information is collated and analysed before being fed into decision-making systems. EU missions and programmes will have mechanisms to feed data upwards in the organisation from the field to Brussels. Along the way, information will be filtered, translated and flattened so that it fits technocratic reporting standards. Staff may augment formal information gathering and reporting with field visits and personal observations, but the sheer bulk of data and the demands of technocratic organisations means that information is parsed and standardised. A 1:1 representation of the local is not possible. Instead, information flows in organisations must turn bulky and often highly localised reporting into representative formats. This involves parsing, editing and aggregating – all of which risk de-localising the data. The key point is that organisations develop specific ways of reading and seeing the local that often iron out the very aspects that make a network or an area local.

On top of this fundamental point about technocracy, in some contexts EU staff will face strictures on how and where they can travel in conflict-affected areas thus shaping their view of the society. The already mentioned use of proxies (rather than engaging in first-hand service delivery) further constrains the ability to capture an accurate picture of events and opinions on-the-ground.

The second issue relating to the "can they ever meaningfully connect with the local?" question, relates to the optimal shape and size of an organisation. The anecdote at the beginning of this article suggested that the EU believes that there is an optimal configuration of the local: the civil society organisation (CSO) or NGO. Thus packaged, the anecdote suggested, the EU would be able to engage with local. This view suggests a static and institutionalised view of the local that has to be organised in a prescribed format before it can be recognised by the EU. It suggests the common worldview that equates civil society organisations with civil society. The two may overlap, but to see civil society as only CSOs and NGOs means that huge areas of the associational life of a society or network are overlooked. Often the glue that holds together a divided society comes in the form of the everyday interactions and restraint of so-called "ordinary" people (Smyth & Mcknight 2013). This "everyday peace" takes place in city neighbourhoods, apartment block stairwells and workplaces (Mac Ginty 2014). It manifests itself through routine civility, reciprocal politeness, and dissembling when in inter-group settings.

While this everyday peace can be ubiquitous and take the form of the routine interactions required to navigate through everyday life, they are difficult for organisations to access. They are embedded in everyday life and are not the product of programmes or projects, nor necessarily on display in NGO platforms or in civil society briefings. They are unlikely to have measurable outputs or at least outputs that can be directly compared from society to society. Even if a EU delegation or

programme staff were to witness such everyday peace and civility, they are constrained in how they may relate this further up the organisation. Indeed, to refer to individual examples may seem anecdotal and too localised. Thus it is worth asking if large organisations can find the optimal deployment dispositions to access the local (in its various formats) and report on it in ways that are faithful to on-the-ground realities.

The in-country orientation of an EU delegation may also pose a barrier to EU-local contact. EU personnel, programmes and projects often emphasise technical aspects of peacebuilding or crisis response. These technical aspects are important (for example, improving governance through financial accountability) but may have a limited direct and visible footprint among people on the ground. By their nature, military missions (the EU had six as of September 2017) often have limited interaction with civilians or that interaction is in particular locations and circumstances. Gippert's contribution to this special issue on EU sponsored police reform and mentorship in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects well on the EU Police Mission (EUPM) (Gippert, this issue). In general, Bosnian police officers had good things to say about their EU counterparts. It is worth noting, however, that EUPM is largely a police-to-police mission with reasonably limited EU contact beyond a particular constituency.

The third issue that follows on from the observation that large technocratic organisations struggle to connect with the local is a temporal one. Establishing relationships takes time. This is not to suggest that the local is a slow-moving entity. The local (as a network and/or a place) is often flexible, adaptive and capable of absorbing and initiating change. Just like other types of networks and spaces, it forges and re-forges its own modernity. Yet such modernities rely on human relationships – professional, social, economic and political – that develop over time. While the EU has maintained an interest and presence in a number of conflict-affected areas over a long period (for example in the Palestinian territories since 2005 and Georgia since 2008), it is the case that there is often considerable turn-over in personnel. This means that it may be difficult for staff to gain a thorough understanding of a conflict-affected context, and perhaps learn the language(s), before they more on to another posting. Consider, for example, an EU delegation member arriving to a conflict-affected context like Myanmar. The context is extremely complex with multiple languages and ethnic groups, a number of live conflicts and peace processes. There are also, in effect, two governments; a fledgling and haltingly democratising government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the all powerful military whose grip on power and economic levers remains firm. Because of on-going conflict, and the controlling tendencies of the government(s), the EU staff member may be restricted in how, where and when they may travel within the country. Myanmar is also a large country with regional differences in ethnic background, language, religion and political economy etc. Moreover, if the context was not complex enough, there is also the politics of donor organisations in the capital city Yangon. The key point is that it takes time and patience for external actors to develop links with local actors, sites and networks. Staff turn-over complicates this.This was echoed by a Palestinian civil society interviewee (Muller & Zahda, this issue) who reflected "EUPOL COPPS is a very difficult partner for us, they bring in several people all the time and there is always several people sitting at the table, many of them new".

It is worth ending this section by stressing that technocracy is not the sole prerogative of international actors. National and local actors have their own technocracies. Gippert's discussion of police reform in BiH (Gippert, this issue) shows how the Bosnian police has its set of hierarchies and structures, that are also cognisant of localised loyalties and contact networks. The essay by Tartir and Ejdus also contains a revealing self-description from a Palestinian Authority securocrat: "I'm a technical technocrat" (Tartir & Ejdus, this issue). Many peace support interventions take the form of statebuilding or good governance type interventions that are precisely designed to build, strengthen or reform institutions. As SDG 16 puts it, to "build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels". The sub-national level has its own bureaucracy in the form of municipalities and local government. But there are also localised forms of governance that may amount to technocratic systems. They may their own *modus operandi*, vernacular and standard operating procedures. They may draw on established (perhaps colonial) forms of bureaucracy, but may have been modified and hybridised through processes of mimicry and adaptation. So rather than conceiving of technocracy as an always top-down process, it is best conceived of as multi-layered and multiscalar. Some forms of technocracy have more power than others and international actors are often capable of mobilising significant material incentives that encourage compliance. It is worth noting, however, that the international attention span may be quite short and that attention moves from crisis to crisis. Localised forms of technocracy may have other types of power – perhaps linked with tradition and localised forms of legitimacy. A future research agenda could usefully look closely at the interaction between different forms and levels of technocracy.

Conclusion

The essential point of this conclusion to the special issue, and as reflected by many of the contributions to the special issue, is that behind-the-scenes, structural, and technocratic factors often shape how international organisations act in peace support operations. These factors are often difficult for the researcher to access. Technocracy in itself often constitutes a gatekeeper or network of gatekeepers. Moreover, the topic is – ostensibly at any rate – dull. Speadsheets, management structures and corporate communications are somewhat removed from the fieldwork raw data that many peace and conflict researchers may be anxious to gather. Yet the apparent banality of the topic belies its importance.

The anecdote at the beginning of this article suggested that the EU wanted local organisations to change shape in order to access the EU. In reality, in many circumstances, we see both the EU and local actors in constant shape-shifting mode. While the EU is often described as slow-moving, bureaucratic, and inflexible, it is not quite the monolith that its critics might describe. Elements within it are capable of change and in-country deployment in new formations. This gives some hope that the EU, or parts of the EU, might be able to communicate in meaningful ways with the local. Similarly, the local is a constantly shifting phenomenon that includes incredible variance. Within this constant movement there will be opportunities for EU-local engagement – some by chance and some by design. What matters is that systems are in place to maximise such exchanges and the extent to which they advance pacific agendas. Structural factors can be put in place to help enhance EU-local pro-peace exchanges including giving further autonomy to in-country EU personnel, reducing

bureaucratic and security-imposed barriers between EU personnel and non-elites in the host countries, and incentives for EU personnel to move beyond the capital city.

Moreover, as many of the contributions to this special issue illustrates (for example, Juncos on security sector reform in the BiH), the EU has invested heavily into capacity building. What is not clear, however, is the extent to which the EU has been able to develop its own capacities as a result of its multiple deployments over the past two decades. In this regard, it is worth revisiting the efficiency, ownership and resistance themes that run through this special issue. These themes are often examined in terms of how subjects of EU intervention (local and national actors) respond to those interventions: Do national and subnational actors and institutions become more "efficient" through reform, good governance and capacity building? Do local actors "own" projects, programmes and ideas that are introduced, funded and directed by the EU and other external actors? Do local actors resist interventions by the EU? It is worth applying these questions of efficiency, ownership and resistance to the EU itself in relation to its crisis management interventions? Has the EU become more efficient in its pro-peace interventions? This would, perhaps, involve more timely, cost-effective and impactful interventions. Has the EU developed a sense of ownership in relation to its deployments, or are these seen as being in the bailiwick of particular parts of the EU, thematic experts or nation states. Finally is there resistance in the EU to peace support interventions? That resistance might be prosaic and based on concerns over budget, open ended commitments, mission-creep or acting out of area. The resistance might also be more principled in the sense of a concern with the meaning and purpose of the EU. All of these questions relate back to capacity building and the ability of the EU to learn from its actions (indeed Juncos' contribution to this special issue hints that the EU has adapted its intervention techniques as a result of resistance). In turn, the ability to learn depends on the technocracy of the organisation and the structures and practices in place to allow for institutional learning. That, however, might be the subject for another special issue.

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