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The Challenges of Deploying Civilian Personnel to Peace Operations

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Executive Summary

The present report addresses the role of training programmes with respect to the deployment of personnel in peace operations. How effective is the deployment of trained personnel, and what are the main obstacles to this deployment? We use the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) as a case to explore the bottlenecks that hamper the recruitment and deployment of trained personnel, especially civilians, to peace operations in the African context. The present study is exploratory in character and our conclusions are tentative in nature, as they are based on limited empirical data.

We differentiate between individual and systemic bottlenecks. On the basis of the present study we argue that individual bottlenecks, referring to the respondent's unwillingness or inability to apply, make up for roughly half of the non-deployments. Systemic bottlenecks are still a crucial factor. Here, the informal nature of the UN's recruitment stands out. Several of our respondents complain about the fact that without personal contacts to push your case, applicants do not stand a fair chance to obtain a position. The underlying issue here is that applications are 'lost' in an overburdened recruitment system. Personal contacts help candidates by drawing attention to their applications, and this allow these candidates to be picked out from the mass of applicants and to be placed in a smaller group from which the selection is made. Those already in the system are most likely to be connected with personal contacts that can have this kind of influence in the system, and this explains why it is so hard for those not yet in the system to get the attention necessary for their applications to be seriously considered.

Addressing the gap between the need for personnel in peace operations and the lack of personnel deployed is a central issue today, and more research needs to look into how training programmes may contribute to bridging this gap. Based on extant literature and the present study, we make the case for an improved link between recruitment architecture of the UN and training programmes. The case of TfP indicates that training programmes should focus more on post-training support mechanisms to facilitate trainees' recruitment. The usage of rosters stands out in this context. In the longer run, however, there is only so much training programmes can do unless the UN's recruitment architecture is the object of a significant overhaul.

1. Introduction: a Sense of Crisis

Peacekeeping is changing. Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis of UN peacekeeping operations has shifted from ‘cease-fire making’¹ to supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. Contemporary UN peacekeeping operations have more in common with the concept of peacebuilding than with the Cold War conception of peace keeping. In some cases, however, UN peacekeeping operations have also been deployed into situations where there is no peace to keep. These changes have resulted in a dramatic increase in the scope and scale of peace operations. Current peace operations call for nine times as many troops, observers and police, and thirteen times as many civilian staff compared to a decade ago. This quantitative increase has come alongside a qualitative change in the scope of peace operations: the average number of mandates that missions are charged with have increased from three to nine over the same period.²

This development has brought about a sense of crisis. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) annual review notes that ‘during 2008, today’s blue helmets found themselves overstretched and confronted with numerous and increasingly complex operations all across the globe.’³ One of the main challenges facing peace operations is what *the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* calls the ‘agonizingly slow’ deployment rates to missions in Africa.⁴ The high vacancy rates that plague a number of current missions are a symptom of the crisis, which many commentators argue charac-

The present research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Programme (TfP). The authors wish to extend our deepest gratitude to Fulvio Castellacci of the Department of International Economics at NUPI for helping out with the statistical analysis. Gratitude also goes to the TfP partners ACCORD, KAIPTC and ISS, as well as Yvonne Kasumba for extensive and helpful comments on an earlier draft.

- ¹ The expression ‘cease-fire making’ is taken from Fortna and refers to peacekeeping aiming solely to end war, where war is defined as 1000 annual battle related deaths. Defined this way, Fortna maintains, UN peacekeeping has historically been remarkably effective. See Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 6.
- ² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2008b). Accessed at <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-142> on 09.02.2009.
- ³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review 2008* (New York: DPKO, 2009). Accessed at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/yir2008.pdf> on 30.03.2009.
- ⁴ Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), p. 2.

terize peacekeeping today.⁵ The irony is that UN peacekeeping was in a similar predicament in the early to mid-1990s, and as a result of the problems experienced with finding and deploying civilian⁶ and police personnel, countries like Norway and others have invested in programmes aimed at training civilian and police peacekeepers, and placing them on standby rosters, so that they can be available at short notice when the UN need them. This study addresses a paradoxical aspect of this predicament, namely the fact that the increased number of trained personnel produced by these programmes has not translated into better staffed peace operations. Instead, we are faced with the paradox of having, on the one hand, a pool of trained personnel, and on the other hand, a vacancy rate of almost 40% in some UN missions. This study seeks to answer the question why this much needed supply of personnel is not being used by the UN at a time when they are obviously in dire need of civilian and police personnel?

With the purpose of increasing the number of qualified personnel available for peace operations, a number of international training and capacity building programmes were initiated in the 1990s. Ostensibly, graduates from training courses constitute a valuable pool of skilled personnel that DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS), as well as others such as the UN Volunteers, can recruit from. What happens to past trainees, however, appears to be an understudied phenomenon, especially with regards to civilian and police trainees. Further, available studies indicate that the many in the peacekeeping training community is not able to keep track of how many of the people that went through their training programmes have been deployed to peacekeeping operations. Conversely, little is known about what hinders the effective recruitment and deployment of past trainees. What are the bottlenecks to deployment and how can they be addressed? This paper addresses these questions. We use the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) as a case to explore the bottlenecks that hamper the recruitment and deployment of trainees to peace operations in an African context. By asking trainees directly about their experience and opinions relating to their recruitment process (if any), this study appears to break new ground in the research and knowledge about the impact of training programs. This knowl-

⁵ Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), p. 2.

⁶ Note that whilst the EU Civilian Crisis Management concept includes and regards police as civilian, the UN and AU treats the police as a separate entity, and civilian for them refers to all the non-uniformed members of staff. A further distinction in the UN and AU contexts is that whilst the military and police personnel are seconded to the missions by their Member States, and are thus still in the employment of those States (and they display their national flags on their uniforms), civilians in the UN and AU are hired as international civil servants. In this study the use of the concept 'civilians' thus refer to the non-uniformed international civil servants hired by the UN or AU. It does not include police officers. When the study refers to police officers they are specifically identified as such.

edge, we hope, can in turn help increase the effectiveness of the UN and African Union (AU) recruitment procedures and systems.⁷

The study is exploratory and our conclusions are tentative in nature, as they are based primarily on the data material underlying the report at hand. However, based on the available literature and data of this study, we make the case for an improved link between the recruitment architecture of the UN and training programmes. The case of TfP indicates that training programmes should focus more on post-training support mechanisms to facilitate trainees' recruitment. The potential utility of rosters stands out in this context. In the longer run, however, there is only so much training programmes can do without the DPKO/Department of Field Support's (DFS) recruitment architecture receiving a significant overhaul. As such, the major bottlenecks to the effective deployment of trained personnel seems to reside with DPKO/DFS itself.

The report first contextualizes the importance and relevance of training programmes in the current peacekeeping environment. Before presenting the procedures and the empirical results of this study, we introduce the case of the TfP programme and the research procedure behind this study. We then contrast our findings with other training programmes and see them in the light of extant literature on the field. Finally, we address the most salient bottlenecks based on the results of the present study and in light of available literature.

⁷ While this study focuses on the recruitment architecture of the UN, training programmes such as TfP also aim to contribute to AU's peace operations. Whilst TfP trained military, police and civilian personnel have served in the AU missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, these missions were all stabilization type missions and the overall number of civilians recruited to these AU missions have been too low to take into account in this section of the study. The TfP Programme supports the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) with the development of the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF).

2. Background: the Move to Peacebuilding

In order to understand why high vacancy rates have become one of most pressing issues for current peace operations, it is important to appreciate the reasons that brought about the change in the nature of peace operations briefly sketched out above. The move to peacebuilding originated from a realization that traditional peacekeeping did not create peace and a wish to deal with the underlying causes of conflict. This development has implied more demanding tasks, increased requirements for the skills peacekeepers need to possess, as well as the sheer number of blue helmets required to fulfil mandates. The following paragraphs sketch out the background of the move to peacebuilding.

Classical or traditional peacekeeping operations were charged with observing ceasefires and monitoring peace agreements. This has not been effective as a means to actually maintain peace: as Smith⁸ notes, the historical record shows that about 50 % of negotiated peace agreements to end civil wars relapse into conflict within the first five years. This realization has led to a wish to go beyond cease-fire monitoring and to deal more with the underlying causes of conflict, and was reflected in changes in the stated aims of the post-Cold War missions, and mandates that include a broad range of peacebuilding tasks, such as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the supervision or organization of post-conflict elections. The Brahimi report (re)defined peacebuilding as operations ‘undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war’⁹ Such missions require different civilian, police and military peacekeepers in larger numbers and with a much broader set of specialized skills than those required for traditional cease-fire missions.¹⁰

⁸ Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, (Oslo: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Accessed at <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf> on 09.02.2009.

⁹ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, (New York: United Nations, 2000) Accessed at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ on 13.03.2009, p.3.

¹⁰ For a snapshot of a burgeoning literature, see: Lisa Schirch, ‘Strategic Peacebuilding: State of the Field.’ *Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, vol. 1 no. 1, spring 2008, pp. 1-17. Richard Gowan, ‘The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-08,’ *International Peacekeeping*, no 15 2008, pp. 453-469. Michael W Doyle, & Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). Cedric de Coning, *Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and*

Peacebuilding in the post Cold-War geopolitical context has often assumed a deeply political nature, and has been informed by the conviction that liberal democracies with an open market economy are more peaceful than other political and economic arrangements.¹¹ The aim was not to create just any peace but more precisely a ‘liberal peace.’¹² The interlinkages between peace, security and development connect with the political content of peacebuilding. The World Bank has noted that civil war is ‘development in reverse.’¹³ Hence, peacebuilding can be defined as development in the context of a (post)conflict environment.¹⁴

Rapid deployment is an important factor for peacebuilding missions to fulfil their mandates in the long run. The Brahimi report noted that the first 6–12 weeks after a peace accord or ceasefire are critical for establishing the success of a peace operation. Chances lost in that period are later hard to regain. In that context, the report stressed the importance of rapid deployment and ‘on-call’ expertise mechanisms to ensure that the initial build-up period of a peace operation functions as smoothly as possible.¹⁵ It further warned against the then current practice of the Security Council to authorize missions before it knew whether the required troops and equipment would be available. The reasoning behind this warning is clear: with insufficient soldiers, police and civilian personnel to run the mission, blue helmets may be unable to carry out their mandate, and may end-up trapped in a mission without the resources necessary to extract them from their situation. In the process not just the mission, but the UN as an institution, loose credibility.

The move to peacebuilding was well underway when the Brahimi report was published in 2000. Developments since have led to a predicament the report warned against: peace operations are authorized before sufficient troops and equipment to run the mission are in place. The DPKO’s 2008 annual review points out that there has been a surge in uniformed UN personnel since 1991. Total numbers have increased from well below 20 000 to more than 90 000 in December

African Peace Operations (Umlhanga Rocks: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2007).

¹¹ Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Peace and Democracy’ in Kurtz, Lester R., (ed.) *Encyclopaedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict*, (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999), pp. 643 - 652.

¹² Gowan, *Peacekeeping in Crisis*, p. 463.

¹³ Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, p. 25.


¹⁴ Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding* and de Coning, *Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations*.

¹⁵ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, pp. 18-19.

2008. This number has been more than doubled since 2004, a year when four new missions were established.¹⁶

The high vacancy rates of current operations in Africa have in other words been an announced predicament. The move to peacebuilding originated from a wish to deal with underlying causes of conflict, but has seemingly not been followed up by a systemic effort to institutionalise or create an effective recruitment system to accommodate for the surge in the number of peacekeepers. Figure 1 shows aggregate global vacancy rates for peace operations.

Figure 1. Global Vacancy Rates



(GAO, 2008b)

The lack of peacekeepers constitutes a significant obstacle for peace operations to fulfil their mandates. UN operations globally were as of late 2008 short of about 18 000 people, or 20 %, of the authorized level of more than 90 000 troops and military observers. The average vacancy rate of international civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has been around 22 %. The same number for police forces has been 34 %.¹⁷ In 2008, the UN was short of 6000 police and 8000 civilians for its peacekeeping operations, authorized to a level of total of 17 500 and 27 600 respectively.¹⁸

Deployment rates have slowed down the last years. The mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000 deployed almost all of its 12 000 peacekeepers within the first nine months, which within the time frame the UN has given itself to set up a mission. In contrast, five

¹⁶ The *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* envisioned that the UN would start up one new mission a year.

¹⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2008a.) Accessed at: <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754>, on 07.02.2009.

¹⁸ Tet Miyabara, Assistant Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, Division for International Affairs and Trade. Private e-mail received 04.02.2009, subject heading 'RE: deployment of trained personnel to peacekeeping operations.'

years down the road in 2005, the mission to South Sudan (UNMIS) had only deployed 40 % of its authorized personnel within the same time period, a mere 3600 people.¹⁹ DPKO's 2008 annual review points to high vacancy rates for the UNAMID mission in Darfur, with a discrepancy between authorized and deployed staff of 7121 (37%) military troops, 3665 (57 %) police and 5034 (56 %) civilian personnel.²⁰ A recent report of the Center of International Cooperation (CIC) identifies similar slow deployment rates for MINURCAT in Chad. High vacancy rates are particularly acute for the international civilian staff. The CIC notes that 'it is difficult to find either practitioners or policy-makers who do not acknowledge the tremendous problem in the pace of deployment.'²¹

¹⁹ Gowan, *Peacekeeping in Crisis*, p. 459.

²⁰ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008. *United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review*. The civilian personnel include both international and local staff.

²¹ Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, p. 5.

3. Research Procedure and the Case of Training for Peace

In order to explore the bottlenecks that hinder the effective recruitment and deployment of graduates from training programmes, we have studied the Norwegian-funded TfP programme. While this single-case study is exploratory and tentative in nature, it allows for an in-depth study of the experiences of a selection of past TfP trainees. While these experiences are not immediately generalizable to other cases, they can create 'working hypotheses' or expectations for other training programs.²² As such, our research design is that of a probability probe.²³

We sent out a questionnaire to 265 TfP graduates trained through ACCORD or KAIPTC between 2006 and 2008. The trainees were asked open-ended questions about their background, type of training, post-training support, involvement with AFDEM and subsequent relevant working experience. Those who had found a relevant job were asked to describe the process that had led to deployment. Conversely, those who had not been deployed were requested to state the reasons why they have been unable to find a job.

3.1 Limits of Study

This exploratory study faces a number of limits. First, we faced a language constraint in that we could work in English only. We were not able to send out the questionnaire in French, which is a considerable limit since some of the courses were conducted in French-speaking countries. However, the language of instruction was English so course participants should have been able to respond to a questionnaire in English.²⁴ Two people asked for a French version, and we were not able to accommodate their needs. Language problems also seemed to be an issue for some of the other respondents, judging from the way they answered certain questions. For instance, one 49 year old respondent reported to have 39 years of field experience. Some trainees

²² The relevant question for future studies is thus the transferability of the conclusions presented in this paper. Cf. Yvonne S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, 'The only Generalization is: there is no Generalization' in Yvonne S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, *Case Study Method. Key Issues, Key Texts* (London: Sage Publications, [1985] 2000), pp. 27 - 44.

²³ See Harry Eckstein, 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science' in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975)

²⁴ 30 of 205 of KAIPTC attendees received French translations.

thought 'deployment' necessarily would have to refer to experience in countries other than their own. A Congolese national thus stated that he had not been deployed despite his experience working for UN's mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Furthermore, the questionnaire read 'have you *subsequently* worked in a peacekeeping or humanitarian related field, or have you been deployed in such a capacity to the field?' (Emphasis added). However, some respondents listed all missions they been deployed to in total and hence some that took place before 2006. We took care to filter out these responses.

Second, limited resources and internet access on part of the trainees make up for possible errors in the data. ACCORD and KAIPTC provided us with the names of 404 past trainees, of which 344 (85 %) were *reported* to have an e-mail. 64 e-mail addresses turned out to be malfunctioning, which means that the questionnaires could only be sent to 66 % of the 404 trainees. Actual deployment rates may thus be lower than what we report, since we were not able to contact all of the trainees. Indeed, people without access to internet or with a working e-mail address can hardly be expected to apply for jobs online. Limited resources constitute a bottleneck in its own way. One respondent explicitly pointed out that 'only my limited resources are the one hindering me from achieving higher levels.'

Third, time turned out to be a more important factor than we had thought in two different ways that may affect the reported response and deployment rate. Answers were received between mid January through March 2009. Some of the latest answers we received were from people that were currently deployed on missions and stated that they had limited internet access in the field. This could mean that we have been unable to reach some deployed trainees. Furthermore, we do not differentiate between respondents that received their training in 2006 from those who did in 2008. Because of the long time it takes to deploy – an average 180 days for the DPKO/DFS – those that received training in mid- to late 2008 are unlikely to be deployed yet.²⁵

3.2 Training for Peace in Africa

A short introduction to TFP is due. The training programme started in 1995 as a partnership between the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa and the Norwegian Institute of Interna-

²⁵ The average reported deployment time was over two years, which suggests that most of the deployed respondents had received training relatively early in the 2006-08 period.

tional Affairs (NUPI).²⁶ In 2004, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC) joined the programme. The three African institutions conduct all the training and much of T fP’s research and NUPI conducts some of the research. T fP further cooperates with the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions (AFDEM) through ACCORD. The Norwegian Police Directorate also assists in T fP civilian and police training courses.

The Norwegian government responded to calls made in the early 1990s to strengthen Africa’s peacekeeping capacity by investing approximately US \$ 22 million in T fP between 1995 and 2010. The overall goal of the programme is to promote peace by contributing towards a self-sustaining African civilian and police capacity for peace operations and peacebuilding missions in Africa. T fP has trained more than 8500 civilian, police and military peacekeepers since its inception, and have generated deployments to more than 15 peace operations in Africa and beyond.

T fP conducts pre-deployment and in-mission training, primarily for civilian and police peacekeepers, and covers issues ranging from conflict resolution and prevention, protection of civilians, human rights, gender, refugees and internally displaced people and HIV / AIDS. The T fP programme aims to deliver capacity-building training, research and policy development support that enhances the efforts of the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in building African capacities for peace missions under UN or AU auspices. In particular, T fP wants to build up a stand-by capacity of regional police trainers that can respond to the increasing demands for mission specific police training. On the civilian side, T fP seeks to contribute to a reliable regional stand-by capacity of civilian experts.

3.3 Post-Training Support and Training for Peace in Africa

An evaluation report of the Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation (NORAD) notes that the success of T fP hinges on the programme’s influence on African peace operations. Given the programme’s broader aims, however, deployment is only one way to gauge its (or other training programmes’) influence on peacekeeping.²⁷ Strengthening African countries’ capacity to respond to security

²⁶ For a detailed outline of the program, see: Randi Solhjell et al. *Training for Peace in Africa. An Overview over the Training for Peace Programme, 1995–2008* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

²⁷ In this context, we want to add that the impact and success of training programmes is not limited to the deployment rate of its trainees, as the people trained can take advantage of this training in other relevant positions too. For instance, a policewoman trained through the T fP programme can make use of those skills in her day-time job as well as in a peace operation.

challenges and contribute to peace operations requires, inter alia, a strong and flexible stand-by capability. It is a debate within the TfP if training should focus on in-mission courses to ensure deployment, or if current pre-deployment capacity building courses should be retained. In either case, the tracking of past trainees seems indispensable for the ability of measuring a training programme's influence. Evaluation reports of TfP since 1999 has stressed the need to improve the database and tracking aspect of TfP. However, no action seems to have been taken apart from a memorandum of understanding established between ACCORD and AFDEM in 2000. In other words, TfP's only tracking mechanism thus far has been of the civilians trained by ACCORD and deployed via AFDEM. AFDEM generated 69 deployments between 2006 and 2008, of which 19 were TfP graduates.²⁸ Of the respondents to this study, however, a vast majority had either not joined or been approached by AFDEM, and no successful applications had resulted from the 22 (15 %) respondents that had been approached by the roster with a question about a position.²⁹

²⁸ Importantly, AFDEM defines 'deployment' not only as work in peacekeeping operations but also in relevant NGOs and the UN. Of the deployed respondents to this survey, one worked at the UN headquarters in New York and the rest had gone to missions.

²⁹ It does not follow that the cooperation with AFDEM is inefficient. AFDEM only has a memorandum of understanding with ACCORD and not KAIPTC. Since the aggregate data does not distinguish between ACCORD and KAIPTC respondents, the numbers indicate a disproportionate disfavour to AFDEM.

4. What Do We Know about Training and Deployment?

Previous studies have established that the UN and other agencies lack the ability to identify and recruit a sufficient number of qualified people to meet the needs of peace operations.³⁰ Capacity building and training programmes such as TFP play an important role in generating qualified personnel, for two main reasons. First, they contribute to increasing the number of people interested in and trained to participate in missions. Second, they provide a mechanism for the DPKO/DFS to identify qualified applicants. This aspect depends on the training programme's system of tracking past trainees through databases or roster systems, the access DPKO/DFS has to this information, and the extent to which DPKO/DFS may recognize the training provided by TFP as valuable to the extent that it improves the likelihood that a candidate may be short listed for a position, among a group of similarly qualified and experienced peers.

To our knowledge, only a select few international training programmes have conducted studies to track past trainees.³¹ The German based Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) issued in 2006 a

³⁰ See African Standby Roster for Humanitarian & Peace-building Missions, 'TFP / AFDEM Proposal 2009.' (Harare: Afdem, 2009).

³¹ The TFP programme was the first of its kind to focus on civilian peacekeeping training through ACCORD in Africa. The civilian training programmes that we are aware of and considered for this study include the following: ACCORD trains mainly in Southern, East and West African regions. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) provides training in the Eastern and Central African regions. The Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA), at the University of Ghana, focuses more broadly on peacebuilding and election observers in West Africa. Other African institutes that offer civilian training include KAIPTC in Ghana, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Zimbabwe, and the IPSTC in KENYA. In Europe, the following institutions offer similar training, typically for their own nationals: the German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Italian Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), the Finnish Crisis Management Centre (CMC), the British NGO International Alert, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT). Most of these European centres are also members of an EU project called the European Commission Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. In North America, the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center offers a range of integrated (civilian, police and military together) training courses. With regards to police training, ISS in South Africa, the KAIPTC in Ghana, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Zimbabwe, and the IPSTC in Kenya offer UN and AU police courses. Both the ISS and the KAIPTC are TFP partners, and TFP has a Norwegian police advisor with EASBRIGCOM that cooperates with the IPSTC. Both ACCORD and ISS cooperate closely with the SADC-RPTC. The joint Kenyan – British Humanitarian Peace Support School (formerly International Mine Action Training Centre) also provides training for police going to peace operations. Internationally, Pearson, SWEDINT, CMC and others also conduct police training.

monitoring report of election observers trained at the KAIPTC.³² ZIF contacted 112 trainees, and report a 71% response rate and a 38 % deployment rate. The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) did a study for the European Union (EU) of civilian experts trained for peace operations in and by member states.³³ They report a 37% response rate, and find that 15 % of trainees have been deployed to EU missions, whereas 37 % have participated in other international missions. The FBA further notes that while it is difficult to establish the reasons for non-deployment, one crucial factor is the lack of coordination and policy among EU member states. The United States Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was established in 2004, and aims to train 75 000 military peacekeepers worldwide by the end of 2010. They report to be on good track to that goal: thus far, 52 000 have been trained mostly on battalion level, of which 42 000 or 82 % have been deployed. According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the US State department, this is a 'pretty darn descent' deployment rate.³⁴ Importantly, the State Department does not track individual trainees, but rather the units that they have trained.

The most relevant information that we have obtained for this study pertains to the police part of the TFP programme. This information does not come from a published report, but from an official who works as a police training co-ordinator at a Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. He provided us with information from a database of police pre-deployment training for UNAMID. The database contains information on trainees from a variety of countries and the institutions that have provided the training, including the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the KAIPTC, and the Swedish Lifeguards Centre, funded through bilateral agreements between Norway and Nigeria, Sweden and the Gambia, and the US and Nepal. Through these programmes, 1400 police officers have been trained since December 2007. Of these, 413 or 30 % have been deployed, and a further 573 or 41 % are on a so-called 'travel status.'³⁵

³² Nana Odo, *Monitoring Project Monitoring Post-Training Activities of ZIF-KAIPTC Election Observation Trainees* (Berlin: German Center for International Peace Operations, 2006). A similar study for 2008 is under way, but was not available by the time this study was written.

³³ Folke Bernadotte Academy, *Recruitment and Deployment of Personnel Trained for Civilian Crisis Management, Results from a survey of participants of EGT courses held 2003-2005 under the framework of the EC Project FBA 2006*, (Unpublished report under the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management., 2006).

³⁴ Phone interview, 05.02.2009. Aiyaz Husain and Steve Foster. These figures are however contested; the GAO report *Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress* finds a 56 % deployment as of mid 2008, and unlike the State Department finds it unlikely that GPOI will reach the 75 000 goal by 2010.

³⁵ That is, they are technically deployed but have not actually travelled to Darfur yet. Data updated as of March 2009. Personal e-mail from Chris Sharwood-Smith, the UNAMID Police Training Co-ordinator UK Mission to the UN in New York. Received 25.03.2009, subject heading 'RE: UNCL: RE: mission specific training'.

We do not have a basis to compare against to say what expected deployment rates for TFP trainees should look like. The above studies have limited relevance the training and deployment of civilian personnel, inasmuch as they deal with different types of training and / or operate in different geographical contexts. Importantly, many deal with personnel that are deployed through secondment, whilst the UN recruits individuals on short-term contracts for its peacekeeping missions. TFP trains civilians and police personnel, and the typical recruitment process for these two groups differs. Civilian staff applies on an individual basis to the DPKO/DFS.³⁶ Police on the other hand are offered to the UN as part of national contributions, and secondment is thus the standard procedure. The decision whether to deploy a police officer trained via TFP is thus a decision of the police contributing country. A report by the Stimson Center points out that some countries regards police officers that have participated in training courses as a valuable asset, and are consequently reluctant to second them to missions abroad.³⁷ Many of the TFP police related training courses are however specific pre-deployment training courses, and in these cases the participants have already been selected for deployment by their respective establishments.

³⁶ The UN posts its vacancy on the website UN Human Resources office (<http://jobs.un.org>.) Applicants apply through the e-staffing system Galaxy, and the office of human resources has the job of sorting the applications and forwarding them to the relevant department. Türk notes that the lack of a pre-screening mechanism means that the system becomes clogged and overburdened with too many applications. While he notes that there is a clear need for a reform and improvement of this system, more research needs to look into what such reform would entail. See: Danilo Türk, 'United Nations in the Era of Reform: The Issues of the UN Secretariat,' *CROSSROADS The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal*, no 01 2006, pp. 85–95.

³⁷ Daniel H. Levine, *African Civilian Police Capacity for International Peacekeeping Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008).
Accessed at: <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=607> on 29.01.2009.

5. Results

The empirical data in this study draws on the experiences of 151 TFP graduates trained through either ACCORD or KAIPTC between 2006 and 2008. We sent out a questionnaire to a total of 344 trainees and eventually received 151 responses. Calculated from the number trainees with working e-mails, this translates into a response rate of 57 %. Although we do not have a basis for comparison, the deployment rate of 53 % appears very high; indeed, almost too high. Previous TFP reports and evaluations have not been able to establish an exact deployment rate, but have estimated an approximately 25 % deployment rate.³⁸ However, the AFDEM data also shows significantly higher deployments in the period after 2006, and there could thus be a related increase in TFP trainees that have been deployed, linked in both cases to the growth in the overall number of peacekeepers deployed by DPKO and the African Union over this period.

5.1 Profile of Respondents

Diversity is a key characteristic of the respondents to this survey. The gender balance was 30 % women and 70 % men. The geographical spread is good: the 151 respondents come from 37 countries, with no one country making up for more than 10 % of the total. 23 countries had three or less respondents. 88 % of the respondents are from African countries, 10 % from Europe or North America, and 3 % come from four Asian countries. 74 % had received civilian training and 22 % police training. 3 % had received military training. The most common profession was police (23 %), who received both civilian and police training. Other common professions were military (13 %) and administrative personnel (13 %).³⁹ The respondent's background does not seem to significantly affect his or her chances of deployment. A correlation analysis of the data shows that neither gender nor the type of training received had any noteworthy bearing on the chance of getting deployed.

³⁸ Solhjell, *Training for Peace in Africa. An Overview over the Training for Peace Programme, 1995 – 2008*.

³⁹ Although ACCORD conducts civilian training courses, it usually includes a few military and police personnel, to ensure integrated training dynamics. That way, civilians can learn about working with the police and military from fellow participants already during the course experience.

5.2 Deployed Trainees

80 respondents (53 %) had found subsequent relevant work. Not surprisingly, applications through the UN system⁴⁰ (36 %) and secondment (20 %) are the two most common procedures leading to deployment. The UN Volunteer Service (UNV) make up the third most important category (10 %), and appears to be a useful gateway for people to find a paid position later.

Table 1. What procedure led to your deployment? How were you recruited?

Stated procedure	Number	Percentage
Application through the UN system	29	36 %
Secondment	16 ⁴¹	20 %
UNV (United Nations Volunteer Service)	8	10 %
Individual application ⁴²	5	6 %
Professional duty	2	3 %
Recruited as a contractor	1	1 %
Application through the African Union system	1	1 %
Not answered	18	23 %
Total	80	100 %

A vast majority (78 %) of the deployed have gone to one mission only and most have worked for a relatively long time: an average of more than two years (29 months). Police are typically deployed for 12 months only, so the civilian deployment time should be proportionally higher. The 80 deployed respondents have generated a total of 86 deployments to 13 different missions in Africa and beyond. Importantly, close to 70 % of the deployments went to either of the following four missions: UNMIS (Sudan), MONUC (DRC), UNMIL (Liberia) or UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire).

⁴⁰ Respondents included in this category indicated that they in some manner applied to the United Nations, but did not always specify through which procedure. An application through the DPKO's Galaxy system would be the common way for civilian applicants. It is interesting to note that while this is the most common procedure of deployment, it is also the system most of the non-deployed trainees complain about. The Galaxy system will change to the so-called 'Talent Management System' during 2009, where the aim is to pre-screen applicants based on minimum requirements for eligibility.

⁴¹ Of these 16, eight had received police training, four civilian training, three military, and one respondent had not specified the type of training he or she received.

⁴² It is unclear precisely how these respondents got their jobs. This category thus includes people who stated that they applied and were selected but without specifying through what procedure.

Mission name	Location	Number of Deployments	Percentage
UNMIS	Sudan	23	27 %
MONUC	Democratic Republic of Congo	16	19 %
UNMIL	Liberia	12	14 %
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	8	9 %
UNAMID ⁴³	Sudan (Darfur)	6	7 %
UNMIK	Kosovo	5	6 %
AMISOM	Sudan (Darfur)	4	5 %
MINUSTAH	Haiti	3	3 %
BINUB	Burundi	2	2 %
UNIPSIL	Sierra Leone	1	1 %
MINURSO	Western Sahara	1	1 %
UN Head Quarter	New York	1	1 %
UNMEE	Eritrea and Ethiopia	1	1 %
Not answered ⁴⁴		3	3 %
Total		86⁴⁵	100%

5.3 Non-Deployed Trainees

Two questions allowed respondents to explain why they had not found work in a relevant field or had not been deployed to a mission. The first one invited respondents to state in their own words why they not been deployed, and the second asked respondents to elaborate on the reasons for not having applied or why an eventual application had not been successful. The answers were subsequently grouped into categories.

The first question relating to non-deployment indicates that 'not applied' (20 %) is the single most important immediate reason for non-deployment. However, the categories 'other professional commit-

⁴³ Norway, among other countries, has emphasized training for UNAMID. The low deployment number reported here could result from one of several factors: deployed personnel have no internet access in the field and a relative low number of trainees had e-mail addresses in the first place. However, a UN official working as a training co-ordinator for the UNAMID mission states that UN security restrictions are the most important reason for slow deployment.

⁴⁴ The overwhelming majority of those who had reported deployment have gone on actual peacekeeping missions. Those who had not specified what type of work they had done stated that they had worked in a related field, broadly understood.

⁴⁵ The total number of deployments is higher than the number of deployed, since some trainees have gone to more than one mission.

ments' and 'national legislation'⁴⁶ combined make up 24 %. These two categories include trainees that may be motivated and willing to go on a mission, but find themselves unable to do so due to external constraints. Another 20 % stated that they either did not know why they had not found a relevant position, or were still waiting for an answer from an application.

Table 3. If you have not been deployed, please briefly state reason

Stated reason	Number	Percentage
Not applied	14	20 %
Other professional commitments	10	14 %
No response from application	9	13 %
Rejected application	7	10 %
Lack of experience or skills	7	10 %
National legislation	7	10 %
Do not know	5	7 %
Not motivated	3	4 %
Other	2	3 %
Not answered	6	9 %
Total	70	100 %

The second question asked the non-deployed respondents if they had applied for a relevant position, and requested them to elaborate on the answer. Half of them had not applied for a position either. Again, 'other professional commitments' (37 %) constitute a common answer for why these people had not applied. More worryingly, an equal number of respondents stated that they did not know where or how to apply to a position, or stated that they did not know of any opportunities. One respondent wrote that she had 'never been given opportunity' and another that he had 'no idea how to make the contact.' Others again complained that 'no one has approached me on joining' or that there exists 'no information available freely regarding opportunities.' Two respondents pointed a blaming finger towards AFDEM; one maintained that she had not applied because 'AFDEM is supposed to aggressively market our CVs in the job market out there' and another that 'I'm still expecting AFDEM to send me registration form.' This lack of a proactive approach on part of the trainees is worrying, and suggests that some trainees have clear expectations of a recruitment system that is supposed to obtain jobs on their behalf. However, it also indicates that TFP has a job to do in terms of improving the information about how to apply to course participants.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ This answer typically refers to police officers that have not made it through their national selection systems. One police officer from Zambia states that there is a policy of not letting police officers go on more than one mission.

⁴⁷ One respondent suggested that course participants be provided with 'a list of links where they can register for deployment to make their exposure to potential employers more accessible.'

Table 4. Have you applied for work or deployment in this field of work?

	Number	Percentage
Yes	30	43 %
No	35	50 %
Not answered	5	7 %
Total	70	100 %

Table 5. Please explain why you have not applied

Stated reason	Number	Percentage
Other professional commitments	13	37 %
Do not know of opportunities, job openings or where to apply.	13	37 %
National legislation	2	6 %
Other	2	6 %
Not motivated	1	3 %
Lack of experience or skills	1	3 %
Do not know	1	3 %
Not answered	2	6 %
Total	35	100 %

42 % of the non-deployed respondents had unsuccessfully applied for a position. Of these, 37 % found it hard to assess why this was so, and reported they had not received any feedback from their application, and another 10 % simply stated that they 'did not know'. Close to a quarter were of the opinion that they had insufficient skills and experience to obtain a position.

Table 6. Please explain why you think your application was not successful

Stated Reason	Number	Percentage
No response from application	11	37 %
Poor recruitment system / informal / nepotistic nature of the UN	8	27 %
Lack of experience / skills	7	23 %
Do not know	3	10 %
Not answered	1	3 %
Total	30	100 %

6. Bottlenecks to Deployment

In this study, we distinguish between systemic and individual bottlenecks. Individual bottlenecks refer to the inability or unwillingness of trainees to obtain a position in a peace operation, such as lack of skills, motivation to apply, and other professional commitments. These are people that would not get deployed regardless of how well structured the DPKO/DFS's recruitment was. Systemic bottlenecks pertain to faults in the design of how the DPKO/DFS and other actors recruit peacekeepers. Since the empirical material of this study stems from trainees' own perception of the situation, we are able to say something about the relative importance of individual versus systemic bottlenecks. The above data indicates that individual bottlenecks are important: the categories 'other professional commitments,' 'not applied,' 'lack of skills' and 'motivation to apply' explain 49 % of the non-deployments.

Structural bottlenecks still play a crucial factor. They are also easier to do something about in terms of policy. Here, the nature and structure of the DPKO/DFS's recruitment system is the most crucial factor. 27 % of those who had unsuccessfully applied for a position blamed the informal and patrimonial nature of the UN recruitment. Responses to that effect stated that 'to get deployed takes personal contacts' or 'I think [that the application was unsuccessful] because I did not know someone personally to push my case' or 'only if there is somebody to back you up, for people like us who follow the right channel of the recruitment process, hardly get the job.' Interestingly, *two* of the respondents claimed separately that a 'common saying in the UN' is that 'it is more important who you know than what you know.' Both deployed and non-deployed respondents stressed the importance of knowing someone 'in the system' to push a person's application personally. Based on their experience with a roster meant to serve the needs of the UN and the AU, AFDEM contends that the informal channels of the UN recruitment mechanisms constitute an obstacle for a merit-based recruitment system.⁴⁸

Our impression is that the informal recruitment structure – and here we do not refer to the formal recruitment process, but the role that personal contacts play in the process – in the DPKO/DFS is a widely acknowledged problem, but available research has not dealt with this question in detail. However, previous studies have noted that the

⁴⁸ Phone interview with Bongie Ncube, Programme director at AFDEM. 26.01.2009.

DPKO is understaffed and overworked.⁴⁹ Job applications to the UN are sent through the so called Galaxy e-staffing system, which receives more than 150 000 applications per year. This creates an endemic problem of filtering out qualified candidates for the relevant UN peacekeeping missions.⁵⁰ According to the GAO, the responsibility for the recruitment of police for UN peacekeeping operations falls on the shoulders of the 34-strong Police Division in the DPKO. An interviewed official states that he reviews approximately 700 applications to find 30 qualified people.⁵¹ A report on the UN's capacity of deploying police forces to peacekeeping operations the by the Henry L. Stimson Center maintains that the UN does not have the capacity to deploy in due time.⁵² The study relates this to the increase of mandated tasks and required increase of personnel associated with changing nature of peacekeeping described above, and chides the 'current, ad hoc system of piecing together a UN mission's rule of law components over the course of many months' as 'poorly suited' to sustain the type of transformations required for a peacebuilding mission.⁵³

Communication with relevant research institutes and practitioners in the field as well as the literature visited for this study has revealed other systemic bottlenecks that are not reflected by the survey results. First, obtaining necessary equipment is a problem. Missions are unable to provide required equipment for new arrivals. Difficulties in obtaining required equipment and provisions for staff such as suitable accommodation slows down deployment of all types of personnel, according to a report of the Secretary General to the Security Council.⁵⁴ Another report on the mission in the Central African Republic, MINURCAT, notes that the UN only offers tented office accommodations due to acute shortage of construction workers. Such conditions make it hard to attract and retain qualified personnel, or to deploy them even if they have been recruited.

⁴⁹ Gowan, *Peacekeeping in Crisis*.

⁵⁰ Catriona Gourlay. 2006 *Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations* (Washington, DC:United Nations Peacekeeping), Accessed at <http://www.canadem.ca/home/documents/DPKO%20Study%20on%20Rosters%20for%20the%20Deployment%20of%20Civilian%20Capabilities.pdf> on 09.04.2009.

⁵¹ GAO, *Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress*.

⁵² Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law* (Washington DC.: Stimson Center Report no 63.) Accessed at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Stimson_UNPOL_Report_Nov07.pdf on 20.01.2009.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 51

⁵⁴ *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur* (United Nations Security Council, 2008). Accessed at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/640/80/PDF/N0864080.pdf?OpenElement> on 10.03.2009.

Second, deteriorating security situations slow down deployment. The UN's police training coordinator for UNAMID point out that the chief reason for the non-deployment of trained police officers to UNAMID is the UN security restriction not to deploy more than 1800 – 1900 police officers.⁵⁵ Third, AFDEM's experience with TfP trainees suggests that there is a mismatch between the type of training offered on the one hand, and type of people that are currently needed by missions. A 2004 evaluation report of the EU project for training civilians for crisis management points to the same type of mismatch in course curriculum and the needs of end users. The report recommends that the “supply” provided by the course programme [...] to be adjusted to the probable future demand for staff.⁵⁶ While the needs of peace-keeping missions are in constant flux, there is at least currently an oversupply of people trained in human rights and the rule of law. The UN needs more mission support staff such as electricians, telecommunication and IT experts, engineers and construction workers. A person trained in the rule of law is thus likely to stay passive on the AFDEM roster for quite some time. Furthermore, AFDEM maintains that some mission requirements are unrealistically high. Especially with regards to substantive positions, such as human rights, political affairs and civil affairs, the UN requires fifteen or more years of experience for an entry level position. Lastly, other systemic bottlenecks include problems of obtaining visas and the ability of small mission administrations to process applications in due time.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Email confirmations from Chris Sharwood-Smith and Odd Anton Utvær of the Norwegian Police Directorate (subject heading 'SV: TfP og UNAMID', received 19.03.2009.) and Derek Deighton of KAIPTC (subject 'RE: clarification on KAITPC trainees', received 20.03.2009).

⁵⁶ Annika Hansen, *Evaluations of the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Phase III)*, (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2007. Preliminary version.). Page 66.

⁵⁷ Personal e-mail from Derek Deighton of the KAIPTC. Received 10.12.2008, subject heading 'RE: TfP bottleneck study'.

7. Conclusion and Suggestions for Improvement: The Missing Link Between Recruitment and Training

The lack of deployment of trained personnel to UN missions is of utmost importance, and remains, paradoxically, understudied. Through the present study we have sought to address this gap. The current situation with high vacancy rates and slow deployment is a direct and predictable result of the move to peacebuilding. This move was a planned and willed development, and although a number of Member States, such as Norway through TFP have responded to calls by the UN in the early 1990s to invest in training and rostering, the UN Secretariat has evidently not invested in measures to ensure that the civilian and police peacekeepers needed to fulfil mission mandates would be available. The surge of peacekeepers over the last couple of decades means that there is a *prima facie* need for training programmes, but training is inefficient if it does not also result in an improvement in the ability of the UN to deploy more peacekeepers. This raises two questions. On one hand, does DPKO/DFS, and other relevant agencies, such as UN Volunteers, take sufficient advantage of training programmes and rosters to broaden their recruitment base? On the other hand, do training programmes and rosters do enough to encourage and support their alumni in the period between training and deployment?

It is beyond the scope of the present study to delve into the first question, but as pointed out earlier, the study suggests that the mere fact that there is such a large gap between those trained on the one hand, and the significant vacancy rates experienced by the UN, especially in some missions, suggest that this questions deserves serious attention.

Furthermore, we argue that the survey results indicate a room for improving the link between TFP training and recruitment.⁵⁸ A deployment rate over 50 % is probably relatively good, although more research is required to verify how reflective this figure is for TFP in general. However, most training programmes in the past, and TFP is no exception, worked on the assumption that it is their responsibility to train personnel, and the UN's responsibility to recruit them. This

⁵⁸ The Hansen report, *Evaluations of the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Phase III)* also highlights the important of enhancing the link between training and recruitment.

study's findings suggest that this assumption has resulted in a large body of personnel trained and not utilised on the one hand, whilst the UN on the other seem unable to find qualified personnel to deploy. This is obviously a serious mismatch, and training programmes, which are also increasingly evaluated on the basis of how the people they have trained were used, can no longer ignore the recruitment aspect of the training to deployment cycle.

The questionnaire did not ask the respondents to suggest improvements, but several people still made it a point to highlight, either in a separate e-mail or in the questionnaire itself, that TfP needs to develop a closer link between training and recruitment. In the view of one respondent: 'there's no link between the recruitment and the training.' Another respondent contended the survey is relevant 'because of the no-following up of the trainings in terms of deployment. I think the big problem is in the Organisation's procedures of recruitment...' and further indicated that TfP and the international bodies in charge of deployment need a chart of common understanding to ensure that training enhances one's chances of deployment. This view was echoed by a respondent who urged the TfP partners to 'move beyond their present position and be more proactive in recruiting qualified existing UN personnel who have been trained by their organizations in order to improve their ongoing recruiting process.' In spite of the limited scope of the present study, a few tentative conclusions and policy recommendations are nevertheless in place.

Rosters such as AFDEM are, with regard to UN positions, currently limited to identifying UN vacancies and informing qualified personnel on the roster of the opportunity to apply, because DPKO/DFS only accepts individual applications through the Galaxy system. Rosters can therefore improve their service to individual applicants by providing additional services such as assistance with preparing CVs and other applications, coaching persons for interviews, etc. There ought to be better coordination between rosters such as AFDEM and the UN system. If such coordination proves difficult, the system needs rethinking, away from either the assumption that the UN can only work on the basis of individual applicants, or away from the thinking that investing in rosters will result in an increased capacity that the UN can use for recruitment.

Some training programmes such as TfP ACCORD has already changed course and is now focussing more on in-mission, induction and pre-deployment training of already selected personnel. If generic pre-deployment training does not result in increased UN capacity because the UN system is unable to make use of that capacity in its present form, then it would make sense to shift to other training ap-

proaches, such as the just-in-time type of model ACCORD has already moved to, for its UN training portfolio.

Training programmes can also do more to encourage and prepare their graduates for applying for positions, by including a training session or module aimed at informing course participants on how UN recruitment works and how to apply for positions. Training programs and rosters can also offer a post-training service by keeping alumni informed of further training opportunities, informing them of vacancies, and by providing them with assistance in preparing applications, and where possible, by facilitating their applications through networking on their behalf with end users, whether these are individual UN missions or the UN Secretariat in New York.

Training programmes can also improve the selection of course participants to match mission requirements, both in terms of the types of positions needed, and in terms of the entry-level requirements for these positions. It would be inefficient to invest in training a candidate that does not meet the UN requirements. For instance, if the UN requires a minimum of 15 years experience for most entry level positions then the trainees should reflect that level of experience. Training programmes could also adjust their training to better meet UN needs, by devoting more training to mission support (engineering, logistics, TC, finance, personnel, administration, etc.). Closer contact between the UN, training programmes and rosters can allow training programmes to adjust their training courses, and the selection of course participants, to match the UN's changing needs. Training programmes and the UN are already networked through the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) and many training programmes undertake annual visits to New York to consult with the DPKO's training unit, but these networking actions do not appear to have had the effect of closing the gaps identified by this study. Perhaps, the gaps would have been much worse if these kinds of contacts have not been established.

There is, however, only so much training programmes can do to increase the deployment rate, inasmuch as some of the systemic bottlenecks lie beyond their reach. In particular, there appears to be a need to engage with DPKO/DFS to improve, or make changes to their recruitment system. This is probably best done through a group of like-minded UN Member States that share the same interest and frustrations. Other UN Member States that have also invested in civilian and police training and in developing rosters over the years, include Sweden, Finland, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. Such a grouping may be able to engage with the UN through the C-34 and other channels, and encourage the UN and the training pro-

grammes and rosters that these Member States support, to work closer together with the aim of closing the training-recruitment gap.