


The ENP as an instrument for building a security community? The case of Moldova

Dorina Baltag and Giselle Bosse



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Abstract

This contribution analyses if and how the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) work as security community-building instruments in EU–Moldova relations –whether, how and to what extent the EU has managed to promote security and stability through the externalization of rules and values. We adopt the framework developed by Rieker (2014), which holds that building an effective security community requires *a certain level of integration* combined with a *certain level of attractiveness*. Our study examines the level of Moldova’s integration with the EU and the domestic support for such integration, based on four main indicators: scope/comprehensiveness of the association, level of adaption/external Europeanization, level of participation/contribution and the level of attractiveness of the EU. We conclude that the ENP/EaP has been relatively successful in stepping up the political and economic integration of Moldova into the EU, but that the process of building a security community is still not mature enough to 'lock' Moldova into a sustainable path towards European integration.

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Introduction

To what extent has Moldova become integrated into the EU? Here we focus on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), developing since 2004, and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy, operational since 2009. We adopt the framework developed by Rieker (2014), which holds that building an effective security community requires *a certain level of integration* combined with a *certain level of attractiveness*. Our study examines the level of Moldova's EU integration, using four main indicators: scope/comprehensiveness of the association, level of adaption/external Europeanization, level of participation/contribution, and level of attractiveness of the EU.

Mapping the level of integration: According to Rieker, the basic idea is that the EU is a security building institution and that security building beyond EU borders is dependent on the neighbouring country's level of integration and the Union's perceived attractiveness. (Rieker 2014: 7). Rieker operationalizes the level of integration as follows: First, she defines the scope/comprehensiveness of association in terms of the scope of association agreements: 'The need to study the scope of association agreements builds on the assumption that the broader the scope of the association is – in terms of comprehensiveness (the policy areas it covers) and dynamism – the more integrated will the associated country be'. We therefore present an overview of all the areas that are covered by the association agreement with Moldova. Second, Rieker underlines the importance of the level of adaptation/external Europeanization, which she defines as 'the degree of adaptation in terms of adjustment made to EU rules, norms and values at the national level' and 'determining the degree of adaptations to EU rules (or Europeanization)'. We examine Moldova's level of adaptation in the areas of democracy promotion and good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights, market economy principles, and trade and trade-related *acquis*. Third, Rieker identifies the level of participation/contribution: 'The higher the degree of participation in EU policies and the more committed a country is, the more likely will it be to build a security community' (Rieker 2014: 10). We examine the level of participation of Moldova based on 'active' and 'passive' participation in EU policies and agencies, including processes of Europeanization. Fourth and finally, Rieker defines the level of attractiveness of the EU as an important measure of integration, because 'the level of support from the domestic political leadership and important constituencies in the partner country will be crucial for the EU to succeed as a regional security actor' (Rieker 2014: 11). We focus

our analysis of how attractive the EU is to Moldova by assessing benefits and access (what's in it for the partner country?) and the relative attractiveness of the ENP/EaP as against that of Russia as a 'competing external actor' (Rieker 2014: 7).

We chose Moldova as a case study.¹ Of all the countries in the EU's closer neighbourhood, Moldova is currently regarded as a frontrunner as regards EU integration, having made significant progress in reforming its foreign policy alongside its domestic political and economic system in line with EU norms and standards. Therefore, we expect EU security community building to be more advanced in Moldova than in the other EaP countries. The extent to which the EU has expanded its security community to Moldova will indicate how close the EU is to influencing European integration dynamics in the EaP region as a whole.

By way of conclusion, we critically reflect on the future of Moldova in the European integration process, and discuss the limitations of a post-sovereign collective security project in a region that continues to be governed by balance-of-power politics and the security of sovereign statehood.

¹ The authors conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with EU officials and representatives of the Moldovan government, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliament as well as with independent researchers and civil society representatives. Interviews took place between July 2013 and January 2014.

Moldova and EU integration

In this section, we analyse the level of integration with the EU in terms of *the scope of the agreements*, *the level of adaptation* to EU standards and the *level of participation* in EU policies and agencies. According to Rieker (2014) this will give an indication of whether the EU can be regarded as a security community-building institution in Moldova.

Scope of EU agreements

The scope of Moldova's agreements with the EU is comprehensive. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed with Moldova in 1994 aimed at providing an appropriate framework for political dialogue, the promotion of trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the parties, fostering sustainable economic development, providing a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation and supporting efforts of Moldova to consolidate its democracy and develop its economy so as to complete the transition to a market economy. Like all PCAs concluded with the former Soviet Union countries, the one with Moldova was primarily an economic cooperation instrument (limited economic scope), though containing in its general principles section an article stipulating that respect for democracy, principles of international law, and human rights constitute an 'essential element' of the agreement (PCA Moldova: 6). The PCA also introduced procedures for political dialogue between the parties and established three bilateral institutions: Moldova Cooperation Council (meetings at the ministerial level), the Co-operation Committee (meetings at the senior officials level), and the Parliamentary Co-operation Committee, composed of MPs of the European Parliament and the parliament of Moldova. Many provisions of the PCA, however, still remained to be implemented by Moldova at the time of the entry into force of the ENP.

The ENP did not lead to new contractual relations between the EU and Moldova; however, the ENP Action Plan set out a roadmap for enhanced relations, including conditionality (soft law). The priorities of the Action Plan (AP) were much wider in scope and went beyond economic cooperation. They included the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration (a stake in the EU's Internal Market), and the possibility for Moldova to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes and participation in Community programmes; an upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation and the opportunity for convergence of economic legislation; the continued reduction of trade barriers; and increased financial support/technical assistance (ENP Action Plan: 2–

3). The EU formally required Moldova to adopt the *acquis*. According to the AP, 'The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the degree of Moldova's commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities. The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully Moldova's efforts and concrete achievements in meeting those commitments.' (ENP Action Plan 2004: 1).

Since 2009, Moldova has been included in the EU's more ambitious partnership, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), as 'a growing responsibility to the partners, to help them address the political and economic challenges that they face and to support their aspirations for closer ties' (European Commission 2008: 2). Replacing the former PCA, the EU–Moldova Association Agreement (AA) aims to enhance the institutional framework with the EU, and deepen political association and economic integration, implying reciprocal obligations and rights. The AA was initialled at the EaP summit in Vilnius in November 2013. Overall, the scope of the AA is considered comprehensive, balanced and broad in scope. As noted by one interviewee: 'the scope of the AA is quite broad especially if we compare it to the earlier PCA. It is highly detailed, is accompanied by various EU support mechanisms, it leaves margins for manoeuvre, and it expects progress'². To a certain degree it is comparable to the 35 chapters that an EU candidate country must negotiate: although structured differently, the AA covers almost all issues incorporated in the 35 chapters³. It is a highly ambitious document that expects a wide range of reforms to be implemented, a high degree of participation in EU programmes and in regional development, cross-border and civil society cooperation. It is a reform agenda aimed at regulatory approximation to the EU, political association and economic integration. Moldova is expected to engage in considerable reforms in the following areas covered by the AA: (i) political dialogue and reform, cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy; (ii) justice, freedom and security issues; (iii) economic and other sector cooperation (including civil society cooperation) and (iv) trade and trade-related matters (AA, 2013). These four chapters reflect reforms based on criteria established in the ENP: the promotion of democracy respect for human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development. Unlike the

² Interview with independent expert, consultant to the Moldovan MFA, September 2013.

³ The EU-Moldova Association Agreement counts over 1000 pages and consists of the followings: A Preamble as an introductory statement of the Agreement, setting out the Agreement's purpose and underlying philosophy; seven Titles: General Principles; Political Cooperation and Foreign and Security Policy; Justice Freedom and Security; Trade and Trade-related Matters (DCFTA); Economic and Sector Cooperation; Financial Cooperation with Anti-Fraud Provisions, as well as Institutional, General and Final Provisions; 35 Annexes setting out EU legislation to be incorporated by a specific date and four Protocols.

candidate countries, however, Moldova is not promised membership in the EU.

Some of the areas have been higher up on the political agenda of the Moldovan government during negotiations, such as cooperation in the sphere of justice, freedom and security (hereafter JFS) and trade and trade-related matters. The framework of the JFS chapter within the AA is based on the Justice and Home Affairs section within the Action Plan, but is perceived as more comprehensive and more ambitious⁴. It represents a reform agenda in the fields of justice, internal affairs and human rights (cooperation on migration, asylum and border management; cooperation on the fight against illicit drugs; money laundering and terrorism financing; combating terrorism; movement of persons; preventing and combating organized crime and corruption and other illegal activities). Furthermore, the issue of mobility and visa liberalization, as components of the JFS, have been widely addressed by Moldova and the EU; and as a result, formulations on the JFS have been included in such a way as to represent the progress made in the area of the visa dialogue (Caras 2011). The main focus here is on integrated border management, visa liberalization and security standards, as well as reform in the judicial and police fields – which are closely related to human rights issues and combating corruption (European Commission 2008). There has been less negotiation concerning the Transnistrian issue, which remains a central point within the political dialogue and reform, cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy chapter of the AA. All these areas involve a high degree of legislation harmonization or in some cases even initiation of new legislation, i.e. adopting EU legislation in areas like environment, trade, education or transportation. In turn, this indicates the strong reform commitment undertaken by the Moldovan government when it initialled the AA.

The EU and Moldova have also concluded negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The main objective of the DCFTA is to bring Moldovan legislation closer to EU legislation in trade and trade-related areas⁵. The DCFTA – the EU's new

⁴ Interviews with Moldovan civil servants (Moldovan parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Chancellery, Ministry of Justice) and independent expert, consultant to the Moldovan MFA, September-November 2013.

⁵ Title IV: Trade and trade-related matters has the following objective: 'The Parties shall progressively establish a free trade area over a transitional period of maximum 10 years starting from the entry into force of this Agreement' and includes the following articles: 1. National treatment and market access for goods; 2. Trade remedies; Technical Barriers to trade; 3. Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures; 4. Customs and trade facilitation, 5. Establishment, Trade in Services; 6. Current Payments and movement of capital; 7. Public Procurement; 8. Intellectual Property; 9. Competition; 10. Trade related energy; 11. Transparency; 12. Trade and sustainable development.

generation of FTAs – is ‘deep’ in the sense that it requires partners to adopt up to 80% of the EU’s trade and trade-related *acquis*. The DCFTA goes beyond the scope of the PCA, to include ‘behind the border’ obstacles to free trade, including intellectual property rights, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) and trade-related investment measures, alongside what have been called the ‘Singapore issues’, including EU *acquis* on mergers, competition and state aid, public procurement and environmental/social standards.⁶ However, the DCFTA should not be interpreted as a tool for deeper integration. It does *not* offer partners any say in EU decision-making; nor does it give them any higher level of access to EU aid/redistribution mechanisms, or, importantly, full access to the EU markets in the short and medium term (Messerlin et al. 2011: 5).

Prior to opening negotiations on the DCFTA, the Commission issued a set of key and additional recommendations to the Moldovan government in October 2010, listing thirteen thematic areas in which additional progress was required. These included market access for goods, tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), trade facilitation and customs administration, rules of origin, services and investment, intellectual property rights (IPR), public procurement (PP) and competition (European Commission 2010).⁷

Level of adaptation/alignment

With all issues addressed by the chapters of the AA, approximation to the EU *acquis* is required. Moldova is considered a frontrunner in the ENP and EaP due to its high level of compliance with the EU rules and norms. The EaP Index also shows Moldova as the best performer in terms of approximation, coming in first among the six EaP members (see Table 1). This refers to how closely the institutions and policies of a country resemble those of the EU member-states, how they converge towards EU standards and whether these are in line with EU requirements. As Table 1 shows, Moldova scores highest in the area of democracy and JFS, and relatively high as regards the rule of law.

⁶ The ENP/EaP coincided with the revision of the EU’s trade policy instruments towards encouraging ‘deep trade’. Deep trade is the attempt by the EU to liberalize trade not only by removing trade barriers ‘at the border’ (reduction of tariff barriers) but also ‘behind the border’ (domestic rules preventing FDI and trade in services, or the lack of domestic labour/environmental standards giving a competitive advantage to domestic over EU producers, etc.). See Young and Peterson (2006).

⁷ The application of conditionality before opening DCFTA negotiation was unprecedented in EU FTA practice. Even Ukraine –the worst implementer of EU *acquis* – was not required to fulfil such preconditions prior to starting its DCFTA negotiations.

Table 1. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU

| Sector cooperation | Approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------|---------|---------|------------|---------|
| | Moldova | Georgia | Ukraine | Armenia | Azerbaijan | Belarus |
| Democracy | 0.72 | 0.54 | 0.64 | 0.47 | 0.31 | 0.20 |
| Rule of law | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.60 | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.23 |
| Justice, Freedom and Security | 0.94 | 0.67 | 0.76 | 0.47 | 0.76 | 0.43 |
| Trade and Economic Cooperation | 0.71 | 0.54 | 0.72 | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.38 |

Source: *Author's compilation based on EaP Index 2013.*

According to experts' evaluation, Moldova has made very good progress in laying down a comprehensive legislative, one more compatible with the regulatory environment (EaP Index 2013). The relevant legislative framework is largely in place, with some of its elements pending approval by Parliament.⁸ As data from the Centre of the Harmonization of Legislation [with the EU *acquis*] show, till today Moldova has adopted 188 normative and legislative acts (see below Table 2). According to EU evaluation, despite the need for certain improvements, the instruments adopted and the drafts are largely in line with European and international standards (European Commission 2012).

⁸ Interview with Moldovan civil servants, Moldovan parliament and Ministry of Justice, September 2013.

Table 2. EU acts transposed into Moldovan legislation, 2007–2013

| Field | Number of adopted acts (normative and legislative) |
|---|--|
| Agriculture and Rural development (incl. veterinary and zoo-technology) | 83 |
| Industrial policy and internal market | 26 |
| Environment, consumers and health protection | 22 |
| Freedom, Security and Justice | 12 |
| Work employment, equal chances and social policy | 9 |
| The right to establish and freedom of offering services | 8 |
| Enterprise law | 7 |
| Transportation policy | 4 |
| Energy policy | 4 |
| General, financial and institutional matters | 3 |
| Competition policy | 3 |
| Customs Union and free movement of goods | 2 |
| Fishing policy | 2 |
| Economic and monetary policy and free circulation of capital | 2 |
| Foreign Relations | 1 |
| Other (taxation; science, information, education and culture etc.) | 0 |
| Total | 188 |

Source: Authors' compilation based on the database of EU transposed acts available on the website of the Moldovan Ministry of Justice:

<http://justice.gov.md/tabview.php?l=ro&idc=225>

Democracy promotion, good governance and the rule of law. On the sectoral level, Moldova has conducted a wide range of reforms in accordance with EU standards. As regards *good governance and the rule of law*, the Moldovan government has progressed reforms in the justice sector and adjacent areas such as migration and border management. The strategy of the justice sector reform is currently being implemented.⁹ The most recent actions within these reforms have been the arrest, on charges of corruption charges, of five judges in early 2014– the first time in the history of the country (Leancă 2014). In the sector of migration and border management, several reforms have been carried out as well. Take, for example, *document security* (including biometrics): today Moldova issues only biometric passports, and a new law on protecting personal data has been passed in accordance with EU standards. In the area of *irregular immigration* (including re-admission), Moldova developed an Action Plan and implemented the Integrated Border Management Strategy. A precondition for effective fight against illegal migration or customs fraud, as expected by the EU,

⁹ Interview with Moldovan civil servant, Ministry of Justice, September 2013.

is the introduction of integrated border management (Canciani 2009). Moldova has modernized its border management procedures in compliance with the EU concept of integrated border management, based on the adoption of regular strategies and plans for integrated border management.¹⁰ Establishing integrated border management impact on such key policy areas as trade, customs, visa and mobility of persons. Moreover, there has been a drastic reform of the police. The border police forces have been demilitarized and incorporated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, salaries have been increased, and disciplinary procedures have been initiated against police officers accused of implication in corruption cases.

Progress has been made also in relation to *democracy promotion and respect for human rights*. As regards *human rights and fundamental freedoms*, Moldova has ratified and made progress in implementing several international and European instruments, as required by the EU, such as the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons. It has also created a Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers and a Temporary Placement Centre for Foreigners. Among the most sensitive legislation that has been passed are the Law on Equal Opportunities and the reform of the Anti-Corruption Centre.¹¹ As Moldovan monitoring reports show, at the end of 2013 the government adopted a new draft law on the people's advocate as well as progressed in organizing the activity of community mediators for Roma-populated communities and continued efforts to promote the social inclusion of persons with disabilities (ADEPT& Expert-Grup 2013). Another successful change is the incorporation in the National Human Rights Plan 2011–2014 of the recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review.

On the other hand, Moldova's track record also has certain deficiencies. Moldova has been lagging behind in the implementation of reforms,¹² and, to cite Prime Minister Iurie Leancă (2014), 'we need to do our homework'. Implementation of EU norms in some cases remains a challenge due to the lack of the necessary financial and human resources and a vision for a mainstream approach or political

¹⁰ Interview with Moldovan public policy consultant, Moldovan Border Police Department, September-November 2013.

¹¹ Interview with Moldovan public policy consultant, Moldovan Border Police Department, September-November 2013.

¹² Interviews with Moldovan civil servants, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September-October 2013.

will.¹³ It is important to differentiate policy areas: as some Moldovan civil servants emphasize, the pace of reform is slower in certain areas than others because some entail political costs, whereas others are more technical in nature¹⁴. Data from the Centre of Harmonization at the Ministry of Justice show that there has been no real effort to create a roadmap for governmental decision-making, with a clear timeframe; moreover, there is insufficient coordination of all relevant ministries to fulfil EU obligations.¹⁵

Table 3. Moldova's progress 2005–2012

| Areas as established within the ENP AP | Rating established | |
|---|--------------------|------------|
| | Nr value | assessment |
| Democracy and rule of law (democratic institutions, judicial system, administrative capacity and other sub-areas) | 2.3 | modest |
| Human rights and fundamental freedoms (minority rights, children's rights, freedom of expression, prevention of, and the fight against, the trafficking in human beings, ill-treatment and torture and other sub-areas) | 2.6 | moderate |
| Settlement of the Transnistrian conflict (border security, civil society and democracy and other related areas) | 1.5 | minor |

Source: Authors' compilation based on national evaluation of Moldova's progress (Botan et al. 2013)

Table 3 assesses Moldova's progress 2005–2012 in the areas of democracy, human rights and rule of law.¹⁶ According to the authors of the evaluation of Moldova's progress, the Moldovan authorities undertaken reforms for the sake of reporting back to the EU; Moldova is still lagging behind in areas like ensuring democracy and the rule of law (Botan et al. 2013). The report highlights that there are deficiencies in carrying out the judicial reform which leaves room for interference of interest groups, political involvement and corruption. Additionally, many actions foreseen in this area have not been implemented. In issues such as developing and implementing a legal framework appropriate for the prevention and fight against trafficking of human beings, Moldova has made modest progress. Low progress in the area

¹³ Interviews with Moldovan civil servants and public policy consultants (Parliament, State Chancellery, Moldovan Border Police Department, National Participation Council), September–November 2013.

¹⁴ Interviews with Moldovan civil servant, State Chancellery, September 2013.

¹⁵ Interview with Moldovan civil servants, State Chancellery and Moldovan Parliament, September 2013.

¹⁶ Progress has been estimated by civil society representatives in charge of monitoring the Moldovan reform process according to EU standards on a level from 0 to 5, 0 being the lowest and 5 being the highest, as well as relevant assessment – regression, no progress, modest, moderate, high.

of human rights is linked with the (poor) quality of the justice system in Moldova, but is also due to the fact that the driving forces in this field are external: *'As a consequence, adoption of the legislation framework is not always followed by the development of effective mechanisms for human rights protection, while strengthening the existing mechanisms is not perceived as a priority. This approach of "half measures" does not allow an effective protection of human rights'* (Botan et al. 2013: 24).

Market economy principles. Moldova has a small and open economy. Agriculture plays a significant role. Of the countries in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood, Moldova has been among the hardest hit by the global recession in 2008–09. Although the economy has recovered from the crisis (average annual GDP growth exceeding 5% in 2010–2013), economic growth has been volatile. Real GDP grew by 7.1% in 2010 and 6.4% in 2011. In 2012, however, GDP contracted by 0.7% because of a drought that led to a contraction of GDP in agriculture (–22.3%).¹⁷ However, according to the World Bank, Moldova has made significant strides in its economic and political transition, although 'much remains to be done'. Moldova lags behind the rest of the EaP region because it has a 'small domestic market with limited competition and weak drive for innovation' (World Bank 2014). The level of the market economy of Moldova is behind that of Armenia and Georgia (Table 4).¹⁸

Table 4. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU

| Sector cooperation | Approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer) | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---------|---------|---------|------------|---------|
| | Moldova | Georgia | Ukraine | Armenia | Azerbaijan | Belarus |
| Market Economy and DCFTA | 0.61 | 0.66 | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.43 | 0.38 |
| Ease of Doing Business Index 2013 | 86 | 9 | 140 | 40 | 71 | 64 |
| Ease of Doing Business 2014 | 78 | 8 | 112 | 37 | 70 | 63 |

Source: Author's compilation based on EaP Index 2013 and World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index 2013/2014

¹⁷ In addition, exports from Moldova into the EU decreased due to the Eurozone crisis. Since 2013, the economy has been growing again, driven by a record agricultural harvest, with GDP increasing by 8% in 2013 (World Bank 2014).

¹⁸ In addition, and despite the sharp decline in poverty statistics, Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. Based on the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) standardized poverty lines of USD 5/day and USD 2.5/day at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 55% of the population were 'poor' and 10% 'extremely poor' (World Bank 2014).

On the other hand, Moldova has made progress in improving its business climate in recent years. It slightly improved its ranking in 2014 to 78th place (out of 185) compared to 86th place in 2013 in the 'ease of doing business ranking' in the World Bank's 'Doing Business 2014' annual report (World Bank 2014). However, according to the European Commission, 'despite this progress further reforms are still needed *inter alia* in countering the grey economy in the retail sector, and streamlining of the legislation' (European Commission 2012: 12). Indeed, foreign investors continue to cite serious problems with the Moldovan tax office and customs officials, including repeated cases of corporate raiding, which are still possible due to loopholes in Moldovan law and high levels of corruption among local judges. In 2012, Moldova lost an estimated €60 million (25%) of its foreign direct investment because of the poor investment climate (Cașuș 2013).

Adoption of trade and trade-related measures. Moldova adopted a significant amount of EU trade and trade-related *acquis* in 2012–13 (in order to qualify for the opening of DCFTA negotiations), including over 4000 TBT standards, and 81 EC legal SPS related legal acts and regulations. Moldova has also begun amending its Customs Code, its legislation on customs tariffs and on free economic zones, as well as completing the implementation of its fair competition legislation. Other reforms include the introduction of new anti-monopoly regulations and a reform of the state body responsible for the prevention of unfair competition.

Regarding SPS standards, a bilateral agreement with the EU on the protection of Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs was ratified by Moldova in December 2012. This is expected to contribute, *inter alia*, to the diversification of wine production in the country. The Parliament also adopted a general food safety law in 2012 which established a food safety agency, and a law on animal identification and traceability entered into force in 2012. Moldova has also further reduced technical barriers to trade: the law on standardization has been amended and the law on accreditation and conformity assessment entered into force. Amendments have been made to the law on metrology. Moldova has amended its Civil Code and other laws in respect of liability for defective products. A law on the industrial security of hazardous industrial objects has also been adopted. Still, according to the ENPI Index 2013, Moldova lags Armenia and Georgia in meeting DCFTA requirements (Table 4).

Overall, actual implementation of the EU's trade and trade-related *acquis* has been moving very slowly. This is not only because immense resources are required, but also because the economic reform project continues to meet considerable resistance within Moldova – not in the form of ideological opposition, but because of the continued

entanglement of the government and parliament with oligarchic structures, corruption and vested interests of rent-seekers who want to maintain the status quo and/or favour cosmetic rather than substantive liberal economic reforms.¹⁹

Level of participation in the EU

Moldova's inclusion in the EaP offers the opportunity to deepen dialogue and cooperation, including participation in EU policies and programmes. Apart from identifying the form and frequency of meetings with the EU, we examine participation along two dimensions: the passive/ active participation of Moldova in EU policies/ programmes, and the socialization effects thereof on the Moldovan political elites (external Europeanization).

Form and frequency of meetings with the EU. Meetings between Moldova and the EU have increased in the framework of the ENP and again with the EaP. EU–Moldova political dialogue continued to deepen throughout 2012 and 2013, and contacts between high-level officials intensified. For example, in April 2012 President Timofti paid a visit to Brussels, reciprocated by European Commission President Barroso in November. In February 2012, Commissioner De Gucht opened negotiations in Chisinau on establishing a DCFTA, and Commissioner Malmström met three times with the Moldovan Prime Minister in 2012 (ENP Progress Report Moldova: 2). Consultations also intensified between the Moldovan government and the EU Political and Security Committee, the Council Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the Political Directors Troika.

On the multilateral level, the head of states and governments of all EaP countries, including the Moldovan president, meet every two years at an EaP summit. Meetings of foreign ministers are held annually, whereas ministerial sectoral conferences/meetings among ministers responsible for various sectors take place on an *ad hoc* basis throughout the year. Multilateral platforms meet twice a year (four platforms: Democracy, Economic integration, Energy Security, Contacts between People) and involve senior Moldovan officials meeting other EaP senior officials and EU Commission officials. Working panels meet several times a year; these are meetings of officials from EaP countries, including from Moldova, who support the work of the multilateral platforms. The EaP parliamentary assembly (with 10 MPs from Moldova) meets twice a year. There are also annual meetings of several

¹⁹ Reforms have also stalled because of competition within the government, for example between the four parties in the Alliance for European Integration, which all catered for different electorates and struggled to act as a single force pushing for reform. For a discussion of the factors resisting liberal economic reforms in Moldova, see for example: International Centre for Policy Studies (2013).

other formations, such as the local and regional assembly of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus or the Eastern Partnership Business Council. Last but not least, Moldova is active within the Civil Society (CS) Forum, the EU platform for EaP civil society cooperation, where common approaches on different democracy and good governance initiatives, including human rights, are discussed. The fact that in 2013 the Forum was hosted in Moldova and not in Lithuania (the EU MS country hosting the Presidency) bears witness to Moldova's progress on the reform agenda as well as its active participation in this framework. Moldovan national CS platform has been very active in proposing items on the policy agenda of the EaP, more active and advanced than the other national platforms: recently it is Moldova that has come with policy proposals on education, on integration of volunteers, on the ERASMUS+ programme, etc.²⁰

Level of participation in EU policies. The process of reform is also supported by Moldova's participation in EU policies and programmes on migration, research, justice and security and other areas. For instance in 2008, the European Commission signed a Mobility Partnership (MP) with Moldova, one of two pilot countries. In January 2011, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, presented an Action Plan on visa liberalization. This is also in line with EU's goal of preserving a safe Europe and ensuring the security of its citizens through cooperation with non-EU countries on issues like border management, migration, and asylum (European Union 2013a, 2013b). Since 2007, some 200 migration-related measures have been implemented. These projects range from effective governance of labour migration to protection and empowerment of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking. Many these migration-related actions have been implemented under the Mobility Partnership umbrella (to date, within this framework, 85 migration-related initiatives have been or are carried out in various fields). Moldova also actively participates in the EaP working group on integrated border management and the structured dialogue on human rights between Moldova and the EU. Further, in late 2011, Moldova and the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding on associating Moldova with the EU's Seventh Research Framework Programme (FP7). This allows scientists, research institutes, universities and companies from Moldova to collaborate with counterparts in the EU, in turn strengthening their research expertise and capacity. This is the only programme within which Moldova contributes to the EU's budget on science and research.²¹

Moldova also works together with EU agencies. Since 2008, the Moldovan Border Police Department has had cooperation with

²⁰ Interviews with Moldovan civil society representatives, September-November 2013.


²¹ Interview with Moldovan civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2013.

FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union), based on a working arrangement. This cooperation involves the Moldovan side contributing human and informational resources, with information exchange with FRONTEX on a monthly basis; further, implementation of FRONTEX risk analysis methodology by the Moldovan Border Police; participation in training, research and development; and joint operational measures. A strategic agreement between Moldova and EUROPOL (law enforcement cooperation) has been initiated, and an operational agreement with this EU agency is being negotiated. Moldova contributes with strategic information (on trends and methods used to commit offences, routes and changes in routes used by smugglers or those involved in illicit trafficking offences, etc.) and technical information (investigative procedures, criminal intelligence analytical methods, etc.). And finally, we note that EUROJUST submitted a draft agreement on cooperation with Moldova (judicial cooperation) in December 2013.

An important additional step towards the integration of Moldova within the EU civil aviation safety system was taken in July 2009 with the signing of the Working Arrangement between the European Aviation Safety Agency and the civil aviation authorities of Moldova. In energy, Moldova successfully completed negotiations for its accession to the Energy Community in 2009. Cooperation with the EUBAM mission intensified significantly after a new Moldova/Ukraine customs regime was introduced in the course of 2006 (NIP Moldova 2011-2013: 8).

Concerning trade, Moldova has gained greater access to the EU Internal Market and is becoming a more integrated participant in the European economy. Since 2004, trade flows between the EU and Moldova have increased, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Trade flows between the EU and Moldova (in EUR)



In 2012, the EU accounted for approximately half of Moldova's exports and imports (more than for any other EaP country), although the significance of Moldova as a trade partner for the EU remained negligible (less than 0.1% of EU total trade) (see Table 6).

Table 6. Trade dependences between the EU and EaP partners

| <i>Share of imports/exports 2012</i> | Imports from EU as share of total imports | Exports to EU as share of total exports | Imports to EU as share of EU total imports | Exports from EU as share of EU total exports |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|---|---|
| Ukraine | 40% | 21% | 0.8% | 1.4% |
| Belarus | 20% | 38% | 0.3% | 0.5% |
| Moldova | 45% | 47% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Azerbaijan | 29% | 54% | 0.8% | 0.2% |
| Armenia | 25% | 35% | 0% | 0% |
| Georgia | 27% | 24% | 0% | 0.1% |

Source: Authors' compilation of data from the European Commission, Directorate General TRADE.

Bilateral trade flows increased, amounting to €2.7 billion in 2012. EU exports to Moldova consisted mainly of mineral fuels, electrical machinery and equipment. Main products exported from the EU to Moldova were electrical machinery and equipment, clothing and animal and vegetable fats and oils. Since 2008, exports from Moldova to the EU have benefited from the autonomous trade preferences (ATPs) system, which offers free access to the EU market for nearly all

products originating in Moldova (except certain agricultural products, for which limited concessions have been granted). Although the ATPs removed most tariff ceilings for the import of Moldovan industrial products into the EU, they served to 'improve' EU market access only for agricultural products (Council Regulation 2008: 1). Quantitative limits on the import of key agricultural export goods from Moldova were maintained, including on sugar and wine, as well as fruit and nut products, of which constitute major export articles from Moldova to the EU. The DCFTA with Moldova abolishes most but also not *all* EU import quotas for Moldovan agricultural products (KAS 2013: 24–25).

In the area of trade and trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform, Moldova does not participate in any EU policy/programme or agency as such, although it will be participating in the European Food Safety Agency's European Neighbourhood Program 2014–2016, and possibly also in programmes of the Office for Harmonization of the Internal Market, and the European Medicines Agency. In the future, Moldova can also participate in some of the new EU programmes 2014–2020 of relevance to economic cooperation (subject to conditions), including COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs, Customs 2020 (functioning and modernization of the Customs Union), European Statistical Programme (development and production of European statistics) and Fiscalis 2020 (cooperation between tax administrations).²²

Level of socialization to EU norms and standards. Moldovans put a high premium on certain standards that stem from the EU – decision-making transparency, human rights, freedom as individuals and freedom to start economic activities. The governmental programmes²³ reflect the expansion of EU rules and norms, and an EU-driven reform agenda: the main foreign policy objective remains EU integration, with new formal and social institutions overseeing the functional cooperation with the EU. Empirical data show that Moldova has left behind its Soviet institutional legacy (formal and social) which led to changes in Moldova's social domestic security patterns in favour of European security norms. This is also reflected in the new governing pattern - that of a coalition government – although not always successful, strongly supported by the current government: 'ultimately it is a positive impact on our development, on our actions and the way we think' (Leancă, 2014).

²² See: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/eu-programmes/index_en.htm (accessed 30.1.2014).

²³ Deepening relations with the European Union and improving living standards of citizens are the main objectives of the 'European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare' programme of the Moldovan government for 2011-2014.

In the process of reform, Moldova's participation in various EU policies and programmes becomes a socialization vehicle on the one hand, expanding EU liberal political norms and practices but also on the other, facilitating the processes of Europeanization. Moldova's participation in EU programmes fosters a high degree of *social learning and socialization*. The country's public institutions have become Europeanized.²⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has changed its name to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is under reform, and institutions such as the Bureau of Migration and Asylum and Border Police, Customs, the Border Guards, Security Service and the Anti-corruption Centre, now working on the basis of EU procedures and not former military or political orders– in order to become more similar to their EU counterparts. These are not just changes on the surface. According to Moldovan civil society, '(...) those institutions that socialize more with the EU become more Europeanized and those that do not – like the Ministry of Agriculture or Transport – are least EU-socialized and do not show progress'.²⁵ In addition, the Ministry of Justice fully supports the adoption of EU legal norm in Moldova's legislative framework. As one public policy consultant noted, 'a lot of Moldovan draft decisions make reference to Moldova's commitments to the EU (...) or are inspired by the EU model'.²⁶

A further important sign of Europeanization is the police reform, being conducted in line with EU standards. This has led to changes in the area of public order and security,²⁷ accompanied by an increase in public trust in state institutions such as police. According to one representative of Moldovan civil society, 'it is not the new uniforms or the cars, but that people no longer fear to walk on the same side of the street with the police'.²⁸ Especially in the capital and the big cities there are a great many citizens who are well-informed about the EU, its institutions and values. In addition, large numbers of Moldovans live, study or work in the EU and are highly integrated and adapted into the EU system; European living standards seem to them the natural way forward.²⁹ The greater level of development of formal and social institutions is also reflected in civil society organisations and the business community, who have become highly EU-socialized.

²⁴ Interviews with Moldovan civil servants (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, State Chancellery) and Moldovan civil society representatives (think-tanks and donors), September 2013.

²⁵ Interview with Moldovan civil society representatives, September 2013.

²⁶ Interview with Moldovan public policy consultant, September 2013.

²⁷ Interview with Moldova civil servant, Ministry of Internal Affairs, September 2013.

²⁸ Interview with Moldovan civil society representative, September 2013.

²⁹ Interview with Moldova civil servant, Ministry of Justice, September 2013.

The attractiveness of the EU to Moldova

Although the Moldovan political elite tend to believe that the signing of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA has made the European integration process 'irreversible', the general population is split on whether to integrate further with the EU, or with the Russian Customs Union. The numbers of those favouring EU integration have increased in recent years, but the population remains divided as to joining the EU (in favour: 33% in 2011, 16.1% in 2012, 44.7% in 2013) or the Russian Customs Union (in favour: 45.6% in 2011, 22.5% in 2012, 43% in 2013). Asked which should be a major strategic partner of Moldova, most people thought of Russia (60.5%) before the EU (23.2%).³⁰ In contrast, the 58% of respondents saw the EU as the actor most effectively helping economic development in Moldova, as against 25% who said it was the Single Economic Area with Russia.³¹ This indicates that integration into the EU is primarily associated with economic cooperation, whereas closer association with Russia is based on strategic considerations. This may open up space for further integration of Moldova into the EU's internal market, but reduce the chances for the EU to be recognized as a provider of (hard) security in the country.

Benefits and access

The EU's support to Moldova (indicative amounts) through the ENP for 2011–2013 was €273.7 million, which marks an increase of approx. €60 million compared to the financial period 2007–2010 (see Table 7).

³⁰ Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011, Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau: <http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=580>

³¹ EU Neighbourhood Barometer Autumn 2012: http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id_type=3&id=433, accessed 30.1.2013.

Table 7. Financial Aid EU–Moldova 1991–2013

| | Total amount (million euro) | Amount per inhabitant per year (EUR) |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| TACIS (1991–2006) | 186.45 | 3.27 |
| Humanitarian Aid (1999–2001) | 5.5 | – |
| Food Security Program (2000–2006) | 35.2 | 1.64 |
| ENPI (2007–2010) | 209,7 | 19.63 |
| ENPI (2011–2013) | 273.1 | 25.57 |

Source: Author's compilation of data from NIP Moldova 2011–2013 and the EU Neighbourhood Info Centre

EU has allocated more funds per capita to Moldova than it has to any other EaP country. Moldova has received EU financial support for regulatory reform and capacity building through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). In the NIP2011–2013, the facilitation of the deep and comprehensive FTA became a priority in itself, with a budget of around €96–109 million (NIP Moldova 2011–13: 39; 24–27).³² Among the goals of the NIP are the approximation of TBT and SPS standards, the maintenance of comprehensive competition laws and implementing rules, ensuring an efficient (and open) public procurement system and even the harmonization to 'existing and future *acquis* in service sectors' such as financial services, transport, postal and courier services, telecommunications and the energy sector (ibid: 24). The receipt of €33 million annually from the ENPI is, however, little more than a drop in the ocean, given the costs of adopting the EU's trade and trade-related *acquis*. Indeed, the costs of implementing SPS standards alone may easily reach €2 billion (Messerlin et al. 2011: 83), which is more than Moldova's total public budget for 2013.

Moldova's growth model in previous years was based on the transfer of resources from abroad to accommodate fast-growing domestic investment and demand. Moldova's economy depends on remittances for one third of its €4 billion GDP. This approach failed in 2008 as a direct consequence of the economic crisis. Remittances decreased by 34% in the first half of 2009.

As regards Transnistria, the EU has tried to encourage Moldovan stakeholders to channel parts of the ENPI assistance to their Transnistrian counterparts in the form of direct right-bank/left-bank confidence-building operations. However, this has not yielded visible results. In 2009, the Commission launched confidence-building pilot

³² The Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) program provided additional funding of €28mil to Moldova for the period 2012–13, of which some funds were used to top-up existing funds for institution building projects.

projects involving civil society organizations (CSOs) from both sides of the conflict, as well as EU-based CSOs, funded by specific allocations. According to the Commission, 'this new approach has allowed concrete activities to be launched on the ground, to the satisfaction of both sides' (NIP Moldova 2011-2013: 11).

Competition from other actors

Russia remains an important factor determining the political and economic security of Moldova. Moldova is officially a member of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the CIS Charter on Economic Union. However, Moldova has never participated in any military aspects of CIS because of its status of neutrality. Russia has continued to maintain a military presence in the Transnistrian region of Moldova, despite previous agreements with Moldova and within OSCE and CAF to withdraw its troops and ammunition. Apart from its military presence in Transnistria, Russia is still Moldova's second largest trading partner, and main source of energy supplies. Moldovan energy dependence on Russian gas supplies is set to diminish from 2014 (by approx. one third), because of the new gas pipeline between Romania and Moldova, a project which also received €7mill. from the EU budget. Still, the remaining two thirds of Moldova's gas requirements will continue to be supplied directly by Russia.³³ Although Russia was initially not opposed to Moldova signing an FTA with the EU, it has since stepped up pressure for joining Customs Union and Single Economic Area (SEA) instead.

Also the EU has also put pressure on Moldova. In 2007, then-Commissioner for external relations and neighbourhood policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that a free trade area with the EU would exclude the possibility for eastern ENP countries to join another regional free trade arrangement, such as with the Russian Federation (Zagorski 2011: 48–49). Moldova therefore find itself in a rather awkward situation. With half of its exports (and almost all agricultural produce) destined for the CIS and especially Russia, the prospect of – potentially – having to choose between a free trade area with the EU and with the SEA is not optimal for Moldova. In addition to losses from decoupling a significant export market, the Moldovan economy would be likely to suffer from trade sanctions on its exports to the Customs Union/Single Economic Area.³⁴

³³ See: <http://www.dw.de/eu-helps-moldova-reduce-dependence-on-russian-gas/a-17050226>, accessed 20.1.2014

³⁴ See for example the Russian-imposed import ban on Moldovan wines and spirits in September 2013: <http://euobserver.com/foreign/121388>, accessed 30.1.2014.

However, for successive Moldovan governments, the DCFTA (rather than EU membership as such) has become the symbol of a forward-looking 'European' choice and future for the EaP countries, set up in opposition to the 'other' choice of turning back to the past and to a 'post-Soviet' identity by joining the Russia-led Customs Union and Single Economic Area. An example of this discourse is found in a report on DCFTA implementation issued by the Moldovan government in 2013:

Moldova regards European integration as a fundamental priority of its domestic and foreign policies. The full achievement of this objective is expected to embark the country on a course of stability and prosperity (...) the government sees responsible implementation of the commitments deriving from the 'European course' as the most effective way to achieve internal transformation of the county. (CIB Report Moldova 2013:3)

The European option is sometimes even constructed as a civilizational choice. As one Moldovan government official put it: 'For Moldovans, EU norms and laws are considered as the highest level, thus Moldova needs to perform better to meet these standards. Moldova and the EU are part of the same continent and we need these EU laws and EU standards to be more EU and less Russia.'

In other words, fulfilling the conditions attached to the AA and DCFTA has become a logical step in a process of becoming more European, with the adoption of the EU *acquis* (whatever it might be) being a necessary and logical process towards this end. Questioning the formal adaptation of any part of the EU's *acquis* therefore means questioning the 'European course' as a whole. It was and continues to be this powerful discourse on the European forward-looking choice versus the Russian backward looking choice and post-Soviet identity that lends authority and legitimacy to the EU, which in turn also allows Brussels to apply significant conditionality in the case of Moldova.

Conclusions

Our analysis has shown that Moldova is certainly integrating with the EU's *acquis communautaire*, and is among the frontrunners in terms of political and economic reforms in the EaP region. Moldova's integration (and socialization) to European norms and standards in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and justice, freedom and security is more advanced than its integration into the EU's trade and trade-related *acquis*. As far as integration into the EU's internal market is concerned, we observe that Moldova is more dependent on trade with the EU than the other EaP countries, and that the DCFTA will abolish many, but not all, import quotas imposed by the EU on Moldovan agricultural products. Moreover, Moldova's economy is just as dependent on and integrated in the Russian market as it is as regards the EU market – a factor likely to complicate further economic integration with the EU's internal market. Political contacts between the EU and Moldova have qualitatively and quantitatively increased through the ENP and EaP. Moldova participates actively in EU initiatives, programmes and operations in the area of democracy, rule of law and justice, freedom and security, but less so in the area of trade and trade-related cooperation. Participation in working groups on migration or border management (via FRONTEX) have had noticeable Europeanization effects, including the socialization to EU norms and standards of Moldovan officials. With these observations in mind, and taking into account the comprehensive scope of the AA and the DCFTA, we may therefore conclude that Moldova has indeed reached a *certain level of integration* with the EU.

Regarding the level of attraction, we have seen that the EU has allocated more funds per capita to Moldova than it has to any other EaP country, but that funds are unlikely to reduce the heavy costs involved in the implementation of the AA/DCFTA. Despite the powerful consensus among Moldovan political elites on further integration with the EU, the population is split over the question of EU membership versus further integration with Russia, and there are powerful business interests within the country that favour tighter economic integration with Russia.

What does that mean for successfully building a security community between the EU and Moldova? The events unfolding in Ukraine since 2013 have served as pertinent reminders that a country's level of approximation with the EU's *acquis*, its level of dependency on the EU's market and its level of participation in EU agencies/programs will not necessarily prevent the government from making a U-turn away from the path of European integration. We therefore suspect that

building a security community involves more than just EU external governance. The level of attraction certainly matters in the equation, especially since Russia has (re-)emerged as a 'competing' pole of attraction through its political and economic power in the region.

In our opinion, there are two significant limitations to the EU's security community expansion to Moldova, and these apply equally to all other EaP countries. First, a mature security community must be based on high levels of diffuse reciprocity and shared security interests (Adler and Barnett 1996).³⁵ The EU has shown little anticipation or 'sharing' of Moldova's interests. Instead of fostering the development of the competitive capacities of Moldovan producers, the EU has prioritized the EU's own interest in creating market access for the EU, which is likely to have negative effects on human security/poverty reduction. It can also be argued that the EU has in fact decreased not just the economic but also political security of Moldova vis-à-vis Russia by pushing Moldova to pursue exclusive trade relations with the EU, without considering the negative effects of a Moldovan withdrawal from Russia's sphere of influence. The perception that Moldova does not benefit economically from European integration has serious implications for the course of European integration. As one Moldovan observer remarked, had Moldova negotiated a 'better trade deal' in the DCFA, the parliamentary elections in 2014 would have been less important for the country's European integration course.

Second, a mature security community is characterized by a high level of de- or re-securitization.³⁶ Moldova's uneasy relationship with Russia reveals the limits of the de-securitization process in Moldova. The main motivation of Moldovan political elites in pursuing European integration has always been based on very traditional hard-security concerns: Russia is perceived as a security threat (state as a referent object), seen to threaten the territorial sovereignty and security of Moldova, especially in discourses on the frozen conflict in Transnistria and restrictions on Moldovan migrant workers in Russia.³⁷ All these

³⁵ In a security community, states build generally accepted standards of behaviour. These standards exert their own normative pressure on state action, contributing to the development of long-term obligations between states. Thus in a system of diffuse reciprocity, states need not seek the immediate benefit guaranteed by specific reciprocity, but can act in the confidence that their cooperative actions will be repaid in the long run.

³⁶ In the words of Ole Waever, security was gradually squeezed out as a strong concern among the states, and Western Europe thus became a security community (or 'asecurity' community) (...) Most of the remaining security concerns were in post-sovereign patterns pushed towards referents other than state-to-state relations' (Waever 1998: 104).

³⁷ Some civil servants argue that the strong motivation to reform according to EU conditionality stems from geopolitical considerations: 'the main motivation for Moldova to reform is its geopolitical situation'. (Interview with Moldovan

issues are of high political sensitivity in Moldova. They have the potential to cause serious tensions within the country, which can be fuelled if the EU fails to recognize or respond to the hard-security concerns of Moldova.³⁸

We therefore argue that Moldova has not yet become locked into an irreversible process of European integration. It remains conceivable that, without the prospect of meaningful reciprocity in relations with the EU in the long term, Moldova (much like Ukraine) may weigh the short-term costs of cooperation with the EU against the costs of an alternative (short-term) course of action (e.g. non-implementation of EU legislation). The most likely reason why Moldova (unlike Ukraine) has *not* yet defected from the AA/DCFTA process lies in the very strong European identity dimension underpinning Moldova's engagement with the EU, which has so far sealed up gaps like the lack of shared economic and security interests. It remains to be seen how strong that glue will prove to be in the future.

government officials (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry of Justice), September 2013).

³⁸ For example, the EU removed the position of a special representative of the EU for the Transnistrian conflict (active post 2007-2011). In 2013 the EU appointed a political officer within the EU Delegation in Moldova in charge of the Transnistrian case, but the officer went on leave after only 3 months of work (Interview with EU official, November 2013)

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