

# **CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST-COMMUNIST STATES IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE**

**A Conference Report**

***Edited by***

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## Preface

On October 5-6, 1992 the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs arranged a conference on civil-military relations in the post-communist states in Eastern and Central Europe. The decision to hold a conference on this topic was taken by the director of the Institute, Dr. Olav F. Knudsen, at the beginning of the year. Domestic political change had by then started a process of redefinition of relations between civilian and military authorities in most of the former East European, Warsaw Pact countries.

In the communist past the armed forces of these countries had enjoyed a special, and often quite influential, role. This was now changing. The change had come further in some countries than in others. But in all of them the role of the military, in government as well as in society, seemed up for reassessment. The outcome might, however, differ from country to country. For instance, it was, and still is, likely to be influenced by differences in tradition, history and actual circumstances which differ among the countries concerned.

The conference brought together participants from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia. This group of participants constituted a mix of civil servants, politicians, military officers and scholars. They met with an equally diverse group of participants from Norway, and a few others, mostly scholars, from other West European countries and from North America.

The first part of the conference was devoted primarily to the situation in Russia and the former Soviet Union, and the latter part to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Towards the end of the conference attempts were made at comparison among the countries studied. For one thing, it became quite apparent that in Russia the situation with respect to civil-military relations is in many ways different from what it is like in the other three countries. Russia is still grappling with problems caused by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its armed forces. That in itself puts the role of the military as well as relations between the armed forces and civilian authorities in a special context. In addition there are the still unresolved questions of jurisdiction between various civilian authorities themselves. As a consequence, less attention has so far been paid in Russia to certain aspects of the relations between civilian and military authorities.

Many of the questions involved in such relations are far from exclusive to the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. As pointed out both by Professor Vincent Davis in his paper, as well as by the former Norwegian Chief of Defence, General Bull-Hansen during the conference

# **Military-Civil Relations in Post-Communist Systems: Common Problems (An Outline)**

**By Dr. Chris Donnelly,**

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## **General Principles:**

Communist Party control was never truly civilian control:

- it permitted military monopoly on military expertise;
- it relied for control on Communist Party and KGB within armed forces.

Result:

- the whole population has an excessive regard for military secrecy and a disinclination to discuss military affairs;
- there is virtually no civilian expertise (civil servants, journalists, academics, parliament);
- there is no basis for rule of law in armed forces (e.g. empowering soldiers' disobedience of illegal orders, etc.);
- there is widespread military contempt for the views of civilian "experts" on military affairs;
- there is no forum for discussion and public education.

So the result is:

- no structures for real civil control of defence affairs, and no concept for its implementation;
- no capacity in new governments to evaluate the role of their military, nor to evaluate military plans presented to them. There is no effective intelligence threat assessment system;
- no capacity to run an Ministry of Defence;
- no understanding of finance and budgets either in military or in civilian, i.e. *NO COSTING*.

## **New Government Problems:**

- no clear institutional model for role of president/government, parliament/NGOs, etc.;
- volatility of government official posts;
- frequent residual mistrust of armed forces and security services;
- no mechanism for discussions and communications:
  - within government; and

- problem of rapid turnover of civilian and military officials in Central and Eastern Europe (and also in West at 2-year intervals);
- underestimation of residual power of the old apparat and state structures;
- no Western capacity for a master plan;
- uncertainty of future situation, especially with respect to Russia, coupled with a fear of making things worse by interfering;
- World Bank - non-involvement in military-political issues, etc., (which dominate Central and Eastern European economies). Military institutions are a very low priority for help, but loom large in the political problem;
- no unity between national agendas in Western nations;

**Problems Special to Russia:**

- disintegration vs. reintegration - two conflicting national trends - nation-building vs. those who want to rebuild the USSR or a Russian substitute;
- NGOs - only in Moscow, and very little influence;
- problems of forming national military systems in ex-republic and Soviet Army formations;
- volatility in Moscow - Armed Forces not under any central command, and strong tendency to local independent actions (cf. General Lebed and 14th Army in Moldova);
- role of parliament vs. government uncertain and confrontational and distinct power vacuum between the Centre and the regions;
- inappropriate force deployment patterns reflecting old requirements, not new realities;
- equipment/CFE/excess equipment;
- strategic situation/requirements of Baltics/nationalities, etc. Pressure on Yeltsin to reestablish authoritarian rule and reimpose Russian dominance.

There is still residual military hostility to West, and suspicion of Western motives, plus:

- outrage at loss of Eastern Europe - humiliation;
- outrage at: social deprivation, blame for the economic collapse of the USSR: civil war situations developing unchecked, etc.;
- nationalism and regional autonomy movements and their impact on army and Russian chauvinism - interaction of the opposing view points;
- problems of military relocation back to Russia;
- tension between "Soviet" formations in the ex-Soviet republics and their

# The Future Political Role of Russian Military Officers: Participation or Coup?

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According to most standard theories of civil-military relations, the Russian military officer corps should have attempted to overthrow the Yeltsin government by now.<sup>2</sup> This paper will explore the question of why a coup had not yet occurred by September 1992 (the point at which this paper was written). The major argument of this paper is that two political choices are open to Russian military officers: the staging of a coup, or participation as an interest group in normal politics. The Russian military officer corps is not now apolitical, and is unlikely to be apolitical in the foreseeable future. Thus, whether or not a coup occurs depends largely on the political strategy followed by Boris Yeltsin and other top civilian leaders. When a military institution finds itself in crisis, civilians can either ease the transition or push officers over the brink. So far, Yeltsin has been walking a fine line between those two alternatives, and he is in danger of stumbling. Only by constantly reaffirming his respect for the military institution, and by acting effectively on policy issues dear to officers, can Yeltsin hope to retain those officers' loyalty.

This will likely present Yeltsin with a dilemma, since the preferences and values of Russian military officers may not match those of democratic reformers. Military officers may want more policy autonomy, more of a

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<sup>1</sup> Prepared for delivery at the conference in Oslo, Oct. 5-6, 1992. I would like to express appreciation to my colleague Judith Kullberg, who has engaged in an on-going discussion of current Russian events with me, and helped me to crystallize my views.

<sup>2</sup> Similar predictions have been made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev, former State Counsellor or Legal Affairs Sergei M. Shakrai, and President Boris N. Yeltsin himself. See Alexander Rahr, "Liberal-Centrist Coalition Takes Over in Russia", *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 29 (July 17, 1992): 22-25. Recently, Yeltsin changed his mind, and said that nothing could impede the reform process. See Radio Moscow World Service, July 31, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 3, 1992, p. 19. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has also said that the Russian military officer corps would not permit a coup to happen now. See Moscow Mayak Radio Network, August 18, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 19, 1992, pp. 27-28.

militaries are ideally suited to remain loyal servants to the state.<sup>6</sup> The retention of civilian control over the power of such military officers is supposed to be unproblematic. That is, it is supposed to be unproblematic if certain conditions are met: if officers believe that civilian leaders retain political and societal authority; if officers are materially and ideologically well-treated by society; and if officers' professional autonomy and corporatism are supported by the state. As long as professional officers feel that the state is stable and that their own positions are secure, what Samuel P. Huntington has called "objective" civilian control over the military is assured.

But when these conditions disappear, and the military's corporate identity is threatened, disaffected officers are supposed to desert their clients and take politics into their own hands.<sup>7</sup> These predictions are thought to hold true not only for unstable Third World governments, where there is often a cultural expectation of military involvement in politics, but also in countries with long-standing, seemingly stable political systems which lack a tradition of military intervention.<sup>8</sup> It is true that in countries with highly developed and legitimate civilian control organs, coups are supposed to fail.<sup>9</sup> Yet this does not mean that they are not attempted. And certainly no

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<sup>6</sup> The classic work on professional militaries is Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957). For a dissenting view, see William E. Odom, "The Party Military Connection: A Critique", in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, ed. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978). Alfred Stepan also deviates from Huntington's view, arguing that the "professional" label should be extended to apply to ruling militaries in Third World countries, who are carrying out an arguably professional political duty. See "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in his *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47-65.

<sup>7</sup> Two classic works on this theme are Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962); and Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>8</sup> Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders*, p. 258, suggests that this would have been a possibility in the Soviet Union of the 1970s if governmental control broke down; Morris Janowitz, in *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, paperback ed. (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 440, argues that something similar could happen in the United States.

<sup>9</sup> Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 95-98, makes this argument in explaining why the attempted French military coup against Charles DeGaulle from Algerian territory failed in April 1961.

associated with the August 1991 putsch.<sup>14</sup> And Russian officers are now regularly harassed, beaten, and killed in many "near-abroad" regions in the former Soviet republics which used to be their home bases. Particularly noteworthy here are the violent conflicts that have erupted between Russian troops and Estonian paramilitary groups,<sup>15</sup> examples of Russian Army officers being kidnapped and attacked as by-products of the Armenian/Azerbaijani war,<sup>16</sup> and the new outbreak of attacks on Russian military installations caught in the crossfire of the civil war in Tajikistan.<sup>17</sup> Societal respect for Russian military officers seems to be sorely lacking.

Moreover, the state to which most officers took their original loyalty oaths - the Soviet Union - is gone. It is hard for outsiders to imagine what it must be like to have the state one is sworn to defend and protect disintegrate from within. Feelings of helplessness must be reinforced by the fact that the new Russian state is so beset by rifts that it is virtually impossible for the Yeltsin government to make coherent policy.

Adding to this, a civilian, Andrei Kokoshin, has been installed as First Deputy Minister of Defense. This is an unprecedented move in the post - Stalin era; the only civilian previously allowed into a high-ranking Defense Ministry position since World War II was Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, a military industrialist whom many officers of the Brezhnev era bitterly resented. Kokoshin's appointment was expressly made for the purposes of installing some civilian oversight into the Defense Ministry. Increased civilian control was also on the agenda when Russian military officers were sent to school at Harvard University in 1991, to learn from their former American opponents how to behave in a democracy.<sup>18</sup> When these events are added to the fact that experts from the former NATO

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<sup>14</sup> Anatolyi Stasovskii and Aleksandr Pelts, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, August 20, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 25, 1992, pp. 23-24.

<sup>15</sup> For reports from both sides of this conflict, see *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV)*, July 17, 1992, p. 69; July 30, 1992, p. 57; and July 31, 1992, pp. 55-56.

<sup>16</sup> See the INTERFAX and ITAR-TASS World Service reports reprinted in *FBIS-SOV*, July 24, 1992, p. 32, and July 28, 1992, pp. 2-3.

<sup>17</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Moscow Fears for Troops Stationed in Tajikistan", *New York Times*, September 30, 1992.

<sup>18</sup> Eric Schmitt, "Soviet Forces Begin a Drill in Democracy", *New York Times*, September 10, 1991.

some sort of coup is launched before this paper reaches its audience. But with each passing day, the mystery of why there has not yet been a coup deepens.

### **Explanations for Quiescence**

A large part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in what Stephen M. Meyer has called the "politicization" of the Russian military.<sup>23</sup> The officer corps has been fractured into groups with competing political agendas, and a coherent "military viewpoint" is probably no longer achievable on many political questions. Any military organization whose officer corps can produce both a radical democratic young firebrand (like Maj. Vladimir Lopatin) and a reactionary, seemingly fascist one (like Col. Viktor Alksnis) cannot be unified.

However, in a comparative study of military intervention, Amos Perlmutter argues that a small number of key activists, often less than 5 percent of the officer corps, can be sufficient to propel the military as a whole into politics. Then an initial coup can be followed by countercoups as various factions within the military demand power.<sup>24</sup> It may not be necessary for the entire military institution to share a broad political agenda for a coup to occur. Instead, a coup requires only a small but cohesive group of officers who share a limited agenda, united primarily by their desire to see the military organization better treated.

One of the reasons for failure of the August 1991 putsch was certainly lack of cohesion among the Soviet military. Commanders refused to follow the deployment orders of their supervisors, and tank drivers promised not to shoot at their fellow Russian citizens. Yet at the time, many observers commented that the putsch really needn't have been so overtly militaristic. The attempt was what Samuel Finer has called a *cuartelazo* or "barracks coup", rather than a simple *coup d'etat*. Finer gives two examples of successful *coups d'etat*, in Argentina in 1944, and the countercoup in Syria in 1948, where heads of state were removed by single commando raids, followed by simple announcements of abdication.<sup>25</sup> What worked in these cases was not a display of brute military force, but rather proof of efficient competence, so that authoritarian legitimacy could be established through

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<sup>23</sup> Stephen M. Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military," *International Security* 16 (Winter 1991/92): 5-38.

<sup>24</sup> Perlmutter, *Military and Politic*, pp. 103-104.

<sup>25</sup> Finer, *Man on Horseback*, pp. 154-155.



revolutionary impulse that has affected society as a whole must have hit the Soviet military as well. After all, a politically satisfied population, and a state with a healthy economy and open access to foreign high technology achievements, would certainly be beneficial to the professional goals of any military organization. Those officers who believe in Yeltsin's abilities to transform the Soviet state must be optimistic.

What we don't know is how many officers stationed at which level believe in Yeltsin. Even those appointed by Yeltsin will not necessarily remain loyal to him. Gorbachev appointed Gen. Dmitrii Yazov as Defense Minister, after all, and received the August 1991 putsch in return.

Furthermore, sociologists tell us that military officers in general are not naturally liberal or idealistic. Instead, according to Huntington, "The military ethic is...pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative".<sup>29</sup> Those attracted to the officer's profession back when the Soviet Union existed are unlikely to support political radicalism, social permissiveness, or economic daring. A little reform may be a good thing, but the current chaos in Russia must be horrifying to the officer corps as a whole.

Perhaps it is not democratic idealism that restrains officers; perhaps it is fear that society as a whole would not support a coup effort, if belief in democratic procedures has suffused the population.<sup>30</sup> If this were the case, then the absence of a coup could be attributed to realism, not lack of motive. Yet opinion polls reported in 1990 indicate that around 40 percent of Russians believe that concentration of power in a "strong hand" leader is often necessary.<sup>31</sup> The present Russian Parliament was not freely elected, and yet it has a strong impact on the policies chosen by the executive branch of the Russian government. Yeltsin himself reportedly told the U.S. Congress that his power can only be taken away by God. And the level of public protest during the August 1991 coup attempt, while laudable, was relatively small. Most Muscovites and virtually all

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<sup>29</sup> Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, p. 79.

<sup>30</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev expressed this thought in a recent interview; see Sergei Guk, "Mikhail Gorbachev: 'Only an Idiot Would Organize Another Putsch'", *Izvestiia*, August 19, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 19, 1992, pp. 28-29.

<sup>31</sup> This is noted by Seweryn Bialer, "Is Socialism Dead?" in *Soviet-American Relation After the Cold War*, ed. Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 102.

pointed out, there really is no such thing as an "apolitical" military organization. Military officers in all states have political interests and channels of influence. To keep the military from staging a coup, civilian leaders must convince military officers that their interests are being sufficiently met through existing channels.

It is along this line that Yeltsin has been walking: the line between satisfying the political interests of the military, and maintaining the momentum of his radical economic and political reform plans. Some analysts have argued that Yeltsin has gotten too friendly with the military, and that Russian military officers and defense industrialists are now working together to control the government through the conservative Russian Security Council, a state body that Yeltsin created in 1991.<sup>34</sup> Yet the very liberal Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar sits on that council too; the fact that he and another strong liberal, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, are still in office indicates that Yeltsin has not given up control completely.

Furthermore, there have been a great number of reports in the last few years of conflict between defense industrialists and military officers in the Soviet Union. If, as the Western analyses indicate, it is the defense industrial interests that are now dominating the Russian government,<sup>35</sup> there is no reason to believe that the interests of military *officers* will necessarily be protected. While perhaps joining defense industrialists in favoring a less drastic economic reform policy, military officers are much more likely to

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<sup>34</sup> See Alexander Rahr, "Moscow One Year after the Attempted Coup", and Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army", both in *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 33 (August 21, 1992): 1-12.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* In addition to Yurii Skokov, the Security Council secretary and apparent leader, attention must be given to Arkady Vol'skii, Chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Yeltsin has carefully bent in Vol'skii's direction, especially through his June appointments of industrial leaders to ministerial positions in the government, see Serge Schmemmann, "New Kremlin Team Raises Questions on Yeltsin's Aim", *New York Times*, June 14, 1992. While Vol'skii himself holds no official governmental post, his decision to join with Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi (a former Colonel in the army) in forming the new Civic Union bloc may give him further leverage. See Elizabeth Teague and Vera Tolz, "The Civic Union: The Birth of a New Opposition in Russia?" *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 30 (July 24, 1992): 1-11. Recently, Vol'skii revealed in an interview that Yeltsin "does consult with us and we do meet with him.... In the majority of cases not only the Supreme Soviet but also the president and the government send us draft documents." Quoted in Marina Shakina, "Arkadyi Vol'skii: 'Like Ladybugs in a Jar'," *Novoe Vremia* 27 (1992), as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, July 31, 1992, p. 18.

Today, thank God, the approach is different. Politicians have recognized that the state has no right to remain eternally in servicemen's debt, year in and year out only noting the increasing number of servicemen without apartments on a long-term basis.... We do not think that this is just talk; this is the position espoused by the president, which he has once again affirmed.<sup>37</sup>

In other words, the Ministry of Defense leadership seems to have accepted Yeltsin's good intentions on this issue. However, Yeltsin's September 8 agreement (signed by Defense Minister Grachev) to withdraw all 20,000 Russian troops from Lithuania within the year will add more pressure to an already sticky situation. While Lithuania has reportedly offered to build housing in Russia for 10,000 of those troops, there are already now roughly 122,000 military families in Russia who lack apartments. This is up from 104,000 families at the start of 1992.<sup>38</sup> Yeltsin may not be able to solve the housing issue satisfactorily.

Yeltsin probably helped his image in the eyes of officers concerned about their own safety, by accepting the right of servicemen, announced by Grachev on July 30, to defend themselves with force if attacked.<sup>39</sup> Before that policy was announced, officers from Russia's 7th Army and 19th Independent Air Defense Army, both stationed in the Caucasus, had sent open letters to Yeltsin demanding action on their behalf because of armed attacks on their installations.<sup>40</sup> Since the policy enactment, the number of reported attacks has plummeted.<sup>41</sup> Even so, Georgian military formations using heavy artillery against separatists in Abkhazia opened fire

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<sup>37</sup> Agapova, "Servicemen and Their Families", p. 17.

<sup>38</sup> Grachev, "Changes in Army and Navy Are Irreversible", *Krasnaia Zvezda*, September 2, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, September 3, 1992, pp. 17-18.

<sup>39</sup> INTERFAX, July 30, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, July 30, 1992, p. 31.

<sup>40</sup> Col. V. Simonov, et al., "The Transcaucasian Sky Is undefended", *Pravda*, July 16, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, July 22, 1992, p. 27; and ITAR-TASS World Service, July 20, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, July 20, 1992, p. 26.

<sup>41</sup> Gen. Yurii Kudinov, quoted by INTERFAX, August 6, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 7, 1992, pp. 49-50.

Airborne Forces from which Grachev came.<sup>45</sup> Military officers seem once again to be firmly in control of the information and planning underpinning the defense policy process.

It is true that Yeltsin appointed civilian ministerial candidate Andrei Kokoshin as First Deputy Minister of Defense. Kokoshin reportedly has access to all military information.<sup>46</sup> A civilian has managed to enter the military fortress. Yet some analysts have reported that Kokoshin's duties may be circumscribed to acting as a liaison with the defense industry.<sup>47</sup> Certainly, if he had to appoint a civilian to do the job, Yeltsin could not have picked a candidate more congenial to the General Staff. Kokoshin, former Deputy Director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute (ISKAN), is a man whom the Defense Ministry newspaper referred to in 1989 as "our man in Congress."<sup>48</sup> He worked at ISKAN for many years with retired Gen. Valentin Larionov, the General Staff officer responsible in the 1960s for putting out three editions of the classic Soviet military work, *Military Strategy*. Larionov is said to have tutored him on militarytechnical subjects, and to have reviewed his writings to make sure that the information they contained was accurate.<sup>49</sup> Gen. Yurii Kirshin, former Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute for Military History, sent his son to work in Kokoshin's group of graduate students at ISKAN. And Kokoshin has repeatedly given press interviews stressing the military background of his family, his own childhood desire to be a naval officer, and his understanding of military concerns and

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<sup>45</sup> Sergei Goriachev, interview with Col. Gen. Ye. N. Podkolzin, Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks, July 30, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 4, 1992, pp. 45-46.

<sup>46</sup> This according to an official at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., interviewed by the author in June 1992.

<sup>47</sup> Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia", p. 7, argues that Kokoshin's role now is very limited.

<sup>48</sup> Yelena Agapova, "Nash Chelovek v Kongresse", *Krasnaia Zvezda*, September 15, 1989.

<sup>49</sup> From interviews conducted by the author at ISKAN in Summer 1989 and Fall 1990.

dismissed to barracks; people wiped their feet on it and poured dirt on it--enough of all that.

There is not and cannot be discipline in the pure form. The state is being destroyed, everything is falling apart, everything is being stolen before your very eyes. What discipline can there be? Anyone, especially people in uniform, must sense that the state is behind them. That is essential to them.<sup>55</sup>

While on most issues of military autonomy Yeltsin appears to have met the wishes of military officers, Yeltsin may have put his foot down on the wrong side of the line in the Lebed case. Lebed may be mistaken about the level of support he holds within the officer corps. If he is correct, on the other hand, Yeltsin may have inadvertently added fuel to a pro-coup fire.

What about the issue of domestic order? This is one of the hardest points on which to gauge Yeltsin's performance, since we lack any objective measure of how legitimate the government is in the eyes of the people, and of how much pent-up unrest may be lying below the surface. It is probably in Yeltsin's favor that, as Huntington would put it, students don't seem to be rioting. It is probably not in Yeltsin's favor that periodic threats of strikes have continually arisen in the energy and manufacturing sectors of Russian industry. And mobs have been demonstrating periodically, most recently outside the main Ostankino television tower in Moscow (the ill-defined protest apparently had an anti-Semitic theme). Nor is it beneficial that Russian society is widely seen to have replaced *glasnost* with *naglost*, a word literally meaning "insolence," that apparently now indicates unfeeling, self-serving, and perhaps criminal behavior toward one's fellow citizens.<sup>56</sup>

Yeltsin's July and August retreat from the more radical planks of Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's privatization platform may have calmed societal fears of economic collapse and profiteering somewhat, although his wobbling now looks suspiciously like that of pre-putsch Gorbachev in 1990 and 1991. Many military officers have been wary of accepting economic assistance from the West, and Yeltsin's refusal to dance to the

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<sup>55</sup> S. Shevtsov and A. Kurbatov, interview of Lebed, "Everyone Is Sick of War", *Sovetskaiia Rossiia*, August 4, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 5, 1992, p. 72.

<sup>56</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "The Russians' New Code: If It Pays, Anything Goes", *New York Times*, August 30, 1992.

participated in the military defense of the ethnic Russian enclave of Bendery. While some witnesses indicated that Russian troops in Moldova acted on their own initiative, others said that the orders came from the Moscow High Command.<sup>60</sup>

Given that the Russian Foreign Ministry strongly supported the establishment of a multilateral peacekeeping force in the Transdnister region, patterned on the United Nations Blue Helmets, it is unlikely that the Foreign Ministry approved of unilateral military action in Moldova by Russian troops. A sore point between Kozyrev and the military developed. However, multinational peacekeeping forces were created, and at present they seem to have succeeded in calming the fighting, as well as officers' concerns. The Blue Helmet idea may have been the compromise that saved the day.

Second, the General Staff has strongly opposed returning the disputed Southern Kuril Island chain to Japan. Yeltsin had hoped that a settlement on that issue would highlight his September visit to Tokyo. The visit was eventually cancelled, since Yeltsin could not muster sufficient domestic support for an agreement.

The Russian Foreign Ministry supports returning the southern islands gradually. The first step, in their view, would be to fulfil a 1956 Joint Declaration between the Soviet Union and Japan, returning the southernmost Habomai island group and the island of Shikotan to Tokyo. Simultaneously, a peace treaty would be signed to end World War II officially between the two parties. Then, later, negotiations could be held on the remaining two disputed islands, Kunashir and Iturup.<sup>61</sup>

On July 30, however, the Russian General Staff publicly stated that Russian troops were stationed on the southern Kuril Islands, apparently including Shikotan and the Habomai group. Its statement reportedly added that a "one-sided" withdrawal would seriously damage Russian security.<sup>62</sup> This reinforced CIS Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov's statement earlier in July that Russian troops should not be withdrawn from the disputed

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<sup>60</sup> The various versions of the reports are summarized in *RFE/RL Research Report* I, no. 28 (July 10, 1992).

<sup>61</sup> KYODO-ITAR-TASS, "Diplomacy: The Tough Nut of the South Kurils", *Rossisskaia Gazeta*, July 31, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, July 31, 1992, p. 30; and Mikhail Galugin, Acting Head of Japan Section of the Asian and Pacific Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, interviewed by Irina Tkachenko, Moscow Radio World Service, July 31, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 4, 1992, p. 14.

<sup>62</sup> Tokyo KYODO, July 31, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, July 31, 1992, p. 9.

operation with the United States in developing an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system against third-party strikes. Many officers are apparently convinced that the U.S. still views the projected ABM system as having an anti-Russian mission; in their view, fewer incoming warheads from the Russian side would make the U.S. ABM defense operation easier. Furthermore, some Russian officers are concerned that American high-precision conventional weapons could knock out a significant percentage of Russian missiles remaining under a 3,000 warhead limit.<sup>68</sup> The collapse of the Soviet economy means, in the view of some officers, that Russia can no longer hope to keep up in the military technology competition.<sup>69</sup>

This opposition has occurred despite the fact that Defense Minister Grachev publicly lauded the nuclear disarmament and defense agreements reached by Yeltsin and U.S. President George Bush in June, and despite his implication that the General Staff helped write the accords.<sup>70</sup> Given that Yeltsin's June acceptance of the American proposals came as a surprise to those who thought he had already been pushed too far by demands for disarmament, the Russian side may have reached the end of the line on these strategic nuclear issues.

### **Conclusions**

It seems clear that the Russian military feels itself to be somewhat under siege by the reformist civilians. However, outsiders have no means of judging whether or not the military opinions expressed on personnel, budgetary, and foreign policy issues are widely shared. It is possible that these articles and statements reflect a consensus among senior General Staff officers, indicating that Yeltsin is in trouble with the military. It is just as possible that such conservative statements are polemics coming from an unrepresentative fringe. The fact of press freedom in Russia means that we no longer can assume that any published statement has official backing. Given the breakdown of discipline in the military, this

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<sup>68</sup> For an example, see Lt. Gen. Yevgenii Volkov, "Military Expert's Opinion", *Krasnaia Zvezda*, July 31, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 3, 1992, pp. 2-3. Also see Scott McMichael, "Russian Opposition to a Joint Global Defense System", *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 28 (July 10, 1992): 57-62.

<sup>69</sup> Pavel Felgengauer, "Military Expect Intervention by the West", *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, August 1, 1992, as reported in *FBIS-SOV*, August 4, 1992, p. 44.

<sup>70</sup> *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 28 (July 10, 1992).

desirable to dewclaw the Soviet bear in one fell swoop.

Instead, policymakers in the West, in Eastern Europe, and in the new post-Soviet states should choose their battles carefully. Leaders outside of Russia must come to a clear and unified understanding about which Russian demilitarization issues matter to them most, and which could safely be put off for a few years. It would do no one any good to have forced, immediate removal of Russian troops from all of their now-foreign outposts, for example, if such a demand pushed officers into taking direct political action. Immediate, drastic disarmament beyond what has already been done may not serve Western goals best.

The results of a potential coup in Russia cannot be known in advance. Perhaps a strong-arm leader could reestablish societal order, and make the transition smoother. On the other hand, a military government in Russia at this point would add an element of uncertainty to an already fragile and potentially unstable European security order. Potential coup leaders, regardless of their ultimate policy strategies, might insist on sacrificing societal well being for the moment to reestablish Russian military power on its borders and abroad. It is probably therefore in the interests of the rest of the world to make a military coup in Russia as unlikely as possible. This may only be possible if Russian security policy is given time to adjust to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.

As the end of the Soviet Union reaches its first anniversary, Yeltsin must navigate a fast and rocky river, and the outside world should be careful not to tip the boat. The fact that the Cold War is over does not mean that Russia no longer matters to the outside world. Unilateral Russian military intervention in the "near-abroad" areas could provoke another great power war in Europe, and the resumption of old weapons production levels could exacerbate Third World proliferation issues. Undue pressure now for ever more security concessions could pull Yeltsin under, and leave Russia in the hands of unpredictable militaristic authoritarians.



classic issues for a democratic society, raised to new levels of anxiety by the emergence of narrowly based technical specialists who are vital to the successful functioning of most state activities: How to maintain efficiency by "turning to the experts," such as the top brass in the national security context, while at the same time protecting democratic values? These paradoxical choices provided points and counterpoints throughout the history of civil-military relations in the United States.

Limits of time and space prevent consideration here of the special case and complex issues arising when essentially the same governmental organization contains both the internal police and external military forces. Suffice it to say that a tyranny is already rather deeply entrenched whenever this condition obtains.

This essay will try to convey an understanding of the role of the U.S. military establishment in making American foreign and defense policy, *first*, by tracing the roots of American thinking and constitutional practices dealing with the overriding issues of civil-military relations; *second*, by noting related and reinforcing patterns of thought and action in early American government and society; *third*, by summarizing the outgrowth of these roots in subsequent years; *fourth*, by describing contemporary governmental structures and processes intended to reflect and implement the latest official thinking about civil-military relations; and, *fifth*, concluding observations on civil-military relations in the United States and other parts of the world as the global system rushes toward the twenty-first century.

### **The Roots of Civil-Military Relations in the USA**

The possibility that military officers, organizations and agencies could challenge supreme and duly constituted civil authority at any level of government has been a continuous concern throughout the history of the United States - which is probably the main reason why no such challenge has ever occurred, or even come close to occurring. The best defense against this road to tyranny is constant vigilance, both on the part of the general public and by civil authorities. This vigilance has always existed in the United States, and has been institutionalized in the fabric of public life in many different ways.

The great theme of civilian control over the military was enshrined in the earliest sacred documents of the United States. A major charge asserted by the authors of the Declaration of Independence against the ruling British monarch, King George III, was simply this: "He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power." The results of this circumstance, according to the Declaration, were a range of

pusillanimous Congress should simultaneously allow themselves to be intimidated by bold reckless men in uniform. The logic of that era noted that armies were usually quartered at locations within and among the general civilian population, and were therefore much more likely than navies - which ordinarily operated at sea, well removed from populated areas and political centers - to get involved in domestic politics. Historically, it remains true even today that army and air force officers have been far more tempted to seek, assume or usurp important governmental positions in many countries than has typically been the case for naval officers.

Accordingly, Paragraph 12 of Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution stipulated the following power to the Congress: "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." The assumption was that no army would exist until it had been raised for some specific military purpose, then it could be funded only for a maximum of two years at a time, and these provisions would sharply reduce the possibility that generals with spare time and pre-mobilized units could move against civil authorities. The immediately following Paragraph 13, however, indicated that it was perfectly acceptable and perhaps necessary for a navy to remain in existence at all times with no funding limitations - because on this point Congress was told simply to "provide and maintain a Navy."

This constitutional and then congressional differentiation between the branches of the armed services had the unintended effect of encouraging the growth of separate cultures and rivalries between and among these military organizations. The rivalries were seen later as serious problems of bureaucratic infighting at precisely those critical moments when the nation needed carefully to mobilize and orchestrate its military assets. But these often-bitter competitions among men in different-colored but all-American uniforms were also part of the web of constraints operating against the possibility that these officers could ever unify in an attempt to take over the government.

Some of the safeguards appeared quaint and perhaps unnecessary by later standards. The Congress, as it happened, rarely appropriated *any* money for more than one year at a time, thus coming nowhere close to the two-year constitutional limit on appropriations for the Army. This reflected, in part, the jealous guarding by the Congress of its ultimately most important set of powers - "the power of the purse." But it became in another sense a debilitating anachronism in that it ruled out the considerable economic savings attainable if Congress were allowed to buy military equipment on longer-term contracts perhaps extending out to five

### **Related and Reinforcing Patterns**

The early days of the American republic revealed other pervasive and by now deeply entrenched outlooks that have worked against any cohesive and enduring political roles for professional military people and the armed forces under them, especially if by "politics" is meant the normal hurly-burly of partisan competition within institutions organized primarily for structuring this rivalry. First, the harsh accusations against King George III in the Declaration of Independence focused not only on his attitudes toward and use of military force, but reflected a more general suspicion and wariness toward strong central government in any and all of its manifestations - indeed, against strong government at any level. The Constitution was thus designed to limit and constrain government in general, and not merely the military components of government.

Second, it was clear enough in the sacred early American documents that, as President Coolidge later put it, "The business of America is business." The American Constitution became the only one in the world that established "*happiness*" as a political birthright, indeed, a juridical right, making the United States the only country where it was possible for a citizen to go into court suing another party for "breach of happiness." Moreover, the word "prosperity" was also prominently mentioned, and it was fairly clear that happiness was defined in terms of prosperity. The founding fathers, after all, were not destitute pensioners lacking personal estates. Private property rights were fundamental to this set of concepts and beliefs.

In retrospect, looking back over the more than 200 years of American history, it was possible to say that military people were constrained not only because they were military people but also because they were viewed as a special category of career bureaucrats - and almost all varieties of career bureaucrats were held in rather low esteem .

The ultimate test of worthiness in America even to this day remains in the minds of many people the question whether an individual has "met a payroll." This simply means that one of the most esteemed individuals is the business owner/manager who is responsible for making enough profit so that workers can be given their wages on schedule on every payday. But military officers, other bureaucrats and professors are not eligible even to take this worthiness test.

What all of this also says is that prosperity, reinforced by long periods without major external threats, has in fact been a generally continuing condition throughout most of the national history of the United States, such that prosperity or at least the perception of and hope for it are not seen by some political philosophers as a precondition for democracy - in

- \* American political leaders, recognizing that the circumstances cited above would likely result in armed forces short of adequate numbers of people, have typically tried to substitute high-technology ordnance and equipment for sufficient personnel. In the language of economics, the goal has been to create machine-intensive rather than labor-intensive armed forces.
- \* Americans, trying but failing to avoid military service and thus finding themselves in uniform, especially if in combat, have not infrequently tried a wide variety of means to get out of these circumstances as quickly as possible - first by seeking a quick victory and thus an honorable termination of military service or, failing that, efforts to get located in "safe" forms of military service, in extreme cases intentional misbehavior in attempts to achieve dismissal, or even desertion.
- \* Wars or warlike situations entailing active American involvement for much more than a year, whether apparently headed for victory or something less, will become massively unpopular to the point of political untenability. Whatever the reasons why most Americans have generally disliked anything pertaining to substantial military service or public service of any kind, one major reason why they dislike being caught up in anything longer than a momentary war is an incorrigible passion for instant clearcut results - and a total lack of patience for anything else.
- \* Rapid demobilization sometimes resembling unilateral disarmament, especially for ground forces, has tended to occur after American wars.

The consequences of these American tendencies have been evident in numerous historical situations. Most of General Washington's troops abandoned him at a crucial moment at Valley Forge in the American Revolution in 1776 when their enlistments expired, and they simply straggled away toward their homes. Much the same happened to General Scott on the eve of what would probably have been a large-scale victory over the Mexicans in 1847. Congress waited until Union forces were facing what easily could have been a terminal defeat before approving a loophole-laden conscription bill in 1864. New troops eagerly enlisted in May 1898 were rioting to be released from uniformed service by August of that same year after the United States had won a swift, sudden and popular victory over Spain.

Turning to the twentieth century, President Wilson won re-election in

passions than reasoned support, and passion is hard to sustain. Again, and fortunately, the side joined by the United States soon began to prevail. By 18 months later when public support was starting to deteriorate, the USA and its allies were able to claim a victory.

A little more than two decades after that, the sinking of virtually the entire American fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941 was needed to propel the United States into the Second World War. Yet, by the autumn of 1944, with final victory still a year away, public support back home in the United States was beginning to unravel, with labor unions threatening strikes for higher pay, shorter hours and other benefits. By the time the war in the Pacific finally concluded in August 1945, American troops around the world rioted for immediate returns home and release from uniformed service. The war had interrupted the school plans of many, and this added to the pressures for instant demobilization so that discharged veterans could be on their chosen campuses when the new school year started about a month after VJ Day. The Congress put heavy pressure on the armed services to comply with these demands "to bring the boys home," and enacted the "G.I. Bill" to pay for the postwar education and training sought by the released service personnel.<sup>75</sup>

In summary on this key point, the magnitude of the catalytic shock required to generate American public support for war efforts grew very dramatically from the Spanish-American War through the World War II period: from one ship in 1898, to several ships in 1917, to most of the battle fleet in 1941. Prospective adversaries might have studied this lesson, because no such dramatic and singular provocations were provided for future encounters - and none of those struggles, particularly in Korea and Vietnam, ever enjoyed strong and sustained public support at home. Indeed, each turned bitter within little more than a year after American forces were fully engaged. More than a few observers speculated what sort of future catalytic shock might be required to provoke a sustained and substantial military involvement by the United States, short of a World War III scenario with immediately desperate implications for the American homeland - and whether time could again be available to get ready for that kind of national life-or-death challenge if it came.

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<sup>75</sup> For especially good accounts and analyses of the various dimensions of civil-military relations in the United States during the World War II era, two books are particularly recommended. First, see Walter Millis with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958). Also see Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951).

a menace required an abruptly uncomfortable shifting of mental gears.<sup>76</sup>

President Truman in the fall of 1949 asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice on how American military force could be used to put pressure on the new Communist government in China, in an effort to gain release for American nationals detained in the newly created People's Republic. The Chiefs were unenthusiastic, with only one of them - Admiral Sherman, the new Navy CNO - sounding confident about an idea.<sup>77</sup> Less than a year later, at the end of June 1950 when the North Koreans made their surprise attack southward across the 38th Parallel, and when President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson then decided to resist, no American military leader had a ready plan or a particularly eager posture. American capabilities had seriously deteriorated in the five years following the end of World War II; the services spent most of their time in struggles with each other while Acheson in January 1950 made a speech giving the impression that American policy did not really care what happened in Korea.

The North Korean crossing of the 38th Parallel was the dramatic catalytic event propelling the United States into what became the Korean War, creating at least a temporary base of public support while leaving no time for anything other than hastily improvised military planning. The Vietnam War, by contrast, featured no clearcut opening event in terms of precipitating American involvement, thus denying the possibility of even a temporary base of strong homefront support - although the slow escalation did allow for military thinking and planning, and most of it was against American entry into the conflict.<sup>78</sup>

The Vietnam War left such deep reservoirs of bitterness among

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<sup>76</sup> For more details on the gradual emergence of the USSR as the new American enemy after World War II, see Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), passages beginning on pp. 76, 100, 199, 219 *et passim*.

<sup>77</sup> For more details on this important decisionmaking occasion, see footnote 7, p. 321, in Vincent Davis, *The Admirals Lobby* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

<sup>78</sup> For an insightful commentary on professional American military thinking about the War in Vietnam during the crucial early 1950-1963 period, see Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), especially the "Prologue" chapter. General Palmer served in the second ranking position in the U.S. Army both in the field and at Pentagon headquarters during the Vietnam War - the only four-star officer to do so.

diverged from the thinking of the top civilian leaders - and how the civilians' thinking always prevailed. From George Washington's famous Farewell Address until American involvement in World War I, a determination not to participate in alliance or coalition warfare was an article of faith in American thinking both on the civilian and military sides - even though American federal forces could not have prevailed had not the French served as *de facto* allies in both the American Revolution and the Civil War. Still, the deeply held belief was that having allies tended to "entangle" one's commitments and forces, serving as debilitating constraints. Americans preferred to fight adversaries one at a time, which required the assumption that adversaries would not come with allies either.

So strong were these public attitudes that when in 1917 President Wilson belatedly took a flipflopping America into active involvement in World War I, he quietly directed that no American statements should describe the United States as the ally of the British and French, or use any other terms to suggest that the United States had entered into a coalition - because Wilson believed that this kind of arrangement would not be acceptable to the American people. Instead, the President said, official American statements should use legalistic and neutral euphemisms such as "co-belligerent" or "co-combatant" to suggest the nature of the relationship between the United States and the other friendly forces on the Western side of the war in Europe. The interesting thing that happened, however, was that Americans decided in the process of engagement in World War I that they preferred coalition warfare.

This 180-degree turn in public attitudes had grown so pronounced by the Vietnam War that it became one of the sticks used by President Johnson's critics. They said, in effect, that it might be a good war in Vietnam if old friends and allies were there in substantial strength alongside the Americans - but, since other nations had sent little more than token forces, this proved it to be a bad war and the USA should get out. This same attitude was stronger than ever by the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, and President Bush's success in putting together a genuine and substantial coalition was a necessary pre-condition for the formidable American involvement in terms of generating the required public support at home. The lack of any obvious coalition ready to try to terminate the ethnic wars in former Yugoslavia in 1992 was clearly one main reason why the United States was disinterested in intervention.

The point here, however, is that whereas the American public and its civilian leaders became ever more enthusiastic about forging strong coalitions, starting with World War I, America's military leaders tended to prefer the older posture whereby America tried to avoid alliances. The

at the official role, followed by a discussion of the unofficial and informal role.

The most important of the institutionalized components of the military establishment is the U.S. Department of Defense (often abbreviated DOD). This large cabinet-level agency consists of a vast and primarily civilian bureaucracy known as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), sitting on top of the tiny Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanisms under the JCS Chairman (C/JCS), with all of this in turn sitting on top of the separate armed services each headed by its own primarily civilian secretariat. Each service secretariat tends to be a miniaturized replica of OSD.

Other components closely associated with or actually connected to the military establishment include the defense industry corporations, the contract research organizations (the "think tanks"), the unofficial organizations for reserve, retired and veterans groups, and the defense booster organizations. Military-style agencies not normally a part of the military establishment, such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Merchant Marine, can temporarily be transferred to the authority of OSD when directed by the President in national security crises. None of these other components, however, has ever had a sustained and significant impact on foreign policy, notwithstanding occasional politically-motivated allegations that the defense vendors or "think tanks" have enjoyed undue influence in their own self-interest.

By far the most important fact to notice when studying the contours of the American military establishment is the location of civilian authorities: first, across the top of the entire structure, and then across the tops of the separate uniformed services. This arrangement is one of the results stemming from the determination of America's founding fathers to assure the supremacy of duly constituted civilian executives over senior military officers. Repeating a point made much earlier in this essay, the most dramatic statement of this principle is found in Article II of the U.S. Constitution where it is directed that the President, who serves both as chief of state and head of government, must also serve as Commander in Chief of the military establishment.

According to the National Security Act of 1947, several times amended and still the most important legislation in terms of structuring the governance of the military establishment over almost all the years after World War II, three civilians are found in the military chain of command before encountering a person in uniform. These three are the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, followed finally by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who is the top uniformed officer in the United States. (Some would argue, depending on



United States. President Wilson, anticipating the possibility of American entry into World War I, formed the first high-level centralized civilian body along the lines of a war cabinet. President Franklin Roosevelt during the World War II era tried several experiments with the first high-level centralized policymaking bodies consisting of a mixture of top civilian and military officials.

All of those fitful earlier steps toward centralization, beginning with the critical reviews of the American armed services in the Spanish-American War, culminated with a similar review after World War II that led in 1947 to the passage of the National Security Act. This sweeping measure, controversial for all of the same reasons that all centralization measures have been resisted, created the Office of the Secretary of Defense (supplemented two years later by an amendment creating the Department of Defense - for two years the new Secretary had no agency), provided statutory legitimacy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff system that had evolved during the war (to replace the ineffective old Joint Board), and created the National Security Council (NSC) system to preside at the presidential level over the entire foreign/defense policy bureaucracy including the State Department and the new CIA (the CIA also having been created by the National Security Act).

The National Security Act was amended in 1949, 1953 and 1958, in each case primarily strengthening the top centralized civilian authorities (meaning OSD) in the Department of Defense. Other less formal measures and some entirely ad hoc procedures reinforced this centralization pattern particularly by strengthening the NSC machinery at the White House level. Somewhat neglected and bypassed in this trend, for better or worse, were the JCS apparatus, the State Department and the CIA. An official presidential directive known as NSAM 341 emerged during the Kennedy Administration, creating something called the "SIG/IRG" system that was supposed to boost the State Department by giving it a potentially powerful coordinating role - although this device was far from successful in offsetting the growing ills of the American foreign ministry. Mighty bureaucratic struggles during the Carter Administration were intended to improve many aspects of the overall Intelligence Community (IC) particularly including the CIA at the heart of the IC system, although opinions differ on what if anything on balance was actually accomplished.

Finally, in 1986, after years of debate over how to strengthen the quality of the professional military role in making and implementing overall foreign/defense policies, a virtually unanimous Congress reversed many longstanding congressional tendencies and overcame considerable presidential resistance in forcing through the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This

The policymaking process can be disrupted by crises of one kind or another, ranging from an unexpected need to send American military forces to provide relief for some natural disaster either at home or abroad, up to the kind of crisis that looks like the outbreak of war. When these surprises occur, the policymaking process is accelerated, leaving out some of the typical participants in the interest of getting quick decisions and actions. As a crisis begins to recede, there is an effort to get back to the deliberate orderly processes prevailing in ordinary times - although sometimes a crisis can so change the basic domestic or geopolitical environment in which policy is made that new groundrules and procedures must be permanently adopted.

Until the most recent reforms represented by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the President typically improvised in the face of every military-type crisis, searching for some able military commander or commanders to whom almost all key decisions could be delegated. President Lincoln tested and rejected a number of generals before he settled on Grant and Sherman to seek the final victory in the American Civil War. President Wilson quickly chose and fully backed General Pershing to head the American military involvement in World War I. President Franklin Roosevelt did not take long in picking the key people on whom he relied to run World War II - primarily General Marshall and to some extent Admiral King. General Ridgway became the key figure under President Truman in the Korean War, First General Westmorland and then General Abrams were the main military figures running the Vietnam War in its most volatile period - although nominally retired General Taylor played a key role at several crucial points too.

The second overall type of participation in the policy process revealed in the activities of the American military establishment could be generally categorized as *lobbying*, and is not essentially different from lobbying by any organized interest group. It could be broadly aimed at creating a climate of opinion in the hope that a favorable public would support the desired positions and policies, or it could be aimed at specific individuals with the power to facilitate or discourage a desired outcome. The effort to influence policy outside of official channels was particularly intense during the several years following World War II when many basic decisions on organizational structures and processes, on roles and missions for the armed services, and on strategies and tactics remained to be made. Each service tended to see itself as under siege, fighting within the bureaucratic arena for those policies most congenial to its own views and values, and fighting against those proposals perceived as threats to its organizational

measures to make itself look good in the eyes of the media and other potentially influential observers, all of this as stage setting for anticipated political battles over budgets and preferred new military equipment in the years after each of those wars.

The prospects for large-scale if not massive changes in virtually all dimensions of the American military establishment following the end of the Cold War, many of these involving reductions in cherished roles and missions assigned to the separate armed services, and thereby also involving denied opportunities to purchase favorite forms of new military equipment, were predicted by some observers to trigger a new outbreak of acrimonious lobbying by components of the military establishment rivalling the intense first decade following World War II. Arguing against this prospect was the panoply of steadily stronger constraints capped by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. But senior officers are ordinarily people of great sincerity and conviction who feel that their oaths of office oblige them to speak up if they think national security is threatened by cuts in their favored forms of military capability. Individuals of this kind were almost certain to feel great anxieties and frustrations in the up-for-grabs political environment as all concerned parties sought new certainties in the wake of the Cold War before any consensus emerged on the nature of the national security problem.

One example of the kind of political activity that could be expected was suggested in the newsletter dated August 4, 1992, from the president of the Naval Submarine League to the NSL membership. A private and relatively new group founded in 1982, but organized along lines common to much older groups such as the Association of Naval Aviation and others dedicated to advancing the special interests of particular components of the American military establishment, the NSL in its newsletter appealed for efforts to increase membership above the 4200 level, creating new organizational strength so as to be more effective in spreading "the gospel" expressed in the NSL's charter: "...to stimulate an awareness...of the *need for* a strong submarine arm of the U.S. Navy" - but doing this in ways "which would not be considered lobbying." The newsletter went on to say:

Now, to our missionary work. Never before in the history of the Submarine Force has there been a greater need for the public to understand the role of the submarine as a truly credible deterrent, a cost-effective keeper of the peace, and, if deterrence fails, a potent and highly survivable war-fighting machine. It is important that the message be delivered to service and fraternal organizations, church clubs, local newspapers, civic groups, radio talk-shows, high schools, and any

involvement by the Congress dominated the making of American foreign/defense policy, with the military establishment serving in a role analogous to technical witnesses in a courtroom trial. This was the way that the system was designed to work, and did work, in accordance with constitutional mandates. It would substantially change if and only if the fundamental beliefs and values of the American social, political and economic systems deteriorated into chaos. There was no evidence for supposing this would happen, whatever the magnitude of asserted problems from time to time.

### **Concluding Observations**

The delicate and yet durable balance between civil and military authority throughout the history of the American experiment in self-government is unmarked by even a single instance in which admirals and generals might have been tempted to challenge civil authority. Certainly there have been individual senior officers who later served in high political places, but only after resigning from all official military affiliations, and in no case carrying political agendas representing their previous military organizations. Some officers reached the highest military ranks but never fulfilled personal ambitions for later civilian service in the highest political offices. Others served in Congress and/or cabinet appointments following uniformed careers. Numerous military reserve and national guard officers have been active leaders as civilians at many levels of government. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Bush served for short periods as young naval officers in their early lives, but absolutely nobody ever suggested that this represented some kind of effort by the Navy to influence national policy. The central point is that all of these kinds of people served in government as individuals and as civilians, not as representatives of the military establishment. They have included both liberals and conservatives, and they have been affiliated with both of the two dominant political parties - the Democrats and Republicans.

The literature on civil-military relations in the United States has focused on several principal cases in which a successful military challenge to civil authority might have occurred but did not occur. One took place in 1948-49 when the dominant elements within the Navy's officer corps believed that the Navy was being virtually put out of business by budgetary priorities favoring the Air Force case for large purchases of the new B-36 bombers in contrast to what the Navy men perceived as a vastly inadequate emphasis on new aircraft carriers. This so-called "revolt of the admirals" was a fairly typical struggle between rival bureaucracies over what the Navy men considered the very highest stakes - institutional

he was still a Senator gearing up to run for the White House, and Taylor soon thereafter was included as a regular member of the Kennedy inner circle, indeed, as the chief military person within that group.

Terms such as "foremost defense intellectual" began to be used in descriptions of Taylor. After he had served as the key military advisor floating around Kennedy's White House, including service on the crucial first fact-finding mission to Vietnam on behalf of the young President, Taylor was asked to come out of military retirement to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was the only time in American history that a top military officer had retired in disgust, then found himself attached as a civilian to a new President in a highly political White House, and eventually was rewarded with an assignment back in uniform to the nation's coveted top job for a military officer. It was part of the inevitable trend toward increasing politicization of the tiny top layer of the nation's uniformed officers, but a politicization always initiated by and under the control of the top civil authorities even if willing candidates among the senior admirals and generals were often not hard to find.<sup>84</sup>

A final example here of another possible opportunity for a military challenge to civil authority occurred in the Nixon Administration when disgraced Vice President Agnew was followed into a politically forced retirement by a disgraced President, Nixon himself, all of this in the midst of the bitter denouement of the Vietnam War while factional strife was increasingly evident at home. More than a few commentators raised the speculative question whether the central institutions of civil government could hold against the possibility of sharp demands for a "temporary" military government for the purpose of restoring effective rule at home while finding some viable solution for the "quagmire" in Vietnam. Such speculations were soon made to look silly, however, when former Congressman Gerald Ford, the only person to serve as Vice President and then President without having been elected by the ordinary procedures, proved fully capable in America's top political job. The key point about this story was what did not happen. No prospective military usurpation was even whispered, much less visible either on or below the surface.

This remarkable record, extending back over more than 200 years of American history, did not come about automatically. It happened in part because people cared about the sanctity of this political value, and this in turn created a sense of eternal vigilance against any traces of military

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<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 239-249, for a perceptive commentary on the politicization of the top uniformed officers during the "revolt of the admirals."

impossible for any new or relatively new political system to emulate the pattern of civil-military relations in the United States, expecting prompt success while obtaining the best professional judgments from its military establishment as inputs for the policymaking process, and then the best professional performance from the military leaders regardless whether their policy preferences had prevailed. But, for a new or relatively new government seeking a model for its own civil-military patterns, the American system would be worthy of careful study and quite possibly elevation as the goal to be sought.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> For a pioneering comparative study of civil-military patterns in developing countries evaluated against patterns prevailing in the West, see Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). This project was sponsored by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, headquartered at the University of Chicago under its founding leader Professor Morris Janowitz. For a somewhat concurrent project by an individual American scholar looking at the patterns prevailing in the American system, see James Clotfelter, *The Military in American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

creates some less concerns in people's minds than state of interethnic relations.

Social differentiation which comes with market economy and the rise of economic inequality of citizens (these are objects of constant fears expressed in the media) de facto, as the poll shows it, are of less concern for people than the other factors mentioned, including regional conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The poll showed quite firm support to the demands to cut back the military budget. 66% of those polled estimated existing military budget as too large under current circumstances. It is clear from the answers to other questions that this estimation proceeds both from the perception of diminishing external threats to the nation's security and from a desire to reshape the profile of the state budget and redirect resources toward domestic needs.

71% disagree that there are serious reasons for Russia to continue nuclear tests after the end of the moratorium on the tests announced by President Yeltzin in October 1991 and prolonged in the fall of 1992, though only 29% in Russia believe tests should be unilaterally stopped forever irrespective of the continuation of tests by other nuclear powers. 97% want to see the region where they live nuclear-free and 78% are ready personally to participate in actions and campaigns for converting their region into a nuclear free zone.

In spite of the visible spread of antinuclear moods, as well as the support for a decrease in defence expenses, there are no reasons to say that pacifism is spreading in the minds of Russians. More than 70% agree that in a nuclear age complete avoidance of use of military force and abstention from violent means of resolution of domestic and international conflicts is the only honest and continuant position. But at the same time about 40% consider idea of nonviolent peace to be an utopia. More than that. Two thirds of the respondents polled in Russia consider "refusal from all forms of violence to be premature under current circumstances". It could be supposed that in the country tired of instability and sporadic flashes of armed violence in regional conflicts reference to "prematurity" of refusal from violence reflect beliefs that only exclusive military measures of the authorities in limited scale could stop or prevent even broader and then already uncontrolled violence.

Military forces have partly lost in public eyes their traditional function of deterrence of external threats but at the same time found, as many people think, important domestic functions. Being estimated on a 5-points scale the army as an institution collected proportionally an equal quantity of positive and negative attitudes. Each fourth citizen gave neutral

# **The Commonwealth of Independent States: Military Integration Problems**

**By Lt.Gen. Leonid G. Ivashov,**  
Secretary, the CIS Council of Defense Ministers

The processes of rapid collapse of the former USSR's political and economic structures and the links between its member-republics, which are independent states now, could not overpass the military sphere.

The Armed Forces created over decades by joint effort of peoples of the Soviet Union stood out as a stable military organization including different groupings of forces and services closely associated by the common command system. Development and utilization of Armed Forces, their logistic support, were centralized. There was also an adequate security system encompassing both the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty.

However, the situation in the sphere of collective security and defense have radically changed within recent years and nowadays the East European countries and the independent states of the Commonwealth solve these problems under entirely new conditions.

In late 1991 and early 1992 there were attempts to preserve, at least for the transitional period, common Armed Forces as a non-state structure within the CIS. However, this intention was futile. A process of rapid formation of national armies followed. This process effected the division of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union, and now the Commonwealth states are completing the formation of their own armies. At the same time, the very first months of military efforts brought about a number of considerable problems, whose independent solution by each state would be either very expensive or simply impossible.

To many it became obvious that tackling such complicated issues as maintenance of the Strategic Nuclear Forces capability, the air defense system, training of officers, development and production of armaments, creating of control and communications systems, social security of servicemen and others, is now possible only by joint collective efforts of all CIS countries. Thus it is not casual, that in the summer of 1992, the active process of the CIS military efforts integration has begun.

Obviously, this stage began with the signing of the Collective Military Security Treaty on May 15, 1992. July 6, 1992, moreover, the heads of the CIS countries signed an agreement on the establishment of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Command. During the next summit, which is due



The attitudes of states where nuclear weapons are now deployed are not straightforward.

Thus, the Russian Federation as the USSR's successor redeploys all Strategic Nuclear Forces and material thereof into its territory. The Security Council of Belarus charged the republican government and defense ministry with development of a schedule and dates for accelerated withdrawal of strategic forces from their territory and preparation of an appropriate draft agreement with Russia. The Ukraine's special position consists in keeping some elements of control over nuclear forces during their redeployment and over the transitional period.

At the same time most of the CIS countries, especially members of the Collective Security Treaty, want the Russian nuclear arms to provide collective security of the entire Commonwealth.

Another line of military integration in the Commonwealth states is the intention to preserve certain capabilities of the former Soviet military-industrial complex for development and production of armaments.

It should be mentioned here, that while pursuing a consistent course towards full or partial conversion of most military enterprises, the Commonwealth states are interested in preserving well-organized production lines of relatively inexpensive armaments and military hardware, which already are deployed in their own armed forces or in armies of their CIS partners. For this purpose the Commonwealth states adopted a number of documents concerning the principles of providing their Armed Forces with armaments, military hardware, material supplies, the organization of research and developments.

Also important in the military integration of the Commonwealth states is officers' training and social security of their families and of veterans of the former Soviet Union's Armed Forces. The latter became especially significant lately as an important factor influencing the stabilization of the social and political situation in the Commonwealth states.

The heads of states, heads of governments and defense ministers adopted about 20 different agreements on the above mentioned issues. Among them are documents on the organization of officers' training; training of scientists and teachers; social and legal guarantees for servicemen, retired persons, Armed Forces veterans and their families; pensions, etc.

Currently the General Command prepares other important documents concerning defense and military build-up. Thus, the ensuing meetings of the Council of Defense Ministers and the Heads of State Council will consider the draft Concept of the Commonwealth states' military security and proposals on carrying out the provisions of Tashkent Collective

# **Problems of the Structure of Armed Forces in Relation to Minorities and Ethnic Conflict: An Upcoming Issue for the CSCE Process ?**

**By Dr. Peer H. Lange,**

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Forschungsinstitut für internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Ebenhausen

- I. The Gulf war made the weapons a theme, the civil war in Yugoslavia the structures.*
- II. Changing perceptions of threats, capabilities, options.*
- III. The present trend toward Intervention-capable new force structures.*
- IV. Defense against Intervention: Territorial defence, militias, peoples war, "Kampfgruppen - Irregular warfare a new threat?"*
- V. Political control - which form ?*
- VI. Security against protecting powers for minorities: Internationalization? Mutual dependence ? Regional approaches ?*

## **I. The Gulf war made the weapons a theme, the civil war in Yugoslavia the structures.**

Military experts around the world were stunned by the miracles of high-tech warfare in the Gulf war. Not so with Yugoslavia, which demonstrates to us that the regular part of an army, out of political control, can change into a loose cannon against the population and that the other part of armed forces, structured for "peoples war", will even deter great and global powers with high weapons technology at their disposal if the rationale of that suicidal mechanism went upside down.

Only two years ago, during the Vienna talks about conventional force reductions, the neutral's ideas about territorial defense and the like were close to models for "defensive defense" - especially in the East of Europe. Now, an army prepared for exactly that kind of war seems to be nearly as dangerous, as a regular army putting itself in place of politics. But Yugoslavia is a writing on the wall only. Both models can easily work in the area of the former Soviet

Union - the political prerequisites for that are apparent. And there seems to be no force at hand to stop them if unleashed.

The once decisive nuclear weapon is of shrinking use. Big fleets offer limited options against irregular warfare. Sophisticated air forces don't dare to stand up against "Strelas" in the hands of irregulars in Yugoslavia. NATO's military top calculated it to be too risky for even the world's

intention to avoid such tendencies by reducing or defusing Russia's potential and optional military preponderance.

The threats envisaged by the smaller states of Eastern Europe, are combined with the revival of nation states - be they equal or dominant. One of the main vulnerabilities felt is the lack of adequate air defense capability against the related options of a predominant power. Precise firepower delivered in the third dimension has to be reassessed after the Gulf war demonstrated the most important option of knocking out key functions of defense structures. Defense against such options of highly intervention-capable forces could be driven into even stronger reliance on "peoples-war" options and the consequent structures which might cause insecurity themselves.

### **III. Intervention-capable new force structures - an unavoidable tendency?**

It is of great importance to point to the fact, that the West already began to reconsider its own force structures as the rivalry among East and West entered its last phase. In the early 80s the West and the East both developed new strategies or concepts named "operational manoeuvre" or "Airland battle". For both cases a technically enhanced airmobility combined with new force structures ("leaner but meaner") was characteristic. For military experts this was a clear consequence of the progress especially on the technical side of military art. Technical progress was driving military art into an enhancement of offensive warfare - deep thrust invasion capability. The consequent options grew more and more threatening whereas paradoxically at the same time the political relations enhanced mutual understanding of the needs of arms control. This in turn meant that East and West were able to agree on the principle of "defensive defense" and later on major cuts of especially invasion-capable armaments. The than following Vienna accords were directed at reductions in the superfluous quantities of armament - the leftovers from the arms racing of the Cold war. Consequently, the armies had to reconsider their shape and structures, and this development strengthened the tendency to have leaner and meaner forces - meaning smaller units with enhanced firepower and enhanced manoeuvrability.

The major question for Europe's future is, whether the upcoming structural characteristics of the army of Russia as a minor nuclear superpower, but a regionally predominant power will meet the political demands of the new political preconditions. These ask for confidence-building structures or at least for criteria for confidence-building structures between unequal neighbours. To name one

That structure very much reminds one of former Yugoslavia, which was split into the normal army, including airpower and heavy armor, and the territorial defenses, structured to fight a "peoples' war" (very much reminding one of Gneisenau's ideas in 1830) against a preponderant intruder. Such structures are widespread among neutrals and the Latvians oriented themselves very much at the Swedish model. Astonishingly there is little talk about the main problem: the reliability of an ethnically and culturally totally heterogeneous social composition after the enforced russification during the 70s and 80s in these countries.

All new states with huge minorities face this problem. The army of Georgia cannot rely on Ossetians in their ranks and files. Can the Rumanian army rely on officers of Hungarian origin? What about a multiethnic Russian army? Will the old habits of ideologic cadre screening revive under national colors?

The more important question is, however, if and how quickly minorities or ethnic groups can build up their own armed forces and grow into civil-war formations. Now in Tajikistan we are watching a multinational army falling apart into its ethnic particles or units. This comes at a time when the outer world is trying to build up multinational formations under the flag of the United Nations or within NATO or among close neighbours like France and Germany on the corps level. These supranational forces are nowadays partly supposed to fight or quell irrational warfighting among unruly ethnic forces. This is a question not only of structures, but as well of political authority and consciousness.

#### **V. Political control - which form?**

Military structures are reliable, as long as they are politically under control. Neither the Swedish nor the Swiss defense structure lured into misuse - whereas the Yugoslav one did.

Political control does not mean hierarchical watchdogging from top to bottom or the kind of control, which was established in the Soviet system. Political control means liberal acceptance of the political system and its structures to which a given military structure adheres. Political control means shaping military structures to the given political demands. Political control progresses towards a sophisticated system of checks and balances in accordance to the political consciousness of a given society. The German "Innere Führung", for example, is supplemented by an extraordinarily tight web of political education through all kinds of academies and institutes in Western Germany - and is confronted and challenged nowadays by the adverse political heritage of Eastern Germany. To a part of the population in Eastern Germany the political system of the West may lack

direction of further mutual understanding of common problems. Military and security problems should be addressed in a most professional way but under political control. For this purpose a supplement to the "Baltic Sea Council" is needed. The Defense ministers of the states washed by the Baltic Sea should meet to name the imminent destabilizing problems and direct some preparatory work to examine criteria for confidence-building military structures in this subregion. That initiative would not mean the creation of an additional, redundant institution, but rather a timely step for preempting dangerous developments in the making. The best way to effectively internationalize upcoming local tensions is their regionalization or treatment in regional frameworks.

Local tensions threaten to come up in the Baltic area of the subregion. Russia's military leadership is striving for a revitalization of its stronghold in Russian Eastern Prussia. It is in a mood to advocate a military role in securing the human rights of Russians abroad - that means the Russians in both the northern Baltic countries. This approach leads to some sort of a pincer movement: in the north of the Baltic area an instrumentalization of the minorities issue to keep influence on Baltic affairs intact and in the south, around Russian Eastern Prussia, an instrumentalization of strategic demands stemming from security interests in Prussia: to secure as well air and ground transit to this enclave as the sea lines of communication along the coastlines of the three Baltic republics.

The Baltic states are trying to block the growing Russian intervention capability by reinforcing their defence planning along the lines of "peoples war" (planning for partisan warfare in Latvia), and by heavily relying on "national guards" and the like. The structure of these forces and their political control are under question. All these problems are urgently demanding arms control and confidence building initiatives - within very short spans of time, leaving open a rather narrow window of opportunity only. The importance of the development to be channelized in the Baltic area lies in the fact, that it could promisingly used as a model for other parts of Europe if only adequately and promptly approached.

two spheres - military and civilian - always existed side-by-side but developed independently. There used to be no question of the civilians intruding into the sphere of the military complex and, which may seem strange, vice versa.

The two spheres of Kola have only one thing in common: in their development both used to be and still are highly dependent from decisions taken in Moscow. The Murmansk authorities, influential within the region, never exercised strategic options within either of the two spheres. They only directed implementation of the policies worked out at the centre, whatever the matter might have been - strategic planning, investments or distribution.

The present Russian system of state management has incorporated the former Soviet type. Two different state bodies are generally responsible for the development of the two Kola's structures, military and civilian. These are the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economy, formerly the GOSPLAN. This two-sided pattern is typical for a centrally planned economy, which is true also about the result: a rise of two independent infrastructures, as far as production activities, communications and transportation are concerned. There are, for example, partly or wholly closed roads for civilian use, two separate communication networks with the civilian one being the less efficient.

The civilian infrastructure is suffering additional loads, since the military one is only to a certain extent applicable to meet the social needs of the army. The servicemen, for example, have to use civilian airports or railways to travel away for a leave. In the Russian remote northern regions these are usually overloaded.

Both infrastructures are very sensitive and suffer from the present economic disorder. Some 300 000 officers in the whole Russian army are lacking housing, the amount of not-paid salary reaches the sum of 1,5 billion roubles, and the food supply problem is reported to be particularly difficult in the Northern Fleet (see *REE/RL Research Report*, Munich, No. 56/1992, p. 60). Officers and seamen in Severomorsk were reported to be very upset and having approached the threshold of rebel.

There are some signs of stabilisation in Russia, at least as far as supplies to the domestic consumer market are concerned: although at higher prices, foodstuffs and consumer goods are available. The social tension, also in the remote regions, have thus been a little eased. The stabilization of the whole national economy is however a question still to be solved.

## **Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist Poland**

**By Dr. Antoni Z. Kamiński,**

Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs

It is often assumed that Poland has a long tradition of involvement of the military in the affairs of the state. Moreover, all public opinion polls in Poland indicate a high level of trust enjoyed by the military in the eyes of respondents. These conditions may not create the best ground for an effective civilian control over the military and, therefore, for a stable democracy in Poland.

The prospects for democracy in Poland may be precarious for other reasons. In my opinion, however, military-civilian relations will not be the main cause of down-fall of the democracy in Poland if this ever happens. Let me qualify the thesis about the special position of the military in Polish political life before further developing this analysis.

First, the exceptional position of the army in Polish society and in Polish politics in the inter-war period may be explained by the role military played in the revival of the Polish state at the end of World War I, and by the difficult geo-strategic situation of the Polish state whose existence was questioned both by the Soviet Russia and Germany.

It is worth remembering, however, that Marshall Pilsudski's coup of May 1926 has less than a full-hearted support in the army. Had it not been for the strike of the railroad workers who supported Pilsudski, military forces backing the legitimate government could have defeated the rebels. Thus, factors accounting for the success of the coup were unpopularity of the government and the widespread opinion about corruption in the public life, as well as the uncertain overall political situation in the immediate neighborhood of Poland, and not the support among the military.

Second, the imposition of the Martial Law in December 1981 is also viewed as a military coup. My view is different. No doubt that with the army as the only socially acceptable element in the communist political system, General Jaruzelski was in 1981 the most natural candidate, initially, for the prime ministership of Poland and later for the post of the first secretary of the PZPR. By doing what he did he acted as the party leader responding to the dangers to the communist regime, and not as the head of the officer's corps in search of more influence.

It is worth nothing that the military under communist regime were part, together with the party intellectuals, of an outer core for the political elite,

some support among the influential political groups in the country. This is not very helpful from the point of view of the goal of the stabilization of the country. Another possible pessimistic scenario consists in a continuing economic decline which produces social turmoil of revolutionary dimensions. This may involve the army as a force necessary to impose some order. One can reasonably assume, however, the probability is high that the present situation in which the army is neutral in political debates and conflicts can be maintained until the constitutional matters are effectively resolved through democratic methods, and the most important economic difficulties have been overcome.



The resumption of security in the philosophy of life by the cadres regardless of the kind and character of their faith has been a consequence of the civilian vice-ministers' presence. While analyzing the evaluation of changes in the armed forces by both military and civil society one can notice the results in two respects:

- the reception of civil persons to the military; and
- depolitization of the military.

I have already mentioned some effects of civil ministers in the MoD.

The process of depolitization in the armed forces has been adopted with relief in both military and civil circles (taking into account the experiences of last 40 years). The restoration of the Polish armed forces, their tradition and history to the nation has been considered as a general evidence of recovery of full independence and sovereignty. The legal act which makes it impossible to conduct active political activities by soldiers in active service has also been received positively. If a soldier wants to be a politician he must suspend his active military service. In other words the army is to defend the country not to govern it.

These changes were the basis for making the decision that the military cannot fulfil a pacifier's role or police functions. The military is taking all these changes of its role with relief and satisfaction.

The research which is being conducted systematically by public opinion research centers concerning the confidence to the state institutions show that the military since the spring 1990 has taken advanced position on the ranking-list with the approval of 65-82%. For some months the army has been on the first place.

After the transitional period of negation of the position of the armed forces, and presenting pacifistic values in social behaviour, a gradual reorientation towards thinking in the categories of the state has taken place since December 1990. It strengthens its power and security.

The relations between the armed forces and the church play an important role in shaping the attitude of society towards the military. These relations are placed very deeply in the historical tradition of the nation and have their specific patriotic and religious expressions. That is why the permanent presence of the military in church celebrations as well as the participation of church representatives in important enterprises within the military ceremonial has a great influence on the image of the armed forces.

The army that the democratic government inherited from the Communists was a legacy of Stalin. Under the previous system, all army generals were members of the Communist Party. 82 percent of all the officers and 51 percent of all non-commissioned officers were communists. For more than 40 years the high command of the army was connected with the Moscow command by way of telephone consisting of only an earpiece. It was an army suffering from inferiority complex and also from the traumatic experiences of Munich 1938 and August 1968, when the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia was decimated. On both occasions, our army didn't manage to fire a single shot.

At the same time, for more than 40 years, the army was a direct power tool of the Communist Party, always ready to serve its interests. Therefore, it's no wonder that the Czechoslovak Army has been viewed by the Czechoslovak population with deep mistrust and apprehension, which surprisingly was not the case in other countries with similar history (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria). During the last three years, over 100 generals most closely connected with the former regime retired or were retired. All political activities in the armed forces stopped soon after November 1989. By the end of the next year, compulsory military service will be reduced to 12 months. Czechoslovakia now has a law on alternative military service, which was formulated so liberally that in certain areas, the army is running out of conscripts.

The introduction of democracy in Czechoslovakia required a reappraisal and review of potential threats, which in turn has led to structural changes in the armed forces. Owing to former Warsaw Pact doctrine, all combat troops and their respective infrastructures were concentrated in the Czech lands, while Slovakia was protected from the potential threats by a few military schools, munition stores, and armament factories. Therefore, during the last three years, a logical process of relocation took place and, thank God, with view to our present circumstances, it's nearly completed, even though it caused a number of economic and social problems. Our army has, to a certain extent, managed to streamline its command structure and get rid of some of its more bureaucratic institutions.

Because of the serious economic situation of the country, the army cannot adopt new technology and equipment. Many officers look back with nostalgia to the good ol' days of the Cold War, when military spending was an absolute priority, when the military budget was top-secret - with parts of this budget cleverly concealed in the budgets of other ministries - when the deputies of the Communist parliament automatically approved anything that was handed to them.

Today the military budget creates heated discussions - not always well-

70% of the trainers in that school are Checks. The same equation applies to certain communication systems, electronic surveillance systems, weapons systems and so on. The only solution to this riddle is creating and approving a number of bilateral treaties and agreements on mutual cooperation in various fields. But those treaties can only serve their purpose as long the foreign policies of two republics will be structured at least approximately along the same lines.

But the division of the army must not be considered merely as a technical, logistical and legislative process. The Czechoslovak Army was created in 1918 as an institution representing both Czechs and Slovaks and other nationalities. It was designed to defend their common state combining the means - on personal and material level - of both nations. There simply is no other Czechoslovak institution where the idea of federalism is so strongly present as in the Czechoslovak army. With its division the army personnel will definitely lose an ideal that was of some importance to them. Therefore the division of the army will also have substantial emotional and moral consequences.

Though the extent of these consequences is hard to predict. Right now some of the problems that appeared during relocations may serve as a glimpse of problems to come. During the relocation and transformation period that took place between 1990 and 1992 nearly 30.000 officers and non-commissioned officers left the army. Only one fifth of all relocated officers actually resettled in new locations with their families, either due to housing shortage or because of other social, economic or family reasons. Right now 21 % of all officers and non-commissioned officers serving in the Czech republic are Slovaks. That is about 8.500 people with their families, 15,2 % of all officers serving in the Slovak republic are Czechs. 65% of the Slovak officers serving in the Czech lands have mixed marriages, their children attending Czech schools. 75% of the Czech officers in Slovakia have Slovak wives, their children attending Slovak schools.

The Slovak Prime Minister, Mr. Mečiar, recently went on record stating that the Slovak republic will gladly accommodate Czech officers who decided to stay on. But so far he has been conspicuously silent about Slovaks stationed in Bohemia and Moravia. It is a public secret that these "federal Slovaks", as they are called, do not enjoy great confidence in Slovakia. The Czech National Council so far has not bothered to answer Mr. Mečiar by formulation its own proposal and how to resolve the problem of Slovak officers in Czech lands.

Alas, it is not easy to be an officer in today's Czechoslovakia !

ordnance and human conversion, research and environmental protection provide valuable support for establishing the Hungarian armed forces according to our needs and possibilities. It also contributes to strengthening our political ties with NATO. Motivated by our perspective to join the European Community, the Hungarian defence concept attaches great significance to the Western-European Union (WEU), with which the country must gradually develop wide-ranging relations.

Hungarian Military Defence must be reshaped so that it can quickly take a bigger share from peace keeping or even peace creating action coordinated by the UN or some other competent organization.

Improving civilian supervision of the armed forces is a priority. Preparing the public for defence is a function of civil acceptance and loyalty to the society. This requires the generation and development of the necessary cognitive, intellectual, emotional and psychological attitudes.

Establishing the nation's security and defence, the sovereign national defence policy plays a significant role in creating stability. This way, it clears the way for partnership and integration that will generate development in the region.

### **Factors Threatening the Security of the Republic of Hungary**

The probability of full-scale war between the countries in this continent has decreased. At the same time, the probability of conflicts that are difficult to forecast has risen due to current economic and social instability, to difficulties and contradictions of the transition into democracy and to the newly-sprung conflicts and the related territorial disputes between ethnic groups, nations and minorities.

The internal conflicts and the civil war-like events breaking out in the region constitute military threat: armed groups may drift into Hungarian territory or may commit provocation against the country. Other forms of not nationally initiated violence below the war threshold must also be reckoned with. Para-military organizations and armed terrorist groups may identify Hungary as a transit or a target country.

Acts of violence may conceivably effect Hungarian transport, energy supply and communication systems. Economic threats such as volatility of the national economy, above average dependence on exports and imports, and foreign energy supply increase security risks.

It must increase awareness of ideals such as integrity with one's nation, the will and determination to defend one's country. It must generate acceptance of military and civil defence obligations.

Balanced functioning of the national economy, supplies to the

# Civil-Military Relations in Today's Hungary

By Lt.Col. Janos Szabo,

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As a sociologist I would like to present a sociological approach, and to bring to your attention a sociological aspect of the civil-military relations.

My starting point is that the basic task of the reconstruction of the civil-military relations in Hungary, as in the rest of the new Central and Eastern European democracies, can be resolved not only by political or economical processes. Much deeper social processes are required.

I think the very simplified purpose of it is the following: We need the kind of societies which can keep their armed forces under their strong and efficient control, and we need the kind of armed forces which want to and can serve their own boarder societies.

At present, however, this task is a very heavy burden in this region. We can not do a real comparison between the eastern and western defence societies without regard to their basic differences with respect to starting conditions.

We know the starting differences exactly: In case of *western type defence society* the army and the all of the defence sector is a result of the intervention of the civil society into the state. Within the traditional *eastern type defence society*, in contrast, the army and largely all of the defence sector was a means for the intervention of the state into society. And this type of defence society model was exported by the former Soviet-Union to all of the former Warsaw-Pact countries.

This situation has come to an end not long ago by the collapse of the eastern type defence societies. The defence societies of the region however could not immediately and automatically be equal immediately to the western type defence societies. For the time being they are in an intermediate situation.

Today the Central and Eastern European countries want to forget the *eastern type defence society* heritage which;

- ignored the professional and personal autonomies;
- ignored the lack of the social legitimation of armed forces;
- kept the soldier out of a law (somebody on the high level could get total power, on the low level the others had no protection against it);
- built the army as an institution by ideologies and symbols;
- kept a continuous discrepancy between the soldier's status and the most important elements of their way of life;
- excepted the military elite, compensated the additional burdens of service only with symbols and ideologies;

5. During the *economic transition* we have to restructure the national armament production and the armament market system (by privatization, new international market orientations, economy-elite-changing, new industrial policies to support the new defence industries, etc.);
6. During the *social transition* to create new, modern type (western type) defence societies (with a new civil-military relation system, a new democratic control, an open structure of the army toward the society, new military public relations system etc.).

Consequently, our tasks concern the day-to-day crisis intervention, the political transition, the economic transition and the social transition.

There is a well-known standpoint of Ralph Dahrendorf, the well-known German sociologist, who said we can complete a political transition with a formal construction reform in about six months, a stable economic transition in about six years, but a self-supporting social transition needs at least sixty years.

The question is here: How can we give some simple answer to the mentioned simple questions? We can think confidently that the problems are much deeper than simple pragmatic level and that the expertise, the knowledge and the resources are not enough today in this region to help a short term crisis intervention and a long term defence system rebuilding program during the same time.

At present in Hungary we are after the main decisions, partly at the start of the reconstruction and the implementation of the new type civil-military relations. In this stage we need most of all mental and moral solidarity with respect to general social and financial resources, the appropriate patterns and standards, a lot of fresh and open information about the same process in the other Central and Eastern European countries, and, I think, a lot of patience.

that the cooperation of CIS states was facing difficulties and even the further disintegration of the Russian Federation can not be excluded. The real question for all of us is, how Russian military would respond to the dynamic political and economic processes in the Russian Federation and in the CIS states. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates how dangerous military machinery could be in a crisis situation without firm political control.

3) Mr. Peer Lange mentioned in his introduction, that armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe might be used against political opposition or against ethnic minorities. He also mentioned the difficulties of multinational armies in this region. Those are very valid remarks, because the aspect of ethnic affiliation makes the relationship of societies and armed forces even more complex. Ethnic conflicts in a society unavoidably lead to ethnic conflicts in the army. Furthermore, the relationship between the ruling elites and the political, religious and ethnic minorities is not without tension. Threat perceptions by all sides can easily be exaggerated and enemy images created artificially. Due to historical and other reasons, enemy images are being created in Central and Eastern Europe along the lines of the ethnic divide. Until we have genuine democratic societies there will be no firm control over the military and there might be temptation to use force against minorities.

4) In the course of the debate the question of officers inherited from the previous system was also touched upon. I am convinced, that only a very few high ranking officers can be considered so called true believers of the communist ideology. Most of the officer corps considered themselves military professionals first of all, and they became members of the party only because that was the condition of becoming an officer. So, there is no need for an all out purification of the armies. The best way is to have a pragmatic approach to this problem, and judge the officers according to their deeds in the past two-three years. Only those should be removed from the army, who were not able to accommodate to the new situation.

Session two (Chair: Iver B. Neumann)

1400 "The Role of the Military in the Making of US Foreign Policy"  
**Prof. Vincent Davis**, University of Kentucky.

"Russian and CIS Military Policies and Nato Military Policy"  
**Dr. Alexander Nikitin** (Center for Political and International Studies, Moscow).

"Problems of the Structure of the Armed Forces in Relation to Minorities and Ethnic Conflicts"  
**Dr. Peer Lange**, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen.

Discussion.

*Session three (Chair: John K. Skogan)*

1700 "Military Integration in the CIS"  
**Lt.Gen. Leonid Ivashov**, CIS Council of Defence Ministers.

"Russian Military Presence at Kola: Strategic Significance and Burdens on the Transitory Society"  
**Dr. Alexei Sekarev**, Institute for Economic Studies, Apatity, presently Humboldt Research Fellow.

Discussion - conference adjourns.