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**CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY
BUILDING IN EUROPE**

Achievements and Lessons

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Summary

The present paper analyses the history of military confidence-building measures (CBM) in the CSCE process. It describes and analyses the first generation of CBM negotiated in Helsinki. These were mainly symbolic measures inaugurating a process based on the notion of shared interests in a divided Europe. The second generation of measures, confidence and security building measures - CSBM, were designed to provide an infrastructure to reduce the danger of surprise attack or short-warning attack. The third generation of measures need to be designed to promote and shape political change. Finally the paper addresses the question of the relevance of the European experience to the Korean peninsula.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING IN EUROPE:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS

1. The Confidence-Building Perspective

Confidence building measures (CBM) have played a significant role in the management of security relations in Europe since the adoption of the Final Act at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975. The first generation CBMs was largely symbolic in nature. The measures did not affect military security considerations in any significant manner. They did, however, suggest and project a perspective on security relations extending beyond that of competition for comparative advantage, pointing towards shared interests and a recognition of the interdependent nature of security on the continent of Europe. They were but one component in a broader framework defining principles and standards which should guide the conduct of international relations among the participating states.

The first generation of CBMs was negotiated and implemented within the context of a divided Europe. The measures constituted the precursors of an infrastructure designed to stabilize the military confrontation which buttressed the political division of the Cold War order. They came into being as the system borders ceased to constitute fences of separation and were seen rather as a demarcation of the political facts which were created on the rubbles of the

Second World War. The borders of the post-war era were declared inviolable and the countries in or with military units in Europe reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of the non-use of force. Equally important they outlined a broad agenda for cooperation in the economic, technological, and cultural spheres. Acceptance of the de facto borders provided a baseline for efforts at their penetration. Furthermore, the Final Act projected the concept of transnational values, values common to the European civilization, particularly those of human rights. The CSCE document inaugurated the final act of the post-war order by mutual acceptance of the geometry within which relations must be conducted. Codification of the rules of conduct combined with commitments to overcome the consequences of division inaugurated a process of transformation which eventually was to contribute to the break-up of the post-war order. The Final Act was also an overture to the post-cold war order in Europe, a framework for peaceful change. CBMs were parts of that framework, admittedly not the principal parts, although they grew in importance with practice and development of the system. They became necessary but not sufficient elements in strategies designed to initiate and sustain a complex pattern of stabilization and transformation.

Confidence-building measures were designed to deal with the consequences of military confrontation rather than to alter it, with the role of military force in the conduct of international relations rather than with the levels of

military force assembled in support of that conduct. They were in some sense focused more on the shadows cast by military power than on its substance. They focused on routine peacetime military activities rather than on the preparations for war. However, the architects were very concerned about creating such transparency and openness which could prevent the former from being understood as the latter. The modest beginnings at Helsinki led to the breakthrough in Stockholm some ten years later. The road was far from straight; two follow-up meetings (Belgrade 1977-78 and Madrid 1980-83) produced practically no results reflecting the souring of East-West relations, Soviet arms build-ups, American human rights offensives, growing dissidence in the East and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. ¹

2. The Helsinki CBM system

The CBM provisions of the Final Act focused on ground troops, those capable of seizing and holding territory in Europe. The area of application largely excluded Soviet territory, including only a 250 km wide strip of territory beyond the borders with other CSCE states. The exclusion constituted an element of asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the other states in Europe, the suggestion of an exclusive, privileged or potentially hegemonic position. Moscow was preoccupied with another relationship, however, extending beyond the European arena, viz. the relationship with Washington. The United States and Canada were participants in the CSCE process, but

their territories were not included in the area to which CBMs would apply. This dual perspective constituted a recurrent theme of political tension and strategic competition throughout the cold war period. West European states feared the imposition of Soviet hegemony in Europe while the Soviet Union was concerned about achieving and maintaining parity with the United States.

The CBMs involved politically mandatory notification 21 days or more in advance of ground troop manoeuvres exceeding 25 000 personnel, independently or combined with air and naval components. The latter would be included in the total. In addition the Final Document provided for voluntary notification on a bilateral basis of troop movements and smaller scale manoeuvres. States were invited to expand the CBM system through practice and adaptation, through a process of customary law. They were encouraged also to invite observers to be present during notifiable manoeuvres and to exchange military goodwill missions. The obligations did not extend to maritime exercises as the area of application beyond the territories of states was limited to the adjoining sea and air space. However, the Final Act did stipulate that participating states "may notify other manoeuvres conducted by them".

According to Webster's Dictionary confidence is "an assurance of mind or firm belief in the trustworthiness of another or in the truth and reality of a fact." We may define CBMs then as

arrangements designed to enhance an assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create in the military sphere. CBMs focused on perceptions of the facts, and were designed to prevent misunderstanding and mistrust. The Helsinki regime was predicated on the presumption that increased openness and access would strengthen confidence among the states facing each other militarily in Europe. Certainly lack of confidence could be nurtured by inadequate understanding of the facts of routine military activity. However, the Helsinki CBMs did but to a very marginal degree supplement national means of intelligence. Their importance related less to operational considerations than to the political symbolism inherent in military cooperation across the cleavage of confrontation, to their contribution to the development of a more extensive and obligatory system, and to the eventual ritualization of routine military activities. As I observed at the time, they formed elements "in a framework for the indirect alleviation and reduction of the incentives for competition which derive from uncertainty and possible misunderstandings." ²

When we consider the record of implementation between 1975-85 we notice that most states adhered strictly to the notification period of 21 days. Norway constituted the exception by going beyond the commitment and adhering to the practice of notifying manoeuvres 30 days in advance. Some of the neutral and non-aligned countries also extended the notification period, but they did not manage to stimulate a

gradual extension by example. States stuck to a strict construction of their commitments. However, they did follow the suggestion to invite observers on a voluntary basis to notifiable manoeuvres, i.e. with a participation of 25 000 personnel or more. The percentage was higher for Western countries (around 80%) than for Eastern countries (less than 50%). The deterioration in East-West relations after 1979 caused Eastern states to stop inviting observers to military manoeuvres. To some extent the voluntary undertakings for confidence-building were fair-weather undertakings which evaporated in the East under the pressure of decreasing confidence and increasing tension, i.e. during the circumstances when they could have been most useful.

Western and neutral and non-aligned states invited observers from all CSCE states or from a cross-section thereof. During the first years the Eastern states tended to invite observers from neighbouring countries, but subsequently expanded their invitations. Western states frequently complained that their observers were only permitted to attend staged performances rather than real manoeuvres. Western and neutral and non-aligned states frequently notified manoeuvres below the 25 000 personnel threshold and sometimes invited observers to attend them. No states were accused of failing to notify a major military manoeuvre. The pattern of military exercises remained quite stable over time, both in terms of frequency and duration. The size exceeded 70 000 personnel only in a couple of instances. Austria was the only country which notified a

command post exercise. No state notified independent naval or air exercises. More than a hundred military exercises were notified involving a total of more than two million personnel, observers were invited to about half of the exercises. NATO accounted for the largest number of exercises (more than 60 per cent), reflecting the structure of linked exercises throughout the territory of the alliance. Most of the notified exercises (almost 75 %) took place during the three months of September, October and November.

In terms of their functions CBMs may be divided into measures involving information, notification, observation and stabilization. The distinctions are not clear-cut and most measures would span several functions. The Helsinki CBMs involved the three first functions but did not extend to stabilization. The first generation of CBMs was designed to inhibit the political exploitation of military force.³ The second generation of CBM's which came out of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) 1984-86 extended to stabilization and hence was designed to deal also with the problem of surprise attack. Significantly the CDE-measures were called confidence and security-building measures, CSBMs.

3. The Stockholm CSBM-System

The mandate for the CDE conference in Stockholm was agreed at the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid in September 1983. It

specified that "the conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe". It was stipulated, furthermore, that the measures should be militarily meaningful, politically binding and verifiable. And, most importantly, they should apply to all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).

The Stockholm CSBM system expands and amplifies several of the parameters of the Helsinki CBM system with respect to notification. The notification time was doubled to 42 days, the notification threshold was lowered from 25 000 personnel to 13 000 troops or 300 tanks, if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades or regiments. The criteria had been broadened to include not only manpower, but also tanks which are normally considered a measure of offensive capacity. A threshold was established also for amphibious and airborne troops involving more than 3000 personnel.

A primary concern motivating the original CBM system was to reduce options for exerting political pressure by staging unannounced military manoeuvres, particularly in a tense situation. Notification could, of course, be used as a means to underline a political message. However, the multilateral framework and obligations made it more difficult to focus threats and isolate the targets for such threats. A further

effort to emasculate military manoeuvres as a means of political pressure was made in the Stockholm document which contained provisions also for forecasting through the exchange of annual calendars of all notifiable military activities. In addition military activities involving more than 40 000 personnel would be prohibited unless announced a year in advance, and activities over 75 000 unless forecast two years in advance. States can choose, of course, to break the rules in order to exert military pressure in support of political objectives in contravention of the Stockholm document. However, such violations would be more costly in terms of political relations than in the absence of such multilateral instruments. The latter serve to raise the threshold by increasing the costs.

Observation has been moved from the shelf of voluntary undertakings to that of mandatory obligations. Observers from all participating states are to be invited to military activities above a threshold of 17 000 troops. For amphibious and airborne activities the observation threshold is 5 000 troops. Alert exercises must be notified provided they last more than 72 hours.

In addition the Stockholm document broke new ground by comprising also provisions concerning inspection from the air and ground as a means of verifying compliance with the agreed measures. The on-site inspection is based on a system of challenge by participating states. It will be carried out 36

hours following the receipt of the request for inspection. States cannot refuse inspection. However, no state need to accept more than three inspections of its territory per calendar year, nor more than one inspection per calendar year from any single participating state.

The CSCE states till now have fulfilled their obligations as specified in the Stockholm document. The calendars provide a good measure of the scale of military activity in Europe. The volume of activity has decreased steadily since the system of annual calendars came into being. The total number of notifiable military activities decreased from 47 for 1987, 38 for 1988, 31 for 1989 to 21 for 1990. Interestingly enough compared to the record from the Helsinki CBM system, the Warsaw Pact countries accounted for the largest total, 71, while NATO notified 51 reflecting the fact that the Helsinki threshold excluded a substantial portion of the military activities in the eastern area of Europe. However, the decrease in military activity has also been more pronounced in the Warsaw Pact area than in NATO. The number of notifiable military activities decreased from 25 in 1987 to 7 in 1990 within the Warsaw Pact and from 17 to 10 in NATO. Twenty-two CSCE countries will not host notifiable military activity in 1990, but some of them participate in such activity. ⁴

The change to a multilateral from a bilateral observation regime did involve certain practical difficulties on implementation, particularly for the smaller countries with

manoeuvre grounds in remote areas without the requisite accommodations for observers, etc. Large observer teams require fairly extensive organizational arrangements which tax the capacities of modest military staffs already burdened with the conduct of a major exercise. However, the general trend is toward fewer and smaller military exercises in Europe. NATO is engaged in developing new exercise concepts involving a new mix of command post-, field training -, and computer simulation exercises. The Warsaw Pact is moving rapidly towards de facto dissolution as an integrated military alliance. Proposals designed to constrain the scale, frequency and duration of military exercises are under consideration at the CSCE conference in Vienna. If this trend continues observations under the mandatory rule will become relatively rare. They were down to a total of 10 in 1989. Western countries still complained that the arrangements for observation in the Soviet Union were more restrictive than the practice followed in other CSCE countries.

The number of on-site inspections carried out under the Stockholm CSBM-system has been growing from five in 1987 to 13 in 1988 and 16 in 1989. In 1988 the ratio of inspections carried out by NATO and the Warsaw Pact was nearly even while in 1989 Western countries conducted nine compared to seven inspections by the Eastern countries. The Soviet Union was the most frequent inspector with a total of five inspections. Three of NATO's nine inspections in 1989 were carried out in the Soviet Union, thereby exhausting the quota of possible

inspections in that country. In no instance did the inspections lead to accusations of violations of the provisions of the Stockholm document. In fact the challenge inspections are conducted more for purposes of maintaining the CSCE system and the perspectives imbedded therein than in order to follow up on real suspicions of violation.

Implementation of the Stockholm document has coincided with the gradual wind-down of the cold war and the dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1989 which led to German unification, the election of democratic regimes in Central Europe and a Soviet commitment to withdraw all troops from Eastern Europe. The process of glasnost' and perestroika unfolded and changed the political landscape and agenda of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a union which is in the midst of a basic transformation and possibly even dissolution.

The perception of threat was vanishing just as states had managed to put in place a system of CSBMs which could stabilize a situation of military confrontation at a high level of military dispositions and activity. The pace of political events surpassed expectations and transformed the environment for military confidence-building. Nevertheless, the CSBM system provided an infrastructure for insurance against the emergence of new threats and, most importantly, for the transformation of the old order based on confrontation to a new cooperative security order in Europe.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe were the result of a build-up of social and economic pressures against autocratic and inefficient regimes. However, they were facilitated by changes in the external environment. The CSCE process probably stimulated and reflected those changes. Clearly Moscow had ceased to view national security primarily in territorial and competitive terms. Modern technology, nuclear weapons and the means of their "delivery" over intercontinental distances had so altered the condition of states as to render largely meaningless attempts to attain security by territorial buffers and military deployments in front of national frontiers. The roofs had been blown off the buildings housing the territorial states. Consequently, ideological conformity and organizational unity within an East European glacis could no longer be justified on the grounds of national security. The marshals of the Second World War, whose visions were shaped by the experience of invasion, had been replaced by marshals who run Soviet defenses in the age of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms limitation talks with the United States. The concept of common security⁵, the recognition of interdependence, had made an impact on security policy outlooks in the Soviet Union. The CSCE process pointed in the same direction.

The Stockholm CSBMs were designed to enhance stability by reducing fears of surprise attack and promoting crisis stability (relative absence of pressures to take early military action to forestall moves by the adversary). The

right to demand inspection, inspection by challenge, constitutes a mechanism for mutual reassurance against exercises being used to hide preparations for attack. The mandatory notifications at low thresholds provide similar reassurance. The system of CSBMs is based on the idea that states have a shared interest in overcoming the consequences of confrontation, the spirals of mutual suspicion which may envelop calculations in a crisis and drive decisions and dispositions to the brink of open conflict in order to forestall actions from the adversary.

The Stockholm CSBM system should be viewed in a broader context as well. It contained the first real breakthrough for on-site inspection in East-West relations, a breakthrough which paved the way for the INF agreement which involved a global elimination of Soviet and American intermediate range nuclear missiles. Furthermore, the system expanded the platform for cooperative transparency in regard to routine peacetime military activities, taking some of the threat out of such activities, thereby contributing to their ritualization and emasculation. They were designed to stabilize a given confrontation ⁶, the pace and direction of events in Europe brought the promise of an end to the confrontation and suggested a new frame of reference for the evolution of the CSBM system. That system had stimulated a perspective on security relations which penetrated into the negotiations about strategic arms and other aspects of the arms competition. Confidence-building was viewed as an

important means also for avoiding nuclear war.⁷

4. Prospects

In attempting to gauge the future role of CSBMs in the security order in Europe we must assess the extent to which such measures could contribute to its reconstruction, to its transition from a system of confrontation to one of cooperation. The security order in Europe is evolving rapidly. The negotiations about Conventional Forces in Europe, CFE, are likely to result in a first phase agreement about major reductions before the end of the year. Such reductions will hardly define the end of the process of build-down as unilateral withdrawals and budgetary pressures are likely to result in a further dismantling of the cold-war confrontation in Europe.

Several possible avenues remain open to the negotiators in Vienna. Amplification and expansion of the existing system could further enhance transparency, predictability, mutual reassurance and ritualization of normal peacetime military activities. Such activities are likely to follow a different pattern in the future emphasizing the training of generic military capabilities rather than the conduct of military operations across or in defence of a fixed line of division buttressed by forward deployments. The issue of short warning attacks will recede into the background of concerns as forces are thinned out and withdrawn. The unification of Germany and

the democratization of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will remove any Western sense of a clear and present danger of attack from the East. Military force will seem increasingly irrelevant to the tasks at hand, the challenges are likely to belong in the economic and social arena rather than in the field of military dispositions. Similarly Western build-down and restructuring of forces will largely remove residual Eastern fears of military threats from NATO. However, uncertainties concerning the future security environment abound; uncertainties concerning the future of the state formation in the area of the present Soviet Union, the role of the military in the Russian political system, the stability of the democratic order in Eastern Europe in the context of economic hardships associated with transitions to a market economy, about the possible eruption and proliferation of ethnic conflicts within and across present state borders in Eastern Europe, about the continued engagement of the United States and Canada in the security order in Europe, about the future aspirations and impulses in German security policy, about possible future dangers of imperial reimposition in Eastern Europe, about the repercussions of armed conflict among break-away republics of the Soviet Union and between some of them and the metropolitan center of the Union and the Russian Federation, about future links between the central areas of the European continent and its peripheries in the north and in the south, about future relation between Europe and the Moslem world, etc.

CSBMs can hardly dispel or remove such uncertainties. They could affect, however, some of the consequences of these uncertainties, prevent military activities from accidentally reinforcing or exacerbating political fears and rivalries, preventing structural instability in the military relationship from blocking conflict resolution and cooperative undertakings in other realms of international relations. Hence CSBMs as well as associated measures linked to agreements on disarmament for stabilization, verification and information exchange could be designed synergistically in order to reduce the political impact of a continuing overhang of military activity from the old order in the new Europe. Structural and operational constraints could stimulate restructuring in favour of discernible defensive emphasis in the military postures of the CSCE states in Europe.

Hence, the second generation CSBMs is likely to be amplified and expanded by provisions for enhanced information on notification, lowering of thresholds for observation, the establishment of a Random Evaluation System with the right to conduct pre-announced visits to normal peacetime locations of units and equipment. In addition structural measures could seek to limit the scale, location and frequency of notifiable military activities. Transparency measures could extend to provisions for exchange of data concerning budgets, force dispositions and structure, procurement, military research and development, as well as weapon tests. 1990 saw the convocation of a CSCE seminar on military doctrine with the participation

of the chiefs of staffs of the CSCE states.

Institutionalization of such dialogues could further serve to dispel misunderstanding and to alert participating states to the concerns and fears concerning military programs and dispositions. Such a process could stimulate states to adopt unilateral confidence building measures to demonstrate the absence of feared threats or their reconstitution.

It is now clear also that the CSCE, which constitutes an embryonic framework for all-European institution-building, will include a center for the prevention of conflict. Further down the road confidence and security building measures could possibly also extend to provisions for fact-finding, mediation and conciliation and, in the longer term, for stand-by forces for peacekeeping operations in Europe under CSCE auspices.

The area of CSBM application has been limited to continental Europe and adjacent sea areas and air space. The Eastern states have pushed for a functional extension of CSBMs to cover independent naval activity while the Western states have opposed such an extension. The oceans differ from the land territory in being beyond the sovereignty of the territorial states. The principle of freedom of navigation, Mare Liberum, has a strong position in the hierarchy of interests in the maritime nations. At sea, however, military forces intermingle in ways which they do not on land suggesting needs for concerted views on the traffic rules to be adhered to. A series of bilateral agreements have been concluded for the

prevention of incidents at sea. They could possibly be extended to cover also greater openness concerning rules of engagement at the superior command level, particularly with a view to identifying the kind of behaviour which is perceived as threatening by the major naval powers and the coastal states affected. Similarly provisions for notification of major naval exercises and movements as well as for mutual observation could contribute, albeit marginally, to mutual confidence. Since naval forces are inherently global in reach structural measures can hardly be designed and implemented in a regional context. However, informational measures could conceivably be agreed by CSCE for the ocean areas affecting security on the European continent; the North Atlantic, the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Operational measures designed to constrain or limit access are likely to be resisted since they would impact differentially on the states most immediately affected, even symmetric limitations could have asymmetric implications because of geographic asymmetries. In addition many nations will oppose such measures for fear of creeping jurisdiction or the territorialization of the oceans as a result of coastal states extending their sovereignty into the oceans. For some of the states on the periphery of Europe the inclusion of naval forces in the CSCE regime of confidence building constitutes a means of preserving links to the broader security order in Europe, assurance against regionalization, decoupling and isolation, since naval forces dominate their security environment. This is particularly true of Northern Europe. It is true also of North-East Asia.

In the context of CFE and START attention may be given also to structural arms control measures at sea, focusing perhaps on the removal of nuclear ordnance from surface naval ships and deep cuts in ocean going attack submarines. The latter would enhance the survivability of strategic missile carrying submarines, SSBN, and hence facilitate further cuts in strategic offensive forces beyond the START-1 levels, and it would reduce threats to sea-lines of communication thus stabilizing the CFE regime. It could also reduce requirements for anti-submarine warfare vessels which make up a large portion of general purpose naval forces and thereby save money.

5. Lessons for Korea?

The European experience with confidence-building measures does not suggest a general model or theory, but rather certain principles, links and sequential relations which could produce sustainable processes. Military confidence-building measures were embedded in a broader construction of cooperative relationships, they were predicated on the adoption of common standards or principles governing the conduct of international relations, contained in the "Decalogue" of the Final Act. The CSBM regime in Europe was tailored to the European condition. The first generation measures contributed to a panoply of means for alleviating the consequences of confrontation, the second generation measures provided elements of an

infrastructure for the prevention of surprise attack and sustained offensive operations. The third generation measures will have to be designed with a view to shaping an open order based on cooperation rather than confrontation, to managing peaceful change rather than stabilizing the status quo.

Institutionalization of the negotiations about confidence-building measures and arms control gave legitimacy to the process and produced mechanisms and vehicles for the implementation of "new thinking" emerging through the domestic processes of the participating states. In Europe the most dramatic example is that of the Soviet Union, the ascent of Mikhail Gorbachev and the pursuit of glasnost' and perestroika. The CSCE process itself had a socializing and educational impact on the participating states, affected outlooks and expectations, commitments and identifications.

Although it was tailored to the European realities, the CSCE experience suggests lessons which are likely to be relevant also to the Korean-peninsula.⁸ Obviously any confidence-building regime in Korea must be designed to cope with the specific realities of the peninsula and the region of which it is a part. The inter-Korean dialogue which has been initiated by the prime-ministerial meetings could provide a pre-negotiating stage, an overture suggesting themes to be developed and framed in the course of a subsequent process of negotiation. The European experience underlines the importance of orchestration, of attention to how the themes are combined

and ordered, to sequence and linkage, to the careful elaboration of a clear mandate, to postponing the most complex issues and generating momentum by modest first steps. Some basic standards need to be established at the outset, the basic rules of the game, for any process to proceed. They should involve a commitment to the non-use of force, respect for the inviolability of borders, and a recognition of the need for mutual reassurance of increased transparency and predictability. The "soccer-diplomacy" which has been initiated between South-Korea and North-Korea could constitute a precursor of greater openness and normal intercourse. Confidence is not a commodity which parties can trade in negotiation. It is a state of mind created by a process of association, it presupposes recognition of shared interests, at least in avoiding specific outcomes.

In Europe the CSCE process was separated initially from the arms control process. In form the former was a multilateral process while the latter was a bilateral alliance-to-alliance undertaking. The two tracks are now merging. They were never so distinctly different and separate as, however, sometimes suggested. In the early years the CSCE was dominated by the East-West conflict, although the neutral and non-aligned states played useful mediating roles. The MBFR talks sometimes reflected latent intra-alliance differences. Confidence-building measures may facilitate and consolidate arms control agreements in addition to contribute to stability by their own merit; as the process matured in Europe more attention had to

be devoted to the orchestration of arms control and confidence-building measures. Upon the effective dissolution of the Warsaw Pact concerns have arisen lest the old negotiating framework legitimate a waning order, particularly a Soviet droit de regard with respect to defence arrangements in Central Europe. Such concerns about the multilateralization of security relations are hardly present in regard to the Korean peninsula.

Because of the geographical characteristics of the Korean peninsula a single track approach of combining confidence-building measures and arms control would seem to be needed. In the first instance the objective should be to stabilize the military confrontation and open up for a new political relationship by reducing the pressures from the military confrontation on that relationship. Due to the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ and the density of forces assembled in the forward areas confidence-building would seem to require parallel agreements on restructuring and disengagement, on the preferential build-down and destruction of offensive equipment (tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery, assault helicopters, attack aircraft) along the lines of the CFE-1 agreement, and the thinning out and demobilization of military formations in the forward areas, resulting in a regime of limited forward deployment and equal ceilings for the Korean states. The US military presence should be scaled down as part of the stabilization regime.

It is possible that the DMZ could be converted and expanded to constituting a stability and transparency zone, STZ. Specific confidence-building measures could involve prior-notification of manoeuvres, exchange of observers and verification of compliance with agreements on reduction and destruction, withdrawal and redeployment of military equipment and formations. The system of verification should involve on-site inspection by air- and ground mobile teams as well as by fixed observation posts at major transportation nodes.⁹ The confidence-building regime could expand over time to include constraints on the size, frequency, duration and location of major military movements and manoeuvres.

During the cold-war confrontation it was an objective of Soviet foreign policy to sever the links between the United States and Western Europe. In the present period of reconstruction the Soviet Union looks to the United States as a partner in the process of European stabilization. North-Korea still appears to consider it a primary objective to sever the links between the United States and South-Korea, politically and militarily. The perspective in Pyongyang reflects a competitive rather than a cooperative approach to security. That perspective could change by involvement in a process of negotiations. Similarly the North-Korean proposals indicate that the competitive perspective prevails with respect to transparency, leading them to view verification and observation as means to attain unilateral advantages relating to intelligence. Consequently they have not included proposals

for verification and transparency and resisted those of the South. This is very much like the Eastern position during the pre-glasnost' phase of the CSCE. Attitudes changed on the way to the CFE-I, verification is no longer viewed as spying for unilateral advantage, but rather as mechanisms for mutual reassurance. Moscow came to recognize the disutility of secrecy, and the utility of making available to the potential adversary authoritative evidence of the absence of feared activities. Such recognition leads countries to seek cooperative verification arrangements. Arms control does not imply a build-down of national means of intelligence, on the contrary, they became more important, but may no longer be viewed as inimical to the interests of adversaries who are also becoming partners. National means of intelligence are complementary and supplementary to arms control verification.

It used to be argued by observers in the West that the Soviet Union was unlikely to go very far down the road of arms control, because the most salient comparative advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union was military power. In all other currencies of power and influence the West was superior. Similar observations could be made about North-Korea in its relations with South-Korea. However, the Soviet Union made a choice in favour of social and economic reconstruction rather than continued pursuit of the military competition. The choice was, perhaps, not a direct result of the CSCE process. However, that process was certainly conducive to such choice and it did stimulate, legitimate and protect internal

dissidents who challenged the domestic order with reference to the CSCE "basket" relating to human rights. It should be observed also that with the increasing scope and rate of qualitative change in military technology the military competition in future would depend increasingly on economic and technological capacity. The European experience suggests that conceptual change is possible but not easy, that its genesis is complex but probably related to changes in the international environment.

Some observers argued that the United States ought to pursue the competition in order to win, opt for competitive rather than cooperative strategies. The advice did not carry the day. It lost to those who argued that the risks and costs of competition must be taken into account, that American and Western interests were better served by policies which would cause the Soviet Union to change rather than collapse, seek accomodation rather than confrontation, stimulate the emergence of a new regime rather than entrenchment of an ancien regime.

North-Korea is not the Soviet Union and no direct analogy is suggested. The main point is that nations do change their view, sometimes in response to domestic pressures, sometimes in response to changes in the international situation, often reluctantly but equally often in response to perceived necessity. The international situation has changed dramatically since 1989. A process of realignment or rather

repositioning is under way in North-East Asia with the major powers securing their positions in the salient quadrangle. The remnants and legacies of the Second World War, and, increasingly, the cold war are being removed. The pressure is on North-Korea which is faced with the growing imperative of breaking out of isolation. Neither Beijing nor Moscow want their relationship with Tokyo or Washington made hostage to the whims of Kim-il Sung. Neither Washington nor Tokyo want their relations to Moscow or Beijing made hostage to the dynamics of the confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Confidence-building measures and arms control could provide means and opportunities to transform the confrontation and to align developments on the Korean peninsula with the dominant trends in international relations, to position the Korean states within the new international framework, and to manage cohabitation on the Korean peninsula.

In the early stage transparency may be generated also by the exchange of data concerning defence expenditures, research and development programs, major procurement decisions and force planning. Military planners could be charged with exploring options for defensive postures on the Korean peninsula. Seminars on security on the Korean peninsula as well as military visits and exchange of lecturers could contribute to a process of mutual awareness, of recognition of the fears which shape expectations and perceptions on both sides of the DMZ.

Withdrawal of short-range nuclear capable missiles could contribute to stabilization of the military situation on the Korean peninsula. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be a major international concern in the years ahead, and a reaffirmation of the commitment not to acquire nuclear or chemical weapons as well as an opening of all nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards should constitute priority undertakings for mutual reassurance. Seoul would strike responsive chords in international society by making such proposals a central part of the proposals to Pyongyang in the emerging dialogue.

The system of confidence and security-building measures in Europe were part of a multilateral framework for mutual reassurance; bilateral arrangements could have been exploited for purposes of exerting pressure, for underlining messages conveyed by military activity. In order to avoid such dangers the verification of agreements for confidence-building and arms control on the Korean peninsula should probably involve and engage the major powers with influence in North-East Asia; the United States, the Soviet Union or Russia, China and Japan. Such involvement would commit them to the process of and increase the cost for either Korean party of violating the agreements. While the major responsibility for negotiating a confidence-building and arms control regime should rest with the Korean states, the need could arise to associate the four major powers with the construction, possibly through a variable geometry formula of 1+1, 2+1 (United States) and 2+4

(US, USSR, China, Japan) talks. However, since Pyongyang has consistently questioned and challenged the legitimacy of the Seoul government, depicting it as an American puppet, it is important that the negotiations be structured so as to confirm and protect the sovereign status of South-Korea. At the same time a confidence-building regime on the Korean peninsula would need to be embedded in a broader regional framework of security and cooperation.

The role of arms control in Europe has progressed from stabilization of the status quo to facilitation of peaceful change, to political reconstruction or perestroika. Technical criteria and assessments have been replaced by political considerations.¹⁰ Arms control can hardly engineer change, only remove obstacles to change, reduce or remove the constraints which military dispositions impose on political developments. German unification was not a direct result of the CSCE regime, the German Democratic Republic came tumbling down as society reclaimed the power which had been abused by the state, as the citizens asserted their right to live in truth and as one nation. Hence, the European experience provides little guidance on how to manage a process of confidence-building towards unification of a divided nation. But it does suggest that a process of rapprochement could generate its own social momentum, kindle hopes for a common future, that a recognition of the de facto situation rather than freezing it constitutes a necessary first step for a process of change to emerge and develop momentum.

Notes

1. For good descriptions of the CSCE process see John J. Maresca, To Helsinki. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1972-75, Durham, Duke University Press, 1985 and Leif Mevik, Underveis Europa, Oslo, Aventura Forlag A.S., 1990.
2. Johan Jørgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence Building Measures", Survival 19 (4) July-August 1977, p. 147.
3. For elaboration see Johan Jørgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", Survival, 25 (1) January-February 1983, pp. 2-15. The literature on the Helsinki CBMs is extensive. Some of the principal works are Karl E. Birnbaum (ed.) Confidence Building and East-West Relations, Wien, Wilhelm Braumuller, 1982; Wolf Graf von Baudissin (ed.), From Distrust to Confidence, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsanstalt, 1983; Karl Kaiser (ed.), Confidence-Building Measures, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1983; F. Stephen Larrabee and Dieter Stobbe, Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983; Dieter S. Lutz and Erwin Muller (eds.), Vertrauensbildende Massnahmen, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsanstalt, 1982. A Soviet perspective may be found in Oleg Bykov, Confidence-Building Measures, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1983.
4. See SIPRI Yearbook 1990. World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 508-520.
5. See Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, London, Pan Books, 1982.
6. For a discussion of the potential objectives and outcome of CDE see e.g. Rolf Berg and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, Building Security in Europe. Confidence-Building Measures and the CSCE, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986; R.B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee and Allen Lynch (eds), Confidence-Building Measures and International Security, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987, and Oleg Bykov, Creating a Climate of Confidence, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1986.
7. For a further discussion see John Borawski, Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, Boulder & London, Westview Press, 1986.

8. For a suggestive and imaginative discussion see James Goodby, "Operational Arms Control in Europe: Implications for Security Negotiations in Korea", The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2 (1), Summer 1990, pp. 111-125 (Abstract pp. 207-208).

9. For exploration of such a system in Europe see Johan J. Holst, "Fixed Control Posts and European Security", Disarmament and Arms Control, 2 (3) Summer 1964: 262-298.

10. For and analysis of the many faces of arms control see Johan Jørgen Holst, "Arms Control in the Nineties: A European Perspective", DAEDALUS, Winter 1991, (forthcoming).

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