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Summary

The present paper attempts to provide a framework for assessing the security challenges in the Northern Region of Europe within the context of a post-cold war order. Specific threats have been replaced by unspecific dangers. They are related primarily to the uncertainties involved in the imperial dissolution in the Soviet Union. The northern states of Nordic Europe are likely to seek protection in linkage to the European Community, by making Nordic-Russian relations an aspect of Russia's relations with the European Community. The paper examines the implications of on-going processes of arms control for coupling between northern Europe and the security order in Europe at large. The absence of naval arms control constitutes a particular difficulty. The paper ends by calling for a broad vision approach to the reconstruction of Europe.

NATO AND THE NORTHERN REGION: SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

The dramatic changes which have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe have changed calculations and perspectives also in Northern Europe. The cold war system of division and confrontation has given way to a post-cold war process of reconciliation and reconstruction. The systemic division of Europe has given way to a process of democratic consolidation. Uncertainties abound, however, as the imperial dissolution in the east creates new instability and unpredictability, as the traditional problems of ethnic and communal conflict and unrest exert their disruptive pressures on the established international order in Europe. Architectural ambitions compete with the fissures and faultlines of that order.

The northern region is caught in the dilemma posed by the dialectic of continuity and change, by the interplay of special features and general trends. In the following I shall outline some of the salient features of the emerging problematique from a Norwegian perspective.

1. The Political Framework

Norway occupies a special position in the geometry of the security order in Europe. Traditionally it has been a peripheral position in relation to the "central front", the epicentre of the cold war security system in Europe. Simultaneously she occupied a key position in relation to the central balance of nuclear deterrence between the two superpowers; she shared a common border with the Soviet Union and chose alignment with the United States of America. Increasingly the two perspectives and linkages merged as the security of the central flank became linked to the integrity of the trans-atlantic sea-lines of communication and as the protection of the latter became linked to dispositions in relation to the sea-based deterrent. The defence of the central front and the northern flank became inextricably

intertwined as limited war scenarios gave way to more holistic perspectives.

The security of Norway depends to a large extent on expectations concerning developments and influence in the ocean areas of the north. Armed conflict for control in Norway may be won or lost at sea. At present armed conflict seems a remote contingency indeed and security increasingly will be defined in non-military terms. It is becoming primarily a matter of international organization and Norway's place therein rather than a matter of containing and manipulating military capacities. It will be viewed inter alia as a function of Norway's ability to maintain settlement in the remote areas of the north, to prevent ecological degradation in a fragile area, to ensure sustainable harvesting of the protein and hydrocarbon resources of the oceans, and to spin a network of cooperative undertakings across the old lines of political division.

Increasingly security policy will become a matter of political rather than military organization, a matter of ensuring reassurance and equilibrium in Soviet-Norwegian relations rather than of coping with the potential challenges from Soviet motorized infantry divisions and naval infantry regiments on the Kola-peninsula. Basically the challenge is one of ensuring coupling and preventing isolation and singularity in relation to the European order at large. During the period of the cold-war the northern region constituted an area of low tension in relation to Central-Europe which harboured the high-points of tension and potential conflict. In the wake of Soviet withdrawal from East-Europe and the emergence of democratic or democratizing regimes, a major challenge in the north is to prevent remnants of the cold war confrontation from enveloping developments in the north and separate the northern region from the general process of reconstruction in Europe.

The Soviet Union or Russia will remain a direct neighbour of the Nordic countries and influence their position and choices in international relations. The turmoil of change introduces an element of uncertainty and unpredictability in the relationship. The position of Soviet or Russian governments vis-á-vis the Nordic states may be driven as much by the turbulence of imperial dissolution and social reorganization as by the logic of specific international issues. Hence, the Nordic states are likely to seek enhanced ties and links with the European Community, to make the relationship between the Soviet Union or Russia and the Nordic states a subset of the relationship between the Soviet Union or Russia and the political power center in Europe. By the same token the Nordic states will be strongly interested in ensuring equal German participation and Russian inclusion in the security order of the future Europe. Any structure which would exclude Russia and stimulate German opposition to the rules of the game of politics in Europe would carry the seeds of a Russo-German challenge to the established order, a constellation which has traditionally spelled danger and disaster for the Nordic States.

Several propositions concerning priorities in Norwegian security policy follow from the above perspective. The European link will occupy a predominant position. It will involve increasingly close links with the European Community. Furthermore, institutionalization of the CSCE will be favoured as a means of projecting and ensuring the vision of an all-European order incorporating both Russia and Germany as equal and constrained partners in a system of cooperation and mutual restraint. Norwegian security policy has constituted a result of considerations relating to three inter-locking and partially overlapping frameworks; the Atlantic, the European and the Nordic. This spatial orchestration will remain a salient feature of the Norwegian foreign policy calculus. However, the general relations are likely to change in favour of the European framework. The Nordic framework is likely to

become increasingly congruent with the European one as the eradication of the East-West division removes non-alignment and neutrality as basic determinants of national security policy. The northern states of Nordic Europe are likely to coalesce around interests in linkage and fear of isolation and regionalization in relation to the CSCE/CFE processes. Policies vis-à-vis the European Community are likely in the case of Norway to be determined by the interplay of external logic and pressures, also from the other Nordic states, and certain populist and isolationist impulses in Norwegian society. The creation of an European Economic Area could provide a framework for national consensus-building, for a historical rapprochement between Nordic Europe and the European Community. It could become an important element in the broader process of political reconstruction in Europe. The European Community may find it hard to grant access and initiative in the decision-making process to the EFTA countries, particularly in view of the emerging jurisdictional battle between the European Parliament on the one hand and the Commission and the Council of Ministers on the other. The deepening of the community by the establishment of the internal market by 1992 and the process of choosing directions for economic and monetary union and long-term political union will shape attitudes and priorities in relation to expansion of the Community. The nordic countries will strive for codetermination in the new European order and from this perspective assess their positions when the negotiations concerning the European Economic Area have been completed. The issues which will be clarified in that connection would require clarification also in negotiations about membership.

The Atlantic links have occupied a primary position in the Norwegian security calculus. The United States and Canada have been the principal sources of reassurance and reinforcement, a necessary countervailing influence to the local preponderance of the Soviet Union. At the same time Norway has emphasized the need to place cooperation with the United States in the

defence area within a multilateral framework, avoiding bilateralization and seeking equality in linkage to a broader framework for defence cooperation between Western Europe and North America. As a front-line state in relation to the Soviet Union Norway has to pursue a security policy reflecting trade-offs between considerations of deterrence and reassurance.

2. The Emerging Security Problematique

It should be assumed that the Soviet Union or Russia will remain one of the two principal nuclear weapon states of the international system. In this connection it must be expected also that a considerable portion of the Soviet or Russian nuclear deterrent will be made up of submarine based strategic missiles and that the European portion of that force will be home-ported on the Kola-peninsula. Furthermore, it is likely that the Kola-peninsula will remain a primary area for the forward deployment of early warning radars and interceptor systems.

The Soviet Union or Russia will be one of the two principal naval powers of the international system. The European portion of the Soviet or Russian fleet will be homeported on the Kola-peninsula. It will conduct peacetime naval training and exercises in northern waters. Such dispositions will require a certain amount of protection in terms of ground-forces and air-forces. The scale of such deployments will be constrained but to a marginal degree by the emerging CFE regime.

Norway's response to this mix of continuity and change in the military challenges in the north is in the making. A clear and present danger associated with specific threat scenarios has been replaced by unspecified dangers. The issue is less one of containing a short-term military threat than of shaping long-term political relations. It is less a matter of countering military forces than of reducing the shadows cast by such capacities. It is more a matter of reducing the salience of

the military factor by constructing a network of non-military cooperative relations concerning the exploitation of resources, protection of the environment and management of economic activity in the Arctic than of seeking direct amelioration through defence and arms control. However, concerns about residual uncertainties, domestic turmoil and reconstitution of the threat will cause security for the medium and long term to be shaped also by defence considerations. In the short term the immediate security challenge may be one of refugees from the Soviet Union compelled to move across the border in the north by economic and ecological collapse rather than a threat of military invasion.

3. Arms Control and Common Security

Arms control and environmental concerns merge in the high north. Norway has been a long-term proponent of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Soviet decisions to concentrate nuclear underground testing to Novaya Zemlya, and the recent test there have caused major concerns in Norway, particularly in view of evidence of radioactive leaks from the testing tunnels on that island. That concern is compounded by Soviet accidents with nuclear powered submarines, indications of insufficient reactor safety on board those submarines, and evidence of inadequate arrangements for nuclear waste disposal on the Kola-peninsula. The fragile ecology of the high north is particularly vulnerable to nuclear accidents and leakage. Agreement on IAEA standards for reactor safety with associated safeguard procedures also for naval vessels could contribute to alleviating Norwegian concerns.

Linkage and balance constitute the primary northern concerns in relation to the CFE negotiations. Dismantling the Soviet military threat in Central Europe alleviates the pressure in the north as well, since that pressure was a function in part of how the Soviet troops in the north were linked to the

offensive posture maintained by the Red Army in the center. However, fear of isolation and reduced drawing rights on the general equilibrium in Europe has remained, particularly in view of the long term prospect of continued substantial Soviet or Russian military deployments on the Kola-peninsula. Norway has been concerned about regionalization, of being isolated from the rest of Europe through zonal arrangements linking Norway to the Leningrad Military District. However, Norway shared with her allies the interest in imposing constraints on the ability to concentrate forces in any specific region of the ATTU (Atlantic-to-the Urals area), including the northern region, and at the same time voiced concern about specific zonal limits in the north for fear of severing links with the general equilibrium and highlighting Soviet local preponderance. Solutions were sought through a system of global limits and decreasing sublimits for concentric zones radiating out of the ATTU area. In a system for regional differentiation Norway sought limits on the amount of treaty limited equipment which may be moved from the core zone to the outer zones. Norway has been concerned, furthermore, about Soviet redeployment of MIG-27's from Hungary to the Kola peninsula and could seek treaty constraints also on options for circumvention by reclassifying treaty limited items.

The Kola-peninsula was a closed area during the cold war. The CSCE system of confidence- and security building measures has led to greater transparency, particularly the provisions for mandatory inspection by challenge. In future, Norway is likely to strive for extending specific manpower reductions in CFE-1A to include Leningrad Military District and the Kola-peninsula. In addition, attention should be devoted to structural constraints on the Soviet or Russian military posture on the Kola-peninsula, with a view to seeking greater defensive emphasis by constraining e.g. deployments of fighter bomber aircraft, the strategic reach of the naval infantry, and the offensive capacity of the motorized divisions.

NATO's strategic review is likely to lead to a military posture based on smaller units, mobilization and multinational formations. The nuclear threshold will be raised by the negotiated removal of battlefield nuclear weapons and short-range nuclear missiles, leaving a residual nuclear theater capability based on fighter aircraft. (Issues remain with respect to free-fall bombs versus stand-off missiles, dual capable versus dedicated air-craft, and their basing on the continent or in the United Kingdom only). Forward defense of a fixed front will be replaced by a capacity to concentrate defenses in areas where dangers may materialize. NATO's defenses in general will differ less from the specific defence arrangements in Norway than during the cold war period. Furthermore, NATO's defenses will not constitute deployments against any specific state or coalition of states, but provide instead a general insurance against uncertainties in a world without specific threats. In this connection the emerging structure constitutes a building block also for the gradual construction of a system of common security in all of Europe. Norway's challenge will be one of contributing to the creation of a reciprocal arrangement in the high north, of fashioning a cooperative security system in the north which could circumscribe Soviet or Russian military investments on the Kola peninsula. Swedish and Finnish inclusion in such an arrangement could contribute to internal balance as well as linkage to an all-European order in a post-CFE-1 stage of the European reconstruction.

Norway will remain dependent on access to trans-Atlantic reinforcements in order to contain the continued military concentrations on the Kola peninsula. At the same time Oslo will seek to avoid being drawn into a Soviet (Russian)-American tension field related to the disposition of global forces in the high north. European links could provide insurance against such perspectives. However, the issues are more complex than suggested by such first order analyses. The emerging security order in Europe at large will constitute a

regulated regime, based to a considerable extent on agreements about confidence and security building measures and arms control. The security environment in Northern Europe will be dominated by naval dispositions which remain outside the domain of regulation. From a Norwegian point of view such juxtapositions could exercise a strain on the security links between Northern Europe and Europe at large. Consequently, Norway has expressed an interest in naval arms control which has struck a certain discord with her principal ally, the United States of America.

The Norwegian position reflects an attempt to resolve several dilemmas. On the one hand Norway depends on the ability of her allies in general and the United States in particular to maintain the integrity of the trans-Atlantic sea-lines of communication. Similarly, as a major maritime nation Norway maintains a strong interest in upholding the principles of freedom of navigation, Mare Liberum. Furthermore, she opposes arrangements which would limit access to northern waters, as such arrangements would tend to favour the power with naval forces homeported on the northern waters, viz. the Soviet Union or Russia. Due to geography, symmetric constraints are likely to have asymmetric security implications.

On the other hand, Norway is interested in linking the security environment in the north to the emerging cooperative security order in Europe. Naval forces are global forces and do not lend themselves to stable regional regulation. Furthermore, they operate outside sovereignties and hence do not lend themselves to operational regulation in the same way as ground forces and air forces. However, precisely because they operate outside territorial sovereignties they tend to intermingle during routine peacetime operations. Hence, a certain regulation through agreed "rules of the road" are needed. This has been recognized through the conclusion of a series of bilateral incidents at sea agreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand and several NATO countries on the

other; the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and Norway. Further regulation could build upon time honoured naval codes of conduct, possibly through discussions aiming for greater clarity and possible alignment of high level naval rules of engagement. A similar foundation for further confidence building measures is provided by the existing rules of innocent passage. Further building blocks for a regime of confidence- and security building, or operational arms control in the North Atlantic and adjoining seas off Europe, may be arrangements for prior notification of major naval manoeuvres and movements as well as provisions concerning mutual observation, primarily from own platforms (aircraft and vessels) but with a voluntary option of inviting observers on-board participating naval vessels during exercises.

The scope for structural measures is clearly more limited in view of the asymmetric dependence on the sea and considerations relating to the protection of security interests beyond Europe. However, it is possible to envisage negotiations for a build-down, probably based on asymmetric undertakings, of ocean-going attack submarines. Such a regime could enhance the survivability of sea-based deterrent forces and facilitate further deep cuts following a START-1 agreement. It could enhance the security of the trans-Atlantic sea-lines of communication and thereby contribute to the stability of a CFE regime based on substantially reduced levels of American troops in Europe by protecting the capacity for reconstitution. It could reduce requirements for anti-submarine warfare forces, a major drain on the defence budgets in NATO.

Another structural measure could involve the removal of nuclear ordnance from surface naval vessels thereby reducing dangers of inadvertent escalation, some incentives for nuclear proliferation, and, incidentally, political controversy over naval port visits to non-nuclear weapon

states. Such a regime would have to include de-nuclearization of Soviet or Russian land-based naval bombers.

4. The Challenge Ahead

We have entered a new era in European history. Northern Europe should seek a role and position in that history, attempt to prevent marginalization and isolation through coupling and linkage. Norway faces the challenge of forming the connecting tissue among the Atlantic, European, and Nordic frameworks for security cooperation in the new era. She was present at the creation of the order designed to contain turmoil and aggression in the post-war order in Europe, participating at the center of events and in the core institutions which shaped that order, NATO and the OECD. Now we are in the midst of another construction, on the threshold of another era. The issues today relate to the removal and transformation of military power rather than its containment, to the construction of a system of common security and cooperation. The challenge is primarily one of international organization and of defining Norway's place and role in the organization of the New Europe. Parochial vision and wishful thinking could conspire to keep Norway out of the main process of construction under way. The European Community will be the principal political engine in that construction. Hence, Norway's relations with the Community will constitute the principal and overriding issue of foreign and security policy in the times ahead. Managing those relations will require leadership, vision and a will to transcend the nostalgic search for sovereignty lost in an interdependent world, to prevent the national interest from becoming a captive of special interests and blocking minorities, to see supranationalism as a means to cope with the common challenges of the European civilization.

The European Community along with NATO and the Council of Europe will form the basic institutional infrastructure of the

new order in Europe. They will all change in the process of shaping that order, of integrating Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union into a coherent European texture of an interlocking and overlapping institutional network. That network will draw resilience also from sub-regional organizations like the Nordic Council, particularly as such bodies seek new cooperative links across the divisions of the old order. Such links could extend also to the constituent republics of the Soviet Union, thereby Europeanizing the transformation of the Soviet Union and facilitating, perhaps, reconciliation of the processes of liberation and community building. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, is likely to constitute a framework for linking institutions and processes. However, it will remain largely an empty shell without the EC, NATO, the Council of Europe and the sub-regional bodies. It is no substitute for the core institutions, but an essential supplement and complement thereto, a framework for linkage and long-term construction. Elements of a system of collective security are in the making within the CSCE. They should be expanded and multiplied. Real collective security requires majority voting on the use of force, or delegation of that authority to a select group of major powers. We have a long way to go before we can enter such a world. In the meantime we face the challenge of creating a new foundation. The future has begun.

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
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