

**Introduction: Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?**

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Abstract:	At a time when liberal internationalism and institutions of multilateral co-operation are dealt almost daily blows, this Special Issue revisits the notion and practice of Middle Power Liberal Internationalism. The Introduction suggests that while liberal internationalism is far from dead, the challenges are serious and multiple. Reflecting on the seven essays contained in the volume, it argues that the biggest challenge for a future liberal internationalism is not to double-down on its normative virtues, but critically to reflect on how it can be retooled to respond to new challenges.

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Review

## Introduction:

Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?<sup>1</sup>

At a time when liberal internationalism and institutions of multilateral co-operation are dealt almost daily blows, foreign policy establishments on both sides of the Atlantic are expressing ever-louder concerns for the vanishing world order.<sup>2</sup> There are multiple reasons to worry: President Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations undermines and hinders international cooperation in key areas, as illustrated by the unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the retreat from the Paris Climate Agreement, and the President's branding of the EU as a 'foe'. This disdain for conventional forms of diplomacy has called the solidity of transatlantic relations into question, as witnessed during the tense 2018 NATO summit. Trade wars are escalating, NAFTA is hanging by a thread, and the US abdication of global leadership is matched by the growing strength and global assertiveness of illiberal powers such as China and Russia. In Europe, the rise of nationalism and populism – and of course, BREXIT – are shaking the foundations and cohesion of the EU. Hungary and Poland's 'illiberal democracies' are pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable in European politics, and once fringe ideas have moved from the extreme right to become part of mainstream politics, as seen most clearly in the rise of anti-immigration sentiments across the continent. On a global scale, the prospects for liberal politics seem equally dire.

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<sup>1</sup> This Special Issue follows from the workshop 'Middle Power Liberal Internationalism in an Illiberal World', hosted by the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Connection Grant #xxxx.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Dawkin and Mark Leonard, "Can Europe Save the World Order?," European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018, [https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/can\\_europe\\_save\\_the\\_world\\_order.pdf](https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/can_europe_save_the_world_order.pdf) (accessed 25 September 2018); G. John Ikenberry, "The Plot Against American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/plot-against-american-foreign-policy> (accessed 24 September 2018); Robert Kagan, "The Twilight of the Liberal World Order," Brookings, 24 January 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/> (accessed 24 September 2018); Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Will the Liberal Order Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive> (accessed 24 September 2018); Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/myth-liberal-order> (accessed 24 September 2018).

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3 Worldwide, democracy is in decline, its basic tenets of freedom of the press, guarantees  
4 of free and fair elections, minority rights, and the rule of law under siege.<sup>3</sup>  
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8 Yet, while there is ample evidence that the institutions, values and practices that have  
9 governed global politics since the Second World War may no longer be taken for  
10 granted, the liberal international order is far from dead. In Canada, the government of  
11 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has confidently restated its commitment to a liberal  
12 international order. President Macron of France has issued a strong defence of  
13 multilateralism, as has Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, while the foreign policies  
14 of the Nordic countries still emphasize support for rules-based international cooperation.  
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22 Against this background, this Special Issue discusses how middle powers such as Canada,  
23 the Nordic countries and a handful other European states have advanced what is often  
24 called 'middle power liberal internationalism'. In doing so, we do not seek to define, nor  
25 necessarily defend, all components of liberal internationalism.<sup>4</sup> Instead we opt for a  
26 minimalist understanding of middle power liberal internationalism as a strategy that  
27 revolves around the building of multilateral institutions and global rule of law as a tool to  
28 advance key security interests and at the same time advance a set of normative ideals. We  
29 recognize that the label "liberal internationalism" itself performs important, often self-  
30 serving, political functions. Our focus here, however, is primarily on how contemporary  
31 changes in world politics – especially the rise of illiberal political trends and key changes  
32 in the role and functioning of multilateral institutions – affect the viability and future  
33 direction of liberal internationalism. We do this for two reasons. First, small and middle  
34 powers are often seen as the main defenders and beneficiaries of a rule-governed,  
35 multilateral world order, and as standard bearers of liberal internationalism. As such they  
36 provide a useful prism for exploring how middle powers are navigating an environment  
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49 <sup>3</sup> "Democracy in Crisis: Freedom House Releases Freedom in the World 2018," Freedom House, 16  
50 January 2018, <https://freedomhouse.org/article/democracy-crisis-freedom-house-releases-freedom-world-2018> (accessed 24 September 2018).  
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52 <sup>4</sup> Definitions of middle power liberal internationalism abound. For a discussion, see Kim Richard Nossal,  
53 *The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era*, in Heather A. Smith and  
54 Claire Turenne Sjolander (ed) *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Don  
55 Mills: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21-35.  
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3 where international institutions are in flux and appear less able to reduce uncertainty.  
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5 Second, we are interested in how broader political changes may impact the substantive  
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7 contents of the foreign policies of middle powers that have historically been wedded to  
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9 liberal internationalism.

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12 The seven essays in this Special Issue illustrate that the current pressures on the liberal  
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14 world order cannot be entirely separated from the policies and actions of ‘good’ small  
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16 and middle powers, while at the same time underlining that the fading liberal world order  
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18 was not entirely ‘made in the West’ but also emerged as the result of prolonged pressures  
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20 from countries in the Global South. Speaking to this puzzle, the Special Issue provides  
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22 for nuanced discussion of the future of middle power liberal internationalism in a manner  
23  
24 that invites open-ended reflections on how, by whom and in what ways the liberal tenets  
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26 of the current order can be defended and improved.

### 27 Morality and Self-Interest in Middle Power Liberal Internationalism

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31 Middle power liberal internationalism is seen to have developed on the margins of Cold  
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33 War politics and scholarship, and has predominantly been used to describe the foreign  
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35 policies of the smaller Nordic states of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, as well as the  
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37 Netherlands and Canada.<sup>5</sup> Internationalism is commonly regarded as a key characteristic  
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39 of Canadian foreign policy, albeit to varying degrees and with different expressions.<sup>6</sup>  
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41 Similarly, the Nordic countries are known for a strong commitment to free trade,  
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43 international solidarity and development assistance in their foreign policies.<sup>7</sup>

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45 <sup>5</sup> Peter Lawler, “The ‘Good State’ Debate in International Relations,” *International Politics* 50, no. 1  
46 (January 2013): 18-37.

47 <sup>6</sup> The premiership of Stephen Harper was for example seen to preside over a withdrawal from liberal  
48 internationalism, most notably from multilateral institutions and commitments to global environmental  
49 protection. Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion  
50 in the Harper Era” *International Journal* 69, no. 3 (2014): 274-307; Don Munton and Tom Keating,  
51 “Internationalism and the Canadian Public,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 3 (September  
52 2001): 517-549; Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Policies of Canadian  
53 Foreign Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991); Smith and Sjolander, *Canada in the  
54 World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*.

55 <sup>7</sup> Olav Stokke, *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of  
56 Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden* (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute: 1989);  
57 Anthony J. Dolman, “The Like-Minded Countries and The New International Order: Past Present and  
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5 Such middle power liberal internationalism can be seen both as a strategy born out of  
6 necessity and relative lack of power in the international system and as a moral  
7 commitment to a more just and rule-governed world order. As lesser powers, these states  
8 stand to benefit from multilateralism and a rule-bound global system, as this may  
9 augment their influence beyond what material resources allow. In this vein, Holmes,  
10 arguably the intellectual father of Canada's internationalism, maintains that  
11 internationalism is a 'hard-boiled calculation of the Canadian national interest'.<sup>8</sup> This  
12 notion of 'enlightened self-interest' in promoting a world in which 'might does not equal  
13 right' sits at the core of middle power liberal internationalism.  
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22 Small and middle powers frequently self-identify, and are sometimes described, as 'good  
23 international citizens' or 'responsible members of international society'.<sup>9</sup> Evidence for  
24 such good citizenship is said to be their long-standing support for the United Nations,  
25 international human rights, peacekeeping, mediation, foreign aid and other progressive  
26 dimensions of the liberal international order. Some even suggest that being a 'good  
27 international citizen' has become part of the national identity in these countries, giving  
28 Canadians a sense of being 'different' and making Nordic publics strong supporters of  
29 development assistance and globalization.<sup>10</sup> Inherent in this notion of a morally superior  
30 foreign policy is the suggestion that middle power liberal internationalism involves some  
31 form of subjugation of narrowly defined national interests in favour of a concern with the  
32 shared, collective or common interests of the international community. Such claims to  
33 lofty normative principles are, however, tempered by the recognition that liberal  
34 internationalism is simultaneously a real-political strategy to secure a rule-based order  
35 that benefit these states' strategic interests. It is, in other words, a strategy that aims to  
36 increase these states' status and importance in the eyes of hegemonic actors such as the  
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49 Future Prospects," *Cooperation and Conflict* 14, no. 2-3 (1 July 1979): 57-85.

50 <sup>8</sup> John W. Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976): 6.

51 <sup>9</sup> Ronald M. Behringer, *The Human Security Agenda: How Middle Power Leadership Defied U.S.*  
52 *Hegemony* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012); Alison Brysk, *Global Good Samaritans: Human*  
53 *Rights as Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

54 <sup>10</sup> Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists?," 274-307; Terje Tvedt, *Bilder av "De Andre": Om*  
55 *Utviklingslandene i Bistandsepoken* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget AS, 1990); Peter Nedergaard and Anders  
56 Wivel, (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics* (London: Routledge, 2017).

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3 US by investing in system maintenance in exchange for support on other issues of vital  
4 concern.<sup>11</sup>  
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8 Contributors to this Special Issue discuss these tensions, but do so by embedding them in  
9 an understanding of two key aspects of the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.  
10 First, foreign policy is always implemented in contexts over which one has limited  
11 control. The implication is that it is important to be sensitive to how foreign policy  
12 decisions that may be justified in terms of liberal internationalism may not in practice  
13 help produce it. Focusing on mediation in ‘messy’ places, the essay by Peter Jones sheds  
14 light on some of the dilemmas that confront practitioners and policy makers on the  
15 ground as they seek to stand up for liberal values while serving as impartial mediators  
16 and ‘helpful fixers’ to both the parties to the conflict and the great powers of the day. The  
17 same goes for Nina Græger’s discussion of Norwegian security and defense policy,  
18 which can be read as an on-going process of adaptation to changing geopolitical  
19 parameters, but with a broadly speaking “liberal” justification.  
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31 Second, while we may debate the fine lines of what constitutes liberal internationalism in  
32 an analytical sense, its practical use demonstrates just how flexible it is: it can be invoked  
33 for multiple purposes, and it can be used to create public support for a broad range of  
34 different, even contradictory, foreign policies. The meaning and practice of middle power  
35 liberal internationalism, in other words, is not fixed and static, but historically specific  
36 and flexible. The conventional stories of middle powers and their impact on world  
37 politics typically inscribe them as ‘good citizens’ and as progressive bearers of  
38 enlightenment values. A more careful reading of history, however, shows that this has not  
39 always or consistently been the case. As David Petrasek shows in this Special Issue,  
40 Western states, including middle powers, have been far from reliable in their support for  
41 human rights.  
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54 11 Iver B. Neumann, “Peace and Reconciliation Efforts as Systems-maintaining Diplomacy: The Case of  
55 Norway.” *International Journal* 66, no.3 (2011): 563-579.  
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3 More broadly, historical progress towards a more just and equal world order has  
4 frequently resulted from prolonged pressure from the Global South and despite Western  
5 resistance. The UN Charter that was agreed in San Francisco in 1945, for example,  
6 contained no commitment to self-determination or decolonization. Instead, mandates  
7 were turned into trusteeships and colonies became dependent territories, thus breathing  
8 new life into a deeply unequal world order and cementing the dominance of the great  
9 powers for years to come.<sup>12</sup> It took concerted and prolonged pressure from southern  
10 actors to arrive at the principle of self-determination and eventual independence for the  
11 colonies, and in this sense, the current international order is far from the product of  
12 exclusively Western authorship.<sup>13</sup> While this may be an uncomfortable truth to many  
13 liberal internationalists, it bears repeating at a time when multilateral cooperation and a  
14 rule-bound world order might need defenders. As Petrusek argues, it may also provide  
15 for a more optimistic outlook: If the human rights regime is in fact less dependent on the  
16 West, then it is possibly more resilient than current worries of a backlash indicate.  
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### 29 The Shifting Grounds of Liberal Internationalism

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32 The historical specificity and flexibility of liberal internationalism is also evident in its  
33 changing practice by Western states and middle powers in a post-9/11 era characterized  
34 by widespread fear of transnational terrorism and violent extremism. In this new security  
35 climate, liberal international ideals are routinely invoked to legitimize interventions that  
36 are difficult to reconcile with claims to self-less 'good international citizenship'. The  
37 most notable illustration is the extensive neoconservative influence over the liberal peace  
38 agenda in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as NATO's pursuit of regime change in Libya  
39 under a 'responsibility to protect-mandate'. These operations have significantly damaged  
40 the 'brand' of liberal internationalism both at home and abroad and have made it  
41 increasingly difficult to sustain arguments of moral superiority. Similarly, as  
42 development and security policies have come to be understood as the two sides of the  
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53 <sup>12</sup> Mark Mazover, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United*  
54 *Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

55 <sup>13</sup> Andrew Phillips, "Beyond Bandung: The 1955 Asian-African Conference and its Legacies for  
56 International Order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 4 (2016): 330.  
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3 same coin, development assistance has more than perhaps ever before come to be  
4 justified not primarily with reference to the welfare of distant others, but with an eye to  
5 national security.  
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10 Such transformations have made it increasingly hard to identify a distinctive Nordic or  
11 middle power liberal approach to international relations. Instead, these countries have  
12 often fallen into line with militarized international policies and initiatives, as most  
13 strikingly exemplified by Denmark's participation in the US-led 'Coalition of the  
14 Willing' in Iraq 2003.<sup>14</sup> It seems the very meaning of liberal internationalism itself has  
15 changed so that being a good international citizen today is entirely compatible with hard-  
16 nosed national defence and self-interest. Continuing this line of inquiry, John Karlsrud's  
17 contribution to this Special Issue looks at the troubled UN 'stabilization' mission in Mali  
18 and argues that the return of small and middle powers to UN peace operations is in large  
19 part driven by a desire to augment their own status and security, and that their  
20 participation may ultimately serve to undermine the liberal character of UN peace efforts.  
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31 This in turn raises the question of what exactly liberal internationalism is anyway, and  
32 whether it is intrinsically a 'good thing' that should be defended. There is little doubt that  
33 the liberal order has historically represented a form of universalism, seeking to export an  
34 often moralistic, paternalistic and Eurocentric model to the rest of the world. Such  
35 critiques have been strengthened by recent interventions in the name of security and anti-  
36 terrorism. From the perspective of many countries in the Global South, the so-called  
37 liberal world order is not so much 'liberal' as profoundly hierarchical and unequal. While  
38 it has sustained institutions like the UN General Assembly, where states have one vote  
39 regardless of economic or military power, it has also facilitated great power domination  
40 through the Security Council and organizations like the World Bank and the International  
41 Monetary Fund, to mention but a few. Hierarchy and inequality, in short, are constitutive  
42 features of the post-war world order. This is further illustrated by Louise Riis Andersen's  
43 article in this Special Issue, as she details the paradoxical nature of the United Nations as  
44 a half-way house between the national and the global, dominated by the great powers of  
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56 <sup>14</sup> Nedergaard and Wivel, (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics*.  
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3 1945. The inherent tensions and limitations of the UN system currently manifest  
4 themselves in more explicit ways than before, in part due to the challenges advanced by  
5 emerging powers, especially China, as they seek to wield more influence and reshape  
6 global norms through multilateral organizations.<sup>15</sup>  
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12 The contemporary challenges to the liberal world order, however, do not emerge only or  
13 primarily from the rise of the global South, including China, or from the aggressive and  
14 subversive policies of Russia, but also from within the Western core, in the form of  
15 populist-nationalist ideologies within key western countries. The rise of nationalist  
16 populism and far right movements is fueled by a profound sense of exclusion and  
17 marginalization by large sections of the population in the industrialized west, and the  
18 main culprit of their misfortunes is perceived to be ‘globalism’, or what we here refer to  
19 as liberal internationalism. Understanding (and responding to) the current crisis of liberal  
20 order therefore entails an active engagement with the foundation of such movements and  
21 ideas. This is the task of the articles by Jean-François Drolet and Michael C. Williams,  
22 and by Alexandra Gheciu. In their contribution, Drolet and Williams explore one of the  
23 lesser-known, yet highly influential ideological underpinnings of the Tea-Party  
24 movement, Alt-Right and Trumpism, namely American paleoconservatism, arguing that  
25 it cannot be dismissed simply as a populist cry of rage, pain, or resentment. Instead as  
26 expressed by one of its key thinkers, paleoconservatism has not only a distinctive and  
27 systematic account of the sociological and political dynamics of the liberal order, but also  
28 a practical political strategy for attacking and undermining it. In her essay on NATO,  
29 Gheciu take this debate to Europe and explores how the rise of anti-liberal sentiments in  
30 member states are undermining and challenging the notion of a pre-existing Western  
31 security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. In short, looking  
32 to the future, it seems that neither the West writ large, nor the traditional middle powers,  
33 can be assumed to be permanent defenders of liberal internationalism, at least not as we  
34 have come to know it. At the same time, recent research on the ideational underpinnings  
35 of Western hegemony suggests that support for some types of liberal principles is fairly  
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55 <sup>15</sup> Alexander Cooley, “Countering Democratic Norms.” *Journal of Democracy* 26, no.3 (2015): 49-63.  
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3 solid in emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa, raising the prospect of new  
4 alliances and dynamics.<sup>16</sup>  
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## 8 Conclusions 9

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11 The liberal world order has not come to an end. But in a period of rising populism,  
12 nationalism and authoritarianism in many parts of the world, much of what is worth  
13 admiring and valuing about world politics since 1945 is at greater risk than for many  
14 years. Amidst anger over inequality, immigration and cultural change, multilateral  
15 cooperation is assailed from right and left. It needs defenders, and it needs debate. This  
16 seems particularly important in the face of an increasingly ‘transactional’ strategy aimed  
17 at cutting costs and relaxing commitments on the part of the US at the same time as  
18 Russia and China are developing a playbook intent on transforming multilateral  
19 organizations to effectively loosen the grip of liberal values.  
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29 Any anxiety about the passing of liberal world order must, however, be balanced by  
30 recognizing its shortcomings and injustices. This is not the time for an unconditional  
31 celebration of liberal internationalism, nor a love-fest for ‘Canadian values’ or the  
32 ‘Nordic model’. But neither is it a time for complacency. This position is underscored by  
33 Louise Riis Andersen’s contribution to the Special Issue. Focusing on the troubled  
34 position of the UN in the liberal order, Andersen suggests that it is timely to revisit and  
35 restore the pragmatic roots of liberal internationalism. The same concern is found in  
36 Drolet and Williams discussion of the rise of a new form of conservatism in both Europe  
37 and the US, which demonstrates that the rise of nationalist and populist politics is much  
38 more than a critique or contestation but more akin to a political project with well-  
39 developed arguments and positions that they want to see established. Add to this  
40 Gheciu’s demonstration of the tensions within NATO that touch on the same ideological  
41 currents, and there is urgent need for an open-minded and critical discussion of what we  
42 can expect in the decades ahead.  
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54 <sup>16</sup> Bentley B. Allan, Srdjan Vucetic and Ted Hopf, “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of  
55 International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects” *International Organization* (2018): 1-31.  
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5 Recognizing the limitations and criticisms of liberal internationalism, in other words,  
6 should not lead us to give up on the idea of responsible state behaviour and efforts to  
7 make the world a better place. As Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami observe, the  
8 debate around the ‘good international citizen’ in the 1990s sought to promote foreign  
9 policy principles among like-minded states that could ‘promote the moral ideas of the  
10 unity of humankind without jeopardizing international order’.<sup>17</sup> Current debates should  
11 not therefore adopt an unconditional defence of the status quo, but instead lead to us ask  
12 what elements of the liberal world order should be preserved, what should be ditched and  
13 what should be reformed? To this end, we conclude with three broad reflections:  
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22 There is an unmistakable self-serving quality to the idea of liberal internationalism. We  
23 know that middle powers, just as other states, engage in different forms of hypocrisy  
24 when they, for example, advance human rights and at the same time sell military  
25 equipment to regimes that have an abysmal human rights record.<sup>18</sup> To the extent that the  
26 prospects for institutionalizing some version of liberal internationalism rests with  
27 emerging powers and the Global South, reflections on this aspect of middle powers’  
28 foreign policies should move center stage as it concerns their operations within and  
29 outside multilateral organizations.  
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38 Middle powers have for a considerable time reaped the benefits of a particular  
39 institutional configuration where the US has borne most of the economic and military  
40 costs of upholding a particular (hegemonic) order, and middle powers have been content  
41 to serve as loyal supporters and helpful fixers. If the US and other western powers are  
42 indeed re-thinking their support to multilateral institutions, middle powers need to engage  
43 in a serious discussion about how much political, economic and military resources they  
44 are prepared to invest in multilateral organizations and forms of cooperation. In other  
45 words; criticizing the current US administration for its approach to multilateralism does  
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52 <sup>17</sup> Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A*  
53 *Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 232.

54 <sup>18</sup> Srdjan Vucetic, “A Nation of Feminist Arms Dealers? Canada and Military Exports”, *International*  
55 *Journal* 72, no. 4: 503-519  
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3 not, in the end, help much in preparing multilateral institutions for future challenges. A  
4 serious discussion needs to be had about priorities and the willingness to invest heavily in  
5 support of these priorities.  
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10 Finally, there is a paradox at the heart of debates about the rise of nationalist and illiberal  
11 policies and the role of multilateral institutions: Multilateral institutions are presented as  
12 the very culprit of the globalization that these political groups challenge. The World  
13 Trade Organization is seen as helping foreign companies steal jobs; EU elites are  
14 presented as making decisions that adversely affect ability of the UK to make its own  
15 policies; and the IMF and World Bank – so goes the argument – shrink the policy space  
16 of governments. The problem for proponents of liberal internationalism is to counter  
17 these arguments with solid arguments and evidence that, in fact, these institutions can  
18 augment rather than shrink policy space. Doing so entails more than simply challenging  
19 the factual and normative grounds on which critics of liberal internationalism make their  
20 case. It also requires a critical look at how the institutions that are said to embody liberal  
21 internationalism can be reformed, charting a feasible strategy for addressing global  
22 challenges that resonate with national publics and not only internationally oriented elites.  
23 In this sense, the biggest challenge for liberal internationalism is not to double-down on  
24 its normative virtues, but critically to reflect on how it can be retooled to respond to new  
25 challenges.  
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