European security as practice: EU-NATO communities of practice in-the-making?

By Nina Græger (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI)

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Introduction

'We have obviously different mandates and different memberships, even if 22 of our Member States are the same, but we have a common challenge in front of us: a security environment that is all the more worrying every day', said the EU High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy /Vice President of the European Commission when meeting the NATO Secretary General on her second day in office (Mogherini 2014). European security clearly is at a critical juncture. The Russia-Ukraine crisis, the fight against ISIL, the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in European cities the past two years call for a more coherent and efficient European response.

In an ideal world, a considerable economic actor with a comprehensive foreign policy tool box and an efficient military actor would make a strong European team. In the real world, both the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU and NATO suffer from constrained economies, leading to defence cuts and disconnected agendas. More importantly, the strategic relationship defined by the EU-NATO joint declaration from December 2002 (EU and NATO 2002) and the Berlin Plus package of cooperation arrangements (Agreed Framework) from March 2003 has been obstructed by the Turkish and Cypriot mutual veto since 2005. The political conflict between the two countries and their different memberships of EU and NATO has created a decade long political quagmire, commonly known as the 'Cyprus issue'.

Existing literature on EU-NATO cooperation tends to focus on performance, comparing outcome and achievements to pre-set goals and ambitions for the cooperation, concluding that the two organisations have performed poorly together. Scholars have explained the lack of efficient performance as a result of conflicting national agendas, institutional rivalry, 'in-mission politics', and an inefficient EU security actor (see e.g. Biermann 2008, Cornish 2006, Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012, Hoffman 2013, Howorth 2003, 2013, Ojanen 2006, Smith 2011, Varwick and Koops 2009). Some of these contributions also leave the impression that little is going on between the EU and NATO, because of the 'Cyprus issue' (but see Gebhard and Smith 2014, Græger 2014, Græger and Haugevik 2011). However, this article argues that there is inter-organisational action and innovation in the form of a range of new *informal* cooperation practices.

To capture the particular epistemology and different logic that is at work here this article applies a practice approach. Practice theory pays distinctive attention to everyday informal practice and how practice is maintained overtime, also in difficult circumstances – i.e. when political signals are absent, or cooperation is blocked, or

when risks are high. The article analyses 'the infrastructure for repeated interactional patterns', to borrow a term from Swidler (2001, p. 94), where diplomats and civilian and military staff carry out their daily business. The EU and NATO headquarters and offices in Brussels and field operations constitute important sites or infrastructures for this new, informal type of European security diplomacy. This article also suggests that informal EU–NATO cooperation could be analysed as a case of a community of practice in-the-making. Communities of practice are constituted by like-minded groups of participants linked informally and contextually by a shared interest in learning and applying common practice (Wenger, 1998, Adler, 2008). Sending et al. (2011: 528) argue that we need to include 'both traditional and nontraditional diplomatic agents as part of an evolving configuration of social relations'. Following this, the article shows how staff in Brussels-based offices and in field operations engages in informal practices across organisational, professional and civilian-military boundaries, constituting a specific type of configuration of social relations in European security diplomacy. Analysing informal inter-action at various levels also shifts the attention away from decision-makers and agendas in Brussels and the capitals, which have dominated existing scholarship in the field.

The rest of the article is organised as follows: In the next section, I discuss how practice theory adds value to the study of EU-NATO cooperation. In the subsequent sections I first analyse informal practices in headquarters and offices and then in field missions, focusing on the Kosovo operations. The last section discusses the extent to which these shared practices may constitute evolving communities of practice, and the sources and effects of such a community.

Studying security cooperation as practice

The article builds on the 'practice turn' in IR, meaning a turn away from or beyond 'a study focusing on language and words, to study social action as enacted in and on the world' (Neumann 2002, p. 628).[1] Despite its strong empirical connotations, practice is not outside of discourse but 'weaves together the discursive and material worlds' (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 8), engaging in interplay (Neumann 2002, p. 651). By analysing EU–NATO inter-action as a field of what we could call European security diplomatic practices, the article contributes to the so-called security as practice research agenda, mainly brought into IR by Adler and Pouliot.

Studying informal EU-NATO cooperation through the lens of practice theory puts questions regarding how and where practice is enacted and produced into focus, adding practical (social and political) knowledge to the study of European security. Furthermore, practice theory transcends some of the dichotomies that have dominated security studies for decades (e.g. agency-structure, ideational-material, exception-everyday) (Bueger 2017). For example, like most IR theories, practice theories regard agency as essential but they see practices as both agential and structural, where agents lock in structural meaning in time and space through practice (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 15-16). Unlike most IR theories, however, practice theory does not seek to explain action through individual or group motives, strategies or interests. According to practice theory, agents develop specific dispositions for acting and thinking in a particular way that is not based on a logic of consequences (instrumental), a logic of appropriateness (rule-based) or a logic of rhetoric (communicative) but on a logic of practicality. This logic starts from the premise that in 'everything people do, in world politics, as in any other social fields, there is always a practical substratum that does

not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection (instrumental, rule-based, communicative or otherwise)' (Pouliot 2010, p. 12). Though reasons may guide agency, along with human creativity and experimentation, social meaning and standards of competence and conduct are furnished by the structure and woven into (often) tacit or unarticulated practice (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 15-16). Practice theories focus on what makes action or repertoires of practice possible, such as (tacit) knowledge and symbolic orders and the power therein. Just as a discourse entails certain boundaries for what can be said, practices set the boundaries and rules ('doxa') of the game ('field') (Bourdieu 1990).[2] The power and persistence of practices lies in the shared implicit understanding of how things should be done (Schatzki 2001, p. 3), and 'their taken-for-granted quality and their reproduction in structures that are to some extent self-sustaining' (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 9).

Where traditional securitization theory often studies the unexpected or extraordinary, practice theory focuses on the daily, routinized or patterned production of security (Bigo 2002). A practice approach is interested in the everyday; in patterns of (inter)action that are iterated over time and triggered by shared values, interests and habits among practitioners that are intrinsic to their profession. Studying the interaction of agents as practice sheds light on what practitioners bring to a particular setting: what they think *from,* rather than what they think about, as put by Pouliot (2010). Drawing on Searle's understanding of background and Bourdieu's habitus concept, Adler (2008, p. 202) claims that background knowledge is 'the context within which rational action takes place', both for those who are creating and engaging in a practice and for future practitioners. This background knowledge is usually action-oriented and practical, rather than ideational, normative or rational, and based on professional competence and experience, human skills and judgement (Neumann 2005). The diffusion of 'background knowledge' – such as education and training – across agents also 'enables practitioners to share similar beliefs related to their practices, to entertain similar reasons and to act with common sense' (Adler 2008, p. 201).

Practical configurations could be conceptualized as a rather structured field, looser heterogeneous networks or coherent community structures (Bueger 2015). If interaction evolves into a domain of knowledge constituted by like-mindedness, and a shared practice that embodies 'the knowledge the community develops, shares, and maintains', then we may speak of a *community of practice*, according to Wenger et al. (2002, p. 29). The collective character of practice is at the centre in Wenger's work, and a community of practice defines itself along three dimensions: mutual engagement, a joint enterprise and a shared repertoire (Wenger 1998). A strong community of practice entails a shared domain that becomes a source of identification, which creates a sense of commitment to the community as a whole (Wenger et al. 2011).

Networks and communities of practice could be seen as different aspects of social structuring. Connections to a few linking nodes would constitute a network, whereas a community usually involves a network of relationships: 'All communities of practice are networks in the sense that they involve connections among members. But not all networks are communities of practice' (Wenger et al. 2011). Along these lines, Adler (2008, p. 199) argues that to enable coherent understanding and goals, epistemic communities – defined by Haas (1992, p. 198) as 'a network of professionals with

recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue area' – seldom comprise an entire discipline and they are therefore *sub-sets* of communities of practice.[3]

Communities of practice develop informally; they define themselves in the doing, which implies a fluid and textured form of participation not necessarily 'congruent with the reified structures of institutional affiliations, divisions, and boundaries' (Wenger 1998, p.118-119). This also means that looser community structures across national, organisational and professional boundaries that develop in response to a specific challenge (e.g. overcoming the Berlin Plus blockage) could be studied within this perspective.[4]

Uncovering practices

Before moving on to the empirical analysis let me briefly outline what practice is not. Practices are 'knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience' (Adler 2008, p. 198). Its repetitive, routinized, and standardized character distinguishes practice from action; action is specific and located in time (see Introduction to this issue, p. X). And although it often provides readymade responses to the world practice should be distinguished from habit, which is fundamentally repetitive (Hopf 2010, p. 541). But the stability of practices does not only stem from habit, routines and other standardized ways of doing things but 'because the need to engage one another forces people to return to common structures' (Swidler 2001, p. 94). Moreover, as opposed to habit, practice can be done badly or well, and practice can be learned from others (Adler 2008, Wenger 1998). Finally, practicality is 'partly improvisatory because it results from the intersection of a particular set of dispositions and social configurations' (Pouliot 2010, p. 21). However, improvisation that leads to non-repetitive action is simply behaviour, not practice.

A practice approach relies heavily on empirical work, and includes sayings and doings, implicit and explicit practical knowledge, as well as objects and artefacts in the analysis. It is only in their unfolding or process that practices exist (Jackson and Nexon 1999). A new practice often emerges from generative relationships, such as 'instances or episodes of formative interactions, which, due to either material or ideational reasons, or both' facilitate that practice (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 24-25). Ideally speaking, a study of practice would analyse the generation, diffusion, institutionalisation and fading of each relevant practice (ibid.). Covering more than a decade and given the limited scope of an article, this is not possible here. Instead, I will identify the main infrastructure or sites where informal inter-action has been enacted since the EU-NATO strategic relationship was established in late 2002 and until 2015. I will further focus on how informal practices are described, re-represented and evaluated by EU and NATO staffs who were engaged in them in Brussels and field missions.

This article rests on a variety of sources. While going beyond text is necessary to reconstruct practices, primary sources such as official declarations, statements and speeches provided important information about the discourse on and ambitions for EU–NATO cooperation set by the organisations themselves and their member states. Secondary sources were useful for accessing scholarly and political debates on inter-organisational relations and European security cooperation. These sources were

combined with qualitative, in-depth interviews with EU and NATO staff working in the NATO HQ, NATO Defence College, EU institutions, the European Defence Agency, as well as in field missions.[5] The interviews were semi-structured and took place in the respective institutions and, in a few cases, by phone or Skype. They took the form of semi-personal conversations and questioning, and were not recorded. The interviews have been further supplemented with informal talks.[6]

EU-NATO cooperation in political stalemate

EU/CSDP-NATO cooperation was initiated and defined by the joint EU-NATO Declaration on CDSP of 16 December 2002. It sets out the conditions under which the EU may draw on NATO planning capabilities and assets, for the exchange of classified information, and consultation in the case of EU-led crisis-management operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. As a follow up of the agreement, the Berlin Plus arrangements established permanent meeting formats and contact points for consultation at political and military levels.[7] Two missions were born under these arrangements: Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004-), both with DSACEUR as operational commander (European Security and Defence Assembly 2009).

However, after Cyprus joined the EU in 2005, its political conflict with Turkey made EU-NATO cooperation difficult. Also, Turkey has demanded more influence and participation in the CSDP and especially in decision-shaping (if not decision-making), and in the European Defence Agency (EDA).[8] An administrative arrangement with the EDA requires a security agreement on classified information between the EU and Turkey, which has been blocked by Cyprus (Sturm 2010).[9] In turn, Turkey has vetoed any sharing of classified information with or access of Cyprus to EU-NATO meetings on the grounds that it is neither member of NATO nor Partnership-for-Peace, to which Cyprus responded by denying any EU involvement with NATO beyond 'Berlin Plus' (Duke 2008). Although a result of two national agendas, diplomats and staff in both organisations seem to agree that the conflict over 'Berlin Plus' at times serves as a cover for national interests and also transcends the parties involved. The political blockage has emptied formal EU-NATO frameworks of substance, both with regard to discussions, consultations and decisions.[10] Instead, informal sites have to a large degree become the infrastructure for inter-action between the two organisations.

Informal practices at the centre

In Brussels informal practices include cooperation involving military and civilian NATO and EU staff at different levels of responsibility and that form part of a normal workday. The sites where these practices – the most frequent being cross-briefings, cross-invitations, staff-to-staff cooperation and contact, and informal exchanges of information on matters of common interest – take place on a regular basis, at all levels.

Starting with the ambassador level, meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), scheduled for every other month as part of the Berlin Plus framework, have generally been extremely short (sometimes down to half an hour) or cancelled. During 2010, ambassadors engaged in formal, high-level strategic discussion only once with the only EU-NATO operation, 'Althea' in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the sole agenda topic (Daalder 2010). But

informal meetings take place if and when events occur on the ground, especially when Europe is expected to take a stand or a specific role. For instance, reciprocal informal cross-briefings between the ambassadors in the NAC and the PSC happened when violence erupted in Libya during 2011, when 'things happened on the ground in Bosnia' in March 2012[11], and during the Ukraine crisis in 2014.

The NATO Secretary General (SG) and the EU High Representative /Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) meet as part of the two organisations' regular and ongoing contacts on topical issues (where also strategic-operational expertise is present), both at NATO and the EEAS.[12] Cross-invitations of the two top leaders to ministerial meetings and summits have been hosted regularly by both organisations. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General during 2009-2014, participated in the informal EU foreign minister meeting in June 2013 and also addressed the European Council in December the same year. Attending the December EU Summit was particularly relevant for the EU-NATO partnership since it was devoted to defence for the first time since 2008. The current NATO Secretary General attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in the format of Defence in November 2014, and the HRVP attended the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 2014 and May 2015. The positive tone in these meetings apparently was new. As one EEAS diplomat put it: 'Jens Stoltenberg got an aplause at the Foreign Affairs Council; and Mogherini spoke to uniformed personnel', which had not happened before.[13] Mogherini also attended the NATO foreign minister meeting in May 2016 to discuss areas for expanded NATO-EU cooperation ahead of the upcoming EU and NATO summits in June and July. Apart from routinized informal interaction, both leaders meet informally when events and crises occur. For example, when Mogherini joined the NATO Foreign Minister meeting in Turkey in May 2015 it was mainly to discuss the long-term security implications of Russian foreign policy, as well as extremism and violence in the MENA region (NATO 2015a).

Over the years, EU and NATO top leaders have expressed their determination to contribute to creating more favourable circumstances for practical cooperation (e.g. Ashton 2010, NATO 2012b). Upon taking office HRVP Mogherini (2014) emphasized: 'the intention stated both by the European Union (EU) at the Council in June and by NATO at the last summit in Wales, is that cooperation among us should improve. This is the only way of having effective capabilities on the military ground'. Informal EU-NATO cooperation nevertheless is 'under close scrutiny by the usual suspects', meaning Cyprus and Turkey.[14] The sensitivity of words was reflected in Mogherini's (2014) remarks after meeting with Stoltenberg in November 2014: 'Even if it is not strictly related to EU-NATO cooperation, let me say a few words on EULEX Kosovo.'.[15]

The fact that Mogherini met with Stoltenberg on her second day in office has been attributed much weight in the context of EU-NATO cooperation.[16] It was also interpreted as a token of their personal friendship, evolving from their participation in the Party of European Socialists (PES) in the European Parliament. A shared background in the PES may facilitate cooperation, as pointed out by Mogherini (2014): 'we know each for a long time, and I think that also personally we can go very well together which is going to be very important for our respective constituencies'. Regarding EU-NATO cooperation, as summarised by one EU diplomat, 'functionalities did not change but personalities have changed'.[17]

The heads of state and government also play an important role in seeking complementarity and sorting things out based on – but also beyond – national positions, sending signals down to officials and staff about how to manage the political stalemate. The so-called Transatlantic informal NATO-EU ministerial dinners, increasingly also attended by the HRVC and the NATO SG, are important for 'keeping the political dialogue going despite the political constrains on Berlin Plus'.[18] These working dinners have been held since September 2005, reflecting a formalisation of this informal site of practices. Transatlantic ministerial dinners sometimes also take place in relation to special occasions.[19]

Staff-to-staff cooperation
At staff level, cooperation in HQs happens in offices, over meals, on the phone, by email, or on the fringe of formal meetings – EU–NATO specific but not only. Like any other informal cooperation, the quality and frequency usually depend on personal relations: 'NATO is not a purely political-military organisation', as one interviewee stressed.[20] Several military liaisons and meeting points, created as part of the 'Berlin Plus' framework for the purpose of staff-to-staff cooperation have become important sites for informal practice.

The EU and NATO Military Committees, which provide military advice and assessments to NAC and PSC, were scheduled to meet four times per year. Joint committee meetings do take place but have lasted for a short time, because of a thin agenda and low expectations about outcome (Græger 2014). However, 'the setting is different after the NATO Wales Summit' in September 2014, according to the Permanent Chairman of EUMC: '[T]he 22 representatives are pushing very hard to further enhance the relation with NATO and putting emphasis on cooperation wherever they can' (Rousiers 2014). Examples include the exchange of written notes on new topics such as cyber security and maritime security.

Informal cooperation at lower levels, involving the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the EU cell at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe) in Mons, and the NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the NATO HQ, is smoother.[21] The Liaison Team also has an office at the EUMS and spends part of the week in downtown Brussels. Informal meetings between military staff in EUMS and NATO take place every other month (both in HQ and SHAPE) but there are also daily exchanges, especially when the EU and NATO are running operations in the same mission area.[22]

The EU-NATO Capability Group (MOD political directors) established as part of Berlin Plus framework has suffered from the political blockage, too. Although practical initiatives aimed at avoiding capability duplication exist, capability development happens as separate processes, under different names ('Smart Defence' in NATO and 'Pooling and Sharing' of resources in the EU).[23] As cooperation came into a squeeze, because of the 'Cyprus issue' the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in facilitating informal cooperation with NATO grew stronger. The EDA is tasked to establish clarity on who does what, to ensure streamlining and avoid duplication and overlaps, also with NATO. Examples of a workable division of labour are within helicopter capacities and the development of an air-to-air refuelling tanker capacity (Simón and Mattelaer 2011). The EDA engages in informal cooperation

through several informal mechanisms; '[A]t the end of the day this is the core business'.[24]

At NATO, the political contact point and liaisons for relations with other international organisations is the International Staff. Here, EU–NATO relations in general are handled by the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, who engage in phone conversations or meetings (which alternate between EU and NATO) with the EU 2-3 times a week.[25] EU–NATO relations in operations are handled by the NATO Operations Division, which is divided into the Afghanistan section and a section for all other operations. In the EU, there is no defined contact point but staff in the European External Action Service (EEAS), such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), geographical desks, directors of divisions for operations, and policy directors involved in defence capability development and planning (e.g. in the EDA) are involved in EU-NATO relations on a regular basis.

Informal *cross-briefings* between the two organisations and informal cooperation at staff level have been particularly important when both organisations are running missions in the same operational theatre like in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Gulf of Aden. When EU briefings in NATO have been blocked by Cyprus, not allowing the Head of the EU rule-of-law mission to brief NATO on the EU view of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, NATO officials (usually the KFOR Commander) have come to the PSC instead.[26] On the EU-side, the practice of 'cross-invitations' has been extended after the Lisbon Treaty to include the Deputy Director General of the Department for Crisis Management and Planning, and the Head of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). The latter has briefed the NAC on the EU's strategic review of EULEX, for instance. Informal cross-briefings also take place between national Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence at Defence Policy Directors level.

At lower levels, a close informal working relationship regarding Afghanistan emerged between SHAPE staff officers and the CMPD, as well as with the EU's Civil Planning and Conduct Capability.[27] At higher levels of responsibility, the NATO Deputy SG for Operations met with his counterpart in the EEAS every second month to discuss the Afghanistan operations, and 'talked almost every day¨ to discuss the Kosovo operations.[28] Frequent interaction also includes the staff in the Operation Division, as one staff in the Afghanistan section notes: 'We meet every week to prepare every level meeting over, write up speaking points and the agenda, take notes from meetings'.[29] However, the same staff points out, 'EU-NATO relations are very sensitive here' and 'how to make sure that we delineate tasks' therefore is central. The importance of 'informal exchange and depolitization' in this situation is also emphasized by other NATO-staff.[30] The member-states generally have turned a blind eye as long as informal practical cooperation is useful and is conducted discretely, sensitively and without serious incidents (Smith 2011, p. 255).

Having identified the key sites of informal practices between EU and NATO staff in Brussels, I now turn to practices that have emerged on a different site – in field operations.

Informal practices in field operations: KFOR and EULEX

Operation Althea, which was launched before the 'Cyprus issue' blocked cooperation under' Berlin Plus', is the only operation where the EU draws on NATO resources. Instead, the EU has launched separate missions, sometimes in the same area as NATO. Running operations in the same mission area, although mandates and responsibilities may differ also indicates that some degree of competition is involved. Indeed, practices are not simply ways of organising activity but signal resolve, commitment, and communicate power (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 30). The anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden launched in October (NATO's Ocean Shield) and December (EUNAVFOR - Atalanta) 2008 clearly mirror that '[T]he idea of successive operations is gone', one NATO source holds.[31] The need for mutual assistance and coordinated action nevertheless has fostered informal practices across EU- and NATO-run missions. Cooperation on the ground has been particularly challenging, especially in demanding security environments like in Afghanistan and Kosovo.[32] As the security situation gradually improved in Kosovo, which is the focus of this section, the EU and NATO operations there have become important sites or infrastructures for informal practices.

NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the civilian European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) differ in mandates, size and tasks. When 'Operation Allied Force' ended in June 1999[33], KFOR was deployed in the first post-war phase to provide a secure space for peacebuilding by the UN and other actors. After Kosovo's independence declaration in 2008 NATO remained in the country under reference to UN Security Council Resolution 1244[34], with an operational mandate to ensure a safe and secure environment and co-operate with other IOs and actors. NATO is to co-ordinate with EULEX on law enforcement and with EULEX Police in the fight against organised crime.[35] In June 2009 KFOR was also tasked with creating a Kosovo Security Force as an all-crisis voluntary, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly-armed force. Since 2012, NATO has gradually reduced its presence to two multinational battle groups. Being a comparatively smaller force, it relies more on flexibility and intelligence with fewer static tasks (NATO 2015b).

The EU has engaged in emergency relief and reconstruction in Kosovo since 1999.[36] 'Draft technical arrangements' on collaboration between a future ESDP civilian mission and KFOR were developed during 2007 (Council of the European Union 2007). In December 2008, the EU took over the Police and Justice and Civil Administration pillars from the UN mission to Kosovo (UNMIK). North of the river Ibër/Ibar, EULEX holds a mainly advisory position, although it has retained executive powers formerly held by UNMIK with the mandate to use 'corrective power' through a Special Police unit (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012). The EULEX mission is aimed at transferring knowledge and Best European Practices through monitoring, mentoring and advising the Kosovo Police (KP) in justice, police and customs in southern Kosovo.[37] On the ground, EULEX 'works closely and co-ordinates with the competent Kosovo authorities and with relevant international actors, as appropriate, including NATO/KFOR (…)' (Council of the European Union 2008, art. 8, no. 9). The KP also plays a role in the hierarchy of inter-organisational cooperation in Kosovo but will not be discussed in any detail here.

Staff-to-staff cooperation
The Turkish and Cypriot mutual veto has obstructed information exchange and coordination and also created overlaps on the ground in Kosovo (Dursun-Ozkanca

2010). Although no joint statements can be signed or joint decisions made formally, staff at all levels in the missions nevertheless meet regularly.[38]

Starting at the top, the EU Head of Mission and KFOR Commander engage in so-called periodical meetings. Here, they provide updates on the security situation all over Kosovo, with a view to guaranteeing the population a stable environment, freedom of movement, and security in line with their mandates (NATO 2013). For example, in October 2013 the two leaders (and the Deputy Head of EULEX) discussed the situation and how KFOR and EULEX could cooperate in relation to the upcoming municipal elections, with main effort to the North (ibid.). In the case of incidents or violence on the ground, the mission leaders would meet more often, for instance for 'decision briefs' but also for informal discussions of strategy and action.[39] The unfolding, character and frequency of meetings between the two heads of mission depend on the personal relations between them. Often they have met over dinner two to three times every month – 'and there are no Brussels-like rules', one source notes, with reference to the generally strict EU-rules for representation.[40] Informal communication and understanding between the two organisations were eased during 2010–2012, when Xavier Bout de Marnhac, a former KFOR Commander (2007–2008), was Head of EULEX. For example, he usually took his Sunday breakfast at Film City, the NATO base in Pristina.[41] The military flavour of these meetings also tends to lessen their political formality, so discussions often comprise the more general state of affairs in the missions and their operations on the ground, including how informal cooperation could be facilitated.[42]

Below the head of mission level, ad hoc, informal interaction take place between the heads of the different sectors and chiefs of staff. EULEX and KFOR officials also meet officially and informally when hosting delegations to Kosovo. NATO has a liaison officer in the EULEX operational centre in Pristina and the EU has a liaison officer to KFOR, who attend meetings and report back to their respective missions. Political staff in both missions meets informally to discuss topics of common interest, including the content of political messages to be sent back to Brussels, to national capitals and to the embassies in Pristina. There is an understanding among the political staff in both organisations that sending similar messages about the progress made and challenges faced by EULEX and KFOR to their respective headquarters and chiefs of staff is desirable.[43]

Outside of Pristina, regular meetings take place among EULEX regional advisors to the Kosovo Police (KP) and the KFOR Liaison Monitoring Team, for instance. They exchange information and discuss issues related to the progress of the KP, regional developments, the rebuilding of Kosovo society etc. Cooperation is usually initiated locally by the regional staff (not by their superiors), often simply over the phone.[44] The EULEX police pillar, the operational pillar and KFOR also meet to discuss arrests, missions conducted by the Kosovo Special Forces and other concrete aspects related to everyday policing and order.

Informal cooperation and exchange of information between mission staff in the international organisations and NGOs in Kosovo is also facilitated by individual or personality-driven relationships.[45] EULEX personnel live in private accommodation, have the weekends off, and may take leaves during their mission deployment (up to three months' holiday per year), all of which facilitate social interaction as part of a

work week, including in 'happy-hour networks'.[46] KFOR soldiers and other military personnel on the other hand, are in uniform seven days a week and on duty six days a week. Although this restricts their participation in social arenas, they do take part in interpersonal exchanges and informal interaction.[47] These casual exchanges not only facilitate professional cooperation but also weave the social fabric of the EU-NATO relationship.

Furthermore, NATO and EU hiring and deployment policies may impact on the effect and value of interpersonal relationships for engaging in informal cooperation. EULEX personnel are hired and deployed for a period of one to three years, while KFOR personnel are normally enrolled for a period of six months. Individuals who have worked for one IO are often deployed back to Kosovo working for another IO or NGO. As one interviewee observed: 'Some people have been through three to four missions here with different entities (UN, NGOs, EULEX, KFOR), so lots of people have crossed paths different times' […].[48] This creates a certain degree of continuity of relationships:

> [H]aving developed relationships with other nations' personnel and seeing them leave after 6 months (and with them the friendly relations) is difficult. But when they 'roll back through' a year later, the interaction can resume where it left off – which aids productivity.[49]

Thus, despite different practices regarding the regular enrolment of personnel, personal and professional bonds are often maintained overtime – advantageous for informal EU-NATO cooperation.

Operational and tactical cooperation
KFOR's operational mandate is to support any activities conducted by EULEX as part of its overall mandate to maintain a stable, safe and secure environment in Kosovo. However, the everyday division of labour between EU, NATO and the Kosovo Police (KP) is blurred, with large elements of informal cooperation. In the words of a former advisor to the KP:

> The three parties make their separate plans and then have a coordination meeting. This is the theory at least. In practice the KP makes its plan, the EULEX advisor gets the plan and hands it over to EULEX and KFOR in order for them to adapt themselves to the KP.[50]

The KP also hands over information directly to EULEX, as well as to KFOR.[51] In the absence of formal EU-NATO cooperation four 'technical agreements' have been negotiated to regulate how and by whom things are to be handled on the ground. These agreements involve cooperation between EU and NATO (and between local and other actors) but remain outside the 'Berlin Plus' agreement.[52] According to the technical agreements, the KP is the first responder, EULEX (Special Police unit) is the second responder, and KFOR the third. However, in the case of violent episodes this formal 'chain of attention' works best on paper. Although EULEX has quite a few international and local staff,[53] the number of EULEX police officers was reduced from 700 in 2010 to 200–250 in 2011, and continues to shrink.[54]

Consequently, with some 4,600 troops KFOR stands ready to assist if and when EULEX cannot handle the situation. Examples include the handling of violence in the northern region (e.g. passing through the road blocks erected by (Kosovo-)Serbs during the ethnic riots in 2011) or crowd control and riots during election periods. The EULEX call for assistance apparently happens very rapidly – 'about 9 or 10 seconds after the conflict starts', one interviewee claimed.[55] This situation has led to jokes among KFOR personnel: 'because they know they cannot tackle violent situations' EULEX staff has installed 'a quick-dial phone number pre-programmed into their mobiles before missions'.[56] EULEX provides police support but not security is acknowledged by its own staff, too: 'We need KFOR in the north, but they don't really need us.'[57] EU- and NATO staff as well as local politicians and the population recognise the importance of KFOR in providing the necessary support for the [Kosovo] police in the north and in stabilising Kosovo (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012).[58] As one EULEX official put it, 'when the Serbian police overreacts or is being provoked, KFOR calms them down. Without KFOR there would be war.'[59]The Agreement on normalisation between Serbian and Kosovo governments from April 2013 has helped improving relations between both parties, but international presence is still heavy, especially in Pristina with its 200 000 inhabitants.

The actors involved stress that communication and sharing of sensitive information at all levels require discretion, because of Turkey and Cyprus.[60] In practice, military leaders on the ground have been cooperating outside of formal agreements and operation plans for years.[61] Only by 'separating military practices and foreign policy', as one interviewee put it, can (military) staff find workable solutions and solve acute problems at tactical or operational level.[62] In Kosovo, given the force asymmetry, this means that KFOR is assisting EULEX.

Interestingly, KFOR personnel have tended to lay the responsibility for coordination problems and operational-tactical failures on the organisational leadership, national agendas, or mission mandates, not on the EULEX personnel:

> Individual members of EULEX are likely [to be] motivated, professional, and skilled in their respective fields – they have just been dealt a shitty hand from an incongruous organisation that speaks from five different angles and permits national caveats to supersede mission requirements.[63]

Not assisting each other in-theatre seems to be a non-option, however: 'I don't think it [the Berlin Plus stalemate] would ever affect a willingness to co-operate – especially as it pertains to vital missions – we're still talking about professionals here', a KFOR source stresses.[64] However, should personnel come home in body bags from Kosovo as a result of decisions made by field commanders, 'the generals would be held responsible'.[65]

That staff in headquarters deliberately seek to bypass governments or the EU- and NATO leadership to get the job done, or that militaries deployed to missions sometimes are pushing the boundaries of what can be achieved within formal frameworks is not new (see e.g. Cross 2011, 2013, Lachmann 2010, Smith 2011, Gebhart and Smith 2014). However, this article argues that there is more to this than individual agency resulting from pragmatic, creative problem-solving and friendly

relations. 'Professionals choose to stick their necks out' to get the job done – 'even when they risk facing court martial, at worst', one NATO-source claims.[66] That EU- and NATO staff is engaging each other in practices that also might put one's career and possibly also life at risk reflects that these practices also have a certain collective character.

Evolving EU-NATO communities of practice?

Having explored rather well-developed repertoires of informal EU-NATO practices at the centre and in the field, this section discusses the extent to which these could be seen as (homogeneous or heterogeneous) communities of practice and the sources and effects of such communities. A community of practice defines itself along three dimensions, mutual engagement, a joint enterprise and a shared repertoire. These dimensions, which are constantly renegotiated, also constitute the source of coherence of that community (Wenger 1998, p. 72, 199).

Regarding the *mutual engagement* of participants of a community of practice, this is really what defines the community. However, although participants 'become interlocked and articulated with one another through mutual engagement' we are not talking about a fusion of identities (ibid., p. 76). Hence, such engagement may lead to homogeneity as well as heterogeneity, where members are fulfilling different roles. In Brussels, the 22 EU Chiefs of defence in the Military Committees of EU and NATO are 'double-hatted' (as are most of the military representatives who often meet in their place), meaning that they participate in decisions and activities in both organisations. While this may promote mutual engagement, the members of the EUMC are also actively promoting a specific EU identity and agenda, Cross (2011) holds. By implication, this may nurture heterogeneity and a certain degree of competition, too. In Kosovo, the EU and NATO have different, complementary mandates but overlap in fulfilling them, creating frustration rather than mutual engagement:

> [The]Leadership of KFOR feels that EULEX expects KFOR to do its [EULEX] job. Diplomats and EULEX tend to blame KFOR for not pulling down the roadblocks and preserving security – even to the point where EULEX insists it could be productive in the north if KFOR would just do its job. They tend to ignore the complete lack of productivity prior to the roadblocks existing.[67]

And although 'technical arrangements' have ensured a workable operational relationship, 'they [EULEX and KFOR] could be more refined to complement each other – too frequently they run at odds', one interviewee stressed. For example, when EULEX was arresting people in the northern part a couple of days before KFOR had planned to take action (primarily to remove the Rudare roadblock erected by Serbs), the consequences were fatal:

> People got shot – in my estimation, at least partly due to a lack of mission coordination which could have altered the timing of one or the other operation. Understanding the nuances and impact of the timing of these activities is important.[68]

This shows potential fatal consequences of the Berlin Plus stalemate, as well as frustration about overlaps and un-coordinated action on the ground in Kosovo.

Mutual ridiculing has taken place, too, which tells of differences and competition among the staff, of which the pre-programmed KFOR phone number mentioned above is one example. Clearly, NATO-EU relations are not all rosy and without rivalry. Hence, the mutual engagement is homogeneous concerning the project (and joint enterprise, see below) of keeping a safe environment – here for the local population and actors involved in community building in Kosovo, but heterogeneity marks their distinct roles. Wenger's point, however, is not that complementary contributions or overlapping competence are good or bad for a community of practice but that they are made useful through mutual engagement among the members, who belong to both communities – the complementary and the overlapping one (peers who share their specialisation).

Regarding *joint enterprise*, three things keep a community of practice together: a collective, negotiated enterprise reflecting mutual engagement; an indigenous enterprise negotiated in response to the situation by the participants; and a mutual accountability that becomes part of the practice (Wenger 1998, p. 78). In the EU-NATO case, staff in Brussels offices and field operations alike report that it has become 'heavy to pull the system, with less and less audience', with reference to the shrinking interest from the member states in revitalising Berlin Plus.[69] As one NATO source complains: '[T]hings die in this process. There is no innovation'.[70] The long-term neglect or inability of political decision-makers to get the EU-NATO relationship back on track, leading to separate initiatives at political level, hardly speaks of joint enterprise. The distinct project in Kosovo – to ensure a secure environment for and engage in community-building – may be better tuned in with such an enterprise, despite operational challenges. Furthermore, defining a joint enterprise is an on-going process, not a static agreement, and one that 'pushes the practice forward as much as it keeps it in check' (Wenger 1998, p. 82). When staff or heads of mission are stretching mandates to get the job done they also engage in establishing a shared repertoire of action.

A *shared repertoire* is the third dimension of a community of practice and includes routines, tools and ways of doing things; words, concepts and discourses through which its members create meaningful statements; historical events and stories, as well as styles, symbols and artefacts by which they express their identity as members of that particular community (Wenger 1998, p. 83). As a source of community coherence, a shared repertoire may include everything that the community has produced or adopted overtime that has become its practice. The repertoire of practice is closely linked to a history of mutual engagement, which creates shared points of reference. But it is also a resource for the negotiation of meaning that remains inherently ambiguous, according to Wenger (ibid, p. 84): 'Shared histories of engagement can become resources for negotiating meaning without the constant need to 'compare notes''.

In Kosovo, both the EU and NATO and local police and authorities are aware of the built-in asymmetry in the relationship, where EULEX depends upon KFOR for security and therefore partly also for implementing its mandate. KFOR personnel have expressed dissatisfaction with the practice they are performing, as noted by a KFOR analyst: 'Asking soldiers to (…) do policing or security missions is contrary to their nature.'[71] In the case of major demonstrations where both organisations decide to

engage, official communication between EULEX police and KFOR forces has been complicated, because they operate on different radio frequencies.[72] This bias is also visible in information sharing practices where 'EULEX always communicate to KFOR what the mission does', but not always vice versa.[73] Although a 'competitive spirit is only natural in the staff', as one officer put it, the EU-NATO community of practice may suffer from professional fatigue in the longer run.[74]

Despite different symbols and artefacts (e.g. flags, signifiers on uniforms, communication lines), EU and NATO staff generally share language codes and concepts, threat assessments, and exchange mission meeting documents. These are examples of a shared repertoire used in practices that may indicate a loose EU-NATO community in-the-making. This repertoire is partly facilitated by shared career patterns, education and former postings to the same headquarters or missions - be they under the EU flag or NATO's. In Brussels, EUMS Staff often have spent 6-7 years in NATO prior to their EUMS posting, or vice versa. The current Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning at NATO was formerly Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations & Exercises Division at the EUMS and Director of the Civilian/Military Cell and the EU Operations Centre. And, as noted above, the former EULEX mission head was formerly KFOR Commander.

Shared education, training and 'ethos'
For members of a community of practice to develop a sense of joint enterprise, mutual engagement and shared repertoire, as well as specific, legitimate dispositions training and education is essential (Wenger et al. 2002). Professional education and training could be seen as the 'anchoring practices' of or the infrastructure that enable informal cooperation to emerge. Education and training are shaping 'background knowledge', forming the common 'ethos' or ésprit de corps underlying the community that grows out of and is confirmed in these shared practices (Adler and Pouliot 2011). This 'background knowledge' is not necessarily explicit or spelled out, however, which adds a strong flavour of 'taken-for-granted'-ness of actions. Practices 'frame actors who, thanks to this framing, know who they are and how to act in an adequate and socially recognizable way' (ibid., p. 15). Familiarizing new members with the repertoire of practice through training activities are also important for expanding the collective of practitioners (Bueger 2013, p. 305).

In the case analysed here, 'background knowledge' and the professional values held by EU and NATO practitioners who engage in informal cooperation on various sites are taught at different national and international institutions. EU staff and NATO staff comprise policemen, lawyers, experts, political analysts, diplomats and militaries. For instance, NATO and EU military officers have followed similar education and training and largely share professional norms and values. A typical military education includes national military academies and mid-level education at staff colleges and increasingly also NATO sponsored international schools like the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Italy and the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO) in Germany. Some European officers also attend US joint military schools (e.g. the National Defence University, National War College, National Staff College) or branch specific schools (e.g. the U.S. Army War College, US Naval War College). A large number of the military representatives in the EU Military Committee have attended NDC as well as American military institutions, for instance (Cross 2011).

In the context of informal practice the NATO Defence College (NDC), which provides senior strategic level education for military and civilian staff is particularly interesting. Where national military education and NATO training and exercises aim at enhancing military professionalism and interoperability, NDC courses aim at increasing human and cultural interoperability. NDC's primary function is to '[P]repare people to go and work in head quarters' in Brussels, other places and in missions where officers are expected 'to work through solutions in multilateral settings'.[75] To prepare them for NATO's multi-national and multi-lateral setting course members are put into committees of some 10 people of different nationalities, who work together during the course when solving joint assignments (e.g. presentations, articles, negotiation games). Social bonding and informal networks that are built, especially over the five months long Main Course, are seen as important for informal interaction in future operations and postings.[76]

The European Security and Defence College was created in 2005 'to give the Common Security and Defence Policy [CSDP] a training and education instrument which actively promotes a European security culture'.[77] It involves a virtual, voluntary network of European Defence academic institutions in the member-states, set up to provide strategic-level education for civilian and military training of field personnel implementing the CSDP in areas like peacebuilding, the law of armed conflict, civilian crisis management, and security sector reform. The College does not provide basic military education and training, however.

NATO has been an influential norm entrepreneur within military professionalism and doctrine development in Europe (Forster 2006), including in the EU (see Mérand 2010). But a distinct EU strategic culture based on a multilateral approach to security that emphasizes the civilian dimension of EU military capabilities has become visible, too (Biava et al. 2011, Cross 2011, 2013). NATO's adoption of a 'comprehensive approach' to post-conflict situations undoubtedly was heavily inspired by the EU and is now generally considered as a 'European' approach. Regarding EU-NATO cooperation, this development may facilitate shared practices and mutual engagement but also potentially create a rivalling EU identity that may weaken the joint enterprise.

Another anchoring practice or infrastructure that links the participants in a community of practice and guides their conduct is a common 'ethos' or professional *ethic*. Militaries and police are trained to have 'professional' values and operational concerns upfront, not mission goals, particular national agendas or the political visions of the organisation they are deployed to. The loyalty and commitment demanded of them first and foremost as professionals represent a collective intention — however tacit and distributed — that appear to have been important for developing a shared repertoire for informal EU-NATO inter-action. In Kosovo, KFOR personnel have provided assistance to restore order and save lives, when EULEX police could not, without deliberations about formal 'response chains', institutional boundaries, mission mandates or 'technical' agreements. As noted by one interviewee: 'the military talk to each other, because they know each other'[78], with reference to a shared repertoire and 'ethos' that cuts across institutional and professional boundaries.

Knowledge learnt from informal practice
The existence of a community of practice relies on its production of a shared practice, 'as members engage in a collective process of learning' (Wenger 1998b: 4). This

process is fundamentally informal, where the members develop among themselves their own understanding of what their practice is about. It is the learning that they have done together that matters, and not the unit they report to, the project they are working on, or the people they know, Wenger (ibid.) holds.

Which new practical knowledge is learnt in and through informal EU-NATO cooperation? Informal interaction facilitates the passing on of experience and creates multiple opportunities for learning. Communities of practice are characterised by a transfer of knowledge and lessons learnt that are tacit and informal, and where interaction and insights not necessarily are documented or cumulative (Wenger et al. 2002, p. 149). This feature fits well with security organisations, where information often is sensitive and where cultures of secrecy among security and military personnel prevail. Extracting from the interviews conducted and inferring from representational knowledge, two observations seem to be of value to the current case.

First, there is a shared understanding among the civilian-political and military staff working for the EU and NATO in Kosovo that they should coordinate their reports to their respective headquarters and chiefs of staff, for instance about the progress and challenges of missions, as noted above. A similar coordination takes place among EU and NATO staff in Brussels when they sit down together to prepare meetings at the next level: 'We try to be synchronised to make the best out of our limitations. We engage in a "joint brainstorm" on what to do'.[79] This shared practice indicates that a common EU–NATO understanding of their respective roles, mandates and how to best achieve them has emerged from engaging in informal practices in the field and in offices. Other aspects, such as concerns with future career opportunities may be involved, too (and establishing this requires further empirical research), but does not change the argument pursued here.

Second, a practical knowledge and lesson learnt from working together informally is that the Kosovo 'chain of attention' involving KFOR, EULEX and the Kosovo Police designed by political decision-makers, partly to bypass the Berlin Plus stalemate, does not work as intended on the ground. In practice, KFOR has filled in the gap between the EULEX mandate and tools at its disposal (esp. EU police forces) in situations of violence. That assisting EULEX colleagues implies that KFOR personnel at times operate outside of both mission mandates and 'technical agreements' is part of the shared repertoire of practice and also reflects mutual engagement on the part of the organisations. The passing on of practical and tacit knowledge happens in Brussels, too. Learning that the 'Cyprus issue' is not likely to be solved any soon, necessitating informal inter-action 'to press to the maximum without involving the formal approval of the nations' was stressed by NATO staff in Brussels when interviewed in 2012, as well as in 2014-2015.[80] That this informal practice seems to have been passed on from one contingent to the next in missions and in the Brussels headquarters reflect that EU and NATO practitioners engage in a collective process of learning that exists over time. This is one of the defining features of a community of practice.

Conclusion

European security cooperation is put forward as increasingly important by both NATO and EU leaders in the provision of a coherent and effective European response to a challenging security environment. The primary tool developed for formal

cooperation between the two security organisations, the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements, has however since long been overtaken by political and operational events. In the absence of functioning formal cooperation formats and political initiatives, EU and NATO staff at the centre and in field missions has engaged each other informally on a regular basis, also expanding these practices into new fields, including hybrid threats, energy security and cyber defence.[81] It has been argued here that practice theory is best suited to grasp how this informal interaction, which now forms the nexus of EU-NATO relations, has developed over time. A practice approach adds important new knowledge about how European security cooperation works in practice. First, because focusing on what the organisations *actually do* together and *how* things are being done informally provides a better and more nuanced picture of the dysfunctions and dynamics of EU-NATO cooperation than portrayed in existing literature, which tends to focus on the achievement of stated political goals. This article shows that there has been innovation with regard to informal cooperation beyond ad hoc interaction, and also learning.

Second, informal EU-NATO interaction follows a distinct epistemology or logic of action that is best captured by practice theory. Because of the 'Cyprus issue', civilian-political and military staff at all levels has sought workable solutions informally, engaging each other in a shared repertoire of practices. This logic of practicality is informed and shaped by shared background knowledge that practitioners bring into the EU-NATO setting. This knowledge is embedded in professional training and education, as well as experience and human skills, which are important 'anchoring practices'. Shared or similar education, training and career patterns among EU and NATO staff in Brussels and in field missions are particularly important for developing specific dispositions to act and think in a particular way. Drawing on the post-2008 Kosovo missions in particular, the article argues that practical knowledge, and professional values that are intrinsic to military practice and security personnel have been pivotal for informal field cooperation between EULEX and KFOR staff. The exchange of personnel between field missions and headquarters, as well as diplomatic and military postings across organisations also facilitates the development of a shared repertoire among EU and NATO staff.

Third, studying (inter-)action at the micro-level offers new insights on European security diplomacy and inter-organisational cooperation. Analysing the specifics of EU-NATO security cooperation as practice - in Brussels offices and mission areas where the two organisations conduct separate operations - has highlighted the importance of engaging in and learning from everyday practices. Functioning field cooperation is not only an expression of being 'far away' from decision-makers in Brussels and national capitals. As this article has shown, it is about how staff may develop shared repertoires of interaction and learn from each other through new practical knowledge, also showing some degree of mutual engagement and sense of joint enterprise. While not evolving homogeneous EU–NATO communities of practice, the analysis has unveiled looser community structures among EU and NATO staff at the centre and in field missions that may constitute the contours of communities-in-the-making.

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[1] See also Schatzki et al. 2001, Adler 2008, Adler-Nissen 2013, Pouliot 2008, 2010, Katzenstein 2010, Adler and Pouliot 2011.

[2] For an analysis of these and other Bourdieuan concepts and their utilization in security studies, see Adler-Nissen (2013).

[3] Adler (2008) drew on Wenger's work in his study of security communities. Epistemic communities traditionally have been used to describe scientific communities (but see Cross 2011, 2013).

[4] For a study of transnational community structures within anti-piracy activity, see Bueger (2013).

[5] The interviews were conducted in 2012 and 2014-2015. Civilians and militaries, and men and women of different nationalities, ranks, and levels of responsibility were selected and approached directly by the author, based on recommendations from colleagues, officials and personal contacts.

[6] Two of these held important postings in the NATO HQ and two were formerly deployed to the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

[7] For a full overview of the package of arrangements agreed in March 2003, see http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/4/documents/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus[1].pdf [Accessed 15 January 2013].

[8] In a 'non-paper' circulated before the Bucharest NATO meeting in December 2008 Turkey summarised its frustrations over 'the lack of progress in addressing certain long-standing shortcomings' in this regard. *Turkish Non-Paper on NATO-EU Relations*, 3 December 2008, unpublished.

[9] In contrast, non-EU member Norway signed such an agreement with the EDA in 2006.

[10] This was confirmed by interviewees in EEAS and NATO HQ on 9 and 10 May 2012.

[11] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 9 May 2012.

[12] http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/27012015_mogherini-and-nato-sg_en.htm [Accessed 25 November 2015]. Apparently, Ukraine was the topic of the meeting at NATO on 26 January.

[13] Interview in EEAS, 7 January 2015.

[14] Interview in EEAS, 9 May 2012.

[15] This also pertains to cooperation in less strategically important policy areas, such as the implementation of UNSCR 1325. NATO official, interviewed in Oslo, 16 September 2013.

[16] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 8 January 2015.

[17] Interview in EEAS, 7 January 2015.

[18] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 8 January 2015. A list of these dinners is available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm# [accessed 3 July 2016].

[19] For instance in honour of the newly appointed US Secretary of State in Rome in February 2013.

[20] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 9 May 2012.

[21] Two of the four positions in the team alternate between Norway and Turkey, and between the USA and Canada, and two alternate between the EU member states (Italy has always been team leader).

[22] Interview in EUMS, 18 November 2014.

[23] EEAS official interviewed 10 May 2012.

[24] EDA official interviewed 7 January 2015.

[25] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 19 November 2014.

[26] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 9 May 2012.

[27] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 9 May 2012.

[28] International Staff 1, NATO HQ, interviewed 8 January 2015.

[29] International Staff 2, NATO HQ, interviewed 8 January 2015.

[30] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 19 November 2015.

[31] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[32] At sea, informal cooperation is easier and has also been extended in response to the refugee crisis (Gebhart and Smith 2014; Græger 2016).

[33] NATO intervened in Kosovo on 24 March 1999, after negotiations failed and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was withdrawn.

[34] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm?selectedLocale=en [accessed 1 November 2013].

[35] See http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/units/msu.html; http://www.nato.int/kfor/structure/units/kfor_ktm.html [accessed 2 January 2013].

[36] In implementing the Lisbon Treaty in 2010, the European Commission Liaison Office and the EU Special Representative - in Kosovo since 2008, merged into the EU office in Kosovo. Available from http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm [accessed 15 October 2013.

[37] Like NATO, EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. EULEX became fully operational from 9 April 2009. All legal documents are available from: http://eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php [accessed 15 October 2013].

[38] EEAS official interviewed 9 May 2012.

[39] Former advisor to the Kosovo Police interviewed 6 June 2012.

[40] This includes the rules for when alcoholic beverages may be consumed. Former KFOR official, interviewed 13 June 2012.

[41] Former advisor to the Kosovo Police interviewed 6 June 2012. Bernd Borchardt was EULEX Head of Mission from 4 December 2012 and until 30 September 2014.

[42] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012

[43] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012.

[44] EULEX regional advisor to the Kosovo Police interviewed 12 July 2012.

[45] International Staff 2, NATO HQ, interviewed 8 January 2015.

[46] Former KFOR official interviewed, 13 June 2012.

[47] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012.

[48] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[49] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[50] Interviewed 6 June 2012.

[51] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[52] In Afghanistan, the EU negotiated 24 'technical agreements' with every lead nation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams to ensure ISAF protection for the Rule of Law Mission. This was time-consuming and, when states would not sign agreements (the USA and Turkey), also limited the outreach of the police (Gross 2009, p. 7).

[53] The number was reduced from 2,250 in 2013 (http://eulex-kosovo.eu, accessed 12 June 2013) to 800 international and 800 local staff in 2015 (http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/pdf/factsheet_eulex_kosovo_en.pdf).

[54] Figures include KP Special Forces (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm, accessed 12 June 2013).

[55] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[56] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012.

[57] EULEX regional advisor to KP interviewed 12 July 2012. After the violent riots in March 2008, protecting the Courthouse became almost a symbolic act of EU and NATO cooperation. Former KFOR official, interviewed 13 June 2012.

[58] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012.

[59] Legal officer, EULEX, interviewed 11 July 2012. Kosovo-Serbs dominate the KP force in the north, whereas Kosovo-Albanians dominate the KP force in the south.

[60] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012.

[61] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[62] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[63] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[64] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[65] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[66] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[67] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[68] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[69] EEAS official interviewed 10 May 2012, and diplomat, NATO HQ, interviewed 17 November 2014.

[70] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[71] KFOR analyst in Pristina interviewed 8 June 2012.

[72] Former advisor to the Kosovo Police, interviewed 6 June 2012.

[73] Former KFOR official interviewed 13 June 2012.

[74] EEAS official interviewed 9 May 2012.

[75] NDC staff interviewed 23 October 2013.

[76] Interview with officers attending NDC, 23 October 2013.

[77] http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/trainings/esdc/index_en.htm [accessed 1 October 2013].

[78] International Military Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 10 May 2012.

[79] International Staff 2, NATO HQ, interviewed 8 January 2015.

[80] International Staff, NATO HQ, interviewed 19 November 2014. This was also confirmed by other interviewees.

[81] See http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf.