



# Enhancing the Effectiveness of African-led Peace Support Operations through an Adaptive Stabilisation Approach

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## Abstract

The African continent's security landscape is constantly changing. Alongside this evolution, changes in the global order have emerged, a decline of multilateralism and an overreliance on security tools to defeat terrorism across Africa. In contrast, these challenges have allowed the African continent and its peace and security mechanisms under the African Peace and Security Architecture to respond to these insecurities through African-led Peace Support Operations (PSO)—amongst other mechanisms. These African capacities, particularly in PSO, have not always been consistently deployed as part of a multidimensional approach to dealing with insecurity. African-led PSOs have evolved and developed unique characteristics distinguishing them from traditional peacekeeping operations. However, their increased use as a sole mechanism to deal with insecurity has led to a deficiency in broader conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and peacemaking mechanisms. This has made it difficult for African-led PSOs to tackle the growing and intersecting challenges and dynamics

the continent faces now and in the future. This article posits that while African-led PSOs have come to represent an increase in African agency, capability and utilisation, their increased use to deal with insecurity has led to African-led PSOs failing to deal with intersecting and growing challenges and dynamics the continent faces. Thus, the article argues that there is a need for African-led PSOs to be more agile, adaptive and comprehensive through the adoption of an Adaptive Stabilisation Approach.

## Keywords

Adaptive Stabilisation approach – African-led Peace Support Operations – African Union and African Peace and Security Architecture

### 1 Introduction

In the 1990s, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to civil wars by deploying Peace Operations in Chad, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. These experiences led to the recognition in the early 2000s that the African Union (AU) needed to develop the capacity to deploy Peace Support Operations (PSO) in a few exceptional cases and as a standard conflict management instrument. As a result, the African Standby Force (ASF) was envisaged as one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) initiative launched in 2002.<sup>1 2</sup> With the emergence of the ASF and related initiatives, Africa has witnessed a significant increase in African-led PSO capacity across Africa over the last two decades.<sup>3</sup> This increase in capacity during the decline of no new United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) and the deployment of African Standby Arrangements indicates a shift in the response to insecurity in Africa.<sup>4</sup> Despite this impact, Africa's contribution to UN PKOs has grown from

1 Linda Darkwa, 'The African Standby Force: The African Union's tool for the maintenance of peace and security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(3), 2017, pp. 471–482.

2 Cedric de Coning, 'Can the AU Finance its own peace operations, and if so, what would the impact be?' (2017), <https://cedricdeconing.net/2017/03/28/can-the-au-finance-its-own-peace-operations-and-if-so-what-would-the-impact-be/#:~:text=If%20the%20AU%20develops%20the,UN%2C%20EU%20and%20bilateral%20partners>.

3 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'Generation three and a half peacekeeping: Understanding the evolutionary character of African-led Peace Support Operations', *African Security Review*, 2023. doi:10.1080/10246029.2023.2237482.

4 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'African-led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 29(2), 2023, pp. 230–244.

less than 20 per cent in 2000 to over 50 per cent by 2020.<sup>5</sup> For example, the number of soldiers deployed by African countries has led to the contribution of over 50 per cent of uniformed personnel to UN PKO and approximately 40,000 uniformed personnel to the African Union (AU) and other African-led PSO since 2015, making Africa the most prominent regional contributor to UN and international peace operations.<sup>6</sup>

Since the inception of the AU in 2000, three types of African-led PSOs outside the original ASF concept have emerged.<sup>7</sup> The first is the AU-led PSOs, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) and the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The second is RECS-led missions categorised by missions led by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia and, more recently, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) and the East African Community Force- in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (EACF-DRC). The third is a coalition of states or coalitions of the willing states operating inside and outside of two RECS forming Ad hoc Security Initiative (ASI), such as the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA); the Lake Chad Basin Commission Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF); and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel).<sup>8</sup> All have been undertaken under the overarching umbrella of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Peace and Security Protocol of the AU and the APSA, sharing several characteristics. This paper focuses on the capacity of African-led PSOs and their deployment trajectories. The paper posits that while these forces are primarily deployed to solve security issues in their respective environments, security mechanism such as PSOs tends to be the primary focus of solving insecurity. However, it is essential to understand some of the challenges of these deployments and their characteristics to gain a deeper understanding of these PSO's role in promoting stability and security in Africa. The article is divided into three sections. The first section of the article takes stock of the

5 See United Nations Peacekeeping data, 2023. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>. The data provide is also the authors' own calculations.

6 Authors' own estimates, See United Nations Peacekeeping data, 2023. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data> This figure is based on approx. 50,000 African troops contributed to UN peacekeeping operations, approximately 20,000 to AMISOM and around 15,000 in the MNJTF, G5 Sahel and other AU and African-led peace operations in 2015.

7 Linda Darkwa, 'The African Standby Force: The African Union's tool for the maintenance of peace and security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(3), 2017, pp. 471–482.

8 EPON (2023). Shifting from External Dependency, Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future. Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/EPON-SAHEL-Exec-Summary.pdf>.

advancement of African-led PSOs over the last 20 years, identifying several challenges these missions have faced, as well as the lessons that the AU and other African institutions can learn from their own experiences of deploying African-led PSOs. The second section moves to offer several suggestions for the future enhancement of African-led PSOs through the adoption of adaptive approaches that are context-specific responses, people-centred and continually adapt to the conditions where insecurity exists. The final section makes a case for adopting an Adaptive Stabilisation approach, which can help advance and assist African-led PSOs in becoming more effective.

### 1.1 *African-Led PSOs*

Over the last two decades, African-led PSOs have developed several unique characteristics that distinguish them from UN PKOs. Firstly, they differ from UN PKOs in that they were not only deployed to implement ceasefire or peace agreements after a violent conflict ended but also to intervene amidst ongoing conflict, to protect civilians (Sudan) or to stop violent insurgencies (Somalia, CAR, Mali, Comoros). Thus, African-led PSOs go beyond peacekeeping—operate within the UN doctrines on peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force—and undertake peace enforcement operations when needed.<sup>9</sup> As a result, the AU has developed its own ASF doctrine and 2019 adopted its own PSO doctrine, which allows for a more pragmatic, needs-based approach to impartiality and the use of force, rather than the principled approach adopted by the UN.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, many African-led PSOs have been deployed to protect and support the state and its people against identified aggressors such as rebel groups, insurgents, violent extremists, or local bandits. For example, AU PSOs like AMISOM and Ad-hoc Security Initiatives such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)<sup>11</sup> and Joint- Force for the G5 Sahel (JF-G5S),<sup>12</sup> have been deployed to counter violent

9 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'Generation three and a half peacekeeping: Understanding the evolutionary character of African-led Peace Support Operations', *African Security Review*, 2023, doi:10.1080/10246029.2023.2237482.

10 'African Union Doctrine on Peace Support Operations, Addis Ababa, African Union Commission', 2019, available at: <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/en-au-pso-doctrine-final-draft.pdf>.

11 EPON (2023). 'A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force'. Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/mnjtf/>.

12 EPON (2022). 'Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future'. Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/shifting-from-external-dependency/>.

extremist insurgencies.<sup>13</sup> Thirdly, many African-led PSOs operate in support of and, where feasible, alongside the nation-state. The AU, as a union of African states, does not see itself as an external actor in Africa, but a mechanism of African member-state capacity designed to assist its members. If a member is experiencing instability and requests the assistance of the AU, and if the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) approves the deployment of an African-led PSO, then that African-led PSO is seen to be supporting the state in restoring its stability. This, by default, allows the AU to naturally deploy alongside and in support of the national forces against rebels or insurgents.<sup>14</sup> This has been the case in operations like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)/The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) (Somalia), The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) (Mali) and The African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) (Central African Republic). This same rationality applies to Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanism (RECS/RMS) operations, which are operations undertaken by the members of a regional community or mechanism to assist one of its members in restoring or maintaining stability.

Fourthly, African-led PSOs take on other forms, such as operations to restore constitutional order, for example, the African-led operation in Comoros in 2008 and the ECOWAS operation in The Gambia in 2017. In this context, where the AU or a REC act to undo an unconstitutional change of government in one of its members, national forces have been unlikely to oppose an AU or REC force in the past. Another type of operation is where the African-led PSOs help to implement a ceasefire or peace agreements, such as in the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Burundi), the African Union Military Observers Mission to the Central African Republic (MOUACA) (Central Africa Republic) and the African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)—consistent with Article 11 (Tigray-Ethiopia). In the latter case, the AU mechanism takes on an impartial position like UN PKOs and, thus, treats national forces as one of the parties to a ceasefire agreement. The AU has also deployed public health PSOs to assist operations mandated to contain the spread of the Ebola virus and other such specialised tasks.<sup>15</sup>

13 Cedric de Coning *et al.*, 'Ad Hoc Security Initiative, an African Response to Insecurity', *Africa Security Review*, 31(4), 2022, pp. 383–398.

14 The African Union Constitutive Act (2000). Available at: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact\\_en.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf).

15 See Table 1 for a list of African-led PSOs undertaken to date.

Table 1.0 African-led Peace Support Operations.<sup>16</sup> [See Annex I]

In the next section, the article identifies five key lessons that have emerged from Africa's experience with African-led PSOs over the last 20 years that the AU Commission and other entities responsible for planning, deploying and managing African-led PSOs need to consider before planning and deploying future missions. These include the need for comprehensive politically led support to peace processes, multidimensional capabilities and planning, flexible "Just in time" standby arrangements, carefully calibrating financing support and innovative partnerships and arrangements, and context-specific and adaptive solutions.

### 1.2 *Comprehensive Politically Led Support to Peace Processes*

A central lesson from the experience of African-led PSOs is that stabilisation and counterinsurgency mandates in contexts where there is no viable political project, peace to be kept, or peace process produces dilemmas for these missions. The more effective African-led PSOs are at dealing with insecurity, the less incentive there is for ruling political elites and existing state networks to find long-term political solutions. This dilemma generates perverse effects, including prolonging the conflict, creating new conflict dynamics, trapping operations in place with no exit options, increasing the resilience of armed groups, indirectly supporting their adaptability and sustainability of affected communities and further embedding PSO into the local political economy. The UN PKOs have experienced this dilemma with the protection of civilians or stabilisation mandates, such as the UN operations in Central Africa Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Mali, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the experience of the UN is not unique to the African experience. However, most African-led PSOs have mandates focused on security objectives which deplore within their operations kinetic, counterinsurgency or stabilisation or hearts and minds strategies, making African-led PSOs at risk of focusing solely on security goals as an end state in and of themselves instead of being in service to a larger political project.

16 In this article, AU PSOs are AU-led and deployed missions where the AU Peace and Security Council have issued a mandate for an AU PSO to be deployed. REC or RM PSOs are authorised or endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council but are not led or deployed by the AU Commission. In some cases, the AU may provide support to such operations. Collectively, we refer to AU, REC, and RM operations such as ASI as African-led PSOs.

17 Cedric de Coning, 'How Not to Do UN Peacekeeping: Avoid the Stabilization Dilemma with Principled and Adaptive Mandating and Leadership'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 29(2), 2023, pp. 152–167.

Given that most conflicts emerge from political differences where, in some cases, bandits or other organised groups commit violence for economic gain(s). The criminal acts of these actors are increasingly fused and tangled with violent acts inspired by political objectives. Many politically inspired groups may also commit criminal acts, and some may have material objectives. However, these are usually used to sustain the organisations instead of enriching individuals. Distinguishing various actors' differences and transforming characters is crucial instead of framing the actions or differences as criminal. Thus, there is a need for elites in power to view these actors as part of a broader political challenge with motives.

Regardless of the complexities involved in making these distinctions, the core lesson for African-led PSOs operating in a context of political conflict, is to recognise that it must be a part of a politically led initiative that supports a broader peace process and a political project. This means that central to deploying an African-led PSO, these PSOs must always be mandated to support a political project and support the conditions for political objectives to reach its intended goal. However, for this approach to be effective, political objectives need to be clearly articulated in the mandate, and the mandated language and tasks must be realistic, achievable, and have a clear implementation strategy from the moment it is executed and backed by resources. This does not mean that the African-led PSO must be responsible for the political aspects of the mandate. In some cases, the head of an African-led PSO is given politically orientated tasks. However, in other cases, that work is undertaken by a special envoy or representative, whilst the African-led PSO is tasked with providing a secure environment for the political process. Even if the PSO is not tasked with political work, its role should be understood and articulated concerning the political project that it serves. For this process to be successful, there is a need for a multidimensional approach to coordinate and plan regularly. However, this kind of coordination can prove challenging if the link between the political and security tracks needs to be established in the mandate and reporting procedures. Coordination can also be a challenge if the political track and security tracks are not undertaken by the same organisation. For example, the AU may lead the political track, while the PSO is led by a REC/RM, or vice versa. In such cases, the relationship between these tracks must be established in the mandating process. Coordination mechanisms must be developed in line with the mandate, and the mission must be tasked to regularly report back, including on the establishment and functioning of the coordination mechanisms. In addition, regular coordination with those responsible for the political track should occur if this responsibility is outside the mandate of the PSO.



If the underlying drivers are not addressed, the conflict will not be resolved, and violence will return. This is why PSOs not serving a political project become victims of the stabilisation dilemma. However, while being a prerequisite for conflict resolution, political solutions are not sufficient on their own to address the underlying drivers of conflict. Conflict resolution and related peace processes must also have social and economic dimensions. Issues of justice and reconciliation need to be addressed, especially at the local level, using existing local mechanisms.

Additionally, there is a need to deal with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, reform of the security sector, and improve state and local governance structures and government institutions. Thus, African-led PSOs need to serve and support a politically led project or peace process that consists of a comprehensive set of dimensions across the political, social, economic and local spectrums. This includes ensuring that a broad range of civil society organisations, community leaders and elders, women's groups and organisations, including traditional and religious actors, are a part of the process. There will also be a diverse set of international actors, such as UN agencies, the World Bank and other development partners, which should play a role. At a minimum, PSOs thus need the capacity to coordinate with or be a part of the coordination with this broader set of actors to safeguard, sustain and support the project comprehensively.

Thus, when African-led PSOs are not a part of this comprehensive approach, they are likely to fall victim to the stabilisation dilemma that generates perverse effects, generating outcomes that have the opposite effect than their mandated objectives. Serving a political project or peace process is thus critical to the credibility and legitimacy of any African-led PSO and a critically important factor in its effectiveness. Without a political project, there is no sustainable end-state or exit strategy.

### 1.3 *Multidimensional Capabilities*

The second lesson closely linked with the first is for African-led PSOs to have the capability to protect and support politically led comprehensive peace processes, they need to have multidimensional capabilities, i.e., civilian, police and military components and exemplary leadership and support processes that can ensure that these components generate integrated outcomes that serve the mandate of the PSO. The need for the AU to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy and manage multidimensional PSOs is articulated in the founding act of the AU, as well as in the AU Peace and Security Council's protocol that establishes the APSA and in the AU PSO doctrine. However, despite significant efforts to develop the civilian and police



dimensions of the ASF, the AU still perceives PSOs as principally military. As a result, the AU Commission's capabilities to plan, deploy and manage AU PSOs and other mechanisms like the ASF are still concentrated on military means. The same is true of RECS/RMS, which means that most African-led PSOs to date have been primarily security-orientated missions. Most African-led PSOs have been civilian-led or headed. For AU missions, this person is often a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AUC (SRCC), but most AU missions have had a small—usually less than 50 persons. For example, with AMISOM/ATMIS the only exception with almost 100 civilian components which typically include political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, gender, humanitarian liaison, legal and public information officers.<sup>18</sup> In addition to these substantive personnel, AU PSOs have a mission support component consisting of financial, administrative and logistical personnel. Some AU PSOs have also had a police component. In AMISOM/ATMIS, this consisted of individual police officers and formed police units (FPUS).<sup>19</sup>

The challenge emerges where the functions of these civilian heads of mission or civilian and police components still need to be fully utilised by the AUC and RECS/RMS. Unlike many African states, armed forces and their associated institutions are the most institutionalised with the most capacity, and this is mirrored in African-led PSOs, leading to a security domain focused on physical protection and stability.<sup>20</sup> It also means that the military officer in PKO are better at planning than civilian and police colleagues; the military and police focus on narrow areas like terrorist and armed actors, resulting in African-led PSOs military and police being less aligned to the translation aspect of UN, AU principles.

As a result, additional challenges with African-led PSO emerge such as the situational awareness: whether the heavy military and police presence and approach fully understands the environment, complexity of environment and has the intelligence backing its comprehension; and situational understanding: whether the mission is able to comprehend in its own analysis why it/things are happening. Civilian heads do not have clear counterparts in the AUC or RECS/RMS headquarters, clear reporting lines, or guidance from member states. Thus, mission heads in African-led PSOs are left mainly to comprehend and implement broad policies, doctrines and mandates that define their functions.

18 Interview with AMISOM staff, July 2020.

19 Cedric de Coning, Meressa Dessu, and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik, 'The role of the police in the African Mission in Somalia: Operational support, training and solidarity' (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2014).

20 Cedric de Coning, Linnea Gelot, and John Karlsrud, 'The future of African peace operations: From Janjaweed to Boko Haram' (London: Zed Books, 2016).

For the most part, civilian heads may often make their plans and develop their roles on the ground, but this is often not done in strong concurrence with the military. For example, apart from AMISOM/ATMIS, the civilian and police components needed to be more prominent and better integrated. Even in AMISOM/ATMIS, the mission that had the most prominent civilian and police components, poor integration meant that gaps in mission planning and coordination led to challenges between AMISOM/ATMIS and the government of Somalia and international partners when it came to coordinating their efforts to improve governance in liberated areas.<sup>21</sup> As a result of the military dominance in planning and managing African-led PSOs, the mandates of these missions reflect militarised approaches partly because institutions assigned to support African-led PSOs and the interpretation of mandates leans towards a military approach only. As a result, most African-led PSOs do not emphasise civilian governance or people-centred or needs-based approaches in their plans and actions. Instead, the focus and embodiment of African-led PSO is enemy-centric plans, degrade enemy actors, hearts and minds campaigns with militarised quick impact campaigns designed to counter insurgencies or those deemed a threat to the state. Thus, African-led PSOs, for the most part, need to address the grievances that drive conflict and invest in state-building processes that can offer a viable alternative to populations.<sup>22</sup> Although the ASF concept and AU PSO doctrine provide for multidimensional peace operations, African-led PSOs are perceived to be the domain of security agencies. For example, when the AU wanted guidance on PSOs, it convened the continents' chief of defence and the AU's standing body that oversees the ASF.<sup>23</sup>

Multidimensional PSOs go beyond deploying a combination of military, police and civilian components, and it is also about having a mandate and plans that integrate the political, governance, security and socio-economic development dimensions of a peace process. This has been one of the most challenging areas for AU and African-led PSOs.<sup>24</sup> The ability to deploy and

21 Effectiveness of Peace Operation Network (2018). 'Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)'; Available at <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/amisom/> (accessed on 25 July 2021). See Tchie, Y. E. A. (2022). 'Waging Peace, towards an Africa Union Stabilisation Strategy for Somalia', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* (25), pp. 236–260.

22 Gian Gentile, 'A Requiem for American Counterinsurgency'. *Orbis*, 57(4), 2013, pp. 549–558.

23 'African Union (AU) Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS)', <https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/handle/123456789/292>.

24 This is the connection between AU PSO doctrine, Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, Human Rights, the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and Political economic development, etc, which are rarely connected during and after AU PSOs.

manage multidimensional PSOs starts with the ability of the AUC or RECS/RMS to generate the information and analysis necessary to inform the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and their RECS/RMS counterparts. In the absence of analysis that provides a comprehensive assessment and recommended actions that support integrated actions, the PSC and its peers have tended to adopt mandates that only speak to the political and security dimensions of the crisis. The article later argues for an Adaptive Stabilisation approach to address this shortcoming, which should be integrated into its doctrines to become more effective. However, the inability of African-led PSOs to sufficiently deploy civilians and police into their missions means that PSOs lack multidimensional reach, which has had a negative effect on the overall effectiveness of these missions to meet their mandates. As a result, African-led PSOs remain largely militarised and weak at implementing mediation and peacemaking, governance and post-conflict reconstruction policies and goals of the AU, RECS/RMS or UNSC. Therefore, the AU, RECS and RMS should significantly scale up their efforts to develop and integrate civilian and police capabilities if they can deploy and manage multidimensional peace operations.

#### 1.4 *Flexible Standby Arrangements*

While the African Standby Force (ASF) was designed to deal with insecurity through deployments, the original concept and the inability to deploy the ASF have led to several deviations between the reality of the concept, which does not match today's realities. First, the AU PSC has rarely initiated the deployment of a PSO and has yet to activate the ASF in any such deployments. In most cases, African-led PSOs have been initiated by RECS sub-regional organisations or coalitions of the willing. Second, whilst the ASF has enabled the deployment of African PSOs by creating a framework for cooperation and capacity building acting as an institutional structure for regions, the ASF has not been used to deploy a PSO. Even when deployments took place in the context of the ASF, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), the AU was not informed, made aware or a part of the planning and force generation process—all were done through the lead nation and other TCCs, not via the planning elements put in place via the ASF structures at RECS/RMS. Third, the rotational standby system has never been used, and it is unlikely to be used as most RECS have indicated that their standby arrangements will only be used within their own RECS. Fourth, the mismatch between the standby arrangements designed to reflect political cooperation and commitment to common security and the context-specific needs of each crisis has meant that the ASF has not been deployed.

Nevertheless, this phenomenon is not unique to the ASF. The various UN standby arrangements have experienced the same challenges over the years. Nevertheless, there is still a need to infuse a context-specific coalition of the willing in a crisis.<sup>25</sup>

In each crisis, a coalition of countries with a strategic interest in resolving the crisis and the political will to act have done so. In some cases, neighbouring countries in the immediate vicinity of the crisis respond. Even when the relevant REC has authorised deployments, the countries that have deployed capabilities have typically been countries that are close enough to reach the theatre of operations by road. Whilst the ASF was envisioned to be continentally coordinated and utilised by the AU, in practice, most PSOs were managed by a lead-nation-led coalitions of the willing, with the political backing of the REC or relevant regional grouping (E.g., G5 Sahel) with endorsement from the PSC, and in some cases also the UN Security Council. Therefore, the continental standby arrangement needs to be moved to a *just-in-time* model and flexible enough to adapt to and support the actual African-led PSOs that emerge from the context-specific needs.<sup>26</sup> Whilst sustaining a common African understanding of African PSOs, supported by training and exercises and informed by AU PSO doctrine and guidelines on compliance and other issues, have proved critical to the development of African PSO capacity over the last 20 years, the assumption that having pre-identified forces on standby will enhance African PSO capacity has not stood the test of time. Consideration should be given to adapting the ASF concept from the standby of prepared forces to the development of planning and preparation modalities that can facilitate the rapid mobilisation of coalitions of the willing as and when needed.

Finally, the ASF has predominantly focussed on the capability to deploy brigade-sized peacekeeping capabilities. For the most part, over the last 20 years the AU, RECs and other African institutions have been called on to deploy an extensive range of operations, including peace enforcement operations, ceasefire observer missions, civilian political and PCRD missions like AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) and African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine (MISCA), and support to stabilisation initiatives like the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery

25 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie and Christian Ani, 'Standby Arrangements and Deployments Setback: The Case of the African Standby Force', (2022). Available at: [https://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/ASF-Report\\_Standby-Arrangements.pdf](https://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/ASF-Report_Standby-Arrangements.pdf).

26 De Coning, C. (2014). 'Enhancing the efficiency of the African Standby Force: the case for a shift to a just-in-time rapid response model?' *Conflict Trends*, 2: 34–40.

and Resilience for the Lake Chad Basin region. The type of support includes supporting sub-regional operations like the AUC to support the MNJTF, whose operations and efforts support the Regional strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Lake Chad region (RS-SRR) with assists in humanitarian and public health operations, and a range of PSOs supporting peace process implementation. Thus, the current spectrum of African-led PSOs is much broader in range and scope than the six scenarios envisaged in the original ASF Concept.

### 1.5 *Cautious Financing, Support and Partnership Arrangements*

Several African-led PSOs, like the AFISMA, the ECOWAS mission to the Gambia, and SADC's missions in Lesotho and Mozambique, are all examples of African-led PSOs where the costs have been largely carried out by the TCCs themselves. However, most other African-led PSOs have required financial support from the UN, European Union (EU) and other donors through bilateral agreements.<sup>27</sup> While financial constraints can significantly limit the effectiveness of PSOs, financial support from the UN and others can also significantly restrict the agency of African-led PSOs. Further consideration should be given when accepting external financial support. The most encouraging support model that has emerged over the years is UN support operations or arrangements for AU PSOs that are undertaking enforcement and counterterrorism operations with a UN mandate, for example, UN support to AMISOM/ATMIS via the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOs).<sup>28</sup> In this model, the UN and AU have mutually reinforcing capabilities that serve as a basis for a strategic partnership that complements each partner's peace efforts.<sup>29</sup> The AMISOM/ATMIS-UNSOs example could serve as an example for a new type of UN support operation that will be deployed alongside AU-led African PSOs and through which financial and other forms of substantive and material support will be provided. In addition to financial and mission support functions, such support from UN missions will likely serve as oversight and compliance monitoring missions that report to the UN Security Council on the support provided to such AU-led

27 In January 2016, the EU decided on a 20% reduction in AMISOM peacekeeper stipends—from US\$1 028 to US\$822 per month.

28 Cedric de Coning, 'Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinction between the African Union and United Nations', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(1), 2017, pp. 145–160.

29 Cedric de Coning, 'Africa and UN Peace Operations: Implications for the Future Role of Regional Organisations', in United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order', In Cedric de Coning and Mateja Peter (eds.) 'United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order' (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_11).

missions. They may also advise and support AU-led missions in planning, public information, human rights, gender, rule of law and the security sector. It is also possible that such missions may include UN Troop Contributing Countries that provide engineering, medical, aviation and other specialised enabling support services to these AU-led missions.

However, challenges exist with this model. First, UN financial and material support will require UNSC authorisation. Under this model, the UNSC, not the AU's PSC, will have the final say about the mission's mandate, scope, size and duration. The implication is that the agency to make decisions about the mandate, scope, size and duration of such an AU-led PSO will no longer reside with the AU PSC or the REC/RM equivalent bodies, weakening the African agency built. For AU-led PSOs through the AU PSC to receive financial support from the UN, these bodies will need to share their agency with the UNSC. As most decisions over the duration, scope, and size depend on funding, under this model, African agency over PSOs will shift from the AU PSC to the UNSC.

Second, UN financial support will add significant transaction costs to managing these operations. All aspects of planning, management and assessments will have to be done in partnership with the UN, and the UN will expect significant efforts devoted to compliance with UN standards and rules and reporting on these to UN entities, which will significantly distract AU PSOs but also shed their current adaptability.<sup>30</sup> A significant percentage of the time of AUC staff working on these missions, and the AU leadership will have to be devoted to engaging with the UN on these issues, which will slow the mission and create additional constraints that impact the mission's effectiveness.

Third, one of the lessons that has emerged from the AMISOM/ATMIS experience is that the UN is not well-matched for supporting enforcement operations.<sup>31</sup> The UN is designed to support peacekeeping operations, and its support system is based on civilian staff and contractors. This means that the pace of the support system is not similar to the high-tempo combat operations that African-led PSOs find themselves operating in. This means that if the UN

30 Timothy Murithi, 'Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations'. *FES Briefing Paper*, 2007. Available at: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04676.pdf>.

31 Anderson, R. L. (2018). 'The HIPPO in the room: the pragmatic push-back from the UN peace bureaucracy against the militarisation of UN peacekeeping'; United Nations, *High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)*, 2015; note: Report explicitly directed UN troops to abstain from military counterterrorism operations; John Karlsrud, 'Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?', *Third World Quarterly*, 38(6), 2017a, pp. 1215–1231; John Karlsrud, 'UN Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism: Uncomfortable Bedfellows?' *Vereinte Nationen*, 153(4), 2017b, pp. 153–158; United Nations, 'High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)', 2015.



is going to support future peace enforcement operations, it needs to develop support that suits combat logistics and combat engineers, which it currently does not have. Thus, dependence on UN support can slow down the efforts of the AU-led PSOs, which in turn forces the AU to match the UN's support system. In addition, there may be a need to invest in combat logistics and combat engineering equipment and training in addition to the support the UN can provide, which will require additional partnership arrangements.

As a result, African-led PSO should only plan to undertake PSO where TCCs can afford to do so, and it can be self-sustained. In addition, the AU and RECS/RMS should only seek funding and support from the UN and other partners as an option of last resort. By designing missions to fit into the budgets and support arrangements of the TCCs, missions are provided with opportunities to deliver innovative, context-specific and creative solutions, which allow them the freedom to adapt instead of being restricted to copy and paste features of the UN support model or the UN culture of troop reimbursements. This is especially important because African-led PSOs can continue to grow and be more relaxed than UN missions that follow a typical UN design parameter. This will allow African-led PSOs to develop their own innovative mission designs that use states' capabilities and that can fit their budget. For example, most African-led PSOs have been undertaken by TCCs that can reach the theatre of operations and re-supply by land, reducing the cost of aviation, which is typically the most expensive aspect of PKO and PSO budgets. Thus, by avoiding dependency on partners, African-led PSOs can reduce their transaction costs, avoid loss of agency and design missions according to the financial means of the bodies and member states that deploy these operations. Where external assistance is needed, as a last resort, support arrangements need to be carefully negotiated to protect African agency. For example, direct financial support should flow via the AU Peace Fund, which will also avoid unhealthy competition and support existing sustainable accountability mechanisms.

### 1.6 *Context-Specific and Adaptive Solutions*

Recent research into how complex social systems respond to external influence has shown that trying to control the outcome usually produces adverse effects, delivering the opposite of what is the desired outcome and generates dependency and fragility because it undermines the capacity of local social institutions to develop and evolve their capacities to learn and adapt.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, evidence suggests that context-specific, locally-driven, and adaptive

32 Cedric de Coning, 'From peacebuilding to sustaining peace: Implications of complexity for resilience and sustainability', *resilience*, 4 (3), 2016, p. 166–181, DOI: 10.1080/21693293.2016.1153773.



approaches to peacebuilding and conflict-affected development are more effective. One of the implications of recognising the complexity of the conflict systems that PSOs are mandated to stabilise and operate in is an understanding that PSOs should not aim to follow a predetermined causal lane or pathway designed to produce specific outcomes. The context-specific approaches that are most effective are those that are rooted in the history, culture and current experienced reality of the people affected by conflict.<sup>33 34</sup> Studies demonstrate that when people affected by conflict felt that they had been involved in shaping their recovery, they also felt a sense of responsibility to sustain the institutions and processes necessary to sustain the peace. Thus, the link between the extent to which a programme is context-specific, participatory and adaptive and its self-sustainability creates a great chance of success.<sup>35</sup> Thus, there is a need to have an adaptive planning and evaluation system in place that ensures that African-led PSOs are continuously adaptive to the changes in their environments and monitor and generate real-time data to improve the mission leaders' and commanders ability to track, assess, adapt and report on the overall performance of their operations. This is especially crucial given that most of the PSO and stabilisation theories of change the AU and RECS/RMS rely on for conflict analysis, planning, management, and evaluation are based on linear cause-and-effect assumptions that do not recognise the complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability that are characteristic of how conflict systems and actors (conflict entrepreneurs, political elites, armed groups and societies and communities in these systems) behave and adapt under stress. Therefore, the article suggests that African-led PSOs adopt an Adaptive Stabilisation approach to mission planning, management and assessments.

### 1.7 *Adaptive Stabilisation*

Adaptive stabilisation is an approach that African-led PSOs can use in their planning and management. It recognises the complexity of the conflict systems that African-led PSOs find themselves in and are mandated to stabilise and navigate. To cope with this uncertainty, PSOs must adopt an Adaptive Stabilisation approach to conflict assessments, situational awareness and

33 Cedric de Coning, 'Adaptive Peacebuilding', *International Affairs*, 94 (2), 2018, pp. 301–317, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix251>.

34 Cedric de Coning, Rui Saraiva and Ako Muto, 'Adaptive Peacebuilding: A New Approach to Sustaining Peace in the 21st Century'. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2023). Available open access at: <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-18219-8>.

35 *Ibid* and see also: Cedric de Coning, Rui Saraiva and Ako Muto 'Adaptive Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Peacemaking in Colombia, Mozambique, the Philippines, and Syria' (2023). London: Palgrave MacMillan, available open access at: <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-92577-2>.

intelligence analysis; include this in their mission planning, form part of the mission leadership, command and coordination, and continually assess and evaluate progress. An Adaptive Stabilisation approach enables African-led PSOs to continuously learn and adapt their plans and actions to their changing operational environment. African-led PSOs try to influence the behaviour of a conflict system by undertaking several actions, for example, patrols. These actions are intended to deter and dissuade actors who use violence to pursue their interests, encourage and support those who reject violence and use alternative means to manage and resolve conflicts. To change the behaviour systems, African-led PSOs' actions need to be directed at specific vital stakeholders. These stakeholders are typically individuals and institutions that influence how others in the system behave and can be identified (by stakeholder mapping). They need to understand the direction they want to influence and then design their actions accordingly.

However, it is not possible to predetermine how these key stakeholders will respond to the actions the mission is intended to undertake. Therefore, African-led PSOs must undertake various actions and actively monitor the feedback loops these actions generate. In other words, it is not sufficient to plan to undertake only one type of action to try to influence a specific key stakeholder. African-led PSOs will need to undertake a range of actions simultaneously and pro-actively monitor how the key stakeholders react to these actions. Thus, the 'adaptation' in the Adaptive Stabilisation approach refers to how African-led PSOs act on the knowledge they gain from monitoring the reactions of the key stakeholders. If the actions have the desired effect, they can be scaled up and refined. If not, they must be adapted or abandoned and replaced with new actions. This process of adapting the PSO's actions based on how the key stakeholders react to the PSO's actions needs to be repeated regularly. Planning, assessments and adaptation is thus an iterative process of ongoing learning and adaptation. Even those actions that had the desired effect need to be continuously monitored because the conflict entrepreneurs are also learning and adapting and actions that have worked will become less effective over time. Three guiding principles are given below for African-led PSOs to successfully use an Adaptive Stabilisation approach to the strategic, operational and tactical scales of planning, management and command.

### 1.8 *Holistic and Comprehensive*

First, there is the need to recognise that a stabilisation or peace process cannot rely on a one-dimensional approach. Conflict systems are complex because their behaviour is shaped by the dynamics underway in multiple interconnected dimensions or sub-systems. The implication is that it is impossible to isolate

one domain from another. In essence, politically led comprehensive solutions and multidimensional capabilities, identified as two key lessons that African-led PSOs have lacked over the past two decades, need to be contemplated. Therefore, African-led PSOs need to pay special attention to helping those affected by conflict to seek comprehensive and holistic solutions and should assist stakeholders with acquiring the means and capacities necessary to implement such solutions. This does not mean that the African-led PSO must be able to cover all dimensions by itself. However, through coordination and cooperation within a broader strategic adaptive framework and engagement with other African-led PSOs and through smart partnerships, holistic and comprehensive social transformation in the conflict systems that African-led PSOs and other actors are trying to influence can emerge.

### 1.9 *Context-Specific and Participatory*

Second, stabilisation or peace processes must be self-sustainable for the Adaptive Stabilisation approach to be effective. Recognising the need for stabilisation or peace processes to be self-sustainable, the parties to the conflict and other key stakeholders must be in the driving seat of the process. In essence, imposed solutions only last as long as they are inflicted. For solutions to be self-sustainable, those affected by the conflict must lead their own stabilisation and peace processes. African-led PSOs and other external actors can support the process but should refrain from driving the process or insisting on predetermined outcomes. The stabilisation or peace process content must be context-specific and reach local aspects of communities. It needs to reflect the needs and interests of the people affected by the conflict and relate their history and socio-political realities and the lived experience of those affected by the conflict. Context specificity can only be achieved if the people affected by the conflict drive the process and make the key decisions at each critical juncture. Attempts to force an agreement or to impose conditions on parties that reflect international interpretations of the problems and potential solutions result in unworkable agreements that crumble under pressure because they lack local ownership. The parties agree under pressure but renege on or endlessly delay the implementation of these agreements because they do not reflect their needs and interests. An Adaptive Stabilisation approach embraces context-specific and participatory processes that encourage parties to a conflict and affected people to find homegrown solutions.

### 1.10 *Process Facilitation*

Third, there is a need for close collaboration with the parties and people affected by the conflict, as they need to be part of the progression and in a position

to inform and steer the process. This principle also requires recognition that the people affected by the conflict have the right to self-determination in their sovereign state and that the role of an African-led PSO is to support and assist them in that process. In the Adaptive Stabilisation approach, the role of the PSO is thus limited to process facilitation. Care must be taken not to dominate mediation or other elements of a peace process. It should give space to the parties and population affected by the conflict to make decisions about processes, content and solutions. International partners are, of course, free to choose to what extent they are comfortable with supporting such processes and their outcomes, but the rights of people to determine their futures—and thus to take responsibility and ownership of these processes and their outcomes—is recognised as a guiding principle of the Adaptive Stabilisation approach. Thus, the Adaptive Stabilisation approach requires PSOs to show humility and an openness to learn from experience(s). It requires African-led PSOs to commit to not imposing pre-conceived plans and theories of change but to allow the process and people affected to generate context-specific solutions and to then collaboratively adapt these homegrown solutions based on the feedback generated by the implementation process.

## 2 Conclusion

In this article, the authors take stock of the development of African-led PSOs over the last two decades with the aim of identifying several critical lessons that the AU and other African institutions need to consider enhancing the performance, effectiveness, sustainability and adaptability of African-led PSOs now and in the future. The article outlined three types of African-led PSOs, how they emerged, their characteristic, and what they entail. In short, this is a collective term for African-led PSOs undertaken by the AU, RECs/RMs and a coalition of states under the overarching umbrella of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Peace and Security Protocol of the AU and the APSA.

The article moved to identify four common characteristics among most of these African-led PSOs, namely that they are not limited to peacekeeping. Many peace enforcement operations operate where there is no peace to be kept; many support states against rebels or insurgents and operate alongside host-nation forces during processes. Therefore, African-led PSOs are not necessarily impartial in the same way UN PKOs strive to be but represent a wide range of operations, including ceasefire observer and public health emergency operations, as well as operations mandated to restore constitutional order in specific states forcefully.

Additionally, the analysis in the article identified four lessons emanating from the experience of African-led PSOs over the last two decades since the establishment of the AU. These were the need for comprehensive politically led PSOs, the need for PSOs to have multidimensional capabilities, the requirement for flexible standby arrangements, the need to have cautious financing, support and partnership arrangements, and the need for context-specific and adaptive solutions. Finally, with the increased use of African-led PSOs to deal with insecurity, which is/are security-driven in nature, the article concluded by making a case for the adoption of an Adaptive Stabilisation approach, which it has been argued will help make African-led PSOs more sustainable, self-sufficient and effective. An Adaptive Stabilisation approach enables African-led PSOs to continuously learn from experience and adapt their plans and actions to their changing operational environment.

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### **Declaration of Interest Statement**

The authors have reported no potential conflict of interest.

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ANNEX I

African-led Peace Support Operations

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) – Transitioned into the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB)	Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique	2003–2004	Burundi
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) I	Algeria, Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa	2004–2005	Sudan
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) II Transitioned into the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur	TCCs: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, The Gambia, Chad, Kenya, South Africa MILOBs: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Zambia	2005–2007	Sudan

African-led Peace Support Operations (*cont.*)

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
African Union Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC)	Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Togo	2004	Comoros
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda	2006	Comoros
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – Transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia	TCCS: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, (Sierra Leone (2013/14), Uganda Staff Officers: Benin, Chad, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia	2007–2022	Somalia
African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros (MAES)	PCCS: Ghana (FPU/IPO), Kenya (IPO), Nigeria (FPU/IPO), Sierra Leone (FPU/IPO), Uganda (FPU/IPO), Zambia (IPO) Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal	2007–2008	Comoros



African-led Peace Support Operations (*cont.*)

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	<p>TCCs:            Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Pakistan, and Tanzania</p> <p>PCCs:            Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Brazil, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Magnolia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Nepal, Rwanda, Pakistan, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Zambia, Zimbabwe</p> <p>Other Contributors of Military Personnel:            Bhutan, Cambodia, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Iran, Magnolia, Malaysia, Malawi, Namibia, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe</p>	2008–2021	Sudan

African-led Peace Support Operations (*cont.*)

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)	Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda	2013	Mali
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic [Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine] (MISCA)	Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda	2013–2014	Central African Republic
African Union Human Rights and Military Observer Mission in Burundi (AUHRME)	N/A	2015–2021	Burundi
African Union Technical Support Team to the Gambia (AUTSTG)	Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda	2017–2021	The Gambia

African-led Peace Support Operations (*cont.*)

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
African Union Military Observers Mission to the Central African Republic (MOUACA)	Benin, Congo, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa	2020–ongoing	Central African Republic
African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)	TCCS: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda. Staff Officers: Benin, Chad, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia PCCS: Ghana (FPU/IPO), Kenya (IPO), Nigeria (FPU/IPO), Sierra Leone (FPU/IPO), Uganda (FPU/IPO), Zambia (IPO).	2022–ongoing	Somalia
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)	African Union authorised missions- African-led peace operations Mali, Nigeria, Senegal	2003	Liberia
ECOWAS Forces in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)	Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo	2003	Cote d'Ivoire

African-led Peace Support Operations (*cont.*)

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
Multinational Force for Central African Republic (Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC))	Republic of Congo, Chad, Cameroon, and Gabon	2003	Central African Republic
Mission for the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Central Africa (MICOPAX)	Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon	2013	Central African Republic
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB)	Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Senegal, Niger	2012	Guinea-Bissau
SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAMPLE)	Angola, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe	2017–2018	Lesotho
ECOWAS Intervention Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG)	Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Togo	2017	Gambia

African-led Peace Support Operations (*cont.*)

Mission name	Troop, police contributing countries and civilian contribution	Period of deployment and conclusion of mission	Country of deployment
SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Rwanda, South Africa, Zimbabwe	2021	Mozambique
Operation Democracy in the Comoros	<u>Regional Economic Community Deployments</u> Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal	2008	Comoros
The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Uganda	2011–ongoing	CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda
Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko-Haram (MNJTF-BH)	Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	2015–ongoing	Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria