



Beyond the Battlefield: the Impact of United Nations and African-Led Peacekeeping on Enhancing Capabilities of African Armies

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Abstract

The character of conflicts across Africa has evolved, necessitating the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), African-led Peace Support Operations (PSO) and African states to adapt their approach to dealing with emerging insecurities. As a response, African states have deployed their armies to UN PKO, African-led PSOs and other peace operations to not only support these missions' objectives and receive training for their forces but also to develop security and military capacities to deal with emerging and existing threats. Drawing on the cases of Chad and Ghana, the paper explores the formation of the respective armies, their influence on their political systems and how the respective armies have been influenced by their participation in peacekeeping operations. The analysis finds that despite being under-equipped and working in challenging environments. Both forces influence and shape the mission's tempo and style of operations by adapting to regional challenges, which is a consequence of the historical and strategic style of the respective militaries but are also capitalised on by the UN PKO and African-led PSO. Finally, the paper finds that dissimilar environments where the armies are deployed contribute to shaping and supporting both armies' evolution, increasing their overall agency and legitimacy in peacekeeping.

Keywords

African armies – Chad – Ghana – United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and African-Led Peace Support Operations

1 Introduction

Since the inception of the first United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), many peacekeeping missions have taken place on the African continent. This has led to three distinct periods in the UN PKO history; the first period (from 1948 and 1978) was a move away from limited efforts to maintain peace in post-conflict environments towards more robust efforts at peace enforcement. The first mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), in 1948 was designed to monitor the ceasefire along Israel's border. Two UN Emergency Forces deployed to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai in 1956 and 1974 followed this.¹ While the first armed peacekeeping mission occurred during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the UN Charter of 1945 did not mention peacekeeping. However, four years later, the UN found itself in the Congo under the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), the UN's first peacekeeping mission with significant military capabilities. This "first generation" of traditional peacekeeping, between 1948 and 1978, interpreted the rules in mostly inter-state wars to allow for deploying an interposing force based on the consent of warring parties to oversee a peace agreement, with the peacekeepers maintaining strict neutrality.^{2 3}

The second period (from the 1980s–1990s) involved the composition of peacekeepers from the global north, who desired to deliver liberal democratic norms and wanted to stop violent conflict from getting out of hand. This led to more international interventions and missions such as the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) (1992–1993), the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (1993–1995), and the US-led Unified Task Force (1992–1993) Operation Restore Hope, also in Somalia. Boutros Boutros-Ghali led the UNSG during this period

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- 1 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, U.K., Polity Press, 2010).
 - 2 Alan James, 'International Peacekeeping: The Disputants View', *Political Studies*, 38(2), 1990, pp. 215–230.
 - 3 Peter Albrecht, 'UN funding cuts for peacekeeping have consequences for Ghana', 2019. Available at: <https://www.diiis.dk/en/research/un-funding-cuts-peacekeeping-consequences-ghana>.

while Kofi Annan later expanded UN PKO.⁴ Mandates included human rights monitoring, training police forces, disarming and reintegrating soldiers, and strengthening state institutions.⁵ These deployments would lead to an intersection with the African continent's regional organisation's operations, such as the UN PKO deploying 368 military observers alongside a 16,000 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in 1993 to Liberia. The deployment represented the first time the UN had co-deployed troops with an existing regional force in the field and, in many cases, rehatting African regional force under the UN PKO banner, indirectly supporting the emergence of African-led Peace Support Operations (PSO), which was regionally focused.⁶

The third period (2000s-current) produced changes to the mandates of UN missions and the deployment of 'robust' UN PKO, with some missions having enforcement and stabilisation directives like the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), with a Force Intervention Brigade primarily made up of African TCCs.⁷ Attempts were made to transfer peacekeeping expertise from the global north to the south, with states like Chad and Ghana (amongst other African states, e.g., Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda) expanding their participation in UN PKO and African-led PSO s across the continent.⁸ The third period intersected with an increase in African-led PSO capacity by the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).⁹

For African-led peacekeeping capacity, the first phase was denoted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) deployment of its first peacekeeping operation to Chad from 1977 to 1982, representing a unique deployment where the state permitted substantial intervention by a regional organisation in

4 Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*. (Oxford Academic, 2008).

5 Lisa M. Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

6 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'African-led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 29 (2), 2023, pp. 230–244.

7 The Effectiveness of Peace Operation Network (EPON), 'MONUSCO's 2021 Mandate Renewal: Transition and exit' (2022). Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/monuscoss-2021-mandate-renewal-transition-and-exit/>.

8 United Nations Peacekeeping, 'Troop and Police Contributors' (2023). Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

9 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'African-led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of UN Peacekeeping Operations'.

crisis.¹⁰ The introduction of peacekeeping forces in 1981 helped reinforce the mission.¹¹ This was contrary to systemic norms and organisational principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states. While the deployment was limited in scope, it represented a change in concept for the OAU, where coercion¹² which was not a distinctive aspect of its peacekeeping approach became so. This was followed by the deployment of military observers by the OAU during the 1990s to Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros.

The second phase of African-led PSO s (REC-led PSO s) was its intersection with the UN PKO discussed earlier. The conflicts of this period often focused on the contestation for national power or, in some cases, for control over regions within states.¹³ This led to the advancement of the African Standby Force (ASF) initiative launched in 2003, focused on responding to civil wars.¹⁴ Furthermore, this period witnessed regional peacekeeping or peace enforcement capabilities under the UN Security Council's authorisation. REC-led PSO s denote a second period for African-led PSO s' capacity, which converges under the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). For example, ECOWAS PSO s deployed peace enforcement operations to Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) to stop the civil wars,¹⁵ while the AU has since deployed eleven PSO s.¹⁶

The third phase of African-led PSO s can be categorised by missions such as AMISOM,¹⁷ where firstly, deployments focused on stabilising environments and states, differing from the UN PKO doctrine, which focused on sustaining

10 Despite this, the peacemaking effort in Chad was conceptually defective; the peacekeeping was operationally inefficient and underfinanced; and its peace servicing was non-existent – in essence, there was no relationship to the strengths and weaknesses of their regional organisation.

11 Charter of the OAU, Article III/2.

12 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace' (U.N. Department of Information, New York, 1992), pp. 8–9.

13 Cedric de Coning, C. (2017). 'Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinction between the African Union and United Nations', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38:1, pp. 145–160.

14 Linda Darkwa, 'The African Standby Force: The African Union's tool for the maintenance of peace and security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38 (3), 2017, pp. 471–482.

15 Davis S. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, 'Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41, (6), 1997, pp. 723–748.

16 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'Generation three and a half peacekeeping: Understanding the evolutionary character of African-led Peace Support Operations', *African Security Review*, 2023. DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2023.2237482.

17 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'Waging Peace, towards an African Union Stabilisation Strategy for Somalia', *Brill Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 2022, pp. 236–260.

peace where peace could be kept, and the rules of engagement were clear.¹⁸ Secondly, African-led PSO s were deployed to protect and support the state against aggressors. Initially, these were internal rebel groups, but lately, they consist of insurgents, violent extremists, or local bandits, often with no clearly defined political motive or geographical control. As a result, there has also been the emergence of context-specific responses called ad hoc security initiatives (ASIS), which include operations such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)¹⁹ and Joint- Force for the G5 Sahel (JF-G5S),²⁰ designed to address insecurity linked with insurgency (rebels or insurgents) fighting the state.²¹ ASI emerged outside of the African Peace and Security Architecture and were a different form of collective security arrangement. Thirdly, they operated in support of and, where feasible, alongside host nation forces and in line with the AU constitutional order,²² designed to support and assist states back to stability through force if necessary.²³ All three have been deployed in conjunction with national security forces, acted as the first responder and crucially, in some cases, handed over to UN PKO s or missions, representing a third phase of African-led PSO s and generation three and a half of peacekeeping capacity.²⁴

While a clear distinction has emerged, the impact of these missions on African armies is an undeveloped area of research that necessitates further enlightenment –particularly the consequences that the UN PKO and African-led PSO s may have on national armed forces.²⁵ Consequently, two vital questions arise from this understanding. First, what influence do UN PKO and African-led PSO s have on African armies? Second, what influence are African

18 Thus, it exposes the limitations of UN doctrine, which preserves traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force.

19 EPON, 'A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force', 2023. Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/mnjtf/>.

20 EPON, 'Shifting from External Dependency', 2022, Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/shifting-from-external-dependency/>.

21 Cedric de Coning, C. *et al*, 'Ad-hoc Security Initiatives, an African response to insecurity', *African Security Review*, 31(4), 2022, pp. 383–398.

22 African Union Constitutive Act (2000). Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

23 Cedric De Coning, C. *et al.* (2022). 'Ad-hoc Security Initiatives, an African response to insecurity'.

24 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'Generation three and a half peacekeeping: Understanding the evolutionary character of African-led Peace Support Operations', 2023, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2023.2237482.

25 Kwesi Aning, 'Unintended Consequences of Peace Operation on the host economy from a people's perspective', 2010, In Aoi *et al.*, (Eds.) '*Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*'.

armies having on shaping and transforming UN PKO and African-led PSO, and what are the long-term effects on African armies (increasing capabilities or militarising domestic security)?²⁶

Consequently, the paper sets out to critically explore the influence of UN PKO and African-led PSOs on the evolution of Chad and Ghana's armies as case studies, which are selected for three reasons. First, the two cases represent states whose armies have become crucial to the UN PKOs and African-led PSOs across the African continent. In the case of Ghana, it has a history of participation in peacekeeping operations going back to the earliest days of UN PKO deployments in Africa. In Chad's case, its deployments have been to states and environments where conflict has become extremely violent, protracted, and within its region. This includes regions where insurgents have embedded amongst civilians and blend violence with criminality and banditry. Second, Chad and Ghana represent states that have experienced latent internal conflicts and have suffered from coups but now represent some of Africa's forces leading the charge against continental insecurity, especially within UN PKOs. Finally, Chadian forces have become a critical military enabler of UN PKO in Africa as the fourteenth highest contributor with 1429, across fourteen UN missions, deploying to the Central Africa Republic (CAR), to Mali (as a non-ECOWAS member) as first responders to the crisis, and later as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); to the G5 Sahel joint force (JF-G5S), a joint force undertaken by the five Sahelian states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad); and across the Lake Chad Basin region, where Chadian forces are fighting the Boko Haram insurgency as part of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Ghana is the sixth highest contributor to UN PKO, deploying 2,769 uniformed personnel across twelve missions of which 15.6 per cent are women,²⁷ and has accumulated a wealth of experience with UN PKO since its first deployment in the 1960s. Thus, it will be argued that both forces have demonstrated resilience, expertise in PKO and PSO, and technical skills, reshaping how the UN PKO and African-led PSOs engage during operations.

The paper's analytical lens is based on understanding relational and contextualised agency, where structures and agency are continuously reproduced over time. Thus, the paper draws on theoretically informed empirical analysis to further understand the impacts of the two armies'

26 Philip Cunliffe, 'From peacekeepers to praetorians – how participating in peacekeeping operations may subvert democracy', *International Relations*, 32 (2), 2018, pp. 218–239, p. 219.

27 'United Nations Troop and Police Contributions' (2023). Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

historical and strategic military engagement in UN PKO and African-led PSO and whether the two armies have any agency in shaping and transforming UN PKO and African-led PSO. The paper employs an exploratory approach where the existence and nature of influence are not assumed but investigated through rich empirical analysis. Thus, the paper challenges narrowly structure-dominated theories and overly restrictive policies intended at understanding whether African armies are increasing capabilities through international peacekeeping or not. Finally, the paper draws on government policies, Armed forces reports, official documents, and information from historical research to ascertain the evolution of both forces. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one briefly explores the history and formation of the Chadian army and the types of UN PKO and African-led PSO its forces have been a part of. Section two, like section one, explores the formation of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), describing the military's influence in politics and how this led to the utilisation of UN PKO to professionalise the GAF through increased deployments. Section three examines the influence of Chad and Ghana (as African armies) on UN PKO and African-led PSO; it argues that their exposure to dissimilar operations has allowed the respected forces to adapt and shape the tempo of UN PKO. Section four studies how UN PKO has influenced the forces through support to their armies and to what degree the deployment of Chadian and Ghanaian armies in peacekeeping has helped to increase the capabilities of these forces. The final section provides concluding thoughts.

1.1 *The Formation of the Chadian Army*

After gaining independence in 1960, President François Tombalbaye (from 1960 until his overthrow in 1975) declared his party, the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT), the only legal party. Tombalbaye ensured that the central government in the south was mostly made up of southern tribes while trying to Africanise the state. Muslim communities in the north felt Tombalbaye was alienating them with his policies. Consequently, when Tombalbaye announced tax increases in 1965, a rebellion emerged that rekindled traditional animosities between the Muslim north and central regions and the predominantly non-Muslim people. In 1975, Tombalbaye was murdered by the Chadian military and was succeeded by a military government led by Félix Malloum, who continued to wage war against northern insurgents. While the National Liberation Front of Chad or, in French, Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Frolinat) fighters controlled vast northern, eastern and central areas, they could not defeat the government, which received substantial support from French forces based in Chad between 1969–72. During this period, procuring forces and defections from one side

to another solidified a political economy of war for local groups. The Borko-Ennedi-Tibesti region would experience rebellions and “warlike inhabitants”, making armed ad hoc resistance attractive to groups and people in this area.²⁸ The resistance during this period observed the spread of traditional nomad pastoralist practises referred to as “going out” that became further embedded in culture and the way of everyday life, involving men (nomads and pastoralists), resistance fighters and hired warriors (warlords), often leaving towns and villages for months and years, rebelling against those in power.²⁹ Essentially, the role of warlords became autonomously governing different territories of Chad and governing how groups would conduct resistance. The fighting strategy of warlords and nomads filtered through to parts of the military and the wider security sector. Consequently, there was an increase in the opportunity for forces to fight and defect, increasing the risk-tolerance of Chadian forces. The north descended into chaos and rebellion, with Frolinat composed of nomads and warlords splintering but maintaining control over their ethnic strongholds, which led to incessant war against one another.³⁰

A new national government, known as the ‘Transitional Government of National Unity’ (GUNT), led by Goukouni Oueddei (in 1979), was installed. During his three-year rule as president (1979–1982), Goukouni exerted little control over the rival northern regions held by nomads. In many ways, warlords in the South became self-sustaining segments of the state. During the 1980s, Chad became a regimented disorder where the rebels had no central government, which allowed for peculiar flexibility, fluidity and opportunity for personal engagement.³¹ As a result, Chad was the first country to host a peacekeeping operation from the Organization of African Unity in response to a civil war between the government of President Goukouni Oueddei and the Northern Armed Forces of former Vice President Hissène Habré from 1981–1982. Previous coup attempts were unsuccessful but led to President Hissène Habré’s purging of the army, which impacted different troops from different regions.

28 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, ‘Nomads and Warlords, Chadian Forces in African Peace Operations’, *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 25(4), 2023, pp. 337–362.

29 Marielle Debos, *Living by the Gun in Chad: Combatants, Impunity and State Formation* (London: ZED Books, 2016).

30 JC Pomonti, *Le Monde* (5 February 1982) quoted in D Yost, ‘French policy in Chad and the Libyan challenge’, *Orbis* 26(4), 1983.

31 Julien Brachet and Judith Scheele, ‘Remoteness is power: Disconnection as a relation in northern Chad’, *Social Anthropology*, 27 (2), 156–171; Julien Brachet and Judith Scheele, *The value of disorder: Autonomy, prosperity, and plunder in the Chadian Sahara*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Idriss Déby Itno, who at the time was a commander under Habré's military in the 1980s, played a significant role during the 'Toyota War', contributing to the Libyan-Chadian conflict's success. However, Habré suspected Déby as one of the coup plotters, forcing Déby into exile, fleeing to Senegal and then to Darfur. Déby established the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) in Darfur and trained approximately 2,000 loyal troops with support from Libya and Sudan.³² In November 1990, he left Darfur for N'Djamena and effortlessly entered the capital city on 2 December 1990. After becoming president, several of Habré's high-level agents continued working for Déby.³³ Chad, up until this period, had become 'a warring society' with aggression against others being normal.³⁴ Tubu nomads and Zaghawa, who are a part of President Déby's tribal group, were allowed to conquer Chad and would go on to become the new ruling elites of the country, controlling not only the government but also the military and embedding their practices and those of society together. In essence, President Déby and his forces in the field used their local combating structures to deal with rebels, contributing to reshaping the Chadian army.

Direct engagement with the UN in Chad came in response to a combination of domestic rebel attacks in Chad and the deterioration of the Chad-Sudan relationship, including cross-border attacks from Janjaweed militias from Darfur. Chad had faced growing violence, theft, and rebellion since 2005, with no justice sector institutions capable of responding.³⁵ In 2007, there were 281,000 refugees in Chad from Sudan and CAR and another 150,000 internally displaced people.³⁶ A report by the UN Secretary-General in February 2007 (S/2007/97, 23 February 2007) proposed a multidimensional force of between 6,000 and 10,900 responsible for protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, and good offices work to improve regional relationships between Chad and Sudan and between CAR and Sudan. However, president Déby would only consider a civilian presence and fiercely resisted proposals for UN troops over a series of consultations with the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, a UN policing mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT IN 2003) was designed

32 Marielle Debos, *Living by the Gun in Chad: Combatants, Impunity and State Formation* (London: ZED Books, 2016).

33 Brody, R. (2015). 'Bringing a dictator to justice: The case of Hissène Habré', *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 13(2), pp. 209–217.

34 Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Le Frolinat et les revoltes populaires du Tchad, 1965* (Paris and New York: Mouton, 1978).

35 *New York University Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp. 100–102.

36 Alexandra Novosseloff and Richard Gowan, 'Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations: The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic, 2006–2010' (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2012).

to help protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian aid to thousands of people uprooted due to insecurity in the two countries and in neighbouring Sudan. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) comprised 300 UN police, 25 military liaison officers and 5,200 military personnel mandated to train and mentor 850 Chadian gendarmes who were also charged with protecting refugees, internally displaced people, and humanitarian actors throughout eastern Chad.³⁷

Over time, the Chadian army, through UN programmes, peacekeeping exposure, bilateral training (US, France and European Union) and the plea to access more of the country's oil revenues, allowed the Chadian army to reform itself into an army equipped to deploy for continental challenges. For example, in 2012, Mali had disintegrated with internal problems in the north, partly due to the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Mali's then-president requested support from the AU and later France, which would translate into the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). The AFISMA was an ECOWAS (Chad is a non-member of ECOWAS) deployment authorised and supported by the UNSC as an enforcement mission to support the government against Islamist rebels in Northern Mali. The main forces included Chadian forces, whose combat style was like the insurgents, and the army was familiar with the terrain and could deploy an amalgamation of home-grown techniques that would be part of the AFISMA strategy. In rehatting AFISMA to MINUSMA, the UN PKO inherited 6,300 of its initially mandated 11 200 troops, mainly from neighbouring countries like Chad (troop contribution was 1400), Niger and Burkina Faso.³⁸ MINUSMA was established by the Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 and was designed as a stabilisation operation.³⁹

However, since the UN does not permit forces to engage militants offensively, it would require forces to "anticipate, deter and effectively respond to threats to the civilian population".⁴⁰ Previous mandates have eventually made MINUSMA more robust but have not included a clear offensive counterinsurgency component. Originally, MINUSMA was supposed to work with Malian and French forces as part of Operation Barkhane, a French military counterterrorism campaign from 2014 to 2022 designed to oversee counterterrorism operations in Mali. The MINUSMA was in the awkward

37 'United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (2023)'. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/minurcat/background.shtml>.

38 United Nations Contributions (2022). 'UN Mission's Summary Detailed by Country', Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/aug16_3.pdf.

39 'United Nation Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013)'. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10987.doc.htm>.

40 Ibid.

position of having to contain the jihadist threat without being able to suppress it actively. However, due to its mandate and insecurity, Chadian forces were offered support and training through the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, launched in 2013. The EUTM also delivered military assistance and educational training, to ensure self-sustainability and establish forces capable of conducting military operations to restore territorial integrity to the G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) and their Joint Forces. The EU training which Chad benefitted from also included the EU Capacity and Assistance Programme (EUCAP) Sahel-Mali and Niger.

Through training, Chadian forces were brought up to UN standards (as well as counterterrorism through Operation Serval and military training designed to professionalise the army for the UN mission and the region). The programmes were designed to support Chad's efforts to support regional stability through MINUSMA and other UN PKOs, such as the UN mission in CAR, where Chad was a lead nation during field operations. Chad forces acquired additional training in remote warfare as part of their deployment to MINUSMA and intelligence training from France and the UK, which has helped the force in its efforts within the MNJTF.⁴¹ The operations have capitalised on Chadian forces' historical background and deployment tactics in both cases. For example, Chadian and Nigerian troops were involved in Operation Yacine Taffi I in 2019, where they cleared areas held by terrorists, neutralised Boko Haram leaders and forced 111 members of the sect to surrender.⁴² Another example of the UN's influence on Chad was the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Firearms Programme. In 2018, UNODC trained national police, gendarmerie, and armed forces to investigate and prosecute illicit firearms trafficking cases.⁴³

Chadian forces also capitalised and utilised UN PKO and African-led PSOs with specific stabilisation and enforcement mandates and operations to gain further training and exposure to hostile environments, supporting its efforts at home. Chad's armies' exposure to nomad and warlord strategies included deploying forces for long periods to remote areas without access to strategic and logistic support, allowing Chadian forces in MINUSMA to sustain gains and permanently have infantry battalions based in the most dangerous and

41 (EPON) (2023). 'A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force'.

42 Nigerian Army Website (2019). 'Operation Yacine Taffi Update: Boko Haram Suffer More Losses'. Available at: <https://army.mil.ng/?p=3010> Accessed 13 September 2023.

43 The former president pushed for a significant role in MINUSMA that included the appointment of a Chadian diplomat as the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG), Mahamat Saleh Annadif.

impassable parts of Sector North in Aguelhoc and Tessalit. This area is close to the border with Algeria, increasing the army's adaptability to support and contribute to combatting current conflicts.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, it led to Chad having one of the highest numbers of soldiers killed, leading to complaints from the government that "Chadian forces have remained stationed in the north, without being relieved".⁴⁵ Consequently, Chadian forces have become a distinct component of the UN's third period of deployments.

In the following section, the paper examines the history of the GAF and its involvement in UN PKO s. As will be discussed, the GAF rely on being positioned close to their compounds to conduct patrol (within a short range of their bases), which supports traditional UN peacekeeping doctrine. Nevertheless, to achieve this success in UN PKO s, the GAF had to modify the colonial structures of the army, which was gradually achieved through the GAF's exposure to UN PKO s and African-led PSO s. This gradual adjustment impacted the GAF approach to UN PKO and produced dissimilar outcomes to that of the Chadian army and the types of peacekeeping operations they are a part of. Thus, GAF has evolved with the evolution of peacekeeping but uses a different engagement strategy and deploys to UN PKO with different types of mandate to that of the Chad army.

1.2 *Forming Ghana's Armed Forces*

Military and military-political leaders shaped the formation of Ghana, shaping the country's foundations through coups, increasing troop deployment to peacekeeping operations and using this as a tool for support and keeping the military at bay. This produced effects on the organisation of security that cannot be divorced from the military's historical role in Ghana's government. Since the 1960s, the GAF has been deployed to over 30 UN PKO s, primarily shaping and defining the GAF through its interactions with UN PKO.^{46 47} Thus, understanding the link between peacekeeping and internal operations

44 Arthur Boutellis, 'Chad, Once Forgotten by the UN, is Back, Front and Center', International Peace Institute, *Global Observatory*, 2013.

45 Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, Peter Albrecht and Rikke Haugegaard, 'Friction and Inequality among Peacekeepers in Mali', *The russ Journal*, 162 (2), 2017. pp. 34–42.

46 In the 1960s, Ghana sent two peacekeeping contingents to the Congo. One was a bilateral arrangement between Ghana and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, fighting a secessionist threat, and two was a peacekeeping force under the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC).

47 Kwesi Aning, 'Unintended Consequences of Peace Operation on the host economy from a people's perspective', 2010. In Aoi et al., (eds.) *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*.

in Ghana requires an appreciation of the historical trajectories, practices and discourses that the GAF has both produced and been shaped by.

During the colonial period, coastal British African armies were primarily composed of civilian police units built and equipped to deal with local and internal matters aligned with the colonial administrator's interests. This directly produced undeveloped British colonial armies. The forces that did exist were small combat units designed to deal with internal challenges. Local colonial military forces were created to fit the empire-wide strategic needs and considerations, suggesting a focus on the empire. To avoid internal rebellions, colonial forces often turned to minority and disadvantaged groups within specific sections of society to recruit personnel, using stereotypes to further their causes, creating rifts between groups.⁴⁸ In some cases, Africans were prevented from joining African armies to stop them from politically spreading the ideology of nationalism.⁴⁹

In the case of Ghana, the British administrator deployed a small number of forces during the Second World War to Burma to reinforce the empire's objectives.⁵⁰ Ghana's army would see an expansion, and by 1945, the British strategy for Ghana's army "was unprecedentedly African in conception, strategic deployment and manpower but Western in construct".⁵¹ With a new wave of independence to hit the African continent, peacekeeping for Ghana would become integral to Ghana's emergence as an independent state in 1957. After independence, the GAF were distinctly British in their formation and day-to-day military organisation. In 1960, when the first president, Kwame Nkrumah, engaged politically and militarily in the Congo, it was a manifestation of his post-colonial grand strategy of decolonisation, Pan-Africanism, non-alignment and a unified military security system. Part of this vision included the aspiration to create a united military force called the African High Command designed to deal with collective continental insecurity.⁵²

However, the deployment by Nkrumah to the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was at a time when the GAF forces still held much

48 James M. Lee, *African armies and Civil Orde* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

49 David Killingray, 'Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen and Politics in the Hod Coast, 1939–1950', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21(2), 1983, pp. 523–534.

50 British Broadcasting Cooperation. 'Destination Burma', 2016. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mPCDFHD3Fk>.

51 Chester A. Crocker, 'Military dependence: the colonial legacy in Africa', *Modern African Studies*, 12(2), 1974, pp. 265–286. In September 1939, the total African colonial forces equalled 19,500; by May 1945, they numbered over 400,000.

52 Ama Biney, *The political and social thought of Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Jeffrey S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism: Nation State, and Pan-Africanism in Ghana* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2017).

of the British training, standards and military doctrine. The decision to deploy GAF to the DRC was influenced by an understanding of creating stability and dealing with the threat of colonialism from Belgium – which was tied to liberating the African continent and a broader theme of Pan-Africanism. This was the basis for shaping Ghana's independence and its foreign policy objectives, influencing the GAF's course of direction.⁵³ While there was a conscious effort to inculcate the Sandhurst tradition in the new military academy, which contributed to the basis of Ghana military doctrine, the GAF quickly developed its Ghanaian characteristics. However, friction between the old and the new within the military emerged.⁵⁴ The old represented the Gold Coast colonial (Ghana), and the new represented the international experience that the GAF was gaining abroad in part due to the challenges of the UN PKO in Congo, which led to their exit in 1964. This dynamic extended to internal challenges between the army and Nkrumah's presidential guards.

While several attempted and successful coups emerged, resulting in Ghana having the highest number of attempted coups in West Africa – earlier forces were composed of candidates who received Sandhurst and other British military training.⁵⁵ However, as time passed, those connected to coups in Ghana became further removed from British influence and focused on acquiring proficiencies from UN PKO experiences.⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ The support for coups from the GAF reduced as time passed, and Ghana's leaders increased GAF participation in UN PKO s. Notwithstanding the military takeover by the GAF, those who committed the coup, military leaders still contributed troops to UN PKO. For example, during Ignatius Kutu Acheampong's mandate, GAF contributed to the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in 1973 in Sinai, Egypt. Under this regime, GAF continued to interact with UN PKO, acquiring valuable skills, some of which may have contributed to Colonel Acheampong's overthrow in 1979 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).⁵⁸

53 Kwesi Aning and Festus Abyn, 'Ghana'. In Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing for Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

54 Ibid.

55 Maxwell Owusu, M. 'Rebellion, revolution, and tradition: Reinterpreting coups in Ghana', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31(2), 1989, pp. 372–397.

56 Fifi Edu-Afful et al., 'UN funding cuts for peacekeeping have consequences for Ghana: After sixty years of UN peacekeeping', DIIS policy brief, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019.

57 Jan Prouza and Jakub Horák, 'Small but substantial: What drives Ghana's contributions to UN peacekeeping missions?', *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 9(2), 2015, pp. 220.

58 Total Contribution UN PKO, Other IGO PKO s, and State-led PKO s (Police, Troops and other missions) 1970–2010; Source: Dr Vita Dórazio, <https://www.vitorazio.com/data.html>.

The 1979 coup was led by a junior officer, Jerry John Rawlings – who would usher in Ghana’s full transition to democratic rule in 1993 and later become Ghana’s president under the Fourth Republic. Under Rawlings, the AFRC stayed in power for roughly four months and returned power to a civilian government. However, the Third Republic was toppled again by Rawlings in 1981 under the Provisional National Defence Council, which would rule the country before calling for multiparty elections and ushering in the Fourth Republic in 1993. Rawlings ensured that GAF’s contribution to UN PKO contributions increased. Ghana’s contribution to UN PKO and African-led PSO included supporting ECOWAS operations in Liberia (1990), which would later be rehatted into UN PKO forces, UNTAC in Cambodia (1992), UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993) and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1998). Rawlings’s efforts to drive the GAF to serve in UN PKO to divert the forces’ attention from politics and future-proof coup attempts meant that the exposure from the UN was shaping the GAF evolution and civil-military relations back home. With the increased exposure to UN PKO, there was pressure to harmonise the training GAF needed for deployment to ensure that the forces aligned with what would be expected from UN PKO TCCs and international deployments. This would result in “GAF standards” versus “UN standards”.⁵⁹ The decades of UN PKO experience have formed part of how GAF would deploy in REC s-led PSO s and its approach to using forces in serious situations to support peace.⁶⁰ The experience gained from UN PKO has gone on to be used in troubled South Sudan and the South sector of Abyei, where the Ghanaian Battalion are based.⁶¹

Under Rawlings, GAF doctrine shifted to one that embraced the Pan-Africanism ideals of Nkrumah – through an increase in peacekeeping and PSO s in Africa, which included deployments under ECOWAS and UN PKO s in African and global operations. Consequently, the deployment of GAF in UN PKO s evolved into a doctrine focused on professionalising the GAF. Under the military regime of Rawlings, Ghana commenced a series of UN macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilise and reform the security forces and the country. What followed was a “silent development” process where, although no specific reforms were announced, certain changes of an increasingly democratic

59 Daniel H. Levine, ‘The Impact of Ghanaian Peacekeeping on Domestic Civil–Military Relations’. *The Good Society*, 25 (1), 2016, pp. 81–104.

60 The Permanent Mission of Ghana to the UN. ‘150 Ghanaian troops in South Sudan awarded UN Peace Medals’. Available at: <https://www.ghanamissionun.org/150-ghanaian-troops-in-south-sudan-awarded-un-peace-medals/>.

61 *Ghana Today*, ‘Ghana’s first battalion in Abyei’, 2022. Available at: <https://ghanatoday.gov.gh/world/ghanas-first-battalion-in-abyei-located-between-south-sudan-and-sudan-inducted/>.

nature began to occur in the security sector through UN support.⁶² On the state's side, one aspect was spending earnings from UN peacekeeping to stabilise relations with the armed forces.⁶³ Although Rawlings' political party, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), was an autocratic military regime, it introduced the 1992 Republic Constitution that reinitiated plural democratic politics. More specifically, the constitution provided the impetus to reform the security sector, emphasising parliamentary and civilian oversight with support from the UN Development Programme (UNDP). For example, the UNDP in Ghana was a partner in collaborating on security sector reform (SSR) through the "Consolidating Democratic Governance Programme (CDGP)."⁶⁴

The GAF (Under President John Kufour) would be further dispersed and redeployed. Kufour redeployed the Forces Reserve Battalion using a similar strategy applied by Rawlings by utilising the UN PKO to support his effort at reforming and coup-proofing the army.⁶⁵ Kufour viewed peacekeeping as having an overall positive effect on the army by giving them a focus and a steady external income that benefitted the military institution and individual soldiers and officers.⁶⁶ Commando units considered Rawlings' most trusted were rotated to different units within the GAF and sent abroad to be part of UN PKO and African-led PSO.⁶⁷ Alongside this was the UN's influence in-country through SSR programmes and its support to military training centres which subscribed to the UN PKO doctrine and guidance.⁶⁸ The UN PKO exposure extended to bilateral partners like the United Kingdom and the US, who provided international UN PKO norms training. In addition, GAF would also be deployed to the UN mission in South Sudan in the Bentiu sector. More recently, the GFA has been part of a joint cross-border corporation called the

62 Eboe Hutchful, *Ghana's Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform*. (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).

63 Eboe Hutchful, 'Military policy and reform in Ghana', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(2), 1997, pp. 52.

64 UNDP (2000): See United Nations Development Programme.

65 Ghana: The commando unit is known as the "64th Infantry Regiment", including who its members are, where they receive their training, and how members are recruited.

66 Kwesi Aning and Festus K. Aubyn, 'Ghana' in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Providing peacekeepers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 269–290.

67 Africa Confidential. 'Ghana: Ole Kufuor! The President Scores High on His First Major International Trip', *African Confidential*, 42:11.

68 United Nations Development Programme, (2005). 'Ghana. Consolidating Democratic Governance Programme', Available at www.undp-gha.org/-CDGP.php.

Accra Initiative, where joint and cross-border operations occur in hot pursuit of terrorists.

The continued influence of the UN and its PKO on GAF includes recent efforts to increase the number of female peacekeepers in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2022, UNIFIL received a grant of US \$357,000 from the Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations (EIF) to build gender-sensitive accommodations for women peacekeepers from the GAF. The GAF history with UN PKO has meant that leaders of Ghana have capitalised on GAF deployment abroad to pay salaries paid by the UN at a fraction of the cost.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, over the decades, this wealth of experience and knowledge has also allowed GAF institutions to open their doors to other African forces to spread UN norms to their armies through training centres such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, collaboration and joint cross-border efforts. This has allowed the GAF to strengthen its tri-service institution comprising the army, navy and air force operating under a Joint Service General Headquarters where the army is most senior in terms of age and size, as it constitutes about 80 per cent of the total strength.⁷⁰ The Navy and Air Force are post-colonial institutions created in 1959.⁷¹ GAF has a combined estimated size of about 15,500 (Army 11,500, Navy 2,000, Air 2,000).⁷² Finally, Ghana benefits enormously from regional security cooperation and participation in REC-led PSOs. Deployments by the GAF to regional international crises have exposed GAFs to state collapse and indiscriminate violence, allowing the GAF to acquire conflict resolution skills used in local contexts and support harmonious civil-military relations.⁷³ This has allowed the force to establish trust with the local communities and enhancing its professional sitting and keep the armed forces covered financially.⁷⁴ One way of ensuring stability at home has been to allow GAF

69 Kwesi Aning, 'Managing the Security Sector in Ghana' in B. Agyeman-Duah and A. Salia Fawundu (eds.), *Understanding Good Governance in Ghana* (Digi Publications, 2008).

70 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2023), Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa, *The Military Balance*, 123(1), 2022.

71 Stephen Addae, *A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces*, (Accra, Ministry of Defence, 2005).

72 International Institute for Strategic Studies, (2022). 'Sub-Saharan Africa, The Military Balance', 123:1, pp. 420–489.

73 Daniel Levine, 'The Impact of Ghanaian Peacekeeping on Domestic Civil–Military Relations', *The Good Society*, 25(1), 2016, pp. 81–104; Humphrey A. Agyekum, 'Peacekeeping Experiences as Triggers of Introspection in the Ghanaian Military Barracks', *Africa Spectrum*, 55(1), 2020, pp. 50–72.

74 Daniel Kofi Banini, Jonathan Powell and Michael Yekple, 'Peacekeeping as Coup Avoidance: Lessons from Ghana', *African Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2020, pp. 235–259.

to receive \$35 a day while staff officers receive roughly \$135 a day and police personnel \$150 a day.⁷⁵ Troops on ECOWAS missions in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau receive USD 50 a day.⁷⁶ At the individual level, the material benefits of peacekeeping deployments empower Ghanaian soldiers as these payments supplement their local wages.⁷⁷ Most military personnel can acquire properties such as housing, cars and domestic and commercial appliances and provide for their families partly from the financial rewards they receive from missions.⁷⁸

The following section explores the influence of UN PKO and African-led PSO on the Chad and Ghana armies, which has intrinsically allowed African armies to set the direction of travel within UN PKO in Africa.

1.3 *The Influence of African Armies on United Nations and African-Led Peacekeeping Operations*

The relations with RECS/RMS through deployments from states like Chad and Ghana have been central to some of the UN PKO success and effectiveness of some missions in Africa, resulting in many cases where African-led PSOs deploy, and the UN takes over once a UN Security Council mandate is attained.⁷⁹ In West Africa, the UN has deployed a range of peacekeeping and peace support operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire and collaborated with ECOWAS and pivotal states within a co-deployment framework. In May 1990, assessing the situation in Liberia, ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to resolve conflicts peacefully. Following months of unproductive discussion with various faction leaders in July 1990, the SMC established and deployed the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) amidst opposition from then-rebel leader Charles Taylor and some Agnolophone West African leaders.⁸⁰ However, there was a need to have a UN Chapter VII (peace enforcement) mandate because of the multidimensional nature of the peacekeeping challenges. Between 1991 and 1997, the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia led to the deployment of the UN

75 Festus Aubyn, Kwesi Aning, Fiifi Edu-Afful, Emma Birikorang, Maya Christensen and Peter Albrecht, 'The many implications of UN peacekeeping: Ghana's Peacekeeping Efforts Abroad Have An Impact At Home', *DIIS Policy Brief*, January, 2019.

76 Communication with an official of Ghana Armed Forces, Accra.

77 Aning, 'Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries from West Africa: The Case of Ghana', pp. 133–155.

78 Aning and Auybyn, 2013. 'Ghana'.

79 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'African-led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 29(2), 2023, pp. 230–244.

80 Clement E. Adibe, 'The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership', *Third World Quarterly*, 18(3), 1997, pp. 471–488.

Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). This was mainly rehatting ECOMOG forces with a Chapter VI peacekeeping mandate based on co-deployment with ECOMOG. This was also aligned with several efforts at mediating the situation, including the signing of several peace agreements such as Yamoussoukro (1991), Cotonou (1993) and the Abuja Peace Accords (1995, 1996). This led to the holding of general and presidential elections in 1997.

In neighbouring Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS-led Peace Plan for Sierra Leone facilitated the signing of peace agreements such as Abidjan (1996), Conakry (1997) and Lomé (1999) and the deployment of UN PKOs, including the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, 1998) and UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999), primarily due to the influence of regional actors and the regional forces' success as first responder but also later producing mixed results. The involvement of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG II peace enforcement intervention led to the overthrow of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military junta and the reinstatement of the government of President Kabbah in March 1998.

In 1998, ECOWAS intervened to restore peace to Guinea Bissau following a revolt in the national army. President Vieira asked Nigeria, the then chair of the ECOWAS Authority, for military intervention to help resolve the conflict. In response to Vieira's request, ECOWAS Foreign and Defence ministers meeting in Abidjan in July 1998 recommended the following: 'affirmed support of the democratically elected government of president Vieira and the need to restore his authority, employing a combination of dialogue, sanctions and use of force', and the establishment of an ECOWAS Committee of seven to implement the decisions. The continued fighting between Vieira and the army commander virtually ended the mission of ECOMOG III, as the peacekeeping force refused to intervene in the fight for control of the capital city or to assist Vieira's forces. This paved the way for the intervention of the UN by authorising the deployment of an assistance mission, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS), which became operational in June 1999. The mandate of UNOGBIS was to promote national reconciliation and assist in organising and supervising parliamentary and presidential elections (UN Security Council 1999). In Guinea Bissau, the UN only intervened after the ECOMOG intervention cleared the way and created conditions for the UN to enter. The UN appointed a Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) to work with ECOWAS and organised and supervised general and presidential elections in collaboration with external partners. This demonstrates the influence of African armies making up ECOWAS forces and the capacity of REC-led PSOs in shaping UN PKO, to which GAF was a leading contributor. While the UN works in partnership with REC s, the evidence above

suggests that ECOWAS, through its PSO, influenced how the UN can deploy its operations, which has led to forces being rehatted and guide how these forces should operate under the UN.

In the case of Chad, its ability to deploy troops to MINUSMA and other deadly missions at a rapid pace has allowed Chad to influence UN PKO with enforcement mandates through its bilateral support from states like France and the US. The AFISMA collaborated closely with Operation Serval and Chadian forces, demonstrating flexibility to “endure while sustaining high casualties”.⁸¹ AFISMA was an ECOWAS (Chad is a non-member of ECOWAS) deployment authorised and supported by the UNSC as an enforcement mission deployed to support the government against Islamist rebels in Northern Mali. Chadian forces as part of the AFISMA would later be rehatted and transformed into MINUSMA units.

Chadian forces have been deployed to several missions, including UN-authorized missions aligned to peace enforcement training, such as the JF-G5 Sahel. The Joint Force-G5 Sahel has its own characteristics but shares similarities with the Multinational Joint Task Force. Establishing the JF-G5S was instrumental in Chad’s acquiring a more central position in the global environment, especially at the UN and within the mission. Chad’s regional initiatives contributed around 1400 forces to fight rebel groups.⁸²

The Chadian force’s inclusion of combat forces signalled Chad’s return and another change in the UN’s deployments away from a traditional PKO posture to one where forces are used to prevent and repel or to stabilise, denoting enforcement. In the case of MINUSMA, there was no peace to be kept, which denoted a peace enforcement mission – wherein African-led PSOs are often deployed as first responders. Indeed, support for the JF-G5S and operation Barkhane has also increasingly been incorporated into the mandates of MINUSMA and EUTM. The collaborative role has meant that the remote capacity and adaptability of Chad shapes MINUSMA but demonstrates how Chad has come to occupy a strategic position where its forces contribute and implicitly shape MINUSMA’s⁸³ approach to stabilising the conditions on the ground.⁸⁴ The success achieved by Chadian forces was denoted on April

81 Thomas G. Weiss and Martin Welz, “The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: A shotgun wedding?” *International Affairs*, 90(4), 2014, pp. 897.

82 Cedric de Coning *et al.*, ‘Understanding Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives in Africa’ (2021), *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (NUPI, Oslo).

83 See the background on MINUSMA. Available at: <https://migration-control.info/en/wiki/minusma-military-operations-sahel/>.

84 Reuters, ‘Chad emerges as African power broker as France steps back’, 2018. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-chad/chad-emerges-as-african-power-broker-as-france-steps-back-idUSBRE94707C20130508>.

2021, when forces repelled an attack against a MINUSMA base in Aguelhok, Kidal region.⁸⁵ Chadian forces have demonstrated their ability to respond to insecurity challenges, increasing their commitment to UN PKO following France's drawdown of Operation Barkhane. With Mali declaring its withdrawal from the JF-G5S, Chad is still seen as a critical enabler and partner for MINUSMA (despite being asked to drawdown by the Malian government) and the UN's operations in the Sahel.⁸⁶

Consequently, using African forces like that of Chad and Ghana has led to additional capacity and agency for African forces, especially given the evolution of conflict and the nature in which the UN PKO have tried to respond to these environments for several reasons. Firstly, regional forces are already on the ground or close by, ready to deploy and respond to the changing nature of conflicts. This means that once African-led PSO forces from a particular region or a collection of states are deployed; they are often increasingly used in joint operations or transnational security cooperation like the MNJTF, G5S or the Accra Initiative. In the UN's case, once UN PKO is mandated, it often must rehat the very same African forces who become part of a new UN PKO and are influenced by the UN PKO agenda.⁸⁷ Being influenced here is not limited to the forces and their interactions during the mission, i.e., how the UN chooses to engage. However, it includes pre-deployments, in mission and post-mission training conducted by African Regional Peacekeeping Centres of Excellence.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, African armies have gained agency since African forces shape the operational environments, strategic response and tempo of both types of operations (African-led PSO and UN PKO). Secondly, the success of these forces in stabilising states in conflicts as first responders means that states like Chad and Ghana represent valuable assets that UN PKO needs and cannot afford to lose, especially where the environment of conflict is evolving and requires constant adaptation from the force which operate in and stretches the parameters of traditional UN PKO doctrine.⁸⁹ Therefore, support from African TCCs like Chad and Ghana translates into political support for the mission, providing a form of legitimacy for the deployment

85 United Nations News, 'Four peacekeepers killed in complex attack on UN base in Mali', 2014. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1088982>.

86 Radio France Internationale (2022). 'Chad to add troops to UN mission in Mali following France's withdrawal'. Available at: <https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220222-chad-to-add-troops-to-un-mission-in-mali-following-france-s-withdrawal>.

87 Ibid.

88 Anne Flaspöler, 'African Peacekeeping Training Centres: Socialisation as a Tool for Peace?' (Routledge, London, 2022).

89 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, 'Generation three and a half peacekeeping'.

of these forces and additional support to build the capacity of these forces. Thirdly, the political nature of these deployments often includes states with strong leadership – authoritarian or democratic – and this strong leadership is vital for the UN PKO to be deployed, sustained, survive and thrive. This support allows the UN and its missions to connect with regional powers that often want to showcase African capacity but may also use the deployments as an opportunity to realign their global standing. This global standing allows the state to indirectly readjust their forces through these deployments, restructure forces and establish further oversight. Finally, the deployments of African armies to UN PKO are used by states as a platform to receive bilateral support, training, compensation, and leniency; showcasing the states' capacity and making meaningful contributions to the global political order. Both armies have received significant support through training initiatives to support their forces in both cases.

The following section examines whether the increased involvement of African armies like Chad and Ghana in UN PKO and African-led PSO has long-term effects on African armies. It explores whether these deployments increase the capabilities of peacekeeping efforts or risk militarising the domestic security of African Armies.

1.4 *Increasing Capabilities of African Armies through Peacekeeping*

Chad and Ghana's varying degrees of success in UN PKO and African-led PSO have allowed the UN to co-deploy with a regional peacekeeping organisation, as envisaged in the UN Charter and which the UNSC can do under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG co-deployed with UN observer missions, while ECOWAS Missions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire provided rapid deployment forces that transformed into UN peacekeepers. Despite the problems of coordination, logistics and differences in mandate and culture, the cooperation between the UN PKO and African-led PSO has led to peacekeeping operations shaping African armies. Nevertheless, African armies have also indirectly shaped the direction of travel of UN PKO and African-led PSO, allowing both to draw on but maximise their comparative advantage and work to resolve conflicts collectively. While the UN has influenced both Chadian and Ghanaian armies through their exposure to UN PKO, the evolution of their armies through peacekeeping operations differs. The influence of UN PKO on both armies has supported the development and refinement of different responses and postures used by both forces during the lifecycle of missions. With the evolution of African conflict environments, the types of UN PKO responses where both armies have been deployed have matched their experiences and interactions within and outside UN missions.

Thus, peacekeeping operations have exposed these forces to environments that have allowed them to sharpen skills and capacities. In the case of Chad, the bulk of its operations tend to involve smaller hegemonic units – often independent – with the forces being the first line of defence, conducting counter-offensive and peace enforcement operations. These forces tend to be harmonised and highly mobile but under-equipped for the types of warfare they are exposed to. They produce significant results sufficient for the initial stages of UN stabilisation mandates.⁹⁰

In the case of MINUSMA, the mission has been able to deal with insurgents and project force where required.⁹¹ The additional training that Chadian forces received under the UN has allowed traditional nomad and warlord practise to be adapted and advanced to current regional and transnational challenges that UN PKO and African-led PSO are deployed to deal with and face – which hinges on continued adaptability.⁹² Therefore, it can be argued that the influence of the UN through the MINUSMA mandate in the region and the mission's international obligations has implicitly provided a platform for Chadian forces to receive further training in peacekeeping, allowing the force to uniquely adapt their historical styles of fighting as forces for current conflicts through stabilisation operations and peace enforcement operations.⁹³ Finally, international recognition for deploying forces under the UN banner has created a path dependency whereby the UN, through P5 members such as France and the US, would prod Déby to nudge his troops to follow UN procedures and policies but use the success of the Chadian army to his advantage, acting as the gatekeeper to regional stability. However, the internal instability has also allowed the Chadian forces to deploy tactics against civilians and largely remain untouched by the international community's condemnation due in part to the legitimacy these forces hold in the region. While the deployments have allowed Chadian forces to increase their capabilities and culpability, they have also used indiscriminate violence against civilians who oppose the transitional government after the death of President Déby. This includes violence against protesters opposed to the transitional government's plans and the regime's no-nonsense approach to those who disagree with the current peace process.

90 Andrew E. Yaw Tchie 'Nomads and Warlords'.

91 Arthur Boutellis, *Chad, Once Forgotten by the UN, is Back, Front and Center*.

92 US Army (2010). Available at: https://www.army.mil/article/127485/usaraf_trains_4000_troops_in_chad_guinea_malawi.

93 United Nations General Assembly Security Council. 'Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people'.

The case of GAF demonstrates how the UN PKO has indirectly shaped and influenced the GAF military and, to some extent, its civil-military relations, helping to equip, train and support the GAF through its international obligations. Ghana has deployed its capacity from experience and exposure to UN PKO across the continent and the globe, with large parts of its military deployment centred on the 60-plus years of UN PKO experiences that often entail missions designed to support a focus on “keeping peace where there is peace to be kept” indicating missions where a ceasefire is in place and in some cases where the UN requires a concentrated force posture in its missions (For example, UNMISS and UNISFA). Over the last two decades (since ECOMOG II), GAF has rarely deployed to peace enforcement missions like the AU mission to Somalia or the ECOMOG of the 1990s. While GAF are deployed to large UN PKO’s or ECOWAS missions in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau – where the UNSC deploys the use of Chapter VII,⁹⁴ these deployments often involve relatively little violence compared to where Chadian forces are deployed. However, the emerging challenges across the continent, which GAF have been shielded from, require a tactical adjustment if Ghana is going to deal with the spread of terrorism in its backyard. While the case of GAF has shown an evolution in capabilities of peacekeeping efforts has emerged, this experience may have unintended consequences.⁹⁵ Unintended consequences include using military tactics to crack down on protestors or public resistance to state policies,⁹⁶ the use of heavy-handed military operations on civilians, leading to indiscriminate violence and, in the prior case, human rights violations. In other cases, GAF has been involved in several local security operations through joint internal operations involving the military and the police.⁹⁷

The overall experience has allowed Ghana and Chad to adopt an agile and progressive response to dissimilar environments of insecurity. Subsequently, both states continue to indirectly shape how the UN conducts peacekeeping operations across the African continent. This demonstrates how African

94 See UNSC Chapter Seven: United Nations Charter, Chapter VII: ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’. Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7>.

95 Kwesi Aning, ‘Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop-contributing countries from West Africa’.

96 Wilson Centre, ‘Western Togoland: A Secessionist Conflict in the Heart of Ghana’, 2022. Available at: <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/western-togoland-a-secessionist-conflict-in-the-heart-of-ghana/>.

97 Edu-Afful, F (2022). ‘The Anatomy of Ghanaian Domestic Military Operations: Exploring Operations Vanguard and Calm Life’, *Contemporary Journal of African Studies*, 9 No. 1: pp. 39–52.

contribution has gained agency to influence the UN PKO and African-led PSO based on the changing nature, demands of conflict(s), the spread of instability, force's ability to stabilise states or environments of conflicts as first responders, the political nature of these deployments; and the ability of states to use the deployment of their forces as a platform to receive bilateral support and compensation.

2 Conclusion

The deployment of African armies to UN PKO and African-led PSO has shown that, in the case of Chad and Ghana, it has expanded their capacity to deal with insecurity abroad and increasingly at home. Consequently, the engagement of both armies in UN PKO and African-led PSO has been shaped by military engagement in politics and political leaders with a military background. This has also paralleled with an embedded militarisation of domestic security in Chad and an evolving role witnessed in Ghana, which is reinforced by their exposure to the operations forces are a part of (as well as bilateral training). Therefore, the convergence between Chad and Ghana's roles in UN PKO and African-led PSO operations at home (guarding and patrolling military and civilian installations conducting internal operations) is an experience both armies draw on during international peacekeeping deployments. While the GAF has made significant progress since independence, this progress is limited to deployments likened to UN PKO doctrine or conventional warfare between two actors. Conversely, through nomad and warlord strategies, Chadian forces present a new approach for African armies who are part of UN PKO with stabilisation mandates. Chad denotes a rapid, adaptable, and agile force for current and emerging conflicts, insecurity and indiscriminate violence used by contemporary non-state armed actors.

However, states like Chad and Ghana continue battling internal conflicts spilling into their border. At the same time, there is an increasing risk that these states could operationalise their experience of force in peacekeeping to repress the very citizens that UN PKO and African-led PSOs are designed to protect. The UN PKO and African-led PSO authorisers and mandating authorities must be aware of the impact of these operations on African armies. This includes how these forces utilise their experience back home to deal with internal challenges the state might deem a threat.

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The author has reported no potential conflict of interest.

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