



[604] Working Paper

Us Russians versus We Russians

Patriotic discourse and electoral support
in Krasnodar *kray*


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Us Russians versus We Russians

This working paper analyses the relationship between different forms of patriotic discourse and electoral support in Krasnodar *kray*. Two main forms of patriotic discourse are identified. One is labelled 'civil-patriotic', and the other 'national-patriotic'. In the civil-patriotic conception, Russian society is conceived of as a unified whole, encompassing numerous and diverse ethnic groups. In the national-patriotic conception, in contrast, Russian society is seen as divided between a good Russian core, and elements that threaten it, such as Jews, reformers, businesspeople or the West. This working paper argues that politicians who have espoused national-patriotic discourse have experienced greater electoral success than those who have drawn upon civil-patriotic discourse.

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Summary

This article analyses the relationship between different forms of patriotic discourse and electoral support. It covers the period from 1993 to 1998, and focuses on politicians in Krasnodar *kray*, one of the more nationalistically oriented regions in Russia. It draws upon the results of the election of the Head of Krasnodar *kray* administration in 1996, and the election to the Legislative Assembly of the *kray* in 1998, stenographic transcripts from the Federation Council and two large opinion polls carried out in 1998.

Two main forms of contemporary patriotic discourse are identified. One is labelled 'civil-patriotic', and the other 'national-patriotic'. In the civil-patriotic conception, Russian society tends to be conceived of as a unified whole encompassing numerous and diverse ethnic groups. In this conception the objective is to overcome the obstacles hindering Russia's welfare and greatness. In the national-patriotic conception, in contrast, Russian society is seen as divided between a good Russian core, and elements that threaten it, such as Jews, reformers, businesspeople or the West.

The article argues that the politician Kondratenko has had greatest electoral success with his national-patriotic version of discourse. Drawing on civil-patriotic discourse in opposing Kondratenko, Samoylenko and in particular Yegorov have been less successful – as have politicians elsewhere in Russia, such as Lebed. Taking into account the charisma of the individual politicians and other extraneous factors, this shows that national patriotism, with its conception of a divided and threatened Russian society, is more powerful in electoral politics than the less antagonistic civil patriotism.

Introduction

It was supposed by the authors of *perestroika* that liberal values would come to dominate Russian society. By the mid-1990s, however, other approaches to state building, based on nationalist ideas and patriotic discourse, had gained a strong foothold. The introduction of pluralist voting brought new realities to Russian society. Elections became indicators of both the political situation and ideological struggles. Opposing approaches to social construction now got their popularity ratings in terms of percentages of electoral support.

Our aim in this article is to identify some of the regularities that underpin electoral support for patriotic politicians in contemporary Russia. We will take Krasnodar *kray* [territory] as our main case, and cover the period from 1993 to 1998 – which was when patriotic discourse gained most in importance. The patriotic theme became central to the programmes of most political parties and organisations in Krasnodar *kray*. In general, the *kray* is distinguished by its stable support for ‘patriotically minded’ candidates in local elections.

Krasnodar *kray* is unofficially referred to as ‘Kuban’, is associated with the Cossacks, and is a subject of the Russian Federation. It has a population of around five million, about 3.3 per cent of the entire population of the Russian Federation. Krasnodar City is the capital of the *kray*, and has a population of around 780,000.

Our focus will be on politics and the electorate in the *kray* capital, though we will touch upon a range of institutions and levels of government in the *kray*. The two most interesting elections for the purposes of this study are the election of the Head of Krasnodar *kray* administration in 1996, and the election to the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodar *kray* in 1998. In addition we will draw heavily upon two large and previously unpublished opinion surveys carried out in the *kray*. The first survey was carried out between 8 and 12 October 1998 and covered 1230 demographically representative respondents in rural parts of Krasnodar *kray*. The second survey was

carried out between 12 and 18 September 1998 in Krasnodar City, and included 721 demographically representative respondents. In both surveys data were gathered by means of formalised individual interviews conducted by the staff of the Krasnodar Centre for Marketing and Social Studies. Data on the discourse of the politicians will be drawn from the stenographic transcripts of the Federation Council, campaign material and the press.

Berdyayev has suggested two basic understandings of nationalism. Firstly, it can be centred on love for one's mother country. Secondly, it can be hatred towards other peoples.¹ Within communist thought, 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' had absolutely negative meanings associated with Nazi ideology, and were practically excluded from self-ascriptive official discourse. Thus in Russia up to the late 1990s, the term nationalism was understood only in its negative sense, as hatred of other peoples.² The concepts of nation-state, national ideology and national interests were instead realised in 'patriotic' discourse with a slightly different sound. The patriotic discourse that we will examine in this article is the continuation and transformation of this previous, euphemistic discourse. We will use the term 'patriotism' generically to refer to the new discourse about love for one's native country [*rodina*], and define further subdivisions as we proceed.

This topic is interesting because there are few works which deal with patriotic discourse at the regional level. Most writers have been interested in Russian patriotism in regions such as Krasnodar *kray* only as an aspect of Cossack ethnic revival. In this article, patriotic discourse as such is the topic of research.

Different perspectives on the various parties and political units in Russia have been discussed widely in the academic literature. The survival strategies of different political parties have also been analysed reasonably thoroughly.³ In this article, we will instead analyse the relation between the popularity of local leaders and the ideologies they promote. The criteria of their popularity will be electoral support – i.e. votes

gathered in elections at various levels – and their ratings in the two opinion polls carried out in Krasnodar.

In current Russian political science a tradition has evolved in which electoral support for a given political force is correlated with three main factors: its access to an organisational apparatus, the charismatic qualities of its leaders, and the discursive niche they occupy. In this study we will pay most attention to the third factor, discourse.

The article also touches upon the perception of leaders as individuals. However, it does not deal with the organisational aspects of their political activities, which are often the primary focus in studies of Russian party politics. Local political actors are usually members of local and regional executive branches of power, and thus usually have those state structures at their disposal as electoral machines in any case. A full analysis of those structures lies outside the scope of this study.

Political context

Since 1993, the channels of power from the federal level down to the regions in Russian politics have become increasingly dislocated. This was particularly the case at the end of 1996, with the election of new heads of *oblast* [province] and *kray* [territory] administrations, who had previously been appointed by the President of the Russian Federation. In practice, their election meant that the ‘vertical powers’ – the system of collateral subordination of the executive organs – ceased to exist. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, those who are elected to public office can only be removed by the same form of elections as those by which they were elected. Thus the President and the government lost control over the governors, and the governors in turn lost control over the mayors of large cities. The result of this development was the formation of two new political forces in Russia: the mayors of large cities and the governors of the subjects of the Federation.

The new political forces, alongside the old party structures, have come to think of themselves more and more as 'electoral machines', as well as 'big players in big politics'. It is not incidental that among the most noted politicians one increasingly finds members of local power elites.⁴

Patriotic ideology has been particularly central to the political discourse of the Head of Krasnodar *kray* administration, Nikolay Ignatovich Kondratenko. He is one of the leaders of the movement *Otechestvo* [Fatherland], a powerful popular-patriotic movement in Krasnodar *kray*. He has also been referred to as 'the nationalist in the Senate'.⁵ His popularity among the general populace is explicable in terms of the fact that while patriotic themes have been touched upon by virtually all political forces in Kuban over the past five years, Kondratenko and his movement *Otechestvo* is the only one that has been able to project a convincing electoral image. In the first 1996 gubernatorial elections Kondratenko got about 57 % of the vote, while his main rival, Nikolay Dimitrievich Yegorov, came second with 25 %. However, the elections were annulled due to low voter turnout, and in the rerun Kondratenko further increased his share of the vote to an overwhelming 81 %.⁶

In the 1996 elections of heads of local administrations, members of local political-economic elites secured victories in the cities of Krasnodar, Novorossiysk, Sochi and Tuapse. In all of the remaining *rayons* and cities people who belonged more or less to 'Kondratenko's team' were victorious, except Kropotkin, where the *Yabloko* party won unexpectedly.

Historical context

Although the first national-patriotic organisations appeared during the Soviet period, patriotic rhetoric first gained real resonance at the end of the 1980s.⁷ By 1993, nationalist and patriotic ideas had taken shape and gained permanency as points in the programmes of a series of Russian parties and associations. Among them are above all the LDPR (Russian Liberal Democratic Party) led by Zhirinovksy, the KPRF

(Communist Party of the Russian Federation) led by Zyuganov and other communist-patriotic organisations such as KTR-SS (Communists, Workers of Russia, for the Soviet Union) led by Tyulkin and Anpilov, and also Lebed's electoral association 'Honour and Native Country', and Rogozin's KRO (Congress of Russian Communities).

In particular the patriotic rhetoric of Zhirinovskiy and Anpilov are well-known and described at length in the literature. As a definition of their version of patriotic discourse one can take the following declaration from participants in a political demonstration in Moscow on 1 May 1997: 'We – workers and peasants, members of the sciences and the arts, servicemen and youth, patriots of our great Motherland – are concerned about Russia's fate, which is threatening to exterminate her as a state, and hereby declare that ...'.⁸

A more accurate interpretation of this concept was suggested by the leader N. I. Ryzhkov of the bloc 'Power – to the people!', an organisation associated with the KPRF. At a press conference on 1 November 1995 he disseminated an proclamation to 'those who do not want to go and vote'.⁹ He reminded that according to the law it is enough for 25 % of the voters to participate in the elections to make them valid: 'If the majority of Russians, Tatars, Bashkirs and other indigenous [*korennyy*] Russian [*rossiyskiy*] peoples fail to participate in the elections, then our fate will be determined in Israel' (that is to say, by those who have emigrated there from Russia and who maintain dual citizenship). 'The elections are a struggle for power, a struggle between those who belong to the indigenous Russian peoples and those whose historical homeland is outside Russia's borders'.

On 21 May 1997 RKP (Russian Communist Party) and the radical communist organisation Working Russia picketed at the entrance to the State Duma demanding the dismissal of Chernomyrdin's government in connection with aviation cutbacks. They held placards bearing the messages: "No" to the deliberate destruction of Russia's aircrews', "No" to the death of Russian aviation!', 'Give Chernomyrdin a

pilot's pension!', 'Indict Chubais!', 'Ul'yanovsk is solidary with Russia's patriots', 'For the Motherland, for Stalin!', 'Indict the leaders and send them to "camps" [*nary*]!', 'Indict Yeltsin's band!'.¹⁰

On 8 August, Zyuganov made a declaration at a press conference on the occasion of the anniversary of the NPSR (The Communist Patriotic Union of Russia). Explaining the main point of the declaration on 'the irreconcilability of constructive opposition', Zyuganov declared that, 'the struggle has flared up between two sides – the patriotic side and the merchant-thieves'.¹¹

We will refer to this conception of patriotism as 'national patriotism'. Many other examples could be mentioned, but its basic traits are already identifiable:

1. It is based on the division of society into two groups, one of which is some or other specific enemy (the Baltic countries, Israel, Chubais, Yeltsin, Russia's leaders, merchant-thieves etc.).
2. The relation between 'us' and 'them' is presented as a form of confrontation, a fight between 'us' patriots and 'them', the merchant-thieves.

It was with similar ideas that the LDPR became the winning party in the elections to the State Duma in 1993, and that the KPRF achieved the majority of the mandates in the elections to the State Duma in 1995. A number of more radical communist organisations such as 'The Communists for the Soviet Union' just failed to pass the five-per cent barrier.

As a counterweight to the national-patriotic discourse, during the years 1993 to 1996 the democratic parties attempted to set forth their own alternative version of love for the native country, in spite of initially having avoided the term 'patriotism' itself. Thus at a conference of the VSND (All-Russian Union of Peoples' Houses) on 25 January 1996, Starovoytova, the Vice-President of 'Democratic Russia', reproached Filatova,

the leader of the VSND, for opposing the inclusion of the word 'patriotic' in the name of the coalition. She spoke out against the de-politicisation of the VSND and argued for the exploitation of its potential in the interest of the LPK (Liberal Right-Centre Coalition).¹²

With the term 'patriotic' already associated with specific political forces in the minds of Russians, the democratic parties also attempted to play this card by drawing on associations to the concept of 'native country' [*rodina*] rather than using explicit language about it. Perhaps the most successful of these was the semblance of native country love in the rhetoric and symbolism of the organisation 'Our Home is Russia'.

The tying of the patriotic theme to the communist-patriotic opposition also forced the 'third force' in the shape of General Lebed to use a different version of the concept. The only way out for him in this situation was to express it by association. Lebed managed to do so by calling one of his organisations 'Honour and Native Country'. Lebed, who in any case is strongly endowed with patriotic charisma in the eyes of many Russians, did not indicate more precisely what he meant by the concept 'patriotism', apart from projecting it as something good: 'The Americans consider themselves patriots, and the Japanese too. But we seem to hesitate.' He seemed to touch upon patriotism only when discussing leadership:

The very most important criterion of fitness to govern the country is not the presence of some sum administrative and economic skills, but patriotism. Thus, in order of priority, what is needed is patriotism, professionalism, orderliness.

Furthermore, his references to the 'we' group were usually watered down and limited to analogies and allusions:

'We', is those unto whom Russia isn't *that* country', but *my* country'. 'We', that is those who are determined to build their futures, and the futures of their children and grandchildren, on free, rich, beautiful and proud land. It is our duty to make it that.¹³

Thus it is possible to distinguish another type of patriotic discourse, with its own distinctive features. We will refer to it as ‘civil patriotism’:

1. Society is principally homogenous and undivided. Hence the name of the political party: ‘Our [read ‘common’] House is Russia’. What can however be distinguished, are the situations in which society finds itself. Thus the good-bad duality is instead in the sphere of feelings and perceptions. As Lebed writes in the introduction to his book *The Ideology of Common Sense*:

The country is coming around after the first reform shock. To be more precise, it is getting used to living in a condition of permanent shock. My book is not a call to build barricades. I prefer more peaceful building projects. But that does not mean that I am suggesting that we should accept the current state of affairs.¹⁴

2. Compared to the concept of ‘national patriotism’ outlined above, only one of its sides is used in Lebed’s version, the basically ‘good’ side which includes love for one’s native country. This he then attempted to associate with organisations such as his ‘Honour and Native Country’. In this version of patriotic rhetoric the second and ‘bad’ side is practically not drawn upon.

Election observation: the 1996 gubernatorial elections in Krasnodar

Due to its political and ideological layout, Krasnodar *kray* provides particularly good examples of Russian patriotic discourse. Here the ‘national patriotic’ and ‘civil patriotic’ variants outlined above exist side by side. On the one hand this region makes up part of the so-called ‘red belt’, in which the electorate has tended to support the communist-patriotic opposition at both the federal and regional levels. On the other hand local non-communist political actors quite often draw upon patriotic discourse in the conceptualisation of their policies. For instance, the Krasnodar City Mayor, who opposed the communist Governor, has proclaimed a special ‘conception of civil patriotism’.

The basic dividing line in the 1996 gubernatorial elections went between the then Head of the Krasnodar *kray* administration, Yegorov, and the leader of the populist-patriotic opposition, Federation Council delegate Kondratenko. Both candidates used patriotic rhetoric actively in their election campaigns.

Kondratenko

Kondratenko used the Federation Council, to which he had been elected by Krasnodar *kray* in 1993, as the platform for his patriotic programme. The following are a few excerpts from his 'programmatic statements', which give a good impression of Kondratenko's ideas about patriotism.

There are those who call themselves Russians [*rossiyane*], Russian-speaking (several Russian peoples), who are currently – pardon me for saying so – enemies of my Fatherland. We keep silent about that [for now]. We will talk about it later. That is the nature of Russians.¹⁵

How is one to explain the passivity in diplomacy and the use of our political means. Aren't they betraying us Russians [*russkiy*] then?¹⁶

The language Kondratenko used in a debate at the session of the Federation Council on 1 June 1994 also serves as a good illustration of his discourse.

Dear colleagues! Twenty years ago I happened to read the manual of a foreign organisation engaged in subversive work in the USSR ... among the Russian [*russkiy*] nation ... But those who destroyed Russia now cry: 'We won't let you mock the people!' Those very Luzkhovs, Sobchaks and so on.¹⁷

At the session of the Federation Council on 21 March 1995, Kondratenko made a speech about the fate of Russian agriculture. The following transcripts have been edited insignificantly.

Those are losses comrade Chubais. Can we compete on the so-called world market? No. It's a bluff ... You know well that Russia is simply 'giving' to the West. They know that it is difficult to control a full stomach, but that a hungry stomach will run where it is told to ... We have become incapable of transporting wares from Europe to the East: it is unprofitable! Now we have Eastern Russia there, and European Russia here. Is it possible to have a united policy when there is one economic expanse there and a different one in Europe? They will integrate with America, with Japan, with whoever necessary, in order to save the lives of their people. And you knew that when you chased the Russians from the North, by not providing them with food and heating. The Russians are leaving, and tomorrow you will give those territories as concessions to the Americans, the Japanese, whoever you want ... I would like to say once more: if you don't come to the Chamber to discuss strategies and tactics of reform, I consider that you are destroying the country's economy wilfully. And it is painful for me to acknowledge that I continue to sit in Russia's parliament in this situation. Thank you for your attention. [Applause]¹⁸

I rejoice in the Cossacks as a Russian patriotic beginning. The cosmopolites today do everything to exterminate, to smash, to defile what is Russian. Denigrating our history, now they try to devastate our souls, spreading sex, rape, and opening up for different sects on television, on the radio and in the press. Of course, in protesting against the cosmopolites, I am happy that we have the Cossacks, including the Cossacks of Kuban, who say a resounding 'No!' to that policy, and I am convinced ... that they will put an end to the chaos ... The Cossacks are needed. It was not for nothing that Leo Tolstoy said that the Cossacks will save Russia. Here there is Russian spirit, here the old *Rus* breathe.¹⁹

It is clear that Kondratenko's patriotic discourse sorts under the national-patriotic version outlined above. He divides society into 'us' and 'foreigners', with a precise definition of 'the enemy', which includes 'spies, nationless cosmopolites, certain specific nationalities and groups such as Armenians, Jews, the Third Force, rich diasporas, Germans', and 'un-Russian' people in general. He also constantly underlines personal belonging to identities along the lines of 'We are Russians [*russkiy*], we are patriots, we are Cossacks, we are in Russia'.²⁰

A particular feature of Kondratenko's discourse is that he simply refers to 'the enemies' as 'all of them, they', or simply 'they, the Christ-sellers', and does not define more accurately in what way or why they are all one thing or another. At the same

time, when he refers to 'us', the opposite applies. There are numerous references to the 'us' group, in which it is ascribed specific qualities. 'Such is the nature of Russians'.

I was extremely indignant, and thought: how can it be, that my nation, which saved the world from fascism, my nation, which flew out into space, how can they say such things about it? And now, when I look at everything that is happening in the country, I can't help but think that everyone of us is talented as an individual, but together we are somehow a strange nation [*chudo-natsiya*].²¹

In the patriotic speeches of the Governor of Kuban, the image of the enemy is strengthened through the projection of a struggle between 'us' and the 'the enemy', which is expressed with accusations that they 'nail, tear down, try to destroy, mock'. But we 'say ... "no", we won't let you'. Thus Kondratenko's national-patriotic model can be further be labelled 'patriotism against'.

Yegorov

By 1996 Kondratenko had acquired a reputation among the general populace in Krasnodar *kray* as the main patriotic politician. However, in the 1996 Gubernatorial elections his main competitor, Yegorov, who was then the Head of the *kray* administration, also started 'playing the patriotic card'. Most of the support for Yegorov's election campaign in fact came from the television and the press, which played a proactive role in the election. In his campaign texts, the patriotic theme was established with statements such as the following one:

Since ancient times the wisdom and counsel of the elders have been appreciated in Kuban. My parents taught me the wise adage: 'A tree can live without twigs and leaves, but if it loses its roots, it dies.' You are the protectors of the greatest traditions, customs and rituals. Kuban's spirit rests with you.²²

There was also a premeditated populist tone in the Governor's official statements, including for example the opening lines of the 'Address of the Head of the administration of Krasnodar *kray* N. D. Yegorov to the inhabitants of Kuban':

Dear countrymen [*zemlyaki*!]! As the Head of the Krasnodar *kray* administration, I would like to call on you to show your Kuban patriotism ... As the head of the *kray* administration I believe that the time has come to put an end to the imposition of foreign produce [*prodovol'stvennaya interventsiya*], which is undermining the Kuban economy, ruining or producers and exterminating the people's gene pool [*genofond*]. Give your preference not to imported trash, but to native Kuban products, clean, safe, nutritious and tasty. Buy our Kuban sausage at the shops instead of the imported ones with harmful conservatives. Take home fish that swam in a pond or a river an hour earlier. Put a bottle of Abrau-Dyurso [mineral water] on the table rather than some notorious fake with a shiny label.²³

Thus we can note that Yegorov's patriotic discourse bears greater resemblance to what we have labelled 'civil patriotism' than 'national patriotism':

1. The division of society between 'us' and 'them' is blurred. The explicit identities of the 'enemy' and the 'us' group are also lacking. Instead there is a duality in terms of the qualitative judgement of the situation, in which the undifferentiated and united society finds itself. 'Give [without reference to anyone in particular] your preference not to imported trash, but to native Kuban products, clean, safe, nutritious and tasty.'
2. Since the 'other' or the 'enemy' is not as explicitly defined, the condition of conflict with it is less profound. The resulting discourse is a 'patriotism for'.

The results of the elections give interesting indications of the level of public support for the different varieties of patriotic discourse. As mentioned, Kondratenko won the final round of the 1996 election of the Head of the Krasnodar administration with 81 % of the vote, compared to less than 5 % for Yegorov, a calamitous result for the latter. Thus it is fair to say that in the rivalry between differing patriotic ideologies in the 1996 elections, Kondratenko's national-patriotic division of society into 'us' and 'them' received greater support than Yegorov's civil patriotism.

Election observation: the 1998 elections to the Krasnodar *kray* Legislative Assembly

From 1996 to 1998 a new political scene with different political forces and actors developed in Krasnodar *kray*. None of them supported the sitting government as clearly as Yegorov had done in 1996. Instead, the perspectives of the new actors matched neither those of the Yeltsin camp nor those of the opposing communists. These new actors were the mayors of the large cities.

Shortly before the 1998 elections, V. A. Samoilenko, the Mayor of Krasnodar City, and Kondratenko, who was then the Governor of the *kray*, clashed together in an open conflict. The conflict reached its peak when Kondratenko went on television and accused Samoilenko of corruption and called the Mayor's office 'a centre of conspiratorial espionage'. Shortly after the broadcast, Samoilenko sued Kondratenko for slander.

The 1998 elections became a confrontation between Mayor Samoilenko and Governor Kondratenko. The distinctive feature of this confrontation was that neither the Mayor nor the Governor were entitled to lead their own electoral organisations, which consisted of relatively unknown people. Thus while their teams and campaigns inevitably were stamped with their personal images, it is also likely that the discourse and ideology in their programmes gained greater importance in the struggle, with slightly less interference from personal factors related to the election candidates as individuals.

Kondratenko

Having become Governor in 1996, Kondratenko continued to use his seat in the Federation Council to put forward his ideas. At a session of the Council on 22 January 1997 Kondratenko promulgated a statement concerning the Kuban Cossacks:

The extremely difficult situation in which Kuban, Stavropol, Don, Chechnya, the entire Northern Caucasus, all of Russia, finds itself, makes it necessary for us, all Cossacks ...

all peoples who live here, to stop up and think about and understand what is happening to us, where we are going, where and why we are being pushed and what the consequences will be ... We, the Cossacks of Kuban, have understood where this game behind the scenes is leading and who is leading it.²⁴

On 15 May 1997 Kondratenko pronounced himself in the Federation Council on the idea of setting up a Federal television channel:

I believe that there is no television for the indigenous [*korennyy*] peoples of Russia, and that the concept itself is very alluring. But if we make a decision and the mechanism for employing people remains non-Russian (excuse me), then tomorrow we'll have Svanidze, Kiselev and so on there again. And the Russians, the Adygs, the Cherkessians, the Kabardinians won't hear anything good there ... That's why if we go ahead with setting up our own television channel, then we need guarantees that it will be Russian [*rossiyskiy*], for the indigenous [*korennyy*] peoples of Russia. Because we've had enough of this so-called 'Russian' [*rossiskoye*] television. When you turn it on, you soon stop watching it. It has no Russian soul, and doesn't smell of Russia [*Rusyu ne pakhnet*].²⁵

On 4 July Kondratenko made a statement regarding a rise in the price of electricity.

Three million peasants in Kuban are doomed to extinction ... Three cosmopolites [in the IMF] have dictated, and we will do, as long as our people breathes.²⁶

Samoylenko

Samoylenko published his alternative concept of patriotism under the title 'The Formation of Civil Patriotism in Krasnodar City':

The formation of civil patriotism in Krasnodar City constitutes a system of perspectives, principles and activities ... related to the development of feelings of participation in city life among the inhabitants of Krasnodar. This patriotism includes a feeling of active participation in Krasnodar City as the basis of Kuban and Russian [*rossiyskiy*] patriotism ... Civil patriotism cannot be based on social conflict and hatred in any form towards other peoples. Calls to search for 'enemies' who are supposed to be responsible for the problems of contemporary Russia, enmity between social groups and violence are

incompatible with real patriotism. We shouldn't allow the division of the inhabitants of Krasnodar into 'us' and 'them'.²⁷

In this statement there is an underlying thrust against the *kray* administration in general and Kondratenko and his patriotic discourse in particular. In Samoylenko's conception of patriotism the division of society into opposing sides is far weaker than it is in Kondratenko's conception. The type of opponent projected is instead one who encourages impatience and inter-group conflict, and there are strong allusions to the *kray* administration in this respect. He also emphasises the 'we' group and identity:

The fact that we are inhabitants of Krasnodar has greater value than any political perspective. The citizens of the city, who belong to the most different parties and movements, can act together in their common interest. To us, Krasnodar is City number one, the glorious city of our lives.

The struggle aspect is present in this rhetoric, but not dominating. In some ways it is similar to the national-patriotic conception of 'patriotism against'. However, the 'against' element is far weaker and calls upon society as a whole to work against the situation. This is in turn reminiscent of the conception of 'patriotism for' something or other better than we noted above. Rather than being 'against' some enemy, it is 'for' Krasnodar.

A closer look at Kondratenko and Samoylenko's opinion poll ratings in the period from August to October 1998 casts light on the popularity of the opposing discourses:

Opinion poll August-October 1998			Gubernatorial elections 1996			
	Karasunsky and Tsentralnyy Districts	Prikubansky and Zapadnyy Districts	Karasunskiy and Tsentralnyy Districts		Prikubanskiy and Zapadnyy Districts	
If the elections of Governor were held today, whom would you vote for?			first tour	rerun	first tour	rerun
Kondratenko	56 %	53 %	68 %	87 %	66 %	86 %
Samoylenko	22 %	16 %				
If the elections of Mayor were held today, whom would you vote for?			Elections of Mayor in 1996			
Samoylenko	52 %	44 %	36 %		34 %	
If the elections to the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodar <i>kray</i> were held today, whom would you vote for?			Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodar <i>kray</i> 1998			
Representatives of 'Fatherland' (without mentioning the party label)	3 %	1 %	36 %		27 %	
Representatives of Samoylenko's team (without mentioning the party label)	41 %	44 %	0 %		35 %	

TABLE 1. The correlation between the popularity and electoral image of political actors in Krasnodar *kray*.²⁸

During Kondratenko's governorship, his national-patriotic ideas seem to have become embedded in the minds of many of the inhabitants of Krasnodar *kray*. Thus when the question 'Do you agree that the current leadership of the country is a tool in a plot against Russia?' was posed to people in Krasnodar City in 1998, 39 % replied in the affirmative and 23 % rejected the statement, while 27 % agreed that the country's suffering was the result of a Zionist plot and 42 % disagreed. The word 'patriot' also had particular connotations. To the leading question 'Do you agree that a real patriot should not support the reforms that were started in 1991?', 35 % replied positively, while 33 % replied negatively. This also indicates that two thirds of the respondents may have a clear idea about what a 'real patriot' is, and are prepared to draw conclusions on that basis.

The survey material and the election results show that also civil patriotism enjoys a certain popularity in Krasnodar City. That is interesting because Krasnodar did not support Yegorov, who stood as a candidate in the 1996 gubernatorial elections with a programme oriented towards civil patriotism. The first time the election was held, he got about 16 % of the vote in the Karasunskyy, Tsentralnyy, Zapadnyy and Prikubanskiy *okrugs*. When, as mentioned, there was a rerun due to low voter turnout, he got about 4 % of the vote in the Zapadnyy and Prikubanskiy *okrugs*, and about 3 % in the Karasunskyy and Tsentralnyy *okrugs*, against more than 65 % for Kondratenko the first time, and 85 % in the rerun.

Judging from the situation in 1998 it seems that Kondratenko and his 'national-patriotism' have retained much of their popularity, at the same time as Samoylenko and his 'civil patriotism' have also grown more popular. Also a straightforward comparison of the (first time) 1996 elections quoted above and the results of the October 1998 opinion poll shows the same development. In the Karasunskyy and Tsentralnyy *okrugs* Kondratenko lost about 12 % of the vote, and in the Zapadnyy and Prikubanskiy *okrugs* he lost about 13 %. At the same time, Samoylenko's popularity grew. If a new Mayor were elected in Krasnodar City in 1998, 47 % of the respondents in the poll said they would have given him their support, compared to the 33 % who did in the 1996 elections of the city Mayor.

Similarly, to the question 'If Kondratenko and Samoylenko were the main candidates to an important post, who would you vote for?', about 53 % of the respondents in the poll said Kondratenko, and about 27 % said Samoylenko. That is more than any of Kondratenko's competitors got in the 1996 elections.

The personal factor.

In examining Kondratenko's popularity one should not disregard the importance of charisma, in which he is in no way lacking. A clear indicator is provided by the

perception of Kondratenko as an individual politician in relation to that of the *kray* administration he leads. This is underlined by data produced by the Krasnodar Centre for Marketing and Social Research on the evaluation of the *kray* administration: 31 % of the respondents deemed it to be bad, 33 % satisfying, 23 % good. At the same time, only 9 % judged Kondratenko's work as bad, 17 % as satisfying and 69 % as good (the survey was carried out in rural electoral *okrugs*, including the Tikhoretskiy, Vyselkovskiy, Pavlovskiy, Krylovskoy, Novopokrovskiy and Beloglinskiy *rayons*). Thus Kondratenko and the *kray* administration under his command are perceived quite differently.

This is revealing, because in the very same rural electoral *okrugs* there is no similar development in the popularity of the *okrug* administrations and heads of administrations. Instead there is a general rejection of both the administrations and their heads. Thus, for example, in the Krylovskoy *rayon* the work of the administration was judged as follows: 82 % of the respondents deemed it to be bad; 9 % to be satisfactory; and 2 % to be good. Similarly, 79 % considered the work of Head of the *rayon* administration bad; 8 % satisfying and 7 % good. In most cases the ratings of the *rayon* administrations and their heads are similarly proportional. This in turn means that people relate to Kondratenko not as a representative of the state, but as an individual politician.

This is also confirmed by surveys of how the *kray* administration and Kondratenko were rated by the inhabitants of Krasnodar City. The work of the *kray* administration was seen by 21 % of the respondents as bad, by 39 % as satisfying and by 29 % as good. In contrast, Kondratenko's work was seen by 14 % as bad, by 20 % as satisfying and by 58 % as good.

The situation regarding the Municipal authorities and Mayor of Krasnodar City was different. Thus 25 % of the respondents judged the work of the municipal authorities to be bad, 36 % satisfying and 24 % good. Mayor Samoilenko's work was seen by 23 % of the respondents as bad, by 27 % as satisfying, and by 37 % as good; and there

was not an overwhelming difference between the popularity of Mayor Samoilenko and the municipal authorities under his leadership. The inverse proportional relation between the popularity of the governmental structure and its head that can be observed in the case of the *kray* administration and its Head, Kondratenko, does not apply to the municipal authorities.

In his electoral image, Kondratenko plays on both his personal charisma and the notion of ‘uncle Kondrat’. However, Samoilenko is not without charisma either. In the elections to the *kray* legislative assembly only a few of those who were elected in Krasnodar were known for drawing on their personal qualities in politics, but nonetheless most of the seats were taken by previously unknown candidates. This all goes to show that a large number of people vote for a ‘label’, for an ideology or a discourse. Fame and charisma have an effect on electoral support, but here we can see that those factors are not the only important ones.

	Which candidates are you familiar with? (October 1998)		Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodar <i>kray</i> (November 1998)	
	Prikubanskiy and Zapadnyy Districts	Centralnyy and Karasunskiy Districts	Prikubanskiy and Zapadnyy Districts	Centralnyy and Karasun Districts
Candidates who got mandates in 1998				
Eshenko S. A.		9 %		37 %
Priz I. V.		5 %		36 %
Kosenko V. G.		6 %		36 %
Mihailov A. S.		3 %		33 %
Hankoev I. M.	58 %		44 %	
Medovnik A. N.	50 %		27 %	
Shnurenko V. F.	0.7 %		22 %	
Protsko V. V.	n.d.		26 %	

TABLE 2. The correlation between the familiarity and electoral support of representatives of local political forces at Krasnodar territory in the elections to the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodar *kray* 1998.

Conclusion

The popularity of local leaders in Krasnodar *kray* is partly correlated with their version of patriotic discourse. The concept of the 'other' is central to patriotic discourse and important for popular support.

An important distinction can be drawn between what we have referred to as 'national patriotism', in which there is enmity and a sharp division between 'us' and 'them'; and 'civil patriotism', in which Russian society is envisaged as united in a struggle against undefined threats. It is noticeable that patriotic discourse based on the idea of the 'other', or 'patriotism against' some enemy, is easier to sell, at least in Krasnodar *kray*.

The popularity of discourse that divides society into two groups indicates that discourse that casts society as 'complex' or 'compounded' and consisting of several parts is most understandable to the inhabitants of Kuban. Thus it also seems that ideologies that construe abstract divisions between conditions in which a unitary society finds itself do not appeal to the general populace and do not receive wide electoral support. Furthermore, this probably applies not only to Krasnodar *kray* but also the rest of Russia, as indicated by Lebed's KRO. It was expected the KRO would pass the five per cent barrier in the 1995 elections to the state Duma. However, similarly to other organisations that drew upon civil patriotism – apart from those that were closely connected with the sitting government – it waned.

In the minds of many Russians, Russian society is constituted by separate groups and identities. The various groups are unequal and have different statuses. One of the most noticeable internal criteria for their general social status is their placement in relation to the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them'.

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- ¹ N. Berdyayev, 'O sovremennom natsionalisme', *Filosofskiye nauki*, Moscow, No. 3, 1991, pp. 99-104, at p.101.
- ² Alan Ingram, 'A Nation Split into Fragments': The Congress of Russian communities and Russian Nationalist Ideology', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1999, pp. 687-74, at pp. 689, 690.
- ³ See for example Grigorii Golosov, 'Who Survives? Party Origins, Organization Development, and Electoral Performance in Post-Communist Russia', *Political Studies*, XLVI, 1998, pp. 511-543; Richard Sakwa, 'Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2.31, 1993, pp. 7-15; Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, 1993, pp. 521-48; Ronald J. Hill, *Parties and Party System in Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics*, 1994, Durham: Duke University Press.
- ⁴ The foundation *Obshchestvennoye mneniye* [Public Opinion] regularly carries out a survey of regional leaders across the federation. See www.fom.ru.
- ⁵ For more detailed information about national-patriotic associations, see A. Vekhovskiy, V. Pribylovskiy and E. Mikhaylovskaya *Natsionalizm i ksenofobiya v rossiyskom obshchestve*, 1998, Moscow: Panorama.
- ⁶ 'Kak golosoval Krasnodar?', *Krasnodarskiye isvestia*, 24 December 1996, p.1; Irina Gruba, 'Na gubernatorskikh vyborakh s bol'shym otryvom pobedil Nikolay Kondratenko', *Krasnodarskiye isvestia*, 24 December 1996, pp. 1-2; 'Postanovlenie izbiratel'noy komissii Krasnodarskogo kraya o rezul'tatah povtornykh vyborov glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya 22 dekabrya 1996', *Krasnodarskiye isvestia*, 25 December 1996, pp. 1-2.
- ⁷ For more detailed information about national-patriotic associations, see A. Vekhovskiy, V. Pribylovskiy and E. Mikhaylovskaya *Natsionalizm i ksenofobiya v rossiyskom obshchestve*, 1998, Moscow: Panorama. The electronic version of the book can be found on <http://www.panorama.ru/works/xeno>.
- ⁸ Tat'yana Shavshukova, 'Sotsialisticheskiye i kommunisticheskiye organizatsii v maye', *Politicheskii monitoring*, Vol. 62, No. 5, 1997.
- ⁹ Tat'yana Shavshukova, 'Sotsialisticheskiye i kommunisticheskiye organizatsii v noyabre 1995', *Politicheskii monitoring*, Vol. 46, No. 11, 1995.
- ¹⁰ Tat'yana Shavshukova, 'Sotsialisticheskiye i kommunisticheskiye organizatsii v maye 1997', *Politicheskii monitoring*, Vol. 62, No. 5, 1997.
- ¹¹ Tat'yana Shavshukova, 'Sotsialisticheskiye i kommunisticheskiye organizatsii v avguste', *Politicheskii monitoring*, Vol. 67, No. 8, 1997.
- ¹² V. Platonenko, 'Demokraticheskiye partii i organizatsii v yanvare 1997', *Politicheskii monitoring*, Vol. 60, No.1, 1996.
- ¹³ A. Lebed, *Ideologiya zdravogo smysla*, Moscow: Rus' fil'm, 1997, pp. 3-4.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 27.
- ¹⁵ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Sovet Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 6, 1 June 1994, Stenographic transcript, pp. 34-35.
- ¹⁶ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 12, 16 November 1994, Part I., Stenographic transcript, p. 11.
- ¹⁷ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 6, 1 June 1994, Stenographic transcript, pp. 23-24.
- ¹⁸ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 18, 21 March 1995, Stenographic transcript, pp. 21-22.
- ¹⁹ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 9, 28 July 1994, Stenographic transcript, p. 31.
- ²⁰ A. Vekhovskiy, V. Pribylovskiy and E. Mikhaylovskaya *Natsionalizm i ksenofobiya v rossiyskom obshchestve*, 1998, Moscow: Panorama.
- ²¹ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 6, 21 March 1995, Stenographic transcript, pp. 23-24.

²² From a leaflet distributed to people's mail boxes in connection with the election campaign.

²³ Nikolay Egorov, 'Podderzhim kubanskogo proizvoditelya! Obrashenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraia N. Egorova k zhitelyam Kubani', *Krasnodarskie izvestiya*, 28 September 1996, pp. 1-2.

²⁴ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 16, 22 January 1995, Stenographic transcript, p. 12.

²⁵ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 20, 15 May 1995, Stenographic transcript, p. 20.

²⁶ *Federal'noye sobraniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, [Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Federation Council], Session 22, 4 July 1997, Stenographic transcript, p. 37.

²⁷ 'Patriotizm kotory my vybiraem', *Krasnodarskiye izvestiya*, 23 October 1998, p. 1

²⁸ For the results of elections of Mayors, see: *Vestnik izbiratel'noy komissii Krasnodarskogo kraia*, No. 2, February 1997.

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