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Towards a Comprehensive Results-based Reporting and Performance Assessment Framework

For UN Peacekeeping Operations

Cedric de Coning and Emery Brusset



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Executive Summary

This report considers the tools and processes that DPKO and DFS currently use to assess the performance of senior personnel, individual units and peacekeeping operations, and proposes a methodology for reorganizing these tools into a single overarching comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment framework.

We argue for a shared analytical framework for performance assessment across the UN system, and show how the terminology used by the United Nations Evaluation Group can be applied in peacekeeping operations.

Currently, performance assessments of peacekeeping operations are undertaken as a number of independent processes, which serve different constituencies and a range of purposes. This report identified eight different tools, each performing its own data collection and analysis. They are concentrated in two distinct areas across the spectrum. On the one hand a group of tools focus on outputs (measurable actions undertaken), and on the other a few tools focus on strategic analysis of the context – where the link to the peacekeeping operation is very tenuous. As a result, the information generated by the current tools cannot be aggregated into a meaningful overall assessment of the performance of a given peacekeeping operation.

The report endorses the principle of establishing a single comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment framework (the Framework), which brings the existing policies and tools together into more efficient interaction. In addition to what exists already, we recommend developing a performance assessment design that supports the Framework and the RBB with information on the performance of the mission against its plans, objectives and mandate.

1. We recommend the establishment of a single comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment Framework that incorporates the current planning and evaluation policies and tools, including the RBB, and that adds a new performance assessment tool and a predictable planning and decision-making cycle.
2. The Framework needs to envision a strategic planning horizon that is linked to the timeframes necessary to achieve the mission's mandate, and should not be limited to the period for which the mission is currently authorized.

3. The Framework should contain a performance assessment tool consisting of three elements, namely a set of indicators for each performance area, a process for analyzing and reporting on performance, and a platform where all the information gathered is stored for current and future use.
4. For each mission, the Framework should be grounded in a context analysis that identifies the key drivers that shape developments in the conflict-system that the peacekeeping operation is intended to influence. It should include in particular the identification of key drivers of change, which are the events or trends that will trigger significant change. The context analysis identifies and analyses the critical conditions that influence these drivers, and the mission's effects-based plans should be aimed at influencing these critical conditions, so as to have an impact on the key drivers.
5. Central to a performance assessment is defining the manner in which outputs are intended to influence the critical conditions around key drivers and actors. Clearly articulating the intended influence (the so-called "theory of change" in evaluation terminology) helps to anticipate what impact a peacekeeping operation can be expected to have on a conflict-system, as the triggers or drivers of the process of change have been clearly identified as part of the context analysis.

Operationalizing the Framework requires three streams of elaboration, aimed at different functions within the organisation. It should be noted that it does not add significant new tasks, but aims to bring together what exists into three categories of capacities:

- **Assessment capacity**, existing staff who will be trained in performance assessment;
- **Planners and managers**, who would be given concrete points of reference on which to base decisions (resources, outputs, critical conditions, assumptions under review); and
- **A digital platform** that can capture, through big data solutions, the information in the existing systems, and present it into a single dashboard interface.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide a diagnostic of the tools and processes that DPKO and DFS currently use for the assessment of the performance of peacekeeping operations. Based on this diagnostic, the authors propose an overarching framework for creating a comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment framework (the Framework).

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The study involved a review of existing policies, procedures, reports and related documentation, a week of interviews and observation at New York Headquarters, and further analysis and remote consultation with key stakeholders. A list of 44 people that were interviewed is provided in annex B.

2. Assessing the Performance of Peacekeeping Operations

2.1 Essential Performance Assessment Concepts

In order to analyse the current tools used to assess the performance of UN peacekeeping operations, we first need to introduce a few generic monitoring and evaluation concepts and definitions, so that we share a common conceptual framework that we can employ for performance assessment in peace operations. These concepts have been developed for the international public policy realm and have been approved by the professional community, which meets under the auspices of the OECD Development Aid Committee (DAC).

The concepts have, amongst others, influenced the formulation of the UN Evaluation Group standards,¹ and they are thus also the approved concepts for the UN system. By utilising these concepts also for the performance assessment of peacekeeping operations, we are facilitating a common baseline across the UN system.

The following definitions capture different levels of results that can be found, stated in slightly broader terms, in the guidance on the evaluation of interventions in conflict situations of the OECD DAC:²

Inputs: the quantifiable resources (human, financial, equipment, etc.) used by a peacekeeping operation to undertake and support activities.

Outputs: the specific products, usually quantifiable, generated by the activities of a peacekeeping operation. This may include, for example, the numbers of patrols conducted, the number of police trained, or the number of capacity building workshops held. Efficiency

¹ <http://uneval.org/document/guidance-documents>

² http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/evaluating-donor-engagement-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264106802-en


is usually determined at the level of outputs – for example, could more products have been generated with the same resources?

Outcomes: The utilisation of an output by a target community, for instance, the way in which key actors view and use an improved capability to resolve tensions between neighbouring communities before they lead to violent conflict as a result of the establishment of a local peace committee, or the application of new skills learned during training and support provided by a peacekeeping operation. It may also be a direct reaction to an output, for instance a reduction in attacks on civilians by an armed group in a certain area as a result of the presence of the peacekeeping operation. Outcomes are often identified by a change in behaviour, i.e. the difference in behaviour before and after the action taken by the peacekeeping operation. It is usually at the level of outcomes that effectiveness and relevance is defined.

Impact: The consequence of an outcome, for instance, following up on the two examples cited under outcomes, a consequence could be a reduction in the number of civilian deaths, or an increase in the perception of safety and security among a local population. It may be intended, or unintended, positive or negative. It may concern not just the affected community and key actors, but also other populations that are not directly in contact with a peace operation. It may be described in successive waves of effects, such as a population influx that leads to an increase in predatory attacks on women and children among the displaced.

This terminology, based on a relatively linear understanding of causal effects, has been used in a number of tools, which have been loosely grouped under contribution analysis. The most well known example has been the Logical Framework, in existence since the seventies, but newer forms include Theories of Change (most frequently described in graphic form), and benchmarking.


Figure 1: The linear causal contribution of the Logical Framework Approach:



The OECD DAC has also developed a core set of evaluation criteria. We propose a slightly revised shorthand version of these criteria adapted to the peacekeeping operations context, which allow for a clearer understanding of the way in which we will establish the link between causal mechanisms of change and performance assessment criteria:

- **Relevance:** alignment of an operation to the needs of the context and the international mandate given to it;
- **Efficiency:** achieving the greatest value from an operation with a given level of resources;
- **Effectiveness:** degree to which outcomes achieved match intended specific objectives;
- **Sustainability:** outcomes achieved endure after the operation has withdrawn; and
- **Impact:** broader consequences of outcomes and the achievement of specific objectives.

Figure 2: The DAC Evaluation Criteria applied to the logical framework:



In this report, we use assessment as an equivalent term for what the OECD DAC or the UN Evaluation Group would term as monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Monitoring and evaluation is usually associated with programmes and projects, as they are understood in the development field. We use assessment because our understanding is that it is a more appropriate concept in the peace and security field, one that is mandate, operational and campaign driven. For the same reasons, we have opted to use performance rather than results.

Another term that we will frequently employ is effects, or results. An effect is an observable change that has occurred as the result of an action. In the peacekeeping operations context change usually manifests itself in a change of behaviour of a specific group (e.g. an armed group or a party to a political process) or an affected community or society.

A third term used here is action. In the peacekeeping operation context an action is likely to be an initiative, such as a reduction of sexual and gender-based violence campaign, or an activity, such as a specific Protection of Civilians (POC) campaign.

2.2 Challenges in the Current System

Many within the UN have pointed to the difficulties of assessing peacekeeping operations. Here is a brief list of these slightly misleading notions, listed as challenges, with the briefest indications of how these could be overcome in the context of peacekeeping operations:

“It is not possible to assess the performance of political or peace-making work.” Some argue that in the context in which peacekeeping operations work, information can be sensitive and objectives may be hidden, and revealing these in a results narrative could undermine the trust the parties to a political process place in the UN. Others argue that these political processes are too complex to capture in a linear results framework, and that doing so will inhibit the flexibility and reduce the efficiency of peacekeeping operations. There is also an argument that change may be triggered by individual decisions made in confidential situations, which lead to large scale unforeseen changes. Others point out that the kinds of societal changes and decision-making processes that are covered under this field of human activity are naturally analysed in depth by the managers of peacekeeping operations.

We think the challenge for performance assessment in peacekeeping operations is the way in which information is produced and the findings communicated. The prevalence of qualitative information should not be a problem, as long as it can be documented, and verified with some degree of plausibility. The key is to capture the type of evidence which decision-makers use, and to ensure that the performance assessment system is able to develop it into operationally relevant knowledge.

“There is a difference between substantive reporting, which is more political, and the kind of output reporting that support and uniformed units are able to do.” The latter revolves around more repetitive and standardised activities, such as servicing vehicles or undertaking patrols, which enable quantitative data-rich reporting, while the former takes place in a highly dynamic environment which is difficult to plan for, and that requires qualitative analysis and reporting.

We think this notion ignores the full spectrum of potential reporting in peacekeeping operations, which includes activities with quantitative and repetitive elements, such as on demobilisation. Reporting extends in a continuum all the way to higher-level political change. Substantive reporting is more about outcomes and impact, and as such special care must be taken to articulate some degree of attribution of cause to effect.

It is better to see reporting as looking at a chain of effects from outputs to impact, where the latter is the most critical element.

“It is not possible to assess impact.” This argument can relate to the time it takes for the actions of a peacekeeping operation to have an effect on a peace process or political transition. It is argued that whilst some security actions may have a short-term effect on stability, a longer-time frame is necessary for a peacekeeping operation to contribute to the development of the institutions and processes, e.g. reconciliation, that is necessary for such stability to be sustained. Some argue the impact of a peacekeeping operation can only really be assessed if the peace is sustained after the peace operation has been withdrawn. Others point to the difficulty of assessing impact if there is no baseline data that one can use to make an analysis of the conditions before and after a peacekeeping operation. Some argue that it is not possible to assess impact without an (counterfactual) analysis of how a situation could have developed with and without a peacekeeping operation in comparable situations. Another reason given why assessing impact is a challenge is the lack of a clear theory of change, as mandates are often broadly aspirational, especially in situations where the peace operation lacks a clear political role. Finally, there is a conviction that sudden changes in the situation require new indicators, which are often not readily available. In these fast changing contexts, a performance assessment framework will be outdated and unable to reflect the real impact of the peace operation.

We think it is possible to collect and attribute output and outcome information in peacekeeping operations. While more substantive, higher-level changes, are often intersected by multiple causes. Later in this report we propose a way of analysing impact that overcomes this hurdle. This involves influencing critical conditions that affect the drivers of change.

It is difficult to measure effects, and there is a danger that only what can be measured will be noticed, supported and resourced. The prevalence of qualitative and multiple levels of data as well as the prevalence of narrative interpretation and of conflicting viewpoints are often mentioned as insurmountable constraints on performance assessment. This is explained also by the lack of capacity, time, or resources to undertake surveys, or to understand economic and physical environments. There is a fear that performance assessment will result in a focus on – and prioritisation of – those things that can be easily measured, at the cost of the really important political, but difficult to report and measure, work of peace operations.

– We contend that the word measurement has become conflated with the word verify, or demonstrate. This is a mistake, as much of the evidence we use for decision-making is qualitative. By using the term “measurement” we eliminate a large part of the very valid universe of information around us. Equivalent terms, such as “soft” or “hard” evidence, over-estimate the validity and rigour of quantitative information. For peacekeeping operations we recommend the use of the terms reporting and assessment.

Rule of Law assistance are currently measured on the basis of countrywide indicator sets, which show the overall trends in relation to, for instance bodies of human rights law (for example: figures on pre-trial detention rates). This also includes policing, criminal investigations, and the very significant component of work that goes toward the support to national counterpart structures. However, making a connection between changes in these indicators and the activities of peacekeeping operations has been no more than an untested hypothesis.

– We believe the error here is to seek to make a causal link between changes that are at the heart of complex effects, and the limited range of activities of a given peacekeeping operation. The approach we propose is to track countrywide indicators, but in a much smaller number, and to use them in a more contextualised way. The purpose would be to track developments in the overall situation, but relate it more clearly to mid-level outcomes. There is also considerable value in keeping the assessment more iterative, for planning and assessing. Adaptive approaches test a hypothesis by a programme, and then use the feedback from that programme to plan the next iteration.

3. Reflections on current systems & tools

3.1 Analysis

This section presents the state of the art in DPKO and DFS in collecting, analysing and reporting information in the current system. We introduce here an adapted form of the “governance/periodicity” table that was proposed by the Peacekeeping Information Management Unit, and situate the instruments within an output/impact continuum.

Currently, performance assessment within DPKO is undertaken as a number of independent processes, which serve different constituencies and a range of purposes. We have identified eight different tools, each performing its own data collection and analysis.

The **Reports to the Secretary General** are the most strategic forms of reporting, and reflects changes in the country situations and adjustments made in peacekeeping operations. These are written primarily on the basis of professional judgements by the senior level staff in a mission and the relevant IOT. The level of analysis is that of outcomes and impact, although the evidence is not systematically organised, as the structure reflects a disconnection between the measures taken and the evidence of change. The reports are heavily focused on outputs.

The **Strategic Reviews** are undertaken under the lead of the OO. These are based on a rapid collection of information, and the analysis is reliant on the professional judgement of senior experts with strong insights into the way peacekeeping operations work. The level of analysis is that of impact, and the reports contain context analysis. The Reviews are not done systematically, and yield varying products. They have, at times, proven useful to inform mandate renewals processes at critical transition points, but they are ad hoc and thus fail to provide DPKO with sustained and predictable performance assessment information.

Code Cables and Situation Reports (Sitreps) capture some evaluative evidence, and support much of the decision making at Headquarters. However, they are heavily focused on events and activities, and do not analyse causal links from outputs to effects. They often feed into the Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. The level of analysis is activities, and context, with some elements of outcomes.

The Compact between the SRSGs and the SG is a form of performance assessment. The compact commits the SRSG/HoM to achieve agreed objectives, for which the Secretary-General (through the USG DPKO) will hold them accountable. The SRSG/HoM also commits to ensuring the agreed objectives are reflected in the work plans and performance assessments of their staff at all levels. However, they tend to focus on resources and output level information. They do not contain context specific information on political processes and wider impact. The level of analysis is mostly limited to outputs, and offers no link to performance.

The Results Based Budgeting (RBB) system is a comprehensive and fully developed form of reporting which aligns core resources, in particular personnel and equipment, to key tasks. It serves the purpose of managing the relationship with the ACABQ and 5th Committee by providing the information that will make budget allocation decisions more transparent. The level of analysis is input to outcome, although the nature of the analysis is self-avowedly to structure the analysis according to the required inputs based on a continuity of operations.

Dashboard is a recent form of presenting data from Missions, and is pooled in different areas of DPKO. This form of presenting data is suited to particular types of events that are counted over time to indicate trends, for instance violence against civilians or attitudes towards peacekeepers. This includes most importantly the Knowledge Management Team and the Operations Centre. The most prevalent reporting concerns incidents (more recently based on SAGE in some missions), and human displacement, flight patterns, as well as humanitarian access. Efforts are ongoing to further refine this tool, for instance to report on gender mainstreaming.

Surveys of a population's attitudes towards a peacekeeping operation are conducted in some mission contexts. The level of analysis is the context and activities or inputs. These have provided useful insights into how these missions are viewed by host populations and have helped missions to improve their communication and engagement with host populations. We advocate much more consistent and systematic use of such surveys, but call for the design of some of these surveys to be informed by the mission's planning and performance assessment framework. In this way, such surveys can help the mission assess the effect of its activities, for instance, protection actions, on the host population.

Evaluations are currently undertaken by DPET and Force Commanders, as well as for some mission components, and audits are conducted by OIOS. Evaluations are conducted at Headquarters and in field missions. Evaluations assess specific aspects of peace operations

that are regarded as problematic or that need further elaboration, such as Protection of Civilians. Audits assess whether Security Council mandates and UN standards, rules and procedures are being implemented. Specific mission components may undertake their own evaluations, for instance, the police division evaluate whether UN police-specific procedures, practices and procedures are being followed in specific peace operations. Military components have their own process, and are addressed in the next paragraph.

Evaluation of Force Commanders and Units are conducted by OMA, using a standardised questionnaire from October 2017. This evaluation process is designed to help Force and Sector Commanders identify and correct problems that affect subordinate unit performance. This does not cover political nor societal aspects. This practice has not been implemented sufficiently yet to assess.


It is important to observe that the diagnostic did not find examples of performance assessments concerning the way in which the Department for Peacekeeping Operations evaluates its own function as a strategic headquarters – in other words, an analysis of how the missions interact with headquarters, and how the Department relates to the missions it deploys – in terms of efficiency, relevance, and sustainability in particular. The Compacts contain a small assessment section on the way in which Missions evaluated headquarters support.

3.2. Observations and findings

The main weakness of the current performance system is that it lacks a common frame of reference. Different tools serve different purposes without clearly distinguishing between their accountability, feedback on implementation and organisational learning roles. There is a gap between the thorough input-centred work on Results Based Budgeting on the one hand, and mandate implementation reporting and context driven analysis on the other.

Preparatory scoping done by DPET showed that the majority of these tools involve headquarters assessing the missions, rather than headquarters and missions assessing together, or missions assessing themselves. Our own finding is also that these processes are poorly linked, and therefore fail to generate the aggregated data and analysis DPKO needs to make a considered assessment of the performance of its peacekeeping operations. As a result, the information generated by the current tools cannot be aggregated into an overall assessment of the performance of peacekeeping operations.

Figure 3: Mapping of existing tools against focus on impact and decision making:



Not all the tools are aimed at the strategic decision-making level. Quite a few are focused on outputs and resource allocation. If one were to place them in a diagram where the vertical axis represents the input-to-impact scale, and the horizontal axis the link to the senior level decision-making in the organisation, one would notice that a number of these tools are situated in the lower left-hand corner. This indicates that much of the assessment carried out within DPKO is currently contributing to lower level adjustments, such as in activities and procedures, rather than higher-level adjustments in mission strategy and strategic policy direction.

Lower-left hand performance assessment tasks are those that are mandated to be performed regularly, and are allocated to the type of functions and units that are common to almost all missions. These more methodologically oriented tasks are those that require less context-specific judgement and can more readily be directed by standard operating procedures across different mission contexts. The closer one moves to the upper right-hand the more context-specific information needs to be taken into account. The upper level of the frame is occupied by less repetitive tasks, is aimed more clearly at the political environment of the peace operations, in particular the Security Council and the host country.

This overall framework call both for greater synthesis, informed by evaluation concepts and data collection, and for a regrouping of the assessments themselves to be informed by a common paradigm.

The diagnostic carried out for this report concludes that it is possible for peacekeeping operations to build on the existing set of tools and extant concepts to arrive at a comprehensive performance assessment.

4. Steps Towards a Comprehensive Performance Assessment Framework

The roadmap proposed here aims to address the challenges and shortcomings identified above. We recommend integrating several of the different performance assessment tools into a single but comprehensive performance assessment framework. We recommend anchoring this framework in a robust and predictable analysis, planning and decision-making cycle.

Our recommendations aim to lighten the reporting load by narrowing the range of information that should be collected, and by reducing the overall number of assessment tools. Our aim is to reduce bureaucratic complexity caused by the large number of tools and systems that currently need to be maintained and processed.

Our first premise is the need to closely link performance assessment with planning, reporting and decision-making. Performance assessment provides the feedback in the planning cycle that enables adaptation. The role of performance assessment is to create a link between the work carried out by the peacekeeping operation and the developments that are underway in the society that the mission is mandated to support.

Our second premise is the importance of context analysis, in order to situate a peacekeeping operation's goals and objectives, as derived from the Security Council mandate, in the dynamic operational reality of the evolving political, security and social context. It is not possible to assess impact without anchoring both the planning and the assessment processes in the local context.

The core purpose of a comprehensive performance assessment system should be to facilitate adaptation. It generates information on past performance that decision-makers can use to identify which activities need to be discontinued and which activities need to be adjusted and/or expanded. The analysis–planning–implementation–assessment cycle is already fairly well known in peacekeeping operations. However, decision-makers in peacekeeping operations are not good at anchoring this process in the context, and they are poor at identifying and ending underperforming activities and initiatives.

4.1 A Results Based Planning Framework

We recommend the development of a new overarching framework that incorporates the current planning and evaluation policies, including the RBB, and that adds a clear performance assessment framework and a predictable planning and decision-making cycle.

The current Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013) and Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations (2017) are sound, but their implementation has been weak. In contrast, the RBB has been comprehensively employed, but as pointed out earlier, there is a significant and unsustainable gap between financial planning and reporting and the substantive planning and reporting system.

We recommend that these 2013 and 2017 planning policies will be used as the basis for establishing an over-arching planning, reporting and performance assessment framework that covers the whole input–output–outcome–impact spectrum in a multi-year strategic planning framework. One of the new elements is that the Framework integrates the existing RBB. The RBB represents the input dimension, i.e. the RBB identifies the resources needed to achieve the mission’s strategic plan, and is used to justify the financial needs of a peacekeeping operation as well as to report on the use of the allocated resources. The RBB and Framework cannot be folded into one process because the RBB has its own annual timetable driven by the financial decision-making rhythm as influenced, amongst others by the ACABQ and 5th Committee schedules. However, they can be closely aligned, and they can share one results framework.

The performance assessment dimension of the Framework links the annual RBB cycle with the longer multiyear-timeframe of the Framework. The Framework needs to envision a strategic planning horizon that is linked to the timeframes necessary to achieve the mission’s core goals, and should not necessarily reflect the period for which the mission is authorized. The Framework breaks the strategic plan down into specific activities and initiatives that will be carried out with the necessary authorizations, but in order for these actions to be coherent with a larger political strategy, they need to fit into a larger and more longer-term strategic vision that can be aligned with national, IFI and partner strategic planning frameworks.

4.2 Performance Assessment

We recommend the development of a planning and reporting Framework that does not eliminate the existing system, but rather brings all its elements together into one integrated planning and reporting system. In addition, the Framework adds a performance

assessment tool that supports the Framework and the RBB with information on the performance of the mission against its plans.

The performance assessment tool should consist of three elements, namely a set of indicators for each performance area, a process for analyzing and reporting on performance, and a platform where all the information gathered is stored for future use.

A performance area is a distinct area of practice that has its own plans and results framework, e.g. Protection of Civilians (POC) or Rule of Law (RoL). Each performance area, for instance Protection of Civilians, need to develop a set of indicators that can be used to track progress against the objectives articulated in its plans. When a performance area has a regular community of practice across several missions, a set of key performance indicators should be developed that is generic across all missions. In addition, each mission can add its own mission specific indicators as needed.

A general rule of thumb is to have as few indicators as possible, i.e. the minimum set necessary to enable an indicative assessment of performance over the reporting period. Fewer indicators imply more resources can be invested in thoroughly tracking and reporting on the indicators, and more effort can be devoted to refining and improving those indicators over time. Indicators need to be tracked and the data need to be recorded in a database. Software tools and apps can be developed to support the tracking, reporting and storage of data. The indicators can be tracked by existing staff in existing units as part of their normal duties. The Framework gives direction to what staff should report on, and how often they should report. The intention is that by integrating results information into routine reporting that is linked to a database, the need to generate separate reports on results will be reduced, e.g. for the RBB, as some of this information can be automatically generated by the database. As a result, the overall reporting burden should be reduced.

The most valuable aspect of a performance assessment system is the opportunities it creates in decision-making processes for discussions among key stakeholders that confirm or adapt the goals and objectives they are pursuing; discussions about key developments that have taken place in the country or region, and their implications for the mission; discussions about the assessment of past performance and the reasons why some initiatives appear to have had more effect than others, and discussions about what can be done differently in the next cycle to adapt current plans to new developments, based on what was learned from past performance.

These discussions need to follow a specific process that result in an analysis of the data generated by the indicators, and these results should then be reported in the form of a self-assessment of performance to the next level in the reporting chain. For instance, it is envisaged that those involved in Protection of Civilians in a specific sector or region will get together and discuss the data generated by the indicators they tracked over the reporting period (e.g. quarterly), in the context of the rest of the information they have about developments over this period. This will then result in assigning values to a number of pre-defined reporting areas, as well as explaining these values through a qualitative narrative report. This process will be explained in more detail below.

At the mission HQ level, those units responsible for each performance area will collect all the reports from the sectors/regions, and draft a mission-wide report for the SMT on the performance of this area of practice over the reporting period. The Chief of Staff (COS) will collect all the reports from the various performance areas, and add mission-wide analysis that relate to how these areas are interlinked, and present it to the SMT. This could be done via a mission dashboard, or series of dashboards, that provide a visual summary of the performance of the mission in selected key performance areas over the reporting period, supported by qualitative reporting. The SMT needs to use this information to adapt mission-wide plans, to report to the Secretary-General, and to recommend changes in strategic direction.

The information generated by the Framework needs to be stored in a platform that enable those so authorized, at the various levels, to generate reports on performance over any given period, for instance a longitudinal comparison of a certain data set (i.e. a set of selected indicators) over the past three years, or a comparison of a certain data set across missions. The development and rollout of such a database and accompanying software tools will have cost implications. At mission level maintaining such a database should be the responsibility of the COS, supported by staff with the necessary expertise to underpin the RBB and the Framework's systems.

Figure 4 shows how the performance assessment tool supports both the Framework and the RBB:

Framework (multi-year planning framework, managed by an analysis, planning and decision-making cycle determined by the mandate renewal timetable)



Performance assessment tool (quarterly, six-monthly, annual and multi-year effects-based assessment system)



RBB (annual planning & reporting cycle with ACABQ and 5th Committee milestones)

4.3 A standard planning and reporting decision-making cycle

We recommend adopting a standard planning and reporting decision-making cycle that will ensure that peacekeeping operations are managed according to a regular and predictable pattern of decisions-making steps. Most of the gaps and weaknesses described earlier are related to the lack of clear linkages between existing planning policies, the RBB and the current performance assessment tools. As a result, strategic HQ and mission staff do not see the relevance of these policies and tools for their everyday work. A standard planning and decision-making cycle will link analysis–planning–budgeting–assessment and reporting in a predictable cyclical process, and demonstrate relevance as decisions at all levels are taken on the basis of the information generated by the system. If the information generated into the decision-making cycle generate feedback, in the form of direction that guides adaptation and information of the performance of the peacekeeping operation as a whole, the staff engaged in performance areas will be more motivated to track developments against indicators, analyze its meaning, capture it in a database and report their findings and recommendations into the decision-making cycle.

At the strategic headquarters level this iterative cycle is principally driven by the mandate renewal process. This may happen on an annual, six-month or in some cases shorter cycle, but it follows a predictable pattern in that Security Council resolutions specify when the next report is due. The principal reporting tool of the Secretariat, that explains the political context and that reports on progress with the implementation of the mandate, is the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council. There is a well-established process for generating a SG report. On the basis of the mandate renewal timetable, it is thus possible to develop a predictable strategic headquarters decision-making cycle for each mission.

Similarly, at the mission level, and in support of the strategic headquarters decision-making cycle, it is possible to develop a predetermined iterative cycle of decision-making steps that need to be undertaken by the SMT to consider and approve the mission's input to the SG report, as well as the mission's financial plans and reports. These major decision points, i.e. approving a mission's input to a draft SG report of approving a financial report, should drive a predictable analysis, planning, assessment and reporting cycle at mission level.

In order to generate the information that the SMT needs to make its decisions, each performance area needs to follow a similar cycle that is synchronized to generate their inputs in time for the SMT's decision-making steps. To inform the SMT's decisions, the Framework must specify the information that needs to be generated by the various constituent parts of the mission.

This information should be reported according to a predictable timetable. For instance, all performance areas should report according to the Framework on a quarterly basis. If deemed necessary, six-monthly and annual reflections can be added to ensure that each performance area benefits from a reflection on performance over a longer time-horizon.

To summarize, the Framework represents the overall effects-based planning approach for UN peacekeeping operations, and is integrated with the RBB, that represents the input-dimension into the planning process. The Framework is underpinned by a performance assessment tool as well a standard planning and reporting decision-making cycle.

4.4 Context Analysis

We recommend that the Framework be underpinned and informed by a comprehensive context analysis. Context analysis is an integral

part of the missions' analysis, planning, budgeting, assessment and reporting cycle. Its purpose is to anchor the mission's planning and assessment processes in a thorough analysis of the context within which the mission operates.


As the context is dynamic, context analysis needs to be an ongoing process with regular products that inform the planning and assessment processes. A context analysis can be similar to a conflict analysis, but it is meant to be broader in that it is not only focussed on the "conflict", but incorporates all aspects – positive and negative – that inform the context within which the missions pursues its strategy. Negative in this context refers to those trends and behaviours that a peace operation would endeavour to prevent, inhibit or end, whilst positive refers to those trends and behaviours, e.g. formal and informal national and local capacities for peace, that a peacekeeping operation would attempt to support, facilitate and encourage.

It may, in certain contexts, be sensitive to frame the situation a peacekeeping operation is dealing with in the form of a conflict analysis, and a context analysis is thus a more neutral approach that does not impose a "conflict" classification on a given situation.

The context analysis needs to identify the key drivers that shape developments in the conflict-system, or system at risk, that the peacekeeping operation is meant to stabilise and support. It should include in particular the identification of key drivers of change, which are the events or trends that will trigger significant change. The context analysis identifies, and analyse the critical conditions that influence these drivers, and the mission's effects-based plans should be aimed at influencing these critical conditions, so as to have an impact on the key drivers.

Figure 5 shows the inter-relationships between the mandate, context analysis, planning, budgeting and assessment:

Integrated Assessment, Planning and Decision Making



In figure 5 the **Cascade arrows** indicate that there is a structuring role played by the mandate, and the mandate implementation planning as reflected in the Framework (and RBB).

The adoption of one over-arching Framework will ensure that the analysis, planning, budgeting, assessment and reporting products follow similar frames of reference and concepts. They will in particular allow for a testing and constant revision of assumptions, as well as inform the adaptation of activities to ensure that they cluster around specific drivers.

The main innovation in the design presented here is that it indicates a way of connecting the different tools among themselves. The main analytical device is to enable the introduction of contextual data to the results chain, at the level of outputs, which are more measurable and tend to be better captured.

One crucial new element of the Framework approach is to translate the analysis of the overall country situation into key drivers. These will in turn be broken down into those that are not amenable to any form of control by the peacekeeping operation, and those that fall under the sphere of influence of the peacekeeping operation.

The core frame of reference uses a combination of mandate and context analysis to define drivers. Around these drivers are critical conditions, which are defined in terms of outcomes within the planning and results Framework. The context analyses and the planning tools would demonstrate how activities cluster around these drivers to generate outcomes at the level of critical conditions. The analytical construct will be made up of, on the one hand the interventions (results

chains, intended and achieved), and how these fit, or do not fit, against the key drivers of the conflict.

Under 4.2 above we have explained how the performance assessment tool of the Framework consists of three elements, namely a set of indicators for each performance area, a process for analyzing and reporting on performance, and a database where all the information gathered is stored for future use. We now return to explain the process of analyzing performance by utilizing the context analysis.

Central to this performance assessment is defining the manner in which outputs influence the critical conditions around key drivers and actors. This influence will define the impact of the peacekeeping operation with a high degree of confidence as the triggers and tipping points of the process of change have been clearly identified as part of the context analysis.

We have mentioned previously that the analysis consists of a process of deliberating on the meaning of the data gathered by tracking the indicators. We now add that this process should result in assigning a specific score to that assessment, for example on a scale of four to denote the level of influence achieved by a particular initiative on the critical conditions around a driver. This is based on an analysis of that influence in terms of three criteria:

- **Relevance:** This denotes the degree to which an activity and its outputs are relevant to a particular condition, well targeted, and able to change the situation.
- **Extent** (or coverage): This denotes the degree to which specific results address a significant percentage of the actors or factors affecting key drivers. This should be based on a mapping of the stakeholders, and whether any important category of them was neglected. This can be a segment of the general population, but is more often made up of organisations and individuals.
- **Duration** (combining timeliness, and sustainability): This denotes the time aspects of the influence, containing an analysis of the timing (are the election results ready on time?); the duration (was the system applied throughout the election cycle?); and in some cases, the repetition (for example was the vote-counting system checked every hour?), which ensures that its effect can be replicated over time.

An impact score can be attributed as a heuristic device as part of the performance assessment method. The impact scoring is based on the three criteria (relevance, extent and duration of the influence on the driver), which are scored on a scale of 4. The scale is used in the following manner:

1 = negligible influence;

2= marginal influence or influence on minor aspects of a driver;

3= average influence which justifies the resources used, and

4= strong influence

This can be represented in the following table:

	Outcome Evaluation	Evidence Required
Relevance	Are the right outputs targeted at the affected community?	Describe the proximity and adequacy of outputs to decisive conditions for drivers.
Extent	What proportion of the affected community benefited?	Define the coverage according to size of population, and using detailed geographical information.
Duration	Was it timely, did it last long enough, and was it sustainable?	Timing, repetition, longevity, continuation of outcome after intervention.
Impact	How probable is it that an initiative has affected a driver?	Score Card approach where relevance, extent and duration are given a value of 1 to 4.

The assessment referent is the concept of contextual driver, drawn from the affected communities with whom the peacekeeping operation is in contact. The score for each impact is attributed by adding the scores attained for each of the criteria, which themselves are the result of a qualitative and closely argued assessment. The aggregation of results could then be done across different sectors, regions, or periods of time.

The drivers are identified during the context analysis. The type of change the peacekeeping operations wants to bring about via initiatives and activities are articulated as outcomes and impact during the planning process. The degree to which the initiatives and activities that were implemented had an influence on the drivers, is assessed during performance assessment. As part of the assessment process, a numerical value is given in order to facilitate the overall presentation of the assessment data, but it needs to be understood as a relative value, and it remains subject to interpretation and re-interpretation as more information becomes available. These analysis, planning, budgeting and assessment activities are all ongoing processes that feed into the iterative decision-making cycle through standardised and regular reporting periods, as specified in each mission's planning, reporting and performance assessment Framework.

At critical strategic tipping points, for instance when there is a sense that there is a need to significantly change the mandate of a mission, there will still be a need for Strategic Reviews.

Within the context of the regular Framework, specific question may arise that need special attention, and these could be addressed by Real Time Assessment, which is an established methodology to achieve a fresh perspective in a rapid feedback loop.³ A Real Time Assessment in a peacekeeping operation would be undertaken by team of experienced personnel using a basic assessment framework but with a focus on the learning aspects of the role, with a view to triggering rapid adaptation. This will provide a level of understanding of the relationship between the context and the delivery of a specific aspect of the operation that is more immediate than the regular performance assessment cycle.

Peer Review and Red Teaming is two other tools that can be used to complement the regular context analysis, planning and assessment processes. Peer Review can be useful when a situation is so dynamic, or has so drastically changed, that the SMT feels that it needs to validate the performance of the existing analysis, planning, budgeting and assessment tools.

³ See "Real Time Evaluations in Humanitarian Emergencies", Brusset, Cosgrave, MacDonald, 2010, American Evaluation Association. The authors describe real-time evaluation (RTE) as a specific tool in disaster management and within the literature on formative evaluation, monitoring, and impact assessment. RTE offers the possibility of exploring innovative ways to empower frontline disaster response staff, possibly even beneficiaries of assistance. The authors describe conditions for the success of RTE, including field credibility, organization, and rapid analysis.

A Peer Review team, selected on a similar basis as the Real Time Assessment team, can evaluate whether a specific planning or performance assessment process has followed organisational procedures and best practices, and thus whether the process has produced a credible analysis, plan, budget or performance assessment. A Peer Review team will in essence judge whether others, faced with the same information, would come to the same conclusions. Whilst a Peer Review team can be used to validate a planning or performance assessment effort, a Red Team is a tool that can be used to enrich an ongoing planning or performance assessment process.

A Red Team, selected using the same selection process mentioned earlier, questions the assumptions and judgements of those responsible for leading a planning process, by stepping into the shoes of spoilers or other key stakeholders. Typically, a Red Team tries to anticipate how those the peacekeeping operations want to influence may react to the actions and activities envisioned by the planning team. Red Teams help to avoid blind spots, positive performance bias, self-censorship and other similar shortcomings that can often influence planning and self-assessment processes in organisations.

4.5 Aligning Organisational Functions

For the Framework to become operational, three streams needs to be elaborated, each aimed at different functions within the organisation. The table below present the re-grouping of existing functions into a single Framework. It should be noted that it does not add significant new tasks, but aims to bring together what exists into three categories of capacities:

- **Assessment staff**, who will be trained to support and facilitate the results chain as indicated above;
- **Planners and managers**, who would be given concrete points of reference on which to base decisions (resources, outputs, critical conditions, assumptions under review), and
- **A digital platform** that can capture, through big data solutions, the information in the existing systems, and present it into a single dashboard interface.

<p>Digital Platform created, including a Big Data mining component. This generates the data needed to analyse, plan, budget and assess performance.</p>	<p>Planners and Managers are enabled to formulate a central frame of reference through the Framework (and RBB). This facilitates reporting and decision-making.</p>	<p>Staff and Managers report on performance assessment on the basis of the Framework. This drives adaptation, stimulates learning and contributes to accountability.</p>
<p>Context is captured in maps of actors, drivers (events and trends), and space. Reports can be supported by visual tools such as Dashboards.</p>	<p>Assumptions are highlighted in terms of key drivers and critical conditions.</p>	<p>Indicators are developed, data is tracked and captured in database by existing monitoring and context analysts. The existing indicators are regrouped using both context and the results chain.</p>
<p>Each driver is analysed in terms of critical conditions that either accelerate or deny it.</p>	<p>Critical conditions are monitored and adaptations to activities and actions made in real time.</p>	<p>Data generated by the indicators are analysed, and plans are adapted.</p>
<p>Activities are linked to outputs, and outcomes, that relate to the drivers.</p>	<p>Clustering of outputs around key drivers, addressing critical conditions.</p>	<p>Performance area teams reflect on indicator data, make assessments, assign scores and report.</p>
<p>Inputs are related to outputs.</p>	<p>RBB clearly link resources to intended outputs.</p>	<p>Performance area reporting is collated and integrated to generate mission-wide assessments of the performance of a peacekeeping operation.</p>

4.6 Institutional and Cost Implications

It should be pointed out that this restructuring does not imply significant new tasks, but rather regroups existing tasks into a single result-based planning and reporting Framework. The digital platform can be developed by building on some of the existing capacities that do exist, for example in SAGE. The performance assessment tool needs to be developed and the Framework should be established. New software and apps that support reporting, facilitate capture of indicators and ease its presentation in visual formats – such as dashboards – will need to be developed.

Implementing these recommendations will require some changes in the organisational and planning culture. For instance, senior leadership will need to signal support and generate momentum by requesting implementation plans and regular progress updates. Senior leadership will also need to ensure missions comply via compacts and other accountability mechanisms.

Whilst new staff may not be needed, new staff categories, e.g. performance assessment officers, or data support (database and data visualization) may be needed, building on existing categories such as planners.

Existing staff would need to develop new skills, e.g. training in performance assessment (indicators, etc.), data management & visualization.

While the development and adoption of the Framework and the implementation of the related recommendations will have cost implications, and will require some level of re-organisation, re-prioritisation and re-tooling of existing personnel, these efforts will be a meaningful investment if it results in providing the UN with the ability to clearly articulate the strategic vision of each mission, as well the ability to articulate how well each mission is performing in pursuit of these objectives. Over time, after functioning for a period, these investments may also result in a reduction of the overall reporting burden, as a result of consolidating many of the current assessment tools into one single planning, reporting and performance assessment Framework. This would result from the greater focus on contextual factors and outputs along a common framework – but this will have to happen progressively.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The purpose of this report was to provide a diagnostic of the tools and processes that DPKO and DFS currently use for the assessment of the performance of peacekeeping operations. Based on this diagnostic, we proposed establishing a comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment framework.

The main weaknesses of the current performance system are that it lacks a common frame of reference. Different tools serve different purposes without clearly distinguishing between their accountability, feedback on implementation and organisational learning roles. There is a gap between the thorough input-centred work on Results Based Budgeting on the one hand, and mandate implementation reporting and context driven analysis on the other. As a result, the information generated by the current tools cannot be aggregated into an overall assessment of the performance of peacekeeping operations.

In order to address these shortcomings and to generate the design for a comprehensive performance assessment framework, we offer the following recommendations:

1. A new planning, reporting and performance assessment framework (the Framework) needs to be developed, that integrates the current planning and evaluation policies and the RBB into a single comprehensive and over-arching analysis, planning, performance assesment and reporting management system.
2. A new performance assessment tool needs to be developed as one of the elements of the new Framework. The performance assessment tool will support both the reporting dimension of the Framework, and the RBB, by tracking indicator data and by generating the information they need to report on performance.
3. The Framework needs to be underpinned by predictable planning and decision-making cycles, both at the level of peacekeeping operations and at the strategic headquarters.

4. The Framework needs to be informed by a comprehensive context analysis. The context analysis needs to identify the key drivers that shape developments in the conflict-system. The context analysis identifies and analyses the critical conditions that influence these drivers, and the Framework's planning should be aimed at influencing these critical conditions, so as to have an impact on the key drivers. The performance assessment tool tracks changes in the critical conditions and drivers.

5. In order for the Framework to function, a new digital platform needs to be developed, consisting of:
 - a. a database where indicator and performance data will be stored;
 - b. linked software and app-based tools for assisting context analysis, and for tracking and reporting on indicators; and
 - c. linked software to support reporting performance, including data visualizations and dashboard-style summaries.

Appendix: Overview of Existing Tools and Processes for Assessment

Tool	Evaluates	Lead	Primary Purpose	Final Product
Senior Manager's Compact for Mission SRSG/HoM	Individual	OCOS	The compact commits the SRSG/HoM to achieve agreed objectives, for which the Secretary-General (through the USG DPKO) will hold them accountable. The SRSG/HoM also commits to ensuring the agreed objectives are reflected in the work plans and performance assessments of their staff at all levels.	Written agreement between the SRSG/HoM and the Secretary-General
Evaluation of Force Headquarters in Peacekeeping Operations	Unit/ component	DPKO/OMA in coordination with Force Commander	Evaluations assist Force Commanders to identify challenges and performance issues, which can then be addressed through collaboration between UNHQ and the Force. Performance ratings developed during the evaluation process are internal indicators used only to prioritise any required remedial action and support.	Internal Report
Force and Sector Commander's Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities	Unit/ component	Force or Sector Headquarters	This evaluation process is designed to help Force and Sector Commanders identify and correct problems that affect subordinate unit performance.	Internal Report
Ad-hoc Internal evaluations and inspections of UN Police	Unit/ component	Police Division Standards Compliance and Audit Office or the Internal Evaluations Unit (IEU) of UN police components.	Internal evaluations and inspections cover UN police-specific procedures, practices, programmes, issues or organisational unit within the Police Division or within police components in peace operations, other than those directly related to finance and property. They assist the Police Adviser in providing strategic direction and oversight of policing issues in peace operations.	Internal Report

DFS Global Client Survey	Unit/ component	DFS	Annual satisfaction survey for civilian and uniformed personnel in all field missions. The aim of the survey is to support improvement in rapid, effective, efficient and responsible service delivery. In 2016, more than 6,900 respondents completed the survey.	Internal Report Presentation to staff
Regional Service Centre (RSC) Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)	Unit/ component	RSC Steering Committee	Regional Service Centres have KPIs to set goals and measure performance in service delivery. The KPIs established are data driven and measured every month. KPIs are measured monthly and given a rating of green (good), yellow (possible issue) and red (attention required).	Report to missions, management of the RSC and the RSC Steering Committee
Results Based Budgeting (RBB) Performance Reports	Mission-wide	Mission leadership, IOTs, FBFD, etc.	Planning process to achieve results through improved strategic management, increased administrative and programme effectiveness, and the enhanced accountability of programme managers. Indicators of achievement measure progress towards expected accomplishments during the budget year.	RBB Report to General Assembly
Mission Support Performance Framework	Mission-wide	DFS	Objective is to establish a core set of indicators of achievement, targets and outputs for field support. The core indicators will become a source for the RBB frameworks for mission components.	TBC
Security Council Benchmarks	Mission-wide	Mission leadership, IOTs	Benchmarks are a point of reference against which change can be measured. Benchmarks are used by the Security Council to inform decisions on mandate renewal and mission transitions. Internally, they are used to measure and monitor performance and impact of a project, programme or activity.	Progress reported (on ad hoc basis) to the Security Council

Evaluation	Unit/ component	Evaluations/ DPET	Evaluations are conducted at Headquarters and in field missions. At Headquarters, evaluations assess the performance and intended and achieved results of DPKO and DFS and the respective sub-programmes. Evaluations of field missions examine and assess the ability of missions to effectively implement Security Council mandates and to manage and administer their resources in accordance with UN policies.	Evaluation Report (internal)
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS): Internal Audits	Individuals or unit/ component	OIOS	<p>OIOS assists the Secretary-General in fulfilling his oversight responsibilities in respect of the resources and staff of the Organisation through internal audit, inspection, programme and thematic evaluations and investigation services.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal Audits: risk-based audits to assist management in establishing and strengthening risk management, internal control and governance. • Programme evaluations: assess the overall relevance, effectiveness and impact of a programme, sub-programme, peacekeeping operation or special political mission. • Thematic evaluations: assess a crosscutting theme or activity across several Secretariat programmes. • Inspections: review of an organisational unit, issue or practice perceived to be of potential risk. • Investigations: of fraud, corruption and misconduct in the workplace. 	Report produced – internal and/or external depending on subject
Office of Strategic Partnership (OPSP)	Unit/ component	OPSP	The OPSP conducts comprehensive and targeted reviews to identify gaps that have an impact on the delivery of mandates by uniformed personnel. The OPSP provides recommendations to address gaps, systemic issues and emerging challenges effecting the implementation of mandated tasks for uniformed personnel.	Report

Board of Auditors	System-wide	Comprised of the heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions from three Member States.	The Board of Auditors provides independent external audit services to the General Assembly. This includes certifying the accounts of the UN and its funds and programmes, and reporting a wide array of financial, managerial and value for money audits.	Audit Report
Joint Inspection Unit	Unit/ component and/or programmes	JIU	Independent, external oversight body of the UN system mandated to conduct system-wide evaluations, inspections and investigations in order to (amongst other things) improve efficiency and effectiveness; propose benchmarks; and identify best practices.	Report, note or letter to management is produced. May be public or confidential depending on subject.

Appendix: List of Persons Consulted

Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG)	
Executive Office of the Secretary-General	Kersten Jauer, Strategic Planning and Monitoring

DPKO/DFS shared functions	
Office of Chief of Staff, Peacekeeping Information Management Unit	Avishan Bodjnoud
	Christina Goodness
	Rajkumar Cheney Krishnan, SAGE system
Office of the Chief of Staff, United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre	Ian Sinclair (Director UNOCC and former CoS MONUSCO)
Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET):	
— Civil Affairs	Marco Donati
	Mireille Kamitatu
— Evaluations Team	Kym Taylor
	Anna Guerraggio, former OIOS
	Michael Mesina
— Policy and Best Practices Service	Oliver Ulich
	Ursula Fraser
— Protection of Civilians	Ralph Mamiya
Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership (OPSP)	Siva Methil
	Gerard Beekman

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)	
Office of Operations	Jack Christofides
	Herve Lecoq
	Cris Stephen
	Samuel Gahigi
	Jerome Mellon
	Brooke Shawn
Office of Operations, Integrated Assessment and Planning Unit	Jonathan Robinson
Office of Military Affairs	Kenneth Chigbu, Chief Current Military Operations Service
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI):	Nikolai Rogosaroff, O/ASG
	Charles Briefel, Justice and Corrections

	Benoit LeChartier, Police Division
	Rebecca Jovin, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Office of the Under-Secretary-General	Frederic Renoux (compacts)
Strategic Force Generation Cell	Reinhardt Matondang
	Adam Smith

Department of Field Support (FDS)	
Office of the Under-Secretary-General	Eugene Chen
	Barbara Nieuwenhuys
Audit Response and Boards of Inquiry Unit	Gary Love, Risk Management
Field Budget and Finance Division	Wayne Whiteside
	Mohammad Jeram
Field Personnel Division	Jessica Newby (civilian staffing reviews)
Operational Support Team	Stephen McOwan
	Nicholas Aarons

United Nations Peacekeeping Missions	
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	Diane Corner, former DSRSG MINUSCA
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)	Walter Lotze, O/SRSG
	Damien Mama, O/DSRSG RoL Ops East
	Natasha Geber, O/CoS
	Daniel Maier, Strategic Planning
	Eveline Rooijmans, Senior Protection Adviser
	Avery Burns, Best Practices

United Nations Political Missions	
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	Denise Wilman (CoS UNAMA and former CoS UNMIL)

Other UN agencies	
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights	Chloe Marnay-Baszanger
United Nations Global Pulse	Robert Kirkpatrick
	Josiane Toundzi Dzouankeu



Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Established in 1959, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs [NUPI] is a leading independent research institute on international politics and areas of relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. Formally under the Ministry of Education and Research, NUPI nevertheless operates as an independent, non-political instance in all its professional activities. Research undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-term applied research to more long-term basic research.

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