

For the greater good?: “Good states” turning UN peacekeeping towards counterterrorism

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Abstract

The usual suspects of middle power internationalism—small and middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden—have all contributed to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This article argues that while these and other Western countries’ contributions to MINUSMA may still be characterized as investments into UN peacekeeping reform and a rule-governed world order, the liberal underpinnings of that commitment are withering. Instead, these countries seek to enhance their own status. This is done by gaining appreciation for their contributions, primarily from the US; strengthening their bids for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and self-interested contributions to reform UN peacekeeping by efforts to enable it to confront violent extremism and terrorism. Paradoxically, the article concludes, when moving the UN towards counterterrorism and weakening the legitimacy of the organization, Western states undermine a cornerstone of their own security.

Keywords

Canada, counterterrorism, “good states,” liberal internationalism, middle powers, the Netherlands, Norway, peacekeeping, status, UN

The participation of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been

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termed a “return” by European states to UN peacekeeping.¹ Western member states have been vigorously welcomed back to UN peacekeeping due to their more advanced militaries and capabilities. These member states bring significant capabilities, innovation, and financial and political power, and their contributions also have important impacts on UN peacekeeping and the UN more widely, in material, discursive, doctrinal, and operational terms.

In policy circles, the return has been celebrated, as Western member states can contribute niche capabilities in dire demand, such as surveillance drones, attack helicopters, special forces, counter-IED (improvised explosive device) teams, as well as share experiences and practices developed over a long period of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism warfare, in, for example, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Mali, MINUSMA is mired in a situation where these experiences and practices unfortunately are increasingly relevant, and future UN peacekeeping missions may be deployed to Libya, Somalia, and Syria, making Mali a key testing ground for the future from this perspective. However, while Western member states may indeed have lessons to share, the article argues that their contributions to MINUSMA have been a mixed blessing. While Western member states have been arguing for reform to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping, their participation has by and large been a “mission within the mission,” marked by limited ability to integrate with other troops and reluctance to operate within the principles and guidelines of UN peacekeeping.

This discrepancy between the will to contribute and the aversion to integrate into the UN mission may appear somewhat puzzling, or even contradictory. When approached from a more instrumental perspective, though, the practices of the Western contributors to MINUSMA appear less perplexing. Traditionally, the literature on small and medium states’ contributions to UN peacekeeping has seen these contributions and similar engagement in world politics as expressions of efforts to enhance status by being “good states” that promote and support the implementation of a liberal international order.² Recent literature has challenged

1. Joachim Koops and Giulia Tercovich, “A European return to United Nations peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead,” *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 5 (2016): 597–609; John Karlsrud and Adam Smith, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali,” *Providing for Peacekeeping* 11 (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015). I will refer to Western countries for the most part throughout the article, as Canada will also contribute troops to MINUSMA, starting in August 2018. Note that this is a Western return to UN peacekeeping *in Africa*, as Western peacekeepers have been present in some numbers in the UN operation in Lebanon since its beginning. Western states have also previously contributed troops on the African continent, but this has mostly been in the form of EU missions (e.g. European Union Force (EUFOR) Democratic Republic of Congo 2006, EUFOR Chad and the Central African Republic 2008–2009). A short-lived exception was the contribution of troops to the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) from 2009–2010, but this was the result of a re-hatting of EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic into MINURCAT, and only on the condition of a short-term engagement. The main European contributors were Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Poland.
2. Christine Ingebrigtsen, “Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s role in world politics,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 1 (2002): 11–23; Peter Lawler, “The good state: In praise of ‘classical’ internationalism,” *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005): 427–449; John Karlsrud, *Norm*

this view and argued that Nordic states have engaged on a path of more militarized activism in order to improve their participation and status vis-a-vis the US.³ Nevertheless, this literature has remained focused on engagements in the “hard” end of international security, such as participation in the coalitions of the willing in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

This article widens the scope of this literature. Methodologically, it follows in the footsteps of de Carvalho and Neumann and studies how small and middle powers seek status by” providing military contributions to the UN stabilization mission in Mali.⁴ Contrary to the “good states” literature,⁵ the article argues that these states’ contributions to MINUSMA are primarily motivated by instrumental strategies for status-enhancement, with limited regard for the potential liberal or illiberal effects of their contribution on UN peacekeeping. The article argues that these states seek to enhance status among greater powers and other peers to improve the relationship and strengthen cooperation with the US and key allies deploying to the same mission. Another important feature is that contributions are regularly made in conjunction with bids for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. A third feature of these contributions is that they are seen as efforts to reform principles, doctrines, and guidelines to make the tool of UN peacekeeping itself more relevant to what are perceived as the main global security challenges of the 21st century: violent extremism and terrorism.

The result is a short-term engagement with an ambition to change the structural preconditions for UN peacekeeping without a strategic understanding of the longer-term implications of this engagement. The article argues that contrary to previous theorizing of “good states” engagement in UN peacekeeping, the contributions to MINUSMA may actually undermine the liberal character of UN peacekeeping, and, indeed, the organization itself.

The article is based on 59 semi-structured interviews conducted during field work in Mali, New York, and Addis Ababa from 2015 to 2018, as well as a review of policy and academic literature in the public and private domains. The article proceeds as follows. First it provides an introduction to the literature on status and “good states.” Second, it looks briefly at the history of Western participation in UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War and then investigates

Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); William Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and Iver B. Neumann, “Moral authority and status in international relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking,” *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2017): 1–21.

3. Nina Græger, “From ‘forces for good’ to ‘forces for status’? Small state military status seeking,” in Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015): 86–107; John Karlsrud and Kari M. Osland, “Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?,” *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 5 (2016): 784–803; Rasmus B. Pedersen, “Bandwagon for status: Changing patterns in the Nordic states status-seeking strategies?,” *International Peacekeeping* 25, no. 2 (2017): 217–241.
4. Iver B. Neumann and Benjamin de Carvalho, “Introduction: Small states and status,” in de Carvalho and Neumann, *Small State Status Seeking*, 1–21.
5. See, for example, Ingebrigtsen, “Norm entrepreneurs,” and Lawler, “The good state.”

more closely the rationales that sparked the contribution to MINUSMA. The final section argues that while “good states” continue to provide support to an international world order, the liberal commitment to this order is in decline.

Status and “good states”

Neumann and de Carvalho have argued that “[s]mall states have little or no power resources—so, for them, aiming for status may well be the only game in town.”⁶ Similarly, the editors of this special issue identify two main rationales for middle power liberal internationalism: “a strategy born out of necessity and relative lack of power in the international system,” and “a moral commitment to a more just and rule-governed world order.”⁷

Neumann and de Carvalho also argue that small states must be more vigilant in seeking status than medium and great powers.⁸ What is the consequence of this argument? States must pursue a repertoire of strategies to enhance their status, with a mix of instrumental and idealistic motivations. The literature on small and medium power states has generally been divided in the assessment of why states contribute to international peace operations—with contributions at the “soft” end of the security spectrum, including to UN peacekeeping, generally being considered as more altruistic, while contributions to the “hard” end, for example to NATO and coalitions of the willing, generally being characterized as more self-interested and utilitarian.

Until the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping was the primary venue for small and medium powers when contributing troops to international peace operations, and contributions to UN peacekeeping have thus been a frequent empirical subject used to analyze middle power liberal internationalism. The Scandinavian countries have been the focus of much of this literature, and the findings have, in general, pointed in the direction sketched out by the editors’ introduction, with contributions to UN peacekeeping described as being motivated by a combination of self-interest and solidarity.⁹ The Nordic states, as well as the Netherlands and Canada, have been described as “good states” committed to an internationalist and normative agenda.¹⁰

6. Neumann and de Carvalho, “Introduction,” 17.

7. Rita Abrahamson, Louise R. Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending, “Introduction: Making illiberal internationalism great again?” *International Journal* 74, no. 1 (2019): 5–14.

8. de Carvalho and Neumann, “Introduction.”

9. Karlsrud and Osland, “Between self-interest and solidarity.” For earlier literature on Norway’s and Nordic contributions, see, for example, Åge Eknes, “The Nordic countries and UN peacekeeping operations,” in Åge Eknes, ed., *The Nordic Countries in the United Nations: Status and Future Perspectives* (Copenhagen: Nordic Council, 1995), 65–83; Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, “Grand strategy, strategic culture, practice: The social roots of Nordic defence,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no. 1 (2005): 5–23. For a take on Canada as a middle power and the balance between idealism and self-interest, see David Black, “Addressing apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian and Swedish policies in Southern Africa,” in Andrew F. Cooper, ed., *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997), 100–128.

10. Lawler, “The good state.”

However, since the end of the Cold War, the Nordic states have shifted their commitment of troops from the UN to NATO, for a diverse set of reasons, although the idealist dimension has continued to be highlighted.¹¹ Recent literature has challenged this view and argued that Nordic states have engaged on a path of more militarized activism in order to improve their participation and status vis-à-vis the US.¹² Nevertheless, this literature has remained focused on engagements in the “hard” end of international security, such as participation in the coalitions of the willing in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

The contributions by small and middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden to MINUSMA enable us to update the literature on middle power internationalism. Previous scholarship on Western contributions to UN peacekeeping has primarily sought to explain these contributions in terms of middle power liberal internationalism. However, de Carvalho and Leira argue that status-seeking behaviour may not necessarily focus on the end result, but rather on the process itself, enabling recognition from peers as well as great powers: “the reasons they [middle powers] may have for engaging in global governance can sometimes be more about themselves than about what they want to achieve.”¹³ Working to achieve peace in faraway countries may, then, be more of a question of being recognized by national as well as international audiences as a state striving to do good in the world, rather than actual results achieved. Although partially dependent, status is, thus, not necessarily related to results. As a relevant example from a related field of foreign policy of Norway, Leira argues that Norway “persists in the pursuit of a peace policy not because it gives us what we want, but because it confirms us as being who we are.”¹⁴

11. See, for example, Peter V. Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Nina Græger and Halvard Leira, “Norwegian strategic culture after World War II: From a local to global perspective,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no. 1 (2005): 45–66; Karlsrud and Osland, “Between self-interest and solidarity.” Even though not a member of NATO, Sweden has long been approaching NATO—for example, by participating in NATO operations (Bosnia, Afghanistan, etc.), and by adapting its standard operating procedures to be aligned with those of NATO. Finland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994, but there is still solid support for non-alignment in the public opinion. As an example, all Nordic states participated in the Trident Juncture in 2018, the largest NATO exercise in Nordic states since the 1980s. See, for example, Thomas Nilsen, “Northern Sweden and Finland play key role as NATO kicks off Trident Juncture,” 23 October 2018, *The Barents Observer*, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2018/10/nato> (accessed 9 February 2019).
12. Græger, “From ‘forces for good’”; Karlsrud and Osland, “Between self-interest and solidarity”; Pedersen, “Bandwagon for status.”
13. Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira, “Stuck in the middle with you: Middle powers as middle management in global governance,” paper prepared for the Middle Power Liberal Internationalism in an Illiberal World Workshop, Ottawa, 28–29 May 2018. See also the introduction to this special issue, as well as Hans-Henrik Holm, “The myth of the responsive North,” *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 1 (1992): 15–120; Ole Waever, “Nordic nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War,” *International Affairs* 68, no. 1 (1992): 77–102.
14. Halvard Leira, “‘Our entire people are natural born friends of peace’: The Norwegian foreign policy of peace,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (2013): 338–356.

The “return” to UN peacekeeping

The situation in Mali rose fast on the international security agenda in 2012 when the government was toppled by disgruntled military officers. Exploiting the confused situation, separatist and jihadist groups in the northern regions of Mali joined forces and took control of the area.¹⁵ The international community remained unaligned and unable to respond to the situation until the jihadist groups started moving south towards the capital Bamako in early 2013.¹⁶ Fearing the collapse of Mali, France intervened at the request of Mali with the counterterrorism operation Serval, and the African Union deployed the African-led support mission to Mali (AFISMA) alongside the French troops. However, to reduce “the chances of their [France] troops becoming mired in a long and bloody insurgency,”¹⁷ France pushed for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission with a robust mandate, and MINUSMA was deployed on 1 July 2013.¹⁸ This was, in large part, done by re-hatting the troops of AFISMA—a counterterrorism operation—in to MINUSMA, but France also put pressure on their European colleagues to contribute to the mission. With the participation of countries like Denmark, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, MINUSMA has been coined as a possible “return” of Western member states to UN peacekeeping in Africa.¹⁹

Analyzing the stated motivations of these countries for contributing troops to MINUSMA, as well as their practices on the ground, provides interesting and relevant empirical material for understanding middle power internationalism and changes in UN peacekeeping. Western countries dominated UN peacekeeping until the end of the Cold War, and continued to be strong contributors during the spike in UN peacekeeping operations during the early 1990s. However, the failures in Rwanda, Somalia, and Yugoslavia, as well as a newfound purpose for NATO in Yugoslavia and later on in out-of-area operations, led to a sharp decline of Western commitments. Since the end of the 1990s, Western participation in UN peacekeeping has been focused on the operations in Lebanon and Cyprus, with a few exceptions.

MINUSMA was deployed in an ongoing armed insurgency marked by threats from armed and terrorist groups, and is the first UN peacekeeping mission

15. Morten Bøås and Liv E. Torheim, “The trouble in Mali—corruption, collusion, resistance,” *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 7 (2013): 1279–1292.
16. See, for example, Walter Lotze, “United Nations multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA),” in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 854–864; John Karlsrud, “Mali,” in Alex Bellamy and Timothy Dunne, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 786–800.
17. Christopher Chivvis, *The French War on Al Qaeda in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 16.
18. UN, *S/RES/2100*, 25 April 2013, New York.
19. Koops and Tercovich, “A European return to United Nations Peacekeeping”; Karlsrud and Smith, “Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping in Africa?”.

deployed into a situation with ongoing counterterrorism operations.²⁰ The terrorist groups operating in Mali have shown an ability to carry out high-profiled attacks, including attacks on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, several restaurants, and military camps, as well as hundreds of roadside bombs. The former head of UN peacekeeping, Hervé Ladsous, has argued that MINUSMA is “a laboratory for UN peacekeeping” where member states faced the “new threats of the 21st century.”²¹ The contributions started early—the key Western contributors made decisive inputs already at the planning stage. This resulted in several innovations in the mission to adapt it to the challenges on the ground.

One of these Western innovations was the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU). The ASIFU was the first dedicated intelligence cell in a UN peacekeeping operation, and was built on Western experiences in stabilization, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism in Afghanistan. The ASIFU was conceptualized during 2012 by an Italian staff officer on secondment to the Office of the Military Advisor at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York,²² and modelled on experiences from the International Security Assistance Force special operations forces Fusion Cell.²³ During the planning and deployment of MINUSMA in 2013–2014, several Western member states with relevant experience from ASIFUs were approached, and responded positively to deploy troops to staff the unit, in particular the Netherlands and Sweden.²⁴

The ASIFU was provided as part of a larger intelligence package where particularly the Netherlands and Sweden provided one intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance company each, deployed to Gao and Bamako. These were further supported with “sophisticated capabilities previously unavailable to UN peacekeeping operations,”²⁵ in the shape of a combined package of special operations forces, transport and combat helicopters, and surveillance drones. To store and manage the information generated by these capabilities, the Netherlands included an information management and communications system, the TITAN Red System, meeting information management and classifications standards at the NATO Secret level.²⁶ While the UN has had, for example, Russian Mi-25 and South African Rooivalk attack helicopters in the UN Organization Stabilization

20. John Karlsruh, “Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?,” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (2017): 1215–1231.

21. Former head of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, in an interview with RFI Afrique, my translation. RFI Afrique, “Mali: Adieux du chef des opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU à la Minusma,” RFI Afrique, 2017, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170318-mali-adieux-chef-operations-maintien-paix-onu-minusma-ladsous> (accessed 29 March 2018).

22. UN official, interview, 3 October 2017.

23. UN, *Lessons Learned Report: All-Sources Information Fusion Unit and the MINUSMA Intelligence Architecture: Lessons for the Mission and a UN Policy Framework*. Semi-final draft for USG Ladsous’ review, 1 March 2016, New York, 3. On file with the author.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. A perhaps unforeseen negative consequence was that this meant that non-NATO member states could not access or use the system. The UN has since been trying to develop an intelligence system that is accessible to all member states.

Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Chinook transport helicopters, the Apache attack helicopters, and the provision of a C-130 transport plane in a rotational arrangement between Western troops established a new level of combat readiness in a UN peacekeeping operation.²⁷

While such combat readiness might be considered necessary given the complex conflict environment and high levels of violence in Mali, the contributions cannot be seen as entirely altruistic. The package was put together to enable intelligence-led operations and robust force protection, and to ensure that Western member states would be able to extract and provide medical assistance to wounded troops according to the NATO 10-1-2 principle,²⁸ as this would be a critical precondition for the participation and deployment of Western troops. These capabilities were provided with an insistence to change the traditional UN command and control structure to enable Western control of these assets in case of emergency,²⁹ insisting on military rather than civilian control over aviation assets. In other words, the Western countries provided new and advanced intelligence capabilities, but also ensured that they would be independent from MINUSMA if they needed to protect their own forces or extract wounded personnel. Another feature of the mission was the high penetration of surveillance drones. An independent report estimated in 2017 that member states had brought a total number of 50 so-called “unmanned aerial systems.”³⁰ This number is quite astonishing, considering that there had been a long discussion on whether UN missions should be equipped with surveillance drones at all only a few years previously, and that the first official deployment of a surveillance drone in a UN peacekeeping mission took place in the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in late 2013.³¹

It was not only the capabilities and capacities provided that were new to the UN, it was also the manner in which they were provided. Western troop-contributing countries resisted painting their military aviation assets and vehicles in the traditional UN white, and only placed a UN logo on top of the green camouflage color.³² The combined symbolic effect of the contributions was, thus, an impression

27. For more on the rotation arrangement, see Arthur Boutellis and John Karlsrud, *Plug and Play: Multinational Rotation Contributions for UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2017).

28. The principle demands: “ensuring access to skilled first aid within 10 minutes of the point of injury or the onset of symptoms; advanced life support as soon as possible, and no later than 60 minutes; and access to limb- and life-saving surgery, no later than two hours.” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/DFS, *Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions*, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations, 2015). For a longer discussion around medical support in UN peace operations, see Lesley Connolly and Håvard Johansen, *Medical Support for UN Peace Operations in High-Risk Environments* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2017).

29. Koops and Tercovich, “A European return.”

30. Alexandra Novosseloff, *Keeping Peace from Above: Air Assets in UN Peace Operations* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2017), 1.

31. See, for example, John Karlsrud and Frederik Rosén, “Lifting the fog of war? Opportunities and challenges of drones in UN peace operations,” in Kristin B. Sandvik and Maria G. Jumbert, eds, *The Good Drone* (Basingstoke, Oxford: Routledge, 2017): 45–64.

32. Interview with Norwegian Ministry of Defence official, January 2017.

that MINUSMA was “going green,” both in terms of colour, and also adopting a much more aggressive posture vis-a-vis threats in the mission area.³³

Both Germany and the Netherlands have, during their deployments, had bilateral agreements with France to transport troops of the French counterterrorism operation Barkhane, and, thus, directly support their efforts, while being part of MINUSMA.³⁴ This makes it very difficult for local populations to differentiate between the MINUSMA and Barkhane.

Cultural friction

The relationship between Western countries and other troop-contributing countries has not been easy. A recurring phrase encountered during field work in 2017 was the division between “skiing and non-skiing nations.”³⁵ This phrase reveals the prevalence of a two-tiered mission. Another challenge is the experience and cultural baggage that many years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations have provided the Western troops with, creating frustration among their UN colleagues. As one UN official said, “[t]hey are not coming to operate in Afghanistan.”³⁶

The participation of Western troops may actually have had a reinforcing effect on violent extremism, strengthening the recruitment to jihadi groups. Following an attack on the MINUSMA camp in Gao in 2016, the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb issued a statement saying it engaged in a clash with “Crusader occupation forces.”³⁷ The experiences from MINUSMA have also led to a discursive turn towards stabilization, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism in the debate on how UN peacekeeping should be reformed to be relevant to future needs of member states. In MINUSMA, it is African and Western member states who have voiced the need for UN peacekeeping operations to break away from its traditional principle of impartiality to fight terrorists, using the challenges MINUSMA has been facing as the main rationale.³⁸ The African Union has

33. John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: Examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali,” *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2015): 47.

34. Interview with senior official, Barkhane, July 2018.

35. The phrase was used by interviewees in several of the interviews with seconded officers from Western countries to MINUSMA, in 2017 and 2018.

36. UN official, Bamako, 31 January 2017. The resistance to the urge to change the way UN peacekeeping is operating has also been discernible at senior levels in New York. See Louise R. Andersen, “The HIPPO in the room: The pragmatic push-back from the UN peace bureaucracy against the militarization of UN peacekeeping,” *International Peacekeeping* 94, no. 2 (2018): 343–361. For more on friction in MINUSMA, see Signe Cold-Ravnkilde, Peter Albrecht, and Rikke Haugegaard, “Friction and inequality among peacekeepers in Mali,” *The RUSI Journal* 162, no. 2 (2017): 34–42.

37. John Dyer, “Why Mali is the deadliest nation for UN peacekeepers,” 13 June 2016, *VICE News*, <https://news.vice.com/article/why-mali-is-the-deadliest-nation-for-un-peacekeepers> (accessed 9 February 2019). Perhaps ironically, it was a Chinese soldier who was killed in the attack.

38. Troop-contributing countries from Asia have generally been more reluctant towards the tendency of more robust mandates and the use of force. See, for example, Ingvild Bode and John Karlsrud,

repeatedly pressed for the inclusion of a regional counterterrorism force in MINUSMA,³⁹ and with UN Security Council resolution 2391 adopted on 8 December 2017, one step further was taken down this road.⁴⁰ The resolution mandated MINUSMA to support the parallel Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (FC-G5S) with logistical and engineering support, as well as enhance cooperation “through provision of relevant intelligence and liaison officers from the G5 Sahel Member States to MINUSMA.”⁴¹

MINUSMA: a quest for status enhancement

Most literature on Western contributions to UN peacekeeping follows the liberal internationalism argument and emphasizes the moral dimension—that is, as small and middle countries lack power in the international system, they act as “good” states and contribute to peace, international cooperation, and a liberal world order. In the case of Mali, this perspective has not entirely lost its validity, but there are other elements that come to the fore that suggest a different conclusion.

Bringing burden-sharing to the UN

MINUSMA was deployed in 2013 in the midst of a flurry of activity, with five new UN peacekeeping missions deployed from 2011 to 2014.⁴² In the same period, there was a notable deviation in the mandates from the UN Security Council, authorizing the UN stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo to “neutralize” identified rebel groups,⁴³ and MINUSMA to support the government in re-establishing control of the northern territories, by force if necessary.⁴⁴ The result was an increasing gap between the traditional principles of peacekeeping—impartiality, consent of the parties, and the use of force only in self-defense or to protect civilians—and the mandates of the UN Security Council moving towards peace enforcement and counterterrorism. As a reaction to this gap, the UN secretary-general at the time, Ban Ki-moon, initiated a reform process and established a High-Level Independent

“Implementation in practice: The use of force to protect civilians in United Nations peacekeeping,” *European Journal of International Relations*. Online first 22 October 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118796540>.

39. For example, during the discussions for the original mandate for the mission, see Thomas G. Weiss and Martin Welz, “The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: A shotgun wedding?,” *International Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2014): 889–905; African Union, “Report of the Commission of the African Union on the Follow-up of the Relevant Provisions of the Declaration of the Summit of the Member Countries of the Nouakchott Process of 18 December 2014,” African Union, Addis Ababa, 2015.
40. UN, *S/RES/2391*, 8 December 2017, New York.
41. *Ibid.*, 5.
42. Abyei on the border between South Sudan and Sudan (UNISFA, 2011), South Sudan (UNMISS, 2011), Libya (UNSMIL, 2011), Mali (MINUSMA, 2013), Central African Republic (MINUSCA, 2014). No new missions have since been deployed, but three were closed in 2017–2018: the ones in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Liberia.
43. UN, *S/RES/2098*, 28 March 2013, New York, 7.
44. UN, *S/RES/2100*, 25 April 2013, New York, 7.

Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in 2014.⁴⁵ Only months later, the US took the initiative to a high-level meeting on UN peace operations during the UN General Assembly, chaired by the then Vice President Joseph Biden. The following year, the US prodded member states to increase their troop and capability contributions to UN peacekeeping, and arranged another summit on UN peace operations during the UN General Assembly, this time chaired by President Barack Obama. The objective of the HIPPO reform and the US summits on peace operations was mainly twofold: they should accelerate reform to make UN peace operations more “fit for purpose” and relevant to the security threats of the 21st century. The summit was considered a great success: 49 member states and three regional organizations—the AU, the EU, and NATO—pledged 8000 standby troops, 26 infantry battalions, 12 hospitals, 12 utility and five attack helicopters, as well as a range of other capabilities.⁴⁶ The most advanced pledges were made by Western member states and mostly intended for MINUSMA.

Concurrently with the push for more member states contributing troops to UN peacekeeping, the US administration also released a new policy on UN peacekeeping, the first in more than 20 years.⁴⁷ When the policy was published, UN peacekeeping experts commented that the policy codified “the importance this administration attaches to UN peace operations.”⁴⁸ However, and for good reasons, the policy also displays the self-interested reasons for why the US should continue to support UN peacekeeping and encourage partner member states to do the same. The policy acknowledges how conflict-affected states, if left unattended, can become breeding grounds for a range of threats, such as

hosts of violent extremism; afford safe havens that transnational terrorists and criminals exploit; generate large flows of refugees and displaced persons that can destabilize neighboring countries and sow regional instability; create humanitarian emergencies; facilitate the spread of pandemic disease; and increase the risk of mass atrocities.⁴⁹

It is in this context that UN peacekeeping is seen as a useful tool to “enable the burden to be shared globally.”⁵⁰ The burden-sharing rhetoric is standard language

45. The panel may also have been an effort by Ki-moon and his bureaucracy to resist the efforts to instrumentalize peacekeeping to become more relevant to particular member states’ needs. See Andersen, “The HIPPO in the room.”

46. Global Peace Operations Review, “Leaders’ summit on peacekeeping,” *Global Peace Operations Review*, 2015, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/un_2015_peacekeeping_summit_pledges.jpg (accessed 24 May 2018).

47. The White House, *United States Support to United Nations Peace Operations*, Washington DC, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015peaceoperations.pdf> (accessed 24 May 2018).

48. Paul D. Williams, “Keeping a piece of peacekeeping,” *Foreign Affairs*, 6 October 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-10-06/keeping-piece-peacekeeping> (accessed 16 August 2018).

49. The White House, *United States Support*, 1.

50. *Ibid.*

in the NATO context for asking partners to increase their contributions. With the US engagement, UN peacekeeping had thus, even for perhaps only a short while, been elevated to the realm of high politics. A number of Western member states responded to the call and made pledges to increase their visibility vis-a-vis the US and key allies. Key secondary objectives cited were to continue and enhance cooperation and strengthen interoperability with key allies.⁵¹ For some member states there was also a demand on the supply side, a lack of theatres for active deployment after the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.

The deteriorating security situation in Mali and the wider Sahel has been a hot topic among member states in the EU as well as NATO, and has also been a topic of increasing importance for the US, the main ally of European member states in NATO. This has meant that contributions to MINUSMA have been important markers of burden-sharing in both the EU and NATO contexts. With the push of the Obama administration for increased participation in UN peacekeeping in 2014–2015, Mali was the mission that stood out as a possible place to participate to gain favour by both the US and France, as well as strengthen cooperation with other key allies. By contributing troops to MINUSMA, member states have been able to show to allies that they are ready to take their share of the collective security burdens.

Although President Trump has been particularly outspoken on the need for partners in NATO to increase their defence spending and reach the 2 percent goal (as measured of total GDP), he has also emphasized the need for burden-sharing in terms of deploying troops, to Afghanistan for example.⁵² In the NATO context, Jakobsen and Ringsmose distinguish between two forms of burden-sharing—as “input” (spending) or as “output” (participation in out-of-area operations). With the end of the Cold War and the diminishing threat of Russia, the *raison d’être* of NATO shifted from deterrence to out-of-area operations, increasing the importance of “output” burden-sharing.⁵³ This also applies to the UN. The Trump administration inherited President Obama’s increased emphasis of the UN’s role in global security matters, but has taken a much more transactional approach to the same organization.

Following the perspective of middle power liberal internationalism, the Western contributions to MINUSMA could be explained as well-intentioned efforts to support reform and enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. However, another perspective would be to see UN peacekeeping “as a tool for sharing the burden of ‘manning the outer perimeter’”⁵⁴—a proxy for securing the interests of Western

51. Karlsrud and Osland, “Between self-interest and solidarity”; Kooops and Tercovich, “A European return.”

52. Barney Henderson and Kate McCann, “Donald Trump commits more US troops to Afghanistan and calls on Britain to follow suit,” *The Telegraph*, 22 August 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/21/donald-trump-address-nation-outline-new-afghanistan-strategy/> (accessed 10 September 2018).

53. Peter V. Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, “Burden-sharing in NATO: The Trump effect won’t last,” Policy Brief 16, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2017.

54. Bruce Jones, “United Nations peacekeeping and opportunities for reform,” *Brookings*, 9 December 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/united-nations-peacekeeping-and->

states in areas of low-intensity conflict. Engagement by middle powers in these locales by providing troops to, for example, MINUSMA, and financial support and training to counterterrorism forces like the G5 Sahel, can enhance their status and is seen as part of the global burden-sharing of security challenges between the US and its allies.⁵⁵

When policymakers have been selling the contributions to MINUSMA to domestic audiences, the security, development, governance, and migration agendas have been blurred.⁵⁶ As an example, David Cameron, former prime minister of the UK, pledged UK contributions to the UN peace operation in South Sudan, and financial support to the African Union mission in Somalia, to foster “less terrorism and migration.”⁵⁷ Similarly, in 2017 Germany highlighted that “stability in Mali prevents migration” as a motivation for its 1000-strong contribution to MINUSMA.⁵⁸ The result is “policy responses informed by a desire to safeguard the ‘here’ against the ‘elsewhere,’ with detrimental effects for both development and democracy.”⁵⁹

Winning hearts, minds, and votes

Member states compete to fill the 10 non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council, and every year five new countries are elected for a two-year term. Why should small and medium powers try to be elected to the UN Security Council? Several factors are relevant to consider for small and medium powers, and can help them muster political capital and status: the peer recognition that a non-permanent seat can bring; to be an agenda-setter by focusing on particular issues;⁶⁰ the ability to facilitate other countries’ access to the Council by putting a particular issue on the agenda; and gathering political capital by supporting resolutions motioned by key allies like the US, UK, and France. Member states devise elaborate strategies to be elected, and the process starts years in advance. These strategies naturally

opportunities-for-reform/ (accessed 13 September 2018). Jones was one of the original members of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations nominated by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to review peacekeeping in 2014, but he pulled out at an early stage. “Manning the outer perimeter” was in quotation marks in the original document.

55. Interview with Norwegian official, Ministry of Defence, 5 February 2018.

56. The merger of these agendas is not only in policy statements, but also in practice. See, for example, John Karlsrud, “From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism,” *International Peacekeeping* 26, no. 1 (2019): 1–21; Rita Abrahamsen, “Return of the generals? Global militarism in Africa from the Cold War to the present,” *Security Dialogue* 49, no. 1–2 (2018): 19–31.

57. Rowena Mason, “UK to deploy troops to help keep peace in Somalia and South Sudan,” *The Guardian*, 27 September 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/27/uk-to-deploy-troops-to-help-keep-peace-in-somalia-and-south-sudan> (accessed 13 September 2018).

58. German Federal Government, “More soldiers for Mali,” 2017, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2017/01_en/2017-01-11-minusma-mali_en.html (accessed 10 February 2017).

59. Rita Abrahamsen, “Discourses of democracy, practices of autocracy: Shifting meanings of democracy in the aid-authoritarianism nexus,” in Tobias Hagemann and Filip Reyntjens, eds, *Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2016), 34.

60. Sweden successfully focused on negotiating humanitarian access in Syria during its 2017–2018 term, and although not all their proposed resolutions were adopted, their efforts for humanitarian access to vulnerable populations in Syria have been widely recognized.

consider the self-interest of large voter groups—for example, developing countries in need of aid and trade, or small island developing states in risk of submergence—but also target individual countries. After all, a vote from Palau counts equally with a vote from Canada.

Contributions to UN peacekeeping is a relevant argument when campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, Western countries have long stayed out of UN peacekeeping in Africa. This changed with MINUSMA. With 54 states (and votes) from Africa, contributions to peace and security in Africa is an important element of the campaign. In the case of MINUSMA, all countries except Denmark have been aiming for a seat at the UN Security Council during or after their contributions to MINUSMA—Canada (campaigning for 2021–2022), Germany (2011–2013, campaigning for 2019–2020), the Netherlands (2018–2019), Norway (campaigning for 2021–2022), and Sweden (2017–2018). Koops and Tercovich argue that for the European contributions to MINUSMA to be defined as a “return,” they have to be evidence of a “systematic and long-term commitment to blue helmet operations, consisting of troop deployments beyond ‘token contributions,’ the provision of critical enablers as well as support among European policy-makers and the wider public.”⁶¹ It is not clear that the contributions are systematic and long-term. But although these contributions may not meet all the criteria set for being more than “token contributions” to UN peacekeeping, they are evidence of increased engagement in international peace and security before, during, and after occupying a seat at the UN Security Council. The increased engagement may lead to increased status as well as contributing to peace and security. The struggle of small and medium powers for status may, thus, push them to do “the right thing” in international affairs, combining self-interest with tempered altruism.

Changing political prescriptivism: from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism⁶²

“The world is changing, and United Nations peacekeeping operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security,” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserted on 31 October 2014, when he announced the establishment of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, tasked to provide suggestions for reform.⁶³ The initiative to reform UN peacekeeping came as a result of financial, doctrinal, and policy macro trends. After the financial crisis in 2008–2009, a drop in UN peacekeeping was expected. Instead, a string of new peace missions were

61. Koops and Tercovich, “A European return,” 601.

62. This section builds on Karlsrud, “From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism.”

63. Ban Ki-moon, “Secretary-General’s statement on appointment of High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations,” 31 October 2014, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-10-31/secretary-generals-statement-appointment-high-level-independent> (accessed 9 February 2019).

deployed to the newly formed country South Sudan in 2011, Mali in 2013, and the Central African Republic in 2014, creating a strong pressure to do more with less.

Doctrinally, the experiences of Western countries in the long-drawn interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been conceptualized as stabilization, a term that has also become increasingly popular in UN circles during the last two decades, although a unified understanding has been lacking. Stabilization as a concept has been around since the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina was mandated in the mid-1990s, and has become increasingly popular at the UN as the key penholders (France and the UK) have uploaded their understanding of the concept into UN Security Council resolutions and the names of UN peacekeeping missions since 2004.⁶⁴ The term has military origins, fusing security with moderate but liberally inspired longer-term development objectives.⁶⁵ Military gains on the battlefield should be secured by a wide range of activities aimed at securing the peace, fusing security with development.⁶⁶

However, military doctrine is a moving target, and since 2010, there has been a gravitational shift in Western military thinking from stabilization to counterterrorism. The main difference is that while stabilization was NATO countries' way of encapsulating the idea of bridging security with development—that is, peacebuilding—counterterrorism strategy is marked by an even narrower and shorter-term outlook. While officially abandoning the Global War on Terror, former US president Barack Obama intensified the practice of counterterrorism, but with a significant change in strategy. The large engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan were scaled back and exchanged for a new and more limited strategy where drone strikes, US special forces, and funding and training of local troops have been the main ingredients. Obama intensified the drone strike campaigns, not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but across Africa and the Middle East, in countries such as Mali, Niger, Somalia, and Yemen. The largely influential US counterterrorism doctrine focuses on the F3EAD process (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate) intended to identify, target, and kill or capture so-called high-value targets.⁶⁷ Glenn Voelz argues that US doctrine has moved into an era of individualized warfare, “defeating networks and individual combatants rather than formations.”⁶⁸ The doctrine is driven by a wish to limit the engagements and risks

64. David Curran and Paul Holtom, “Resonating, rejecting, reinterpreting: Mapping the stabilization discourse in the United Nations Security Council, 2000–14,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4, no. 1 (2015): 1–18.

65. Robert Zoellick, “Fragile states: Securing development,” *Survival* 50, no. 6 (2008): 67–84.

66. For a longer discussion of stabilization and how it is being integrated into UN peacekeeping, see, for example, Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsruud, eds, *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats* (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2017). For more on the merger of security and development agendas, see also Abrahamsen, “Discourses of democracy, practices of autocracy.”

67. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism*, Washington, DC, 2014, V-3.

68. Glenn J. Voelz, “The individualization of American warfare,” *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 45, no. 1 (2015): 99.

that the US military is exposed to, as well as by technological advances in the use of surveillance, drone, and munitions technology.⁶⁹ The number of US special forces deployed in Africa has risen from 1 percent in 2006 to 17 percent in 2016 (1700 special forces troops in 2016).⁷⁰ Including other forces, the US has 6000 troops in Africa, with, for example, 800 deployed to Niger, and special operations forces carrying out raids in countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Libya, Mali, and Somalia, with logistical support from private subcontractors to limit risk exposure.⁷¹

While the War on Terror has been a central discursive frame since the attack on the New York Twin Towers, it has only recently moved centre stage of the policy debates and institutional development at the UN. The word “terrorism” has traditionally been divisive at the UN, and there is still not a common definition of the word. However, there has been increasing interest and consensus since 2005, when the Bush administration changed its rhetoric from fighting a Global War on Terror to a “Struggle against Violent Extremism.”⁷² Discursively, the fight against violent extremism has proved much more effective. In 2015, Ban Ki-moon launched the *UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, and in 2017, the UN General Assembly elevated the new UN counterterrorism office to the level of under-secretary-general.⁷³ MINUSMA forms the point where these trends converge, and although the mission has stabilization in its name, it is in practice moving towards counterterrorism.⁷⁴ At the UN, there is a growing feeling that “the Europeans try to NATO-nize the UN as much as possible” with the efforts to update and add doctrines, policies, and capabilities.⁷⁵

Concluding remarks

European countries have created strong expectations from the UN, the host country, and African partners when deciding to participate in MINUSMA. They have brought new capabilities, new technology, and new operational and doctrinal concepts developed over years of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

69. For a succinct account of this development, see Jon R. Lindsay, “Reinventing the revolution: Technological visions, counterinsurgent criticism, and the rise of special operations,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 422–453.

70. Nick Turse, “The next Niger,” *VICE News*, 29 November 2017, https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/bjddq8/everything-we-know-about-u-s-special-ops-are-doing-in-33-african-nations (accessed 5 July 2018).

71. Adam Moore, “US military logistics outsourcing and the everywhere of war,” *Territory, Politics, Governance* 5, no. 1 (2017): 5–27; and Adam Moore and James Walker, “Tracing the US military’s presence in Africa,” *Geopolitics* 21, no. 3 (2016): 686–716.

72. See, for example, Robert Fox, “Gwot is history: Now for save,” *New Statesman*, 8 August 2005, <http://www.newstatesman.com/node/195357> (accessed 5 July 2018).

73. UN, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, New York, 2015; UN, “Mr. Vladimir Ivanovich Voronkov – Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office,” United Nations, 21 June 2017, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctif/en/mr-vladimir-ivanovich-voronkov-under-secretary-general-united-nations-counter-terrorism-office> (accessed 11 September 2018).

74. Karlsrud, “Towards UN counter-terrorism operations.”

75. UN official, interview, 15 February 2017.

With these followed increased expectations as to what they could be able to do. But instead, European countries have often proved to be as risk-averse, if not more so, than other more traditional troop-contributing countries. While Western countries have indeed brought troops on the ground, they have also made sure that these are protected and are not exposed to high levels of risk. There is a clear chance that the return of Western countries has created “cultural bubbles” or a mission within the mission.⁷⁶ The combination of high expectations and low dividends is proving poisonous. In addition to being force multipliers, Western contributions are part of longer-term material and discursive engagements in other arenas—in gaining enhanced status from the US and other allies; in the competition for seats on the UN Security Council; and in the eagerness to prove that these countries assume their fair part of the global burden-sharing of international low-intensity security threats with the US, the principal allied power in NATO, and France, an increasingly important power in Europe with Brexit set for 2019. The participation in MINUSMA also creates the ability for Western member states to generate national intelligence streams from one of the key outposts in the unending War on Terror.

From an analytical point of view, Western contributions to MINUSMA thus seem to be primarily motivated by self-interested concerns, and while they may still be viewed as valid contributions to a rule-based world order, the liberal underpinnings of these contributions seem to be withering—lowering the “liberal, transformative ambitions” of UN peacekeeping “towards more realistic mandates.”⁷⁷ There is a discernible shift in strategy among Western states from liberal peacebuilding towards stabilization and counterterrorism, and with the Western engagement and contributions to UN peacekeeping, this strategic shift is also being imposed on the UN. Concurrently, there is also less emphasis on strengthening good governance in the host state,⁷⁸ and more focus on combatting terrorism and preventing violent extremism. Reform efforts directed towards UN peacekeeping follow this line of thinking, as the UN increasingly is seen as a possible proxy tool in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, with little concern for the legitimacy costs this may have for UN peacekeeping and the UN in general, particularly its work in mediation and humanitarian action.

Perhaps because the UN historically has been associated with the more altruistic dimension of foreign policy, the Western contributions to MINUSMA may by

76. Boutellis and Karlsrud, *Plug and Play*.

77. Andersen, “The HIPPO in the room.”

78. In 2012, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries’ support for “government and civil society” was at 12.3 percent or US\$15.6 billion of total spending, down to 9.6 percent or US\$13.9 billion in 2016. To compare, “humanitarian aid” received 12.3 percent or US\$17.8 billion in 2012, increased to 8.1 percent or US\$10.5 billion in 2016. See OECD, “Aid by major purposes in 2012,” 2014, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-2014/aid-by-major-purposes-in-2012_dcr-2014-table354-en (accessed 13 April 2018); and OECD, “Statistics on resource flows to developing countries,” 2018, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm> (accessed 13 April 2018). See also Abrahamsen, “Discourses of democracy, practices of autocracy.”

default be viewed as commitments to liberal internationalism. In several respects this is also correct: Western contributions are significant to MINUSMA and to Mali, and a majority of countries may be motivated by ambitions to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council to gain a say on international peace and security. But for liberal internationalism to be more than a hollow concept, it must not only be about whether or not states support international institutions with a liberal mission like the UN, but also about the impact of the support on the ground as well as on the UN as an institution. There is a gap between the *prima facie* commitment to liberal internationalism that contributions to UN peacekeeping in Africa signify and the actual practices in MINUSMA, subverting the tool of peacekeeping and weakening the legitimacy of the UN. Thus, while there may still be evidence of commitment to international liberalism at the surface of things, there is less depth to this engagement. This means that the engagement of “good states” in UN peacekeeping may undermine the liberal character of UN peacekeeping, as well as of the organization itself. Such a development points to a central feature of liberal internationalism: small and medium powers are dependent on a well-functioning international system, and the UN is perhaps the most important part of this system. In conclusion, then, Western states are paradoxically weakening a cornerstone of their own security when moving the UN towards counterterrorism.

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