United Nations Peace Operations: Aligning Principles and Practice

A compendium of research by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Edited by Mateja Peter
United Nations
Peace Operations
Aligning Principles and Practice

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# List of acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al Quaida in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Community Alert Network</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Community Liaison Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>The National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJTF</td>
<td>Multi-National Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Rights Up Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Volunteer Technological Communities</td>
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UN peace operations at a crossroads

Mateja Peter

The mandates of recent UN peacekeeping operations show substantial innovation in the thinking of the UN Security Council. The authorization of a Force Intervention Brigade, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, a focus on strategic communication and intelligence, and peacebuilding mandates in the midst of ongoing conflicts – have all expanded the scope of activities of UN missions. These developments have prompted questions over the future direction of UN peace operations. Has the UN the capabilities to command, support and implement more robust operations? What are the implications for the Capstone Doctrine and the peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate?¹ And more generally, what are the limits of UN actions to support peace?

Since the turn of the millennium, both practice and scholarship have stressed the importance of protection of civilians as a peacekeeping priority, the inclusion of gender perspectives in all efforts aimed at promoting and maintaining peace and security, and linking peacekeeping activities to peacebuilding and political processes. Linkages with special political missions are particularly important but have received less attention in policy debates. How might all these recent advances in thinking about peace and security be affected by new developments in peacekeeping? What are the implications of the new peacekeeping reality on the identity of the UN as a whole?

In October 2014, the UN Secretary-General appointed a High-Level Independent Panel to review UN peacekeeping and special political missions. The 17-member panel works under the leadership of the 1996 Nobel Peace Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta (Timor-Leste). The panel has been encouraged by the Secretary-General and other senior UN figures to be bold and creative in its recommendations. Members are expected to produce a joint report by June 2015. The Secretary-General will submit this report to the Security Council and the General

Assembly, together with his own recommendations. It is anticipated that the General Assembly will consider these during its autumn 2015 session. The report of the previous high-level panel, the 'Brahimi report', has had considerable impact on the reform and direction of UN peacekeeping in the decade following its release. It is thus anticipated that what will undoubtedly become known as the 'Ramos-Horta report' will have a similar impact on the direction of UN peace operations in the decade to come.

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) has been at the forefront of research on peace operations since their inception. This compendium draws on recent work conducted by researchers at the institute and is meant to provide scholarly insights on the issues the panel is grappling with. As reflected in the wide variety in the contributions presented here, security, conflict and peace have been and remain a research priority at NUPI.

The work on this compendium was generously supported by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A special thank you to Paul Troost and Liv Høivik for help with the formatting, and Susan Høivik for language proofing the compendium.

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Section 1: Conflict and peace trends

Broad trends

Morten Bøås

Peacekeeping has never been easy, but the current context of broad and ambitious mandates combined with instructions to use force robustly may present even further challenges. If recent conflict trends can be taken as a guide to ongoing and future peacekeeping operations, the field will continue to be characterized by complex missions conducted in politically difficult terrains. There is no clear endgame in sight. Missions dispatched to facilitate the production of peace must grapple with weak states and increasingly unpopular national leaders with low levels of legitimacy. Such missions may easily end up fighting or attempting to control armed non-state actors that are hard to defeat in battle and also have agendas that leave little room for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Moreover, these missions will probably be conducted in areas where local livelihoods are under pressure from a range of external shocks, including increased climatic variability; and the states in question are rarely seen as actors able to offer their local populations much support. Indeed, often the states will be seen as being part of the problem and not the solution.3

This ‘messiness’ of things to come is readily observable in various areas in which the UN is currently engaged in various peace operations, like the Mali, the Central African Republic, and the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Even if each mission has its own set of unique challenges, there are also certain commonalities that must be thought through carefully, because ever more robust and comprehensive mandates are not going to solve these.

First, it must be acknowledged that many armed non-state actors today do not fit the established categories of insurgencies, like national liberation, separatism, revolution or warlordism.4 The new generation of insurgencies, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are


both deeply local and undeniably global at the same time. Branding has become an integral part of their strategy. These actors may be religious fundamentalists, but they are also pragmatic and very good at appropriating local grievances for their own purposes. Most of them also operate in a setting where there is little state control or state legitimacy, and where local livelihoods are under immense pressure due to a combination of increased climatic variability and the inability of the states to react adequately to this. And as these non-state actors are not seeking to capture the state or to break away from a state, but are challenging the very concept of modern statehood, there are scant margins for a negotiated settlement. Finally, since most of these actors also seem to be very hard to defeat in military terms, the UN finds itself attempting to control conflict situations to which solutions may be very hard to find.

This is not made any easier by the fact that most peacekeeping operations are and will continue to struggle with limited capacity – perhaps achieving nominal daytime control of conflict-prone areas, at best. Moreover, the space available to national leaders for making strategic decisions is often severely constrained. This means that peace processes attempted and sponsored by the international community at large or certain concerned stakeholders will not achieve much, as national leaders cannot make the essential decisions needed, or the main armed actors are simply not present at the table.

Overlapping systems of governance

Morten Bøås

UN peacekeeping operations are by definition state-focused. That makes them poorly equipped to deal with the overlapping systems of formal and informal governance nested around much of the zones of conflict today. Armed struggles have always been in a constant state of flux. However, with more and more new technologies, strategies, and pathways to resistance emerging, insurgencies adapt and new ones appear on the scene. Global and regional forces – be they political, economic, or social – impact on the context of the armed struggles in multiple, and often unpredictable, ways. In some cases, local causes of conflicts become interconnected, intertwined, and layered, producing a constantly shifting landscape.

It is important to acknowledge that armed insurgencies are not only forces of disorder: they are equally parts of emerging systems of governance. What we see today where armed insurgencies exist is that a
monopolized system of governance has either broken down completely or has become so weakened that competing systems have emerged.\(^5\)

These new systems are characterized by flexibility and adaptability. Their actors compete to become the nodal point between various networks of attempted informal governance that collaborate, but they also compete and are at times in violent conflict with each other. The fluidity of these networks may be seen in the continuing existence – but changing function – of regional and local ‘big men’ within these armed insurgencies. In many conflict-prone societies, the new forms, and the increasing degree to which the ‘big men’ (and their networks of governance) are connected to other regional and international networks and markets, lead to networks increasingly characterized by adaptability and pragmatic shifting of alliances.

This can be seen in the dual dynamic unfolding in parts of Africa, as in the eastern DRC. On the one hand, there is the drive whereby regional ‘big men’ operate in a downward direction to capitalize on local grievances, largely for their own benefit (take the history of the CNDP and M23, both of which relied heavily on top–down leadership by regional big men). On the other hand, there is the evolution of local defence forces/militias moving upwards and becoming intertwined in larger networks and markets – in the process, producing new regional big men. Take, for example, the proliferation of Mayi-Mayi and other local self-defence militias as the Raia Mutomboki that originally emerged as grassroots responses to the abuses perpetrated by the FDLR. Regardless of the internal dynamics, new networks of power and rule are constructed, challenging – and replacing – existing systems of governance. What we see are complex political configurations that have shifted away from monopolized systems of governance and patronage to one characterized by a multitude of competing actors and networks of patronage and shifting alliances. In consequence, peacekeeping operations are confronted with a field in constant flux and fragmentation, where the important dimension to keep track of is not so much the actual agents of violence, but the nodal points in these networks of governance and violence, and their ability to maintain networks across space and time. Only by having an understanding of these networks and how they work can the international community offer an approach to policy that make these networks less integral elements in the daily livelihood struggles of the local population.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Ibid.
Relevance of the UN Security Council

Niels Nagelhus Schia

The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the most important international decision-making body, with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.\(^7\) It is empowered to make legitimate and binding decisions, including mandates for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. That means that the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations rests on the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions. The Council is the only arena where such decisions can be made: it is good, but not perfect. The Council depends on being perceived as relevant to all 193 UN member states. To be relevant, its decisions must be seen as both legitimate and efficient. However, the growing use of informal processes and shadow mechanisms in the Council is challenging the balance between these two considerations.

Member states are again calling for reform of the composition of the UNSC. Previous attempts have been blocked by the veto of the P5 (permanent members). Instead of changing the formal composition, a reform should focus on:

- enhancing the transparency and democratic procedures of the Council’s current decision-making process and the informal parts of this process;

- enhancing the influence of the E10 (elected members) in the Council so they can participate in the decision-making processes in the same way as the P5 (for instance, all members states should be ‘penholders’ on a regular basis);

- addressing the changes in the global balance of power by incorporating a new layer of member states or regional organizations in the Council;

- establishing more systematic and coherent relations with regional organizations, particularly relevant when mandating peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations;

- improving the dynamics of the Council’s working methods so that they can better address and respond to emerging conflicts.

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As a result of the Council’s growing workload, new and less formal ways of approaching cases before they are dealt with around the horseshoe table have become more common and almost institutionalized (like the ‘penholder function’). With this trend, the decision-making process in the Council is being shifted further away from the formal arenas – which in turn means that member states will invest increasingly in shadow decision-making processes in the Council. That is not to say that having a place at the table has become irrelevant: a country’s chances of influencing matters backstage are greater when it is also a member of the UNSC. However, these informal processes could be improved, made more democratic, transparent and institutionalized into the Council’s rules of procedure.

While informal decision-making processes increase efficiency of the Council, they may also decrease the legitimacy of these same decisions. These conflicting concerns are equally important for the Council’s relevance as regards the maintenance of international peace and security. Despite the massive contradictions between the great powers during the Cold War, the Security Council has managed to balance between these two conflicting concerns for seven decades now. Its predecessor, the League of Nations, sacrificed efficiency to increase legitimacy; it became irrelevant and was dissolved before completing its third decade. The Security Council has evidently been better at maintaining its relevance than the League of Nations was. However, sacrificing legitimacy for the sake of efficacy could change that.

With less legitimacy, it will be more difficult in the long run for the Security Council to maintain efficiency through its relevance in international affairs. In other words, if the Security Council is unable to balance these two considerations satisfactorily in the future, it will be weakened in its ability to safeguard international peace and security, not least in connection with mandating UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Particularly R2P situations trigger this dilemma.

The good news is that decision-making processes and informal processes are easier to reform than matters of formal composition. A reform of the informal processes could serve to address and enhance both the legitimacy and efficiency of the UN Security Council.
Section 2: New issues in peacekeeping

Organized crime

Francesco Strazzari

For more than a decade there has been growing recognition that UN peace operations need to include a focus on organized crime. While that is a positive development, the outcomes have been elusive to say the least, and much remains to be done to operationalize fine-grained understanding and strategic planning regarding organized crime in contexts emerging from armed conflict. The operationalization of organized crime as a driver of state fragility in a given conflict-affected region should emerge as the product of the joint activities of specialists with backgrounds in political science/sociology, economics/development and criminology/law. However, organized crime continues to be seen as primarily a question of law enforcement, at best a judicial matter. Moreover, more is needed to improve synergies within the UN system: despite efforts to establish a solid base for collaboration between UNODC and DPKO, actual cooperation in the field has remained fairly episodic.

Of the 28 UN missions underway in 2013, 10 had organized crime in their mandate. Likewise, a growing number of specialized units focusing on organized crime have been established. However, the closing of the UN Taskforce on Transnational Organized Crime reflects difficulties encountered in this area, not least as regards achieving institutional consensus about the policy target. The operationalization of organized crime has been obstructed by reductive understandings. For example, MINUSMA (Mali) has a Task Force on Organized Crime: it is driven by UNPOL, which means that it is highly focused on security and law enforcement. Similarly with other missions, starting with UNMIK, the first mission to be endowed with counter-organized crime capacity.\(^8\)

Definitions of (transnational) organized crime vary depending on contexts, sector of activity and organizational culture. All over the world, police tend to associate drug-related crime with organized crime, regardless of the actual circumstances. Any attempt to understand how organized crime affects local governance, economy and

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society should be based on a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, above all in its ambivalent, non-linear relationship with political system stability and violence. It is imperative to understand how war economies, often involving significant criminal activity, take root and become resilient. Likewise, there is a need to distinguish between organized crime and the more generic crime boom often observed in post-conflict situations. Great variation exists across regions, countries and local contexts: given the fact that organized crime is often invisible, based as it is on connivance and intimidation, distinctive methodologies are needed to identify critical areas, assess potential damage and strategically plan how to deal with it, gradually decoupling crime from politics, so as to make the issue more tractable and offer better chances of success.

Importantly, experience shows that there is little chance of fighting organized crime (especially its mafia-style variant) unless the issue features in the public debate, engaging civil society segments especially sensitive to matters like corruption, development, human rights and social justice. Internationally mandated operations have a role to play in facilitating this process, supporting forums for discussion and targeted research. A key challenge is to establish such forums and support those media that can promote debates about strategies and policies, so that they can bring into the local context evidence from other countries and contexts, to avoid insularity and demagoguery.

New technologies

John Karlsrud

New technologies can also be used as arguments for more intelligence- and technology-driven robust missions. However, UN missions do not need new technologies in order to become more robust, but to enable them to implement their mandates better. UN missions can also use these tools to help empower local populations to participate in and have more ownership of discussions concerning the future of their

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country – perhaps alleviating some of the democratic deficit that too commonly exists. For best results, the UN should link up with the private sector and volunteer technological communities (VTCs). Furthermore, the UN should take care that the gathering of data does not harm vulnerable host populations – following the ‘do no harm’ principle – and make sure that remote sensing does not lead to further ‘bunkerization’ of UN missions retreating to the safe walls of their compounds.

New technology can be seen as both an advantage and a challenge to the UN. Surveillance drones and commercial satellite image providers are increasingly becoming an important source of information for UN peace operations. They can provide up-to-date images at low cost. However, new tools require new capacities – for instance, analysis capacity is crucial, and it is not a layman’s task to analyse satellite pictures and synthetic aperture radar data.

Google, Microsoft and other tech giants can help the UN in getting a grip on how to sort more effectively through the vast piles of data it gathers. Digital ‘exhaust’ can be useful to detect macro-trends – group geotagging of mobile phones to detect population movements, using sudden spikes in remittances to detect geographical locations where tension is looming – and the Secretary-General should find ways for the banking, telecoms and remittances industries to share their data without revealing business secrets. More direct cooperation with the private sector is needed – the engagement of Facebook with the humanitarian sector can serve as one possible example.

Community Alert Networks (CANs), as in the DRC, can alert the UN when a situation is emerging, and enable real-time monitoring of evolving issues. This will improve the ability of a mission to capture, understand and integrate local perceptions into daily decision-making. However, the UN must take great care to ensure that members of the host population are not treated as second-rate citizens – it might be implicitly, but wrongly, assumed that the need to give informed consent is a luxury good that does not apply in situations of crisis. Using crowd-sourced information can have unintended and negative consequences through group or individual re-identification when combined with other information (the ‘mosaic effect’), putting civilians in danger of persecution, torture or death.

There is also a real danger that technology will speed up the tendency for troops, civilians and humanitarians to retreat to the safe walls of their compounds. Greater knowledge creates greater responsibility. The UN should resist ‘bunkerization’ of UN peace operations, and use technology and innovation to enable peace operations to match the greater knowledge that technology can give with increased mobility and agility, and the requisite will to implement their mandates. In the calls for more and better technology there lies the inherent
danger of distancing ourselves from those we aim to help, and shifting the burden of accountability from helpers to receivers.

Cybersecurity

*Lilly Muller and Niels Nagelhus Schia*

Peace operations cannot afford to ignore emerging security trends. Including a focus on cybersecurity in UN peace operations can improve the level of global cybersecurity, enhance the sustainability of peacebuilding processes in post-conflict countries and contribute to economic growth, infrastructure and development in post-conflict countries. In order to secure access there is a need for mainstreaming of cyber education, awareness and various structural and cyber-specific ‘add-ons’ into the civilian and policing dimensions of peace operations. This includes training of judges, police and prosecutors in the host countries, as well as developing investigative methods for computer-related crimes and electronic criminal evidence. It is crucial that states receive the technology they need to use and utilize cyberspace; however education, awareness and infrastructure must follow this access. This will require awareness of the importance and challenges that cyberspace holds, in all phases of UN peace operations.

Interconnectivity via digital networks is the key characteristic of today’s global economy and communication, and is increasingly required for global economic stability and development. Nevertheless, providing or securing such interconnectivity is not included in peacebuilding. Cyberspace is a cornerstone of all societies today: this includes fragile states, countries in conflict and post-conflict countries. Many African countries, also those categorized as fragile states, are experiencing substantial economic growth. In the past decade, seven of the world’s ten fastest-growing economies were in Africa. Increased and improved technology and access to cyberspace are facilitating this growth. Many African countries are making huge leaps into wireless telephony, avoiding the cost/effort detour involved in using expensive copper cables. This trend is confirmed by UN figures which show a rapid increase in mobile phone subscriptions, also in post-conflict countries hosting UN peacekeeping missions.

Access to such technology and infrastructure facilitates lines of communication, and can boost a country’s economy and social stability. A secure cyberspace affects social and economic factors nationally and worldwide, and there is a clear link between national development and cyberspace. However dependence on cyber and ICT also increases societal vulnerability. The degree of a country’s cyber/infrastructure

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technology and capability influences its stability, economy and development, and vice versa. Thus, cybersecurity and cyber capacity-building must be included in peacebuilding. Neglecting this may have negative effects on the sustainability of peacebuilding processes for the long-term governance, development and stability of states.

The question of access versus institutional stability and framework creates key challenges in implementing cyber capabilities. Many countries are rapidly increasing their access to cyberspace, without having the security and institutional stability to secure it. This can result in more damage than benefit to both the state and the local economy. The challenge here is to create a structure and institutional stability as early as possible, and integrate it into the local system. This will allow for maximal utilization of the internet and protect users against malware. Cyber security should be an integral part of creating good governance and institutional stability. We hold that cyber security and capability must be included in the early stages of peacebuilding, and the infrastructure necessary to reach the tipping point where internet access becomes beneficial must be established.

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16 Ibid.
Section 3: Peacekeeping doctrine

Offensive and stabilization mandates

*Cedric de Coning*

UN stabilization operations require a new doctrine, one that is separate from the existing UN peacekeeping principles, identity and approach. When the UN Security Council – as a last resort – mandates the UN to undertake stability and offensive operations, the UN should not have to do this on the basis of the existing peacekeeping doctrine and its blue helmet identity. A new UN stabilization doctrine with a matching identity should be developed to provide guidance on what would be required, should the UN be tasked with such mandates.\(^\text{17}\)

Such a new stabilization doctrine can help to protect UN peacekeeping doctrine and identity from being misapplied in unsuited contexts. It can also help the UN to maintain credibility and legitimacy by ensuring that when the Security Council opts to mandate the UN to undertake stabilization operations, it can do so knowing that there is an appropriate doctrine with the requisite capacities in place to ensure that the UN mission is prepared for the task assigned to it.\(^\text{18}\)

The missions in CAR (MINUSCA), the DRC (MONUSCO) and Mali (MINUSMA), taken together with AMISOM in Somalia and the new Multi-National Joint Task Force (MJTF) mission against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin, represent a new category of stabilization operations. These missions are tasked with protecting the government and its people against an aggressor. They have several features in common:

- they operate in the midst of ongoing conflicts;
- they are mandated to contribute to restoring and maintaining stability, by helping to protect a government and its people against identified aggressors;

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\(^{18}\) See John Karlsrud (2015) ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’, *Third World Quarterly* 36 (1): 40–54.
they operate in support of and alongside local security forces that have the primary responsibility for protecting their government and citizens

they are mandated to use force robustly in the face of anticipated attacks against them and those they are tasked to protect. In the case of the FIB in eastern DRC, AMISOM in Somalia and the MJTF in the Lake Chad basin, they are also tasked to undertake offensive operations to forcefully disarm the aggressors, or to degrade their capacity to continue their insurgency and to enforce stability.

However, these stabilization missions should not be misunderstood as a military solution to a conflict. They should be seen as part of a larger strategy for proactively shaping the security environment, by containing the aggressors in order to create space for political solutions.

The tension between the established UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the limited use of force, and these new stabilization missions is rooted in the fact that in each of these missions the UN Security Council has identified aggressors that need to be contained. The aggressors are framed outside the context of (legitimate) 'parties to the conflict', because they have opted to use violence to pursue their objectives. However, the short-term focus on containment does not preclude them from joining the peace process downstream. Until such time, the Security Council has identified them as aggressors, and the UN mission does not require their consent, is not impartial, and has been mandated to use force to contain them.

There has been a significant shift in the orientation of UN peacekeeping over the last decade, from conflict resolution to conflict management. A decade ago, most UN peacekeepers were engaged in post-conflict peace agreement implementation missions in countries like Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia and Sudan. Today, approximately two thirds of the UN’s peacekeepers are deployed in the midst of ongoing conflict in missions where there is no ‘peace’ to ‘keep’.

Over this same period the UN has developed significant operational political and peacemaking capacities. As a result, a division of work has emerged: UN peacekeeping missions are increasingly limited to containing violence, whereas UN special political missions and special envoys are tasked with seeking enduring political solutions.

19 The M23, FDLR and other armed groups in DRC, AQIM in Mali, Seleka and anti-Baleka in CAR, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in the MJTF.
Enforcement peacekeeping

*Mateja Peter*

The United Nations is moving into a new era of enforcement peacekeeping. This has manifested itself both in the enforcement of political solutions through support to government statebuilding ambitions in the midst of conflicts, and the enforcement of military victories through the offensive use of force. These changes challenge all three key peacekeeping principles: consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. Such a shift in UN peacekeeping opens the door to several unintended but problematic consequences. Has the concept of peacekeeping become overstretched? If doctrinal implications of recent developments are not properly acknowledged, there will remain a wall between operational activities and strategic considerations. For a mission to succeed, all stakeholders need to have a shared understanding of what peacekeeping means and what principles it follows.

In peacekeeping today, the ‘targets’ of peacekeeping actions tend to be non-state actors that enjoy little international legitimacy. As a result, no comprehensive peace agreements with them are sought before the international community takes sides in a conflict. UN peacekeeping has come to bear a startling resemblance to stabilization missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that the short-term results have been at best mixed, and the longer-term objectives unaccomplished, should hold lessons for UN peacekeeping. If ‘enforcement peacekeeping’ remains under the peacekeeping umbrella, support should be lent to structures that consider its longer-term implications for peacebuilding and how supporting one side in a conflict affects regional dynamics and peace processes. For these missions, context sensitivity is of paramount importance.

Abrogation of peacekeeping principles is bound to carry unintended consequences. While the full extent may be difficult to foresee, given the stakes involved for both the hosting states and the future of UN peacekeeping, such assessment is needed as part of strategic considerations before missions are authorized. Security of international personnel and civilians, and mandate implementation could become complicated. If peacekeepers take sides in a conflict, that may well lead to increased resistance among disenfranchised groups likely to take action against the mission and other international presence. Moreover, the increasing robustness of missions and their expanding mandates seem set to complicate their success and later drawdown.

UN peace operations should be wary of assuming specific political solutions. When UN peacekeepers side with one side in a conflict,

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whether by helping it ‘extend state authority’ or defeat enemy combatants, that substantially affects conflict and political dynamics. Conflict parties against which government and now UN action is directed are key players in a conflict. Regardless of their international legitimacy, these armed groups or their political reincarnations will need to be included in peace settlements if these are to become sustainable. UN support for the central government politically and/or militarily empowers one side, and can result in a peace settlement that fails to reflect political realities on the ground. This complicates longer-term peace-building and reconciliation processes.

Finally, there is a need for broader consideration of how enforcement peacekeeping could affect regional dynamics. The conflicts in Mali, Somalia, the DRC, the CAR, Sudan and South Sudan, to mention only some, are all regional conflicts. And yet, UN peacekeeping operations generally have a single-state focus. Militarily defeating an armed group in a particular state could move some of their operations to neighbouring states – as seen in the past in the Middle East and in Africa. Given the cross-border nature of contemporary conflicts, the UN will need to examine the roles played by regional actors. While regional involvement has primarily been seen as positive, the UN should be wary of deploying peacekeepers to areas where they might be perceived as instruments of the policies of their own governments.

Robust use of force

John Karlsrud

The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel.21

At the strategic level, careful consideration should be given to what kind of instrument UN peacekeeping should be.22 Can the UN deploy peace enforcement operations? While that may be a tempting solution for members of the UN Security Council wanting to show leadership and resolve and with limited interest in engaging bilaterally or through regional organizations, equipping UN peacekeeping operations with

22 Also see John Karlsrud (2015) ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’, Third World Quarterly 36 (1): 40–54.
enforcement mandates that target particular groups should not be undertaken lightly. The use of force should be limited to critical instances when civilian populations are in grave and immediate danger. The urge to satisfy short-term objectives, like demonstrating that the UN Security Council and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations are ‘doing something’, needs to be resisted. UN Security Council mandates should not specify any potential enemies. They should avoid including euphemisms like ‘neutralize’, and force should be used only for short periods in order to protect civilians.

‘To a man with a hammer, the problem will look like a nail’. With the inclusion of the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC, the UN has got its hammer and has shown that it can use force against specified targets to ‘neutralize’ them. On the other hand, MINUSMA in Mali can be seen as a laboratory for incorporating some of the concepts and lessons learned from Afghanistan. It is essential to support this process by providing new arrivals to the UN with a better understanding of the similarities and differences between NATO and UN missions, and the need to take a less combative stance in Mali.

Modern peacekeeping needs modern tools and technologies – including surveillance drones, tactical human intelligence teams and communicating with host populations through social media. However, there seems to be an unspoken linkage made between the inclusion of modern military capabilities and the more robust version of stabilization, leaning towards peace enforcement. With the Western capabilities, the MINUSMA mission is becoming more robust. But the robust posture may also have a self-fulfilling effect, drawing attention to the mission and increasing the likelihood of targeted attacks against the UN. In the longer term, retaliatory attacks may target the soft underbelly of the UN – the funds, programmes and agencies that carry out development and humanitarian work.

In 1993 John Ruggie warned that the UN had entered ‘a vaguely defined no man’s land lying somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement – for which it lacks any traditional guiding operational concept’. His warnings were not heeded, and the UN soon failed miserably in Srebrenica and in Rwanda. The solution to the problem was to come to a new understanding that impartiality should be understood from the perspective of protecting civilians, and that the UN could not stand idly by while atrocities were committed. The Brahimi Report held that the traditional principles ‘should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping’, but that peace operations should be sufficiently mandated with robust rules of engagement for civilian protection and have the necessary resources to react where civilians were in danger.

Today the UN finds itself in a similar predicament, taking on new tasks that border on peace enforcement. The question is whether the gap between principles and practice signify a need to update principles – or whether this is a case of practice leaving still-valid principles behind.
Section 4: Focus on civilians

Protection of civilians: conceptual UN clarity

Jon Harald Sande Lie and Benjamin de Carvalho

Lack of conceptual clarity and a shared understanding of what the Protection of Civilians (PoC) means and entails for practice are key challenges to UN peacekeeping mandates, policies and practice. The PoC concept is a very broad one, and fails to orchestrate action between civilian and military entities. Instead, agencies interpret and apply PoC in terms of their own mandates and institutional culture, which impedes interagency coordination and contextual implementation. Few agree whether PoC is a specific peacekeeping task, or should be an overall concern of UN operations. Further, the lack of differentiation between PoC and the somewhat contested Responsibility to Protect (R2P) contributes to undermining PoC. The emergence of the Rights Up Front (RUF) agenda is not going to make that more clear. An essential task at the policy level is therefore to clarify the status and meaning of PoC as regards other tasks, concepts and protection concerns.

Recent years have seen an increasing number of policy and doctrinal processes aimed at streamlining PoC. Combining the UN’s military capacities with the humanitarian ethics of protection can yield both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it makes the PoC framework more robust, putting greater political (and military) capital behind preventive protection efforts, while also enabling actual physical protection of civilians. On the other hand, it risks politicizing protection, conflating the UNs political–military agenda with the humanitarian agenda, thereby jeopardizing the humanitarian principles so central to the legitimacy of PoC.

The protection of civilians is central to peacekeeping in seeking to manage war-to-peace transitions. This involves both civilian and military entities, and a critical problem is the lack of a shared understanding of what PoC means in and entails in practice. This is partly because the Security Council feared that defining and operationalizing PoC would make it too binding for member states, and could override the UN’s lack of resources. Hence it was never properly defined: instead, the Secretary-General opted for mainstreaming a ‘culture of protection’

throughout the UN system. The problem is that different actors interpret this culture differently and contextually, making interagency harmonization difficult. Mainstreaming PoC would require simplifying and defining the concept to make it more tangible. That, however, would entail the risk of undermining PoC’s malleability to provide protection in all situations with the necessary range of UN entities.

PoC is broad, lacks tangibility, and has remained an elusive idea to many involved in peacekeeping. Accordingly, it has become a conceptual battlefield with little agreement on the status of PoC, whether as a legal principle rooted in international humanitarian law, guidelines for humanitarian action, or a comprehensive doctrine including coercive means. This confusion is due to the fact that PoC is vague and open to interpretation and contextualization. Furthermore, various actors keen to further legitimize the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have been deliberately confusing the two concepts. While both the PoC and R2P concepts are related as regards aims, there are clear differences between them. R2P is interventionist, PoC is not. R2P faces the problem of legitimizing humanitarian intervention, which PoC does not face. Disciples have therefore sought to attach or confuse the two in hopes of sharing in the broad legitimacy which PoC has enjoyed but R2P has lacked.

There is a crucial need for more grounded reflection on how to provide effective protection. If no concerted and central efforts are made within the UN to clarify conceptually how PoC, R2P and RUF relate to different agencies, contexts, policies and actions, UN peacekeeping will have to deal with three related, often competing, ideas or cultures of protection – all well-intentioned, yet not clearly shared and defined so as to enable contextual, sensitized and harmonized action.

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Protection of civilians: from generic to context-specific approaches

Cedric de Coning

No other goal more clearly captures the ethos of what UN peacekeeping should be about than Protection of Civilians (PoC). And yet, exactly how the UN should protect civilians has remained ambiguously complex, posing challenging ethical dilemmas. As a result, peacekeepers have generally opted for a more cautious approach at the operational and tactical levels.28

The most serious challenge for the PoC role is the inherent tension in relations between the peacekeeping mission and national authorities. Missions are dependent on the consent of the host government and are mandated to support the local security forces that have primary responsibility for protecting the citizenry. In missions like UNAMID in Darfur or UNMISS in South Sudan, where the UN shelters civilians who feel at risk from government forces, or where the government is complicit in attacks on civilians, UN peacekeepers are placed in an impossible position: carrying out their mandate may result in armed confrontation with host government forces.29 Such incidents may result in a loss of consent, and the UN’s continued ability to protect civilians. The UN leadership is thus forced to confront the ethical dilemma where the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.

- The tension between the mission and the host government can be better managed politically through clear and iterative communication with national and local authorities, so that they are aware of the mission’s PoC mandate and how it will approach situations where civilians are at risk of imminent violence.
- Uniformed peacekeepers can be better prepared to use the mission-specific SOPs and Rule of Engagements that have been developed for PoC. This is best done in mission contexts by bringing the relevant officers at different levels of command together to fine-tune their responses to various scenarios.
- The UN should improve its engagement with troop and police contributing countries and discuss with them how their peacekeepers are expected to act when faced with various PoC scenarios.

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A second challenge is the tension between peacekeeping and humanitarian approaches to PoC. Although these differences are deeply rooted in principle and doctrine, and cannot really be resolved, past experience has shown that relations can be managed through meaningful coordination. The aim should not be to arrive at a common approach, but to bring both sides to a point where they respect the role and contribution of the other and therefore recognize the need to coexist and coordinate. Acting robustly against those who threaten civilians is likely to result in displacements and other negative consequences for civilians, especially when the aggressors are embedded within civilian populations, like the FDLR in eastern DRC.

- Mission PoC strategies should not shy away from these tensions, but be explicit about the efforts they will apply in dealing with them.

- Mechanisms need to be in place where potential differences can be managed on a case-by-case basis.

- A culture of frank and open dialogue should be developed, based on mutual recognition and respect.

Peacekeeping mission strategies have shown a lack of appreciation for the capacity of host communities to manage their own protection. In fact, local societies will have developed coping strategies for protection before the deployment of the mission, and will continue to apply such approaches after the mission has withdrawn. There has been too little focus on how to assess the population’s own perception of threats and protection needs.

- Mission PoC strategies should be more sensitive to how they can support local protection capacities, as opposed to imposing their own ideas and approaches on host communities.

- POC strategies should be more sensitive to the unintended consequences of mission actions, and be more proactive in monitoring the impact they are having, including possible side-effects.\(^{30}\)

Comparison of the PoC strategies of several missions reveals how generic guidance needs to be applied differently in specific contexts, and how consideration should be given to the time-period, or phase, in

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which the mission finds itself. These findings point to the need for a shift from generic guidelines to a mission-specific and case-by-case approach to Protection of the Civilians.

Lastly, the Security Council must take care not to use PoC as a justification for using UN peacekeepers to protect governments against radical Islamist insurgents, as it is doing in Mali (MINUSMA). That will inevitably result in politicizing the PoC agenda.

**Mass atrocities and gender**

_Eli Stamnes_

UN peace operations may be deployed to setting where mass atrocities (war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide) occur or are about to take place. Such atrocities invariably have gender dimensions. In order to address these comprehensively, the UN must understand gender from two perspectives, guided by the questions ‘where are the women?’ and ‘how does gender work? In the context of mass atrocities, the first perspective involves identifying women’s experiences in connection with mass atrocities and taking into account their roles as agents for preventing and protecting against such atrocities – as well as in the commissioning of them. The second gender perspective involves investigating what work gender is doing in the context of mass atrocities. For example: how are combat strategies, the treatment of individuals of the enemy group, or sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), based on and serve to maintain or cement certain notions of femininity and masculinity? Here, ‘gender’ is not understood as simply women’s issues, but as the socially constructed hierarchies of gendered identities.

In practical terms, the first gender perspective (‘where are the women?’) means:

- consciously looking for women, making sure that a male-as-norm approach is not taken
- identifying how mass atrocities impact on women in specific instances, rather than relying on abstract models that may obstruct observation of what is really going on
- widening the lenses used in identifying potential mass atrocity situations to include the experiences of women

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• moving beyond the women-as-victims stereotype.

• acknowledging the role of women as active agents in prevention and protection activities, and ensuring their participation at all levels of the spectrum of instruments and strategies, utilizing already existing knowledge and policies for women's participation developed in connection with the implementation of UNSCR Resolution 1325

• identifying the specific roles women assume in the commission of mass atrocities.

In practical terms, the second gender perspective (‘how does gender work?’) means:

• conscious investigation of the role played by the construction of gender identities in the commission of mass atrocities – e.g. how sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) can be understood as violent assertions of masculinity

• taking into account a whole new set of warning signs: indications of a hyper-masculinized environment and indications that assertions of masculinity may turn violent, as these are often precursors for ethnic cleansing and genocide. Such signs include:
  o growing polarization of gender roles in society
  o a change in gender power relations to the detriment of the feminine
  o gendered propaganda and hate speech, with clear assertions of masculinity and denigration of femininity
  o media ‘scapegoating’ of females
  o ‘feminization’, through words and deeds, of the enemy group’s men.

Further, the second gender perspective (‘how does gender work?’) means:

• Measures should be developed for dealing with the intersection of gender and ethnicity as well as other identities.

• When dealing with SGBV, the structures of domination that allows for SGBV to take place must be the primary focus. Otherwise, measures will only act as a temporary quick-fix solution.
There should also be measures aimed at making hypermasculine language unacceptable.

Whereas the first perspective is increasingly gaining ground within the UN, through the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325, the second perspective may be harder to grasp and to implement. However, if it is to deal with the gender dimensions that lie at the core of mass atrocities, the UN cannot shy away from a comprehensive gender approach that includes both perspectives.32

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Section 5: Sustaining peace

Inclusion of local perceptions

Niels Nagelhus Schia, John Karlsrud and Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik

The international community needs to do more in systematically collecting, sharing and analysing local perceptions, and ensuring that they are used in monitoring progress towards key benchmarks. Further, they must inform decision-making at the field level and at the UN Security Council and UN Secretariat/Headquarters (HQ). Here are some practical recommendations for policymakers and the international community:

- **Integrate.** The UN should ‘mainstream’ local perceptions into political analysis and planning at the mission level and at HQ New York HQ.

- **Knowledge sharing:** between New York HQ, mission HQs and the field.

- **Nationals and internationals:** Although not neutral, national staff and the local population are the ‘real’ experts on local perceptions.

- **Political buy-in:** Too much focus on the field might lead to a disconnection with the political elites. It is crucial to involve the political elites into the bottom–up approach.

- **Infrastructure and partnership:** The UN should establish partnerships with national universities and researchers, to strengthen capacity and improve the analysis of data.

- **Methodological approach – Outsourcing:** Capturing local perceptions through surveys requires methodological expertise.

- **Methodological approach – In-house:** To be able to carry out and interpret surveys, staff must be qualified and trained properly.

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• **Expertise:** UN needs a mechanism that can ensure good partnerships. Two ways of establishing partnerships could be envisaged: in-house capacity to work with partners and outsource surveys; working with consultants (for instance, UNMIL has worked with academics, the World Bank and others).

• **Transparency** of research, data and findings should be the rule, not the exception.

• **Funding.** Funds for capturing local perceptions through surveys and the like should be entered into the budget and coordinated with the UN Country Team (UNCT).

The increased focus by policymakers on understanding and capturing local perceptions has sparked discussion on how UN peacekeeping may go about this more systematically. This debate may enhance local trust in peacekeeping missions, bolstering the legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding processes. However, it may also nurture a more proactive mission approach to activities that will inevitably connect link with local processes, forces, traditions, customs and groups of people, while disconnecting others. Because it may have effects on the existing power structures in the host country, the focus on local perceptions requires careful handling, to avoid bringing more stress to local communities.

**Security sector reform**

*Kari M. Osland*

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has often been presented as a panacea for achieving sustainable development after a war. This is because SSR has been perceived as a separate discipline, encompassing elements of the larger peace- and state building agenda, bridging the gap between security and development. Such an understanding places too much responsibility on the concept itself, making it one more among many complex, unattainable goals.

Rather, SSR should be perceived as an integrated approach involving certain major principles:

- human security at its core
- balancing effectiveness and accountability
- recognizing the inter-linked nature of the system
- recognizing the political nature of such reform.\textsuperscript{34}

By keeping human security at its core – the first principle listed above – it can help to reinforce a focus on protection of civilians as the centre of gravity in a peace operation. The second principle, balancing between effectiveness and accountability, is challenged in situations where there is no peace to keep. The basic assumption is that some security must be created first, for development to happen.\textsuperscript{35} However, if accountability is not made an integral part of this process right from the start, it will be an uphill struggle to set about introducing this \textit{after} some degree of security has been established. As for the third principle, having a holistic approach to the reforms refers to an undeniable truth: there is little point in reforming the police if neither the judicial nor the penal system is functional. The last principle, the political nature of these reforms, recognizes the security sector as part of the state sector and the state-sanctioned use of force.

At UN headquarters, the SSR unit should be placed with the Under-Secretary General. In the field, it should be part of the office of the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG). This will underline the political nature of SSR and to ensure linkages between sectors such as the police, military and civilian components.

The possibilities for influencing potential obstacles through the SSR intervention are limited. Therefore, the goals of SSR must be linked to the wider process of peace- and statebuilding, so that these processes can reinforce rather than contradict each other. In addition, the mandates should be specifically tailored and needs-based, realistically reflecting what is possible to achieve in the short term. At the same time, an SSR intervention should assist in developing a long-term goal, supporting the host-state in its efforts to establish a national vision and strategy focused on accountable institutions.

A central challenge related to SSR is connected to national ownership as vital to the legitimacy and sustainability of SSR processes. This implies that the host-state is the main interlocutor in developing and implementing SSR. However, such a focus may exclude other key stakeholders, like customary and informal providers of security and justice. Perhaps up to 80\% of security and justice providers in sub-Saharan Africa are non-state actors. Therefore, it is important to move ownership \textit{beyond} a state-centric focus. On the other hand, such an


approach may be perceived as undermining the already weak authority of the state in question— and it is questionable how many UN member states would be willing to legitimize non-state actors within their own country.

**Police reform**

*Kari M. Osland*

International police assistance mandates have changed over the decades, from monitoring to support reform of police organizations. In today’s complex environments, the challenges are many and varied. My main recommendations are as follows:

**Strategic level:**

- Recognize that in a short time frame, it is mainly within the more technical part of the police reform that change can reasonably be expected. This does not exclude the need for concurrent work aimed at long-term goals regarding accountability and governance, which should be seen as generational issues.

- Target the assistance, with smaller, more specialized and mixed teams.

- Maintain a division between the host-state’s civilian police service and its military force.

- Continue to promote a coherent approach across bilateral and multilateral assistance.\(^{36}\)

**Training and recruitment:**

- In-mission training should be emphasized, in order to enable officers to develop and master the needed skills.

- Put more emphasis on mentoring, as part of pre-deployment or in-mission training.

- Match skills to mission requirements.\(^{37}\)

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• Provide the host police with operational, practical training, and less theoretical training.

Whereas there is evidence of positive changes regarding the more technical parts of international assistance to police reform (training, rebuilding and equipping), there is little evidence of success in dealing with longer-term issues that require changes in attitudes, orientation and behaviour.  

Today, where it is only exceptionally that there is a peace to keep, it is important for the UN to adapt, and to deploy more specialized and mixed police teams in addition to Formed Police Units and individual police officers. These specialized teams should be multidisciplinary, to ensure the right type of support to police missions. And it goes without saying that all support should be targeted according to the needs of the host-state.

In addition, especially in conflict environments, it is important to maintain a distinction between a civilian police service and a military force, where the centre of gravity for the police service should be the same as for the UN mission: protection of civilians. Because there is such a diversity of police traditions among the police-contributing countries (PCC), the UN – before mission and in mission – should continue to promote a coherent approach across bilateral and multilateral assistance.

With regard to training, it should be recognized that UN police deployments are at the same time assistance missions and a means for developing policing capacity in the PCCs. Precisely because many officers come to the peace operation with little mission-specific training, in-mission training is a way of ensuring a certain level of mission-specific competence.

The mentor arrangement is a central part of building capacity in a host-state. Greater emphasis needs to be put on training the mentors in the art of mentoring, lest the arrangement do more harm than good. Connected to this is the importance of matching skills to mission requirements, by developing specific job descriptions for UNPOL posts, in order to ensure recruitment that can fulfil specific tasks.


A final point here is that police forces in many post-conflict host-states have low literacy levels, making traditional school-bench training of little or no value. It is essential that all training be conducted in a practical and suitably contextualized way.

Gender

Randi Solhjell

Today’s gender perspectives in UN peace operations serve more to exclude than include, with little or no inclusion of men and masculinity. Such an approach has negative repercussions also on women, as it removes discussions about gender from mainstream debates and policies. The problem stems in part from the wording of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, with the terms ‘gender’ and ‘women’ applied interchangeably. The Panel will need to address gender perspectives beyond those affecting women in particularly vulnerable situations (usually gender-based violence) or women in need of empowerment in host states (e.g. electoral quotas). Gender perspectives need to be recognized as a tool for understanding the interconnected lives of men and women in conflict and post-conflict situations. Missions should be encouraged to develop a truly integrated approach to gender.

Experience from MONUSCO, the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, provides an example of good intentions gone wrong. In recent years, an innovative form of peacekeeping has been developed: Community Liaison Assistants (CLA). These are Congolese nationals with high expertise in language, conflict resolution and diplomatic skills. They connect the international peacekeepers (civilian and military) with the ‘locals’ and vice versa. On a daily basis, these liaison assistants are confronted with a range of gender-relation aspects and gendered security concerns, such as negotiating with customary chiefs, the role of men as protectors, and socioeconomic factors for men, women, children and the elderly in villages exposed to roaming armed groups.

However, instead of an integrated approach to gender, MONUSCO has supported CLAs with one person in charge of ‘gender issues’: the Gender Focal Point. In practice, that created a perception of ‘gender-as-women’, leading the male-dominated group of CLAs to assume that gender has nothing to do with their normal work: gender issues are something to be relegated to the Gender Focal Point. The main role of

39 Ibid.
40 For more on the CLAs, see Randi Solhjell and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik (2014) Female Bodies and Masculine Norms. Oslo, NUPI. Report no 2.
41 This research was conducted in September/October 2013.
the latter is to establish, in each peacekeeping base, a network of women’s associations to identify the challenges that women face and to propose strategies and measures. It is evident that gender is understood as mainly women, and that dealing with women’s concerns is best done through women’s associations.⁴² What is less clear is how the entire society can be actively involved in mapping and putting forward ideas concerning protection.

Improving this at the level of implementation and performance measurement will require systematic disaggregated gender indicators and targets. Here, MONUSCO also needs to broaden its scope on gender – which at the time of my research appeared narrow, characterizing gender as something ‘particular’, ‘special protection for women’ and ‘sexual’. Gender relations could not be recognized as something that may facilitate and/or obstruct wanted outcomes.

Some of the insecurities facing Congolese women can be dealt with only if men are included in the discussion. For instance, Congolese men need to be engaged in what have been considered ‘feminine tasks’ – fetching water and charcoal, going to markets, harvesting etc. – as these present major daily security risks for women and girls. I hold that MONUSCO needs senior leadership to push for inclusive gender perspectives across all UN sections and to work systematically on this through CLAs, and not just their Gender Focal Points.

⁴² Research conducted through fieldwork using documents, interviews and participant observation. Published in Randi Solhjell and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik (2014) and Solhjell (2014) “Sin mujeres por aquí”. Discursos de género en las Operaciones de Paz de Naciones Unidas” (There are no women here. Gender discourses in UN peace operations), Relaciones Internacionales 27.
Section 6: UN internal systems and processes

Civilian capacity

_Cedric de Coning and Paul Troost_

UN peace operations are associated with the blue-hatted uniformed UN personnel – but civilian capacity is crucial to success in areas such as politics, justice, core government functionality, reconciliation, human rights, security sector reform and economic revitalization.

Although the UN CIVCAP reform initiative failed to bring about much-needed innovation, several recommendations in the Guehénno report remain relevant and urgent.\(^4^3\) Building on our research, we will highlight the following points:\(^4^4\)

- International capacity should not become a substitute for national capacity. A peace operation has failed if it withdraws without leaving behind enhanced national capacities in areas critical for peace consolidation.

- UN civilian staffing tables are based on outdated planning templates. Fast-changing needs call for context-specific innovative planning and responsive recruiting processes.

- The UN needs to broaden its resource pool and adapt its recruitment needs to match, _inter alia_, that of the providers of South–South Government Provided Personnel (GPP).


Establishing resilient functioning state institutions like a ministry of justice and court system, or a ministry of finance and tax system, should be a key priority for any society in transition. UN peace operations should support the development of these institutions, including short-, medium- and long-term plans to develop the civilian capacity need to staff these institutions. No single factor is more important than the development of local institutional capacity to ensure context-sensitive approaches, local ownership, continuity and longevity. International civilian capacity can assist in establishing such institutions and can help to prepare local civilian capacity, but should not be a substitute for national capacity.

Whereas the training of police officers is accepted as part of peace operations, very few peace operations, other than the transitional administrations in Timor-Leste and in Kosovo, have engaged in developing local civilian capacity. Peace operations should become a driving force in the development of local civilian capacity, together with all other partners with a stake in this aspect, because developing resilient state institutions is a critical dimension of peace consolidation.

How can the UN improve the professionalism and relevance of its international and local civilian staff? One aspect in need of a critical overhaul is civilian staffing templates. Despite vast differences in context, almost every UN peace operation has the same staffing table. Civilian staffing tables should be designed according to need, not supply.

A further aspect concerns the quality of personnel. The UN can expect staff to have received specialized training and have relevant experience for the task at hand. The UN should advertise in and recruit from its global resource base, instead of lazily drawing on an almost incestuous New York diplomatic pool. Our research on the capacity of emerging actors found that whereas relevant civilian capacity is increasingly available for international use, it is underutilized because of lack of information on modalities and opportunities.45

Further, we found that people with technical knowhow and language skills appropriate for many of the conflict areas where the UN experience significant vacancy rates are potentially available in the form of specialized teams or as individuals through the GPP modality. The UN urgently needs to improve how it makes requests to governments to provide experienced personnel in these areas, and clarify under what conditions such personnel will do their work.

45 NUPI is a member of the Peace Capacities Network, which consists of research institutions from Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Norway, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. The baseline study of the civilian capacity of emerging actors is available at www.peacecap.org.
Implementing these recommendations will be possible only if the institutional limitations of the UN are recognized, and the potential of local and South–South capacity provision are fully realized.

**Measuring and evaluation**

*Kari M. Osland*

Recent experiences with peace operations show that it is almost impossible to succeed in building peace if war is raging at the same time. Particularly in such environments, it is crucial to have realistic ambitions, and aim for small changes. Further, because there is no consensus on when, where and what to prioritize, how UN operations are evaluated matters. Instead of counting the number of people who have been trained and whether ‘democratic’ elections have been held, we should look for more incremental changes over time. It is important to acknowledge and reward those in charge, so as to encourage further progress – in particular, with changes initiated and carried out with the host-state in the driver’s seat, and where a long-term perspective is needed to recognize sustainable change. Often, the forces obstructing peaceful change are so massive that even limited success should be welcomed and reinforced. It is not only that small changes should be nurtured: also commitment to undertake change should be recognized.

Further, we must acknowledge that working on development, security and justice reform is not going to be effective use of aid. There is considerable risk that the investments made may not lead to sustainable reform. However, even if success is only partial, the consequences may be high for the individuals concerned, and the danger involved in doing nothing will probably be greater.

There is a gap between the kinds of indicators used by various parts of the UN system on the one side, and the perceptions of the host government and not least its population, on the other. In attempting to measure and assess peace operations, it should be understood that while multilateral organizations, NGOs and individual donor-countries may need to evaluate their efforts to be accountable to their own constituencies, it is the population in the post-conflict states that will benefit or suffer, depending on the effectiveness of a peace operation. That makes it essential to ensure that ‘measured results’ do not deviate

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too much from the results actually experienced by the local population. The indicators must be relevant to the context within which they are applied.

Moreover, there must be clarity about the underlying purpose of measurement. Is it intended to feed the results back into the mission to improve doctrine, or is it outcome-oriented, focused on assessing whether the mission has achieved its goals? A particular challenge emerges here: the problem of attribution. It is difficult to prove the causal effect in general, but it is also difficult to prove the effects of resources put into one segment of the intervention compared to the larger peace operation, or to identify what may be due to factors other than the presence of a peace operation. Additionally, it is often very difficult to obtain reliable and valid information.

It should also be noted that measuring progress might be subject to political interference. This could come from the host government, which might have an interest in presenting the country as being below or above a certain threshold – but also from the donor side, wanting to see its engagement presented as successful and thereby an argument for further funding, or as proof that it has accomplished its work, as an argument for an exit-strategy.
Section 7: Partnerships and transitions

AU–UN strategic partnership

Cedric de Coning

The most important regional relationship for the United Nations is that with the African Union (AU). African capacities are a major resource for UN peacekeeping, currently contributing approximately 45% of the UN’s uniformed personnel, 60% of its international civilian personnel and 80% of its local staff. UN support is a critical enabler for AU operations, and the UN is an important exit strategy partner for the AU. The effectiveness of both the UN and the AU are thus mutually interdependent on several levels. The UN will have to consider more predictable ways in which the UN and other partners can support AU and regional peace operations, like the MJTF operations against Boko Haram.47

At the strategic level, the UN and AU should foster a common narrative that is mutually reinforcing and respectful of the roles of each. At the operational level the UN and AU can develop joint guidelines on transitions. Such an agreed joint approach can make it easier for both organizations to involve each other from the earliest stages – in assessments, planning, coordination mechanisms, mission support, benchmarks and evaluation.

More efforts are needed to find creative and innovative ways of supporting African peace operations. For instance, the UN could make some of its Department of Field Service capabilities available to the AU, including its Brindisi and Kampala logistical depots; it could include the AU in some on-call procurement arrangements, for instance strategic airlift; and partner with the AU in developing essential mission support planning and managing capabilities in the AU Commission and AU missions.

African peace operations represent local responses to global problems. Most African conflicts are global in the sense that they are heavily influenced, if not driven, by external factors. These include the global war on terror; the exploitation of natural resources by multinationals; capital flight facilitated and solicited by the international

banking system, and transnational organized crime, driven by markets
in the West for narcotics, human trafficking, timber and illegally
caught fish. Effective African peace operations thus represent a signifi-
cant contribution to the global common good.

A partnership model has emerged whereby the AU and regional
entities, with support from the UN and partners, have acted as first
responders to African crises, as in Burundi, CAR, Darfur and Mali. Once
basic stability had been achieved these missions were handed over to
the UN, and the African military and police peacekeepers were re-
hatted and became UN peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{48} Somalia has been the excep-
tion, as sufficient stability has not yet been achieved to trigger a hand-
over to the UN. However, the AU and UN are jointly developing bench-
marks for a future transition. In the meantime, AMISOM and UNSOM
are working closely together, and both are supported by UNSOA.

The AU lacks predictable funding for its peace operations. That
dilemma impacts negatively on the UN, which had to – as a last resort –
take over the AU’s missions in Mali and CAR earlier than if the AU
missions had been supplied with sufficient resources. As a result the
UN had to deploy stabilization-type missions that forced it to go beyond
its peacekeeping principles and doctrine.

\textbf{Gender and AU–UN partnership}

\textit{Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik}

Some 15 years after UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace
and Security, gender mainstreaming remains a great challenge in peace
operations. This is evident not only internally in operations but also in
connection with executing the given mandate. There is increasing
recognition that the inclusion of gender perspectives – how men and
women experience and are affected by conflict and war, and their
various roles and contributions to violence and to peace – is crucial to
the path to sustainable peace. Gender perspectives and gender main-
streaming need to become integrated in all types of peace operations,
from the initial stages including pre-assessments, conflict mappings
and mission planning across the various components.

Today, gender is included as a separate ‘add-on’ component often
\textit{after} peacekeepers have been deployed on the ground. Peace opera-
tions are still highly military and masculine in nature, with gender seen
as a secondary priority and not a crucial factor in providing security

\textsuperscript{48} See Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud (2015) Strategic Options for
International Affairs; Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.
and stability in conflict areas. In turn, gender and gender mainstreaming become the ‘sole’ responsibility of the gender unit or gender officers. UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have taken positive steps in including gender dimensions in their own missions, but including gender perspectives and ensuring gender mainstreaming is equally important in UNSC-mandated missions not executed by the UN itself.

The UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a clear example of a PSO where gender and gender mainstreaming constitute an add-on component. Although the mission arrived in Somalia in 2007, it was not until 2012 that a gender officer – the first gender officer in an AU PSO – was deployed. The gender officer then set about developing, from scratch, the first gender strategy for the mission. A gender strategy is an important tool and point of departure in the work towards achieving a more gender-sensitive and mainstreamed mission. The absence of a gender strategy and the late arrival of a gender officer clearly show that gender was not a prioritized component when the mission was planned and set up.

In addition, as is the case in many other peace operations, AMISOM’s gender officer has been seen as the de facto ‘gender responsible’ in the mission, rather than having the intended advisory role. Compared to the UN, the AU is lagging behind as regards work and focus on gender. However, AMISOM is a UNSC-mandated mission, so the UN should focus on promoting gender dimensions to ensure that gender perspectives are integrated into all parts of the mission, from the planning stages to the actual execution of the mandate.


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