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# THE FUTURE OF EUROPE A Personal Scenario



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## THE FUTURE OF EUROPE A Personal Scenario

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"What is happening to us is that we don't know what is happening to us, and that is precisely what is happening to us"

Jose Ortega y Gasset

Norek Uterreherolitisk Reg. nr. 

SUMMARY:

The present paper constitutes a private odyssey into Europe's future. The author hopes and expects (and he recognizes how hope may shape analysis) a Community order to constitute the primary framework for the political order in Europe. The European Community will constitute an expanding core of an European confederation. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, is likely to develop into an embryonic security system from Vladivostok to San Francisco. It will not be able to replace NATO which in a reconstituted form will be an essential structure in the new architecture.

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#### 1. <u>A New Era</u>?

Europe is reemerging. It was divided for almost half a century. It was engaged in destructive "civil wars" in large parts of the other half. We know whence we came, but our destination is unknown. Europe is in the making. It does not come ready made. It will not only be made in Europe. But the Europe of to-morrow will be different from the Europe of yesterday.

Two hundred years after the French Revolution a series of revolutions swept through the center of Europe. Ancien regimes disappeared over night. They did not fight back, they just vanished from the scene. The peoples' republics were reclaimed by the people. Marxism-Leninism ceased to be viewed as a relevant idea for social organization in the countries where it had been elevated to state religion. It survived only on university campuses in the West, in environments which had lost touch with the lives and aspirations of the people of the twentieth century. The ideas of democratic centralism and the dictatorship of the proletariat were disclosed as smokescreens for non-accountable exercise of power, a prostitution of democracy. The Communist emperor had no clothes.

The revolutions of 1989 were largely peaceful revolutions. They followed various trajectories in the different countries. In Prague the saying went: "It took ten years in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in the GDR, and ten days in Czechoslovakia". It was not quite accurate, but, nevertheless, a reasonable approximation. The revolutions constituted an amalgam of meticulous planning and spontaneous outburst. Except for Roumania they were peaceful revolutions. They influenced each-other, created the impression of a chain reaction. The Communist regimes turned out to be shallow regimes which had failed to develop roots in East-European society. They were exposed as paper tigers. The revolutions of 1989 created another spring-time of nations. The last time such a spring enveloped the European conscience was in 1848.

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In less than a year the forces of reaction were on the way to triumph in Europe. Hopefully, 1990 will not be like 1849.

#### 2. The Waning of the Old Order

The revolutions of 1989 did not only wipe out a domestic order in the states of Central and East-Europe. They also wiped out an international order which had structured relations on the continent of Europe and beyond for more than forty years, during the period which came to be known as the cold war. The cold war order was based on a systemic division buttressed by a military confrontation of two alliances. The two alliances were built around the guarantees and forward military deployments of the two principal powers of the international system, the superpowers. They were extra-European powers whose rise to preeminence constituted the result of the political collapse of Europe, the invention of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery over intercontinental ranges. The cold-war order contained important asymmetries, however. The Western alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, constituted a voluntary association the formation of which largely reflected European initiatives. The Eastern alliance, the Warsaw Pact, constituted an imposed association the formation of which reflected a Soviet diktat. NATO provided the framework for linking the military and industrial might of a transoceanic power, the United States of America, to the defence of the rimland states on the western shores of the Eurasian continent. The Warsaw Pact constituted a framework for the westward deployment of the military might of the dominant heartland power of the Eurasian continent, the Soviet Union. American engagement in the European order constituted a necessary condition for the containment of the potential hegemon of Europe.

At the level of international relations the cold-war order in Europe was a stable order. The lines were clearly drawn. The commitments were clearly understood. At the level of military relations the confrontation was similarly stable,

although structural asymmetries in the force postures and geopolitical conditions led to concerns about preemptive instabilities in a crisis, about the pernicious consequences of a race for the initiative, of the premium associated with striking the first blow. The dialectic between the military capacity to control and threaten territory on the one hand and the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage by the use of nuclear weapons on the other, the system of nuclear deterrence, dominated the conduct of East-West relations. The condition of stalemate and the residual danger of inadvertent conflict induced the two alliances and their principal custodians to stabilize the confrontation through arms control negotiations and tacit understandings. In fact they found themselves on the threshold of major agreements concerning strategic arms reductions, START, and conventional forces in Europe, CFE, by the time that the revolutions in Eastern Europe swept across the landscape of the old order. The prospective agreements indicated an increasing ritualization of the military confrontation, its growing divorce from the processes of political relations.

At the level of societal relations, the old order remained unstable in its eastern part. The relations between society and the state, and between social organization and the perceived imperatives of foreign policy, defined the faultlines of the Soviet imperial order in Eastern Europe, of the outer empire. That order came to an end as the citizens, in the words of president Vaclav Havel, reclaimed "the right to live in truth".

So the post-war order in Europe has come to an end. The contours of the new order are still extremely vague and in the making. Military threats are disappearing. A clear and present danger is being replaced by the risks and dangers associated with uncertainty, with the embrace of the unpredictable. Empires in decline almost inevitably introduce incalculable dymamics into international relations. Social forces are set in motion which are not subject to diplomatic management and political suasion. A new <u>Zeitgeist</u> is penetrating the

political cultures of Europe. The process of recreating historical Europe, of relinking Central Europe with Western Europe transformed the political agendas and outlooks in European capitals and societies. Managing peaceful change is in the process of replacing managing deterrence as the primary task of statecraft. The military factor has moved from the front to the back seat.

#### 3. The Challenge of Change

Periods of compressed and rapid change often obscure the permanent features of an international order, highlight novelty at the expense of continuity. Vital structures and linkages are frequently ignored as fascinating and captivating change attracts attention and stirs imagination. The constraining impact of the factor of time is often forgotten as hopes for the future become confused with the reality of the present, as wishful thinking replaces a sense of realism, as expectations of instant transformation ignore the obstcles to change. As societies reclaim state institutions which had been used to suppress and exploit them rather than serve them, state policies inadvertently may collide in the international arena. The removal of barriers and obstacles within national polities, the very process of liberation and revolutionary change, could cause state policies to overlook the structural constraints and competing wills at work in the international arena. It could cause the will for change to transgress the residual thresholds of tolerance in the last imperial capital, and, indeed, cause those thresholds to be lowered as chauvinist impulses are nurtured in response to claims for autonomy. The challenges and opportunities for short-term change may obfuscate requirements for long term stability. Transformation could erode the conditions for balance.

Withdrawals from the forward lines of military confrontation in Europe could reduce the chance of inadvertent escalation in a crisis. However, a greater separation of forces could also result in less cautious behaviour in crises,

precisely because the dangers of inadvertent escalation are deemed to be less acute. Military postures will change as borders are opened, as the troop levels and defence budgets come down, as impatient societies advance their claims for a peace-dividend. A new military order will have to be constructed amidst profound and prolonged changes in the political order.

It has become fashionable in this period of enthusiastic departure and uncertain arrival to engage in abstract projects of European architecture, in positing brave new worlds rather than managing the travails of an old world in transition. The states of Europe have embarked upon a journey towards a destination unknown. The trends are contradictory, often inchoate, and invariably uncertain and conjectural. They coexist and interact in the present situation. The future destination will constitute an amalgam of the multiplicity of trends at work. Hence, we have to map out and analyse the trends before we can construct scenarios of the future. The seeds of the future are planted in the past and the present. It is important to think in time without becoming imprisoned by false analogies and past scenarios. The future Europe is likely to contain elements from different models of possible order, balance of power, nuclear deterrence, regional organization and community order. My personal preference and expectation is for an emphasis on the latter. I recognize that expectations are often conditioned by preferences. Nevertheless, in order to understand the range of choice and possibility I shall focus next on an analysis of present trends, projecting them into the future and calling attention to the uncertainties involved.

#### 4. From Interdependence to Integration

The structure of the European political order will be determined by the processes of European integration, German unification, superpower cooperation, systemic transformation in the East and their interaction. The European Community

provides the main vehicle and framework for political integration. It embodies and projects a unique and novel approach to international relations, what we could call the community approach. It constitutes an attempt to provide a new equilibrium between the trans-national forces which have circumvented and outpassed the capacities of the nation state on the one hand and our political institutions and decisionmaking processes on the other. The trans-national forces include environmental degradation; the internationalization of finance, production and distribution; technological innovation; protection of human rights. These forces supplement and reinforce the basic transformation of the condition of international relations, indeed of the human condition, caused by the invention of nuclear weapons and the means of their long range delivery. The protective roofs have been blown off the nation states, sovereignty can no longer be predicated on the ability of the state to protect society against physical assault. States are caught in a web of interdependence. Integration is the logical response to interdependence, making virtue out of necessity, making possible that which is necessary.

Integration is a means also of mutual reassurance against the reemergence of old enemities, of linking nations to a common future through a common enterprise. In Europe the territorial nation-state increasingly is becoming an archaic institution, reflecting the realities of a period of human history which now belongs to the past. It still provides symbols of identification and pride, like royal families in constitutional monarchies. The real power and influence is channeled through other institutions. Parallel to the process of trans-national integration our polities undergo a process of devolution, of decentralization and delegation of power and influence to local governments and communities. The nationstate is in the process of being eroded from both ends.

In my personal scenario the objective needs for effective social organization and political management will be met by a growing community order with the EC as the core institution.

German unification and the return to Europe of the countries of Central and East-Europe, with their numerous, unresolved issues of ethnic animosities and communal tensions, reinforce the need for integration, as does the challenge of economic development in an arena where competition from Japan and the United States could generate protectionist impulses to the detriment of the welfare of the citizens of Europe.

The European Community is caught in the dialectic between deepening and expansion, between the need to protect and consolidate its essence and the need to project a framework for a broader Europe. German unification, which is now close to a political certainty rather than a distant prospect, imposes the need to embed it in a larger political framework in order to provide reassurance against German power and German <u>Alleingang</u>. A united Germany will alter the internal balance of the Community, imposing the need to deepen the process of economic integration in order to provide reassurance against German dominance. The European Community hence must be able to absorb the five eastern <u>Lander</u> of a united Germany in the context of making further progress towards Economic and Monetary Union, EMU.

France and Germany have relaunched the project for political union in the EC. The Community now looks towards the parallel and interactive functioning of two intergovermental conferences on political and economic and monetary union respectively. The objective is to complete the work early enough for member states to ratify the new construction before the end of 1992. The Community explicity recognizes, in the words of the Dublin statement, that "it has become a crucial element in the progress that is being made in establishing a reliable framework for peace and security in Europe". Germany and France envisage the definition and implementation in this connection of common foreign and defence policies. Logical links and imperatives obtain between the EMU and the constitution of the single internal market, and between the project for political union and the return of Eastern Europe, including eastern Germany, to the European mainstream.

Nevertheless, the actual constitution may lag behind the conception. Some states, the United Kingdom, in particular, represents a political culture of pragmatic solutions to concrete problems, rather than the programmatic enunciation of architectural projects. The word "union" has negative connotations and evokes memories of unwanted subjugation in some countries. The more abstract and distant term, integration, may seem more appropriate, particularly since it connotes a process of evolution rather than a final condition. Nevertheless, the Franco-German initiative responded to the need for reassurance and commitment on a continent which is haunted by fears of the unacceptable consequences of another carnage, of another European war. It responded to the need for an anti-dote, an optimistic contrast, to the pessimistic propensity in European political culture and consciousness, to the idea that if anything can go wrong it will. The outlook of the Anglo-Saxons traditionally has been broader and more optimistic. In the present circumstances, however, the reluctant British stance would seem to project insularity of vision rather than a sense of historical opportunity. That "vision thing" is actually better understood in Washington than in London. We could come to see a community of deux vitesses, but eventually Britain will reconnect with the train to Europe out of pragmatic adjustment rather than idealistic conviction. As in the past, the real engine for European integration is likely to be Franco-German cooperation.

The EC is pursuing a dual-track strategy of expansion and deepening. It will absorb the soon defunct GDR as a member. It is in the process of negotiating with EFTA about the constitution of a single European Economic Space, EES. It is preparing negotiations about second-generation association agreements with countries in Central and East-Europe. It will develop special cooperation agreements with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. We can envisage a future Europe with the EC as the central core surrounded by various rings of states, many of which will strive to join the central core, a centripetal European confederation formed by and around the European

Community. The process of confederation will be neither tidy nor easy. Austria has applied for membership and developments in Central Europe could speed up its consideration. The other countries of Central Europe are eager to join although they recognize that they will need time for economic adjustment. However, the unpredictable impact of the internal turmoil in the Soviet Union on Soviet foreign policy is likely to strengthen their political interest in moving as close to the Community as soon as possible. In the 1990's Norway, Sweden and Finland could become members of the Community.

The Community, in the short term, is likely to be concerned about the disruptive impact on the process of integration from over-extension. Hence, the Community is likely also to be reluctant to provide access to EC decisionmaking for the EFTA countries in the context of the EES so as not to invite similar demands from countries of Central Europe which actually want membership. In addition, the project for political union, or further political integration, is motivated also by the need to narrow the gap between the economic and political relations in the Community. Narrowing the gap implies reducing the so-called democratic deficit by reinforcing and developing procedures for democratic accountability, particularly through increasing the role of the European Parliament. That process could run counter to a policy of granting non-member countries influence over Community decisions.

#### 5. <u>A Painful Return to Europe</u>

A community order constitutes an alternative to an European order based on nation states. The return of Central and East-Europe to a common European home raises fundamental issues about the stability and viability of a nation-state order. History has not distributed the nations of Europe in a manner which permits of organizing Europe according to the ideological prescriptions of the nationalist prophets, i.e. the idea of establishing congruence between political and

ethnic borders. The cold war put many of the unresolved issues following the dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires in the deep freeze. The current thaw brings them to the surface, the ethnic mosaic of Europe could produce internecine strife as well as cross-border conflicts, threats to peace and security as well as to human rights and the rights of minorities. A community order transcends and relativizes the nation state divisions, it provides for both more general and more specific identification and association.

The countries of Central Europe have entered a period of basic social and economic transformation, replacing command economies with market economies. Free elections have changed the political texture of the systems. However, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the democratic traditions are very thin. Furthermore, it will take time to create the institutional infrastructure for democracy - political parties, a network of voluntary associations which cut across the cleavages in society, independent judiciaries, press and bureaucracies. The new democracies to a large extent will depend on the civil service and executive aparatus of the <u>ancien regimes</u>. Opportunities for silent and stubborn obstruction and negligence of reform abound.

The real challenge in Central Europe is a crisis of expectations. Democracy could be the loser as revolutionary enthusiasm erodes in the encounter with economic hardship. The basic economic restructuring on which they have embarked, of moving from command to market economies, has never been attempted before. The task is formidable as are the obstacles, not the least of which is that of debt, particularly in Poland and Hungary. The short term problems of debt can be solved through the traditional means of rescheduling. The real problem is the long term, the way in which the shadows from the debt burdens may deprive the people of Poland and Hungary of hope for the future. Without imaginative action by the creditor nations of the West the people of Poland and Hungary cannot look forward to sound and safe economies, and without that prospect they will hardly be able to bear the hardship of

transition. The democratic experiment will be in danger as economic hardship approaches the <u>Schmerzgrenze</u> of the people. Community solutions are needed. Solutions which are predicated on the idea of a common European future, involving perhaps a pay-back of the debt through investment in local currencies for cleaning up industries which pollute the common European environment.

The revolutions of 1989 projected hope for the future of democracy in Central Europe, they demonstrated social resilience, the existence of vibrant societies beneath the thin veneer of a stagnant communist system. The social network and basic human solidarity which developed in response to the oppression of the communist regimes provides strength to perservere on a slow and arduous journey towards modern and open societies. The spiritual resources and commitment of Central European societies constitute invaluable contributions to European civilization. The sense of solidarity which permeated the revolutions of Eastern Europe provides an ideological basis for the development of regional organizations in Central and East-Europe, preferably cutting across also some of the old divisions from the cold war, as well as for the eventual integration into an expanded European Community. However, as the East-European nations moved into democratic elections, the coalitions and fronts which produced the revolutions were swept aside by more narrowly conceived political parties. The implications for foreign policy remained uncertain, old rivalries and suspicions vibrate close to the surface.

#### 6. The Decline of the Soviet Empire

The most difficult issue in the reconstruction of Europe is the position and rôle of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is too large and militarily powerful for inclusion in the European Community. Even if the union should be dissolved in its present form, a Russian state would remain as the single largest state in Europe and extending beyond Europe all the

way to the Pacific Ocean. The impossibility of including the Soviet Union in the European Community does not imply excluding the Soviet Union from a broader cooperative order in Europe. The EC has concluded a comprehensive cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union and relations could be broadened in the context of the process of European reconstruction. The key factor is likely to be developments inside the Soviet Union and how they structure relations with the rest of Europe, particularly whether constituent republics, like the Baltic states, be permitted to leave the union and seek association with the emerging community order in Europe. It is possible to envisage constructions which involve their inclusion in a European confederation combined with maintenance of special cooperative links with the Soviet Union.

The current leadership in the Soviet Union is caught on the horns of an irreducible dilemma. If it were to slow down or halt the process of perestroika in order to contain and constrain nationalism in the union republics, it runs the danger of returning to the stagnation of the Brezhnew years. That in turn would amount to taking the Soviet Union out of the league of major powers by the turn of the century, and of further eroding the legitimacy of the Soviet system of governance due to its inability to produce and deliver. The regime could crumble in confrontation with a restive society. The process of reform can break the forces of lethargy and resistance only by destabilizing the system in order to change it. That is a calculated risk which is magnified by the time it will take to turn the economy around. The absence of tangible results could undermine the policy of perestroika in its encounter with rising expectations.

The Soviet Union has two achilles heels, the economy and the nationalities. It is a multinational state encompassing more than 140 nationalities. Again the idea that ethnic and political boundaries should coincide constitutes an unworkable

principle. Some national aspirations are more clearly defined and historically based than others. Nevertheless, Moscow is confronted with a prospective problem of falling dominoes. Nationalist flames are likely to cause fire alarms, violent clashes and chauvinistic reactions in the years ahead. Empires in decline inevitably constitute factors of uncertainity in international relations. Such uncertainties are compounded in the Soviet case by an arsenal of 30 000 nuclear weapons dispersed in depots throughout the union, including areas of actual or potential strife and unrest. A distinction must be made, of course, between the physical security of the special munition sites and the ability of unauthorized groups to use the munitions. Desertion and violence would introduce disturbing uncertainties.

If the leadership in Moscow were to give in to secessionist pressures it risks being swept aside by the forces of Great-Russian nationalism or a Communist Counter-Reformation. If it resorts to the use of military force it risks being consumed by the forces of repression, in addition to placing in jeopardy the policies of arms control and cooperation with the West, thus undermining some of the preconditions for <u>perestroika</u>. Only two policy options seem available, one general and one specific.

The general policy involves the elaboration of a basic transformation, <u>perestroika</u>, of the union itself, of delegation and decentralization, of conversion into a Commonwealth structure which would alter the trade-off between the benefits of association and the costs of dependence, leading to a choice of interdependence over independence. Such a constitutional reform is risky, however, and could stimulate rather than contain and rechannel nationalist aspirations. The history of the growth of the Russian empire continues to haunt its future.

The second policy option is to try to separate the dominoes by emphazising the <u>sui generis</u>, the specific, situation of each

republic, trying to prevent precedent setting effects. The Baltic states constitute a case <u>sui generis</u> due to the illegal manner in which they were incorporated into the union. Management will require ingenuity and restraint, including tolerance of formal ambiguities in order to preserve freedom of manoeuvre. However, the volatility of public emotions and the momentum of events make such guided dissolution a very complicated option indeed. National unrest on the fringes of the Soviet Union carry the added risks of spilling over across the borders with Eastern European countries.

Outside powers have limited influence in such vital matters of raison d'état. They have an interest in protecting general principles of international relations such as the nonuse of force, respect for human rights and the right to selfdetermination. They have an interest also in the preservation of international order and the prevention of chaos. They are constrained and moved by a public opinion which is shaped in the global village formed by modern mass media. They can impose sanctions and they can offer rewards. They face dilemmas too. They cannot appear to back down from basic principles the maintenance of which remains a vital interest. They must not so encourage the separatist forces that the latter embark on an unsustainable course, and they must avoid pressing the imperial authorities against the wall. They must attempt to engage in private diplomacy while under siege by public pressures for visible demonstration. Such will be the ingredients and challenges in policy-making vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the capitals of Europe for years to come.

<u>Perestroika</u> was motivated by the need to revitalize a stagnant economy, failure to achieve economic results threatens the policy of <u>perestroika</u>. The political forces released by <u>perestroika</u> threaten to destabilize the Soviet economy, to drive it towards collapse. Failure to implement economic reform in tandem with political reform could result in explosive contradictions. According to Soviet economists production is substantially lower than official figures, and as much as half of the industrial output and 40 percent of

agricultural production is lost because the system of distribution has broken down. The centrifugal forces of claims for autonomy and national assertion cause economic links between regions to break down. Imbalances are worsening as wages outstrip production and fiscal deficits produce large amounts of excess money. Tactical political skill has not been matched by economic acumen and determination. The economic system may still consume the champions of political reform.

The military burden of empire has been extremely high for the Soviet Union. Prominent Soviet economists claim that military expenditures amount to 20-25 % of GNP. The real costs are the opportunity costs, the costs of allocating vital, scarce resources like skilled workers, engineers, managers and computers to the defence and space sectors. The distance between those sectors and the rest of the economy has been too large for the former to pull the latter, the spin-off effects may in fact have been negative. The next round in the East-West arms race would be even more intensely qualitative than the last one, claiming an even larger preferential allocation of scarce resources from a starved economy. Perestroika depends on arms control and disarmament. The alternative would be increased militarization of the Soviet economy and external relations. Failure of economic reform could bring the Soviet military more prominently into the political arena of a waning empire.

It seems extremely doubtful that solutions to the Soviet dilemma can be found within present structures. The future could harbour vexing alternatives such as a Great Russian empire in the authoritarian tradition, fragmentation, and even upheaval at the center. The challenge for the West in general, and for the European Community in particular, is to chart possible and desirable future relationships which could offer Moscow alternatives to suppression, and the nationalist forces alternatives to secession. Added rings of states associated in different ways with the EC within a complex European confederation could provide a model for overlapping and interlocking associations also with a future Soviet or Russian

commonwealth.

#### 7. The Security Dimension

The future European order will be contained within a larger security order encompassing both the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, extending from Vladivostok to San Francisco. The fact and necessity of American engagement in the security of Europe is hardly an issue. It is determined by the size of the Soviet Union and its status as a nuclear weapon state in the superpower range. However, the volume and shape of the American engagement seems bound to change.

The Soviet Union is in the process of withdrawing its military troops from Eastern Europe. The new regimes in Central Europe are negotiating for their rapid withdrawal. The urgency is greatest in Prague and Budapest where there is a need to remove the vestiges of past subjugation, to emphasize discontinuity with the past, to break the links to 1968 and 1956. The removal of Soviet troops is a key element in the policy of national restoration. As a transitional arrangement Soviet troops will remain at reduced levels in the territory of the former GDR as part of the agreement to permit German unification. The all-German government will assume the former responsibility of the GDR government in paying for the Soviet troops, an arrangement which will provide leverage over the time schedule for Soviet withdrawal. Soviet forward deployments in Germany would be unsustainable in the absence of logistic support and transport arrangements in Poland. They are unlikely to last more than a couple of years.

The two alliances are likely to conclude an early agreement on conventional troop reductions in Europe. A complex regime will emerge. Soviet and American troop levels in Central Europe will be equalled at 195 000. In addition a broader regime of constraints will apply to all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean, with special strictures applying to concentric areas extending from a core area made up of Central Europe,

the Benelux countries and Denmark. The regime itself will consist of a set of rules concerning collective ceilings, sufficiency, stationed troops, sub-ceilings and information exchange. The concept of sufficiency is a political one designed to provide insurance against the military hegemony of any single state, none of which will be allowed to possess more than 30 % of the collective holdings of any treaty limited item. The regime is designed for preferential reduction and withdrawal of those force components which contribute most to capacities for suprise attack and sustaind offensive action.

The CFE agreements will certainly not determine the bottom line. The negotiations were launched at a time when the principal perspective was one of stabilizing the military confrontation in Europe. The revolutions of 1989 initiated its dismantlement. Soviet troops will be further reduced as they withdraw from Central Europe, and American troops will probably be drawn down to about 75 000, providing a framework for reconstitution in response to a reversal of Soviet military policy in Europe. The post-CFE drawdown of troops is likely to be the result of unilateral decisions and bilateral negotiations rather than a second CFE round. Political conditions have changed and the Western powers may be unwilling to continue negotiations within a framework which could perpetuate the division of the cold-war era.

The Warsaw Pact is likely to wither away as it is emptied of military content. NATO is likely to remain as a framework for North-American engagement. All of Germany is likely to enter into NATO, but NATO will not enter into all of Germany. The five Eastern <u>Länder</u> are likely to be accorded a status similar to that of the northernmost county of Finnmark in Norway prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops, nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as allied manoeuvres. The "red lines" in the future security order in Europe are likely to be Soviet troops crossing Poland's eastern border or NATO troops moving up to Poland's western border. Mututal reassurance could be provided by the establishment of a security zone

comprising the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria and the former GDR wherein all foreign troops, nuclear and chemical weapons would be banned. This arrangement could be formally approved by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE, thus embedding the new status of East-Europe, the principal security provision concerning German unification, and a reaffirmation of the military status of Austria in the context of membership in the European Community, in an all-European arrangement. The CSCE in fact constitutes the framework for an embryonic all-European security system, including also the two states of North-America and the Soviet Union.

The CSCE cannot provide a substitute for the security arrangements maintained by NATO. However, it can provide an important supplement thereto and a framework for long-term change, for the gradual construction of a more cooperative security order transcending allied arrangements for collective defence. The CSCE is essentially based on the nation-state as the decision-making unit, far removed from constituting a collective security system based on majority voting. The postcold-war balance of power in Europe will be maintained by NATO and the Soviet Union. It will not be based on confrontation buttressed by forward deployments.

The CSCE is likely to gradually move towards institutionalization, constituting in the first instance a general conference of member states, but where NATO and the European Community could also be represented by the Secretary General and the President of the European Commission respectively. Further institutionalization is likely to be associated with specific tasks. We could envisage the establishment of special CSCE Agencies, or Bureaus, for such tasks as arms control verification; non-proliferation; crisis prevention; exchange of information about defence budgets, major weapon acquisitions, force structures and deployments; airborne and satellite surveillance; and peacekeeping. It is possible to envisage CSCE nations earmarking and training troops for peacekeeping in Europe following a decision of the General Conference to deploy such forces to stem local conflicts which threaten to ignite larger conflagrations in Europe, or which threaten human rights or the rights of minorities.

NATO would be reconstituted to deal with the new realities of post-cold war Europe. It is likely to fashion a new military strategy, MC14/4, dispensing with key principles of the strategy of flexible response such as forward defence, follow-on forces attack, and first use of nuclear weapons. The size and rôle of theater nuclear weapons most likely will be significantly reduced, leading to two more zero options for the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery munitions) and short-range nuclear missiles. The residual nuclear capacity will be confined to a small number of air-delivered weapons. The number of airborne nuclear weapons is likely to diminish. Some will push for "modernization" in NATO by the introduction of a new tactical air-to-surface missile, TASM. However, the launching of another modernization debate could create domestic and interallied ruptures in NATO at a critical juncture of international relations in Europe and hence seems undesirable on political grounds. The military rationale is not very strong either in the context of a dismantling of Soviet air defences in Eastern Europe and of moving away from an emphasis on warfighting to deterrence. Airborne systems are not like missiles and artillery tied to fixed fronts and targets. Most NATO allies are likely to emphasize the political desirability of maintaining some nuclear weapons in Germany, the Americans could make it a condition for continued troop-presence.

The peace-time presence of US ground troops will essentially constitute lead elements of combat units and combat support units, supplemented by stocks of prepositioned heavy equipment providing a framework for reconstitution in the event that a Soviet militray threat should reemerge. The United States is likely, furthermore, to maintain some tactical air force units in Europe as well as communication and naval support installations. NATO, most likely, would

emphasize maintenance of an integrated command structure and an infrastructure for C3I (Communication, Command, Control and Information). The concept of forward defence is likely to be replaced by a new concept for mobile defence, and the concept of deep strikes by a new concept for defensive defenses. Military postures and strategy will be tailored to the structure of the emerging political order. NATO and the Soviet Union are likely to converge on a concept for minimum nuclear deterrence constituting a <u>de facto</u> no-first use regime.

#### 8. <u>Concluding Remarks</u>

And here I conclude my journey into the European future. It has been a hopeful journey, and I should warn that uncertainties abound. Military threats have been replaced by risks and dangers which could combine and compound so as to move Europe in very different directions. The process of dissolution of the Soviet internal empire is particularly pregnant with such risks and dangers. States will hedge against the uncertainties, but hopefully manage to avoid the pitfalls of the self-fullfilling prophecy, of bringing about the very conditions they seek to avoid. The tragedy of European history looms on the horizon. However, the revolutions of 1989 lit new lamps of promise and hope. Our common future is now in our hands. Our sense of opportunity and possibility should not be overshadowed by our sense of risks and dangers. Europeans should draw inspiration from the citizens of Warsaw, Leipzig, Prague and Budapest, maintain belief in their ability to overcome.

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