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ETHNIC CONFLICT, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING TOWARDS 2000

Second Generation Peacekeeping

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
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ETHNIC CONFLICT, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING TOWARDS 2000

Second Generation Peacekeeping

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
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SUMMARY

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs was recently awarded a major grant by the Ford Foundation to conduct research on the future of UN peacekeeping. This research project will attempt to elaborate new political, military and operational doctrines aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces in the fulfilment of their traditional roles. It will also examine the possibility of expanding the concept of peacekeeping to include new functions and capabilities. In short, the project aims to draft a framework for a second generation of multinational peacekeeping operations. To flesh out some of the conceptual ideas developed, the project will also explore possible new forms of peacekeeping in 4 different regional settings: the Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Eastern Europe.

E: Peace keeping

Ethnic groups

Conflicts

G. Israel

Lebanon

Sudan

In 1984 the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) received a generous grant from the Ford Foundation in order to study international peacekeeping. The 1984 project focused on recent peacekeeping operations, particularly on one of the most difficult and controversial missions in the history of UN peacekeeping, the force in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL (1978 -). The ill-fated Multinational Force in Beirut was also examined in detail. During the course of this project many different aspects of peacekeeping were surveyed and analyzed, particularly aspects related to diplomacy within and around the Security Council and to practical political and military problems in the field.

Due to our experience with this project and to similar previous research endeavours combined with Norway's active participation in a wide range of peacekeeping missions, NUPI has built up a solid appreciation of both the possibilities and constraints inherent in multinational peacekeeping as a form of third-party involvement in conflicts. Because of deep reaching changes in the wider political environment, however, NUPI feels that a serious reconsideration of the entire peacekeeping concept is now possible and, indeed, timely. Therefore, this current research project will attempt to elaborate new political, military and operational doctrines aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces and observer corps in fulfilment of their traditional roles. It will also examine the possibility of expanding the concept of peacekeeping to include new functions and capabilities. In short, the project will attempt to draft a framework for a second generation of multinational peacekeeping operations

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

An international peacekeeping force is dependent on the disposition of the international consensus which sustains it. The international environment has previously imposed tight reigns on

both the military and political capacities of peacekeeping forces and, consequently, has limited the tasks such forces could be expected successfully to undertake.

With the end of cold war, rivalry and competition between the great powers has been replaced by a cautious collaboration. Within the UN the automatic division of the Security Council which chronically disabled diplomatic progress on a range of regional issues has for the most part vanished. This atmosphere of increased cooperation in resolving regional conflicts has been reflected in a new readiness to employ the peacekeeping instrument. Between 1988 and 1990 5 new peacekeeping operations were initiated. Moreover, major operations are under consideration for the Western Sahara, El Salvador as well as Cambodia.

The nature of regional conflicts has also changed. Ethnic animosities have traditionally been a major ingredient in political conflict and violence. Especially after the Gulf War, a range of factors could mean that increasingly the ethnic element could become the driving force of conflict and war. With the dissolution of the Russian Empire in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, for instance, old conflicts and animosities, arranged along ethnic cleavages, have reemerged with virulence. Many of the states affected have few means by which these conflicts can be constructively controlled and mediated. Frequently, ethnic insurgents view the state that commands jurisdiction over them as dominated by ethnic foreigners and thus irretrievably on the other side of the barricades. The state may also be perceived as the root cause of ethnic disfranchisement and repression. In either case the state is seen as a party to the dispute and, therefore, will be denied legitimate authority to act with perceived good offices.

In Eastern Europe, as elsewhere, ethnic boundaries and political boundaries do not overlap. Indeed, the very complexity of the ethnic mosaic makes such a correspondence impossible. However, states tend fiercely to defend their territorial integrity

regardless whether the source of threat is external or internal. Hence, the unwillingness of ethnic militants to compromise on certain nationalist demands together with the state's reluctance and/or inability to concede to such demands could threaten the stability of the new European order.

In other regions ethnic strife could also gain new destructive potential. In large parts of the Middle East as well as Africa ruling elites are often ethnically based and conflict both within states and between them tend to possess a pivotal ethnic component. With the demise of the cold war, local antagonists can no longer effectively captivate great power military and diplomatic patronage. Reversely, this means also that major powers have lost some of their leverage to restrain the truculence of regional adversaries. Detached from the grid of international strategic balances, future regional conflicts might become less hazardous for international stability while, simultaneously, more frequent in the regions involved.

Although commendable progress has been made in the industrial world in the field of both nuclear and conventional disarmament, arms races in some of the more volatile regions of the world have continued unabated. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with missile delivery systems gives special reason for anxiety. Thus, regional conflicts might become more militarily devastating as well.

The economic and political depredations that have overtaken the Soviet Union have resulted in, among other things, the disappearance of the bi-polar balance that has marked the post-war era. Thus, the United States currently occupies an unique position of power within the international community, a position which might in the medium term entail unacceptable burdens both for the United States as well as the world at large. With reference to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and American reactions to it, Secretary of State Jim Baker was asked by a journalist if he thought it appropriate that the United States should play the role of world policeman. He answered that the United States did

not want to be a global policeman. But, he continued, "When the world needs a cop, guess who gets called?"

This leads to a critical question: Does the world really need a cop? It should be noted that the functions of the cop are myriad and range from a reassuring presence in the neighbourhood to pacifying domestic quarrels to large scale enforcement of the legal order against well armed and organized transgressors. Broadly speaking, the cop's functions consist of the enforcement of law and the provision of protection which the individual is not expected to render for himself. On a much more limited scale peacekeeping forces have had similar functions on the international level. The relative success of past UN peacekeeping operations in activities as varied as monitoring elections to monitoring buffer zones, the current dramatically increased demand for peacekeeping, the UN's role in relation to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the challenges of future unpredictable regional balances seem strongly to indicate that the world does indeed require a cop.

The high regard with which the world community currently views UN peacekeeping also reflects an explicit acknowledgement of the many challenges which states cannot successfully confront unaided or on a bi-lateral basis alone. Critically, for those states which are too small to provide for their own defense - and the majority of states fall into this category - these challenges involve effective provision for their own national security. Moreover, certain challenges exist which many states, although able, appear unwilling to confront. Chief among these is respect for human and minority rights.

A dependence on the United States to fulfil disproportionate, the various roles needed to satisfy these requirements as well as to resolve threatening regional conflicts and provide for collective security is unrealistic. Among other reasons, no one country, however powerful, is able to command sufficient resources. Moreover, the management of core areas of the international system would become unduly subordinated to American national

interests. Such a situation would tend to induce disruption and division rather than cooperation and conciliation.

THE PROJECT: A SECOND GENERATION OF UN PEACEKEEPING

This project will comprise two related parts which will proceed in parallel. One part will consist of a critical examination of a range of conceptual issues that affect the efficiency of peacekeeping and have in the past restricted the scope and effectiveness of its activities. The aim is to recommend new political, military and operational doctrines of use to peacekeeping in the future.

The second part will explore the possible use of new forms of peacekeeping in 4 different situations: the Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Eastern Europe. In addition to a detailed exploration of the political and military features of these areas and the conflicts they contain, the analysis will incorporate insights gained from studies of past and present UN operations.

Part I: conceptual issues related to the reform of peacekeeping

Up to now UN peacekeeping has tended to be a somewhat haphazard affair which has commanded more laudatory rhetoric than dependable support and financial backing. The weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the peacekeeping instrument are well known although solutions to them are not always obvious. Brian Urquhart has described peacekeeping as a "sheriff's posse; mustered at the last minute to prevent the worst."¹ Others have viewed the deployment of peacekeeping forces as a means of placing regional crises into cold storage enabling Security Council members to divert their attention elsewhere and, thereby, inadvertently to display the fragility of their

¹. Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse', Survival, May/June 1990, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London

commitment both to the operations and to resolving the conflicts which produced them. In addition to chronic budgetary deficits, the reactive, improvised manner in which peacekeepers are frequently injected into crisis situations reflects the inadequacies of peacekeeping's institutional anchoring. If peacekeeping is to discharge the enhanced role which so many members of the international community seem to expect, these weaknesses must be systematically addressed.

Currently the trend is to deploy peacekeeping in an increasingly wider set of circumstances. There is a real prospect that peacekeeping will be required to cover a broad scale of activities ranging from prevention and deterrence to enforcement and punishment. Furthermore, the classic case of deployment along a border between two sovereign states in order to monitor compliance with cease fire or disengagement agreements between them could possibly become an exception rather than the norm. Increasingly, peacekeepers might be charged with intervention into the internal situations of sovereign countries, such as the case of the planned operation in Cambodia. Breaching of national sovereignty may also be required if ideas concerning humanitarian corridors and the protection of hostage civilian populations come to fruition. UNIFIL (southern Lebanon) and UNFICYP (Cyprus) are already injected into areas in which disputes between states are intimately interwoven with the violence of civil strife.

Therefore, a further weakness of peacekeeping in relation to potential future tasks might reside in the conventional wisdom which currently sustains it. This wisdom can be roughly condensed into 6 assumptions which are now deemed pre-conditions for a successful operation.

1. Consent by the parties involved, usually two states
2. Continued support by the mandating authority, i.e. the Security Council
3. Effective military force and use of force in self-defense only

4. A clear and achievable mandate
5. Maintenance of strict neutrality which implies, among other things, precluding great powers from contributing troops
6. No enforcement of an external will or solution which means a clear separation of peacekeeping from peacemaking

Because of changed circumstances and demands, these assumptions require a careful and critical reexamination.

For instance, if peacekeeping is to be used in a deterrent capacity, it may be neither possible nor desirable to gain the consent of the party threatening the borders of another. Moreover, many conflicts are of such intricate and shifting nature that it becomes almost impossible to identify clearly who the parties to the conflict are.

With reference to clear mandates, it should be noted that minimum diplomatic consensus is frequently dependent on at least a certain degree of diplomatic ambiguity. Therefore, the ability of the international community to agree to deploy a peacekeeping force in an area which threatens to become a major conflagration might hinge on imprecision and fudging of the mandate.

The concept of neutrality is also open to question. In at least two senses a peacekeeping force is never neutral. First, it reflects the views of the international community which mandated the force in opposition to those parties whose behaviour are regarded as transgressing these views. Second, because a peacekeeping force has usually required the consent of a host government in order to be deployed, such a force will not be perceived as unbiased by those parties which contest the legitimacy of that government. This, of course, becomes critical when a force is deployed in an area disrupted by civil war.

Furthermore, the convention which disbars great powers from active participation in peacekeeping also needs reexamination.

In the new international environment, great power participation may in certain cases be critical if peacekeeping is to fulfil a wider range of functions. First, great powers have military credibility and capacities of a sort small nations do not possess. Such capacities would be decisive in cases, for instance, where enforcement or strategic airlifts to deliver humanitarian supplies are required. Second, the participation of great powers would provide a vivid incentive for such powers to address actively the financial burdens incurred by peacekeeping. Third, such participation would create incentives for great powers to seek resolution of the conflict, thus, providing a linkage between peacekeeping and peacemaking and, thereby, avoiding the cold storage syndrome.

Peacekeeping till now has been based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Peaceful settlement of disputes). In future we may see operations based on Chapter VII (Enforcement) or operations bridging the two chapters. In the wake of the multinational operation "Desert Storm", which was mandated by the UN, the need to put in place permanent mechanisms envisaged in article 43 is likely to receive renewed attention. It could alter the shape and nature of UN peacekeeping in the years ahead.

Some issues for research

1. New functions: a typology of second generation peacekeeping

- What are the range of circumstances in which multinational peacekeeping would be both a desirable and preferred means for 3rd party intervention?

2. Institutional issues

- What institutional changes inside the UN are required in order to place an expanded and diversified peacekeeping capability on a sound, systematic footing?
- Should new institutionalized capabilities, such as

intelligence gathering, be appended to the existing UN machinery?

- How can planning and logistics be improved?
- Are standby or ear marked peacekeeping units required and feasible?
- How can mandates be altered in relation to changing political or operational requirements?

3. Operational issues

- How can peacekeeping forces be made more effective on the ground?
- How can the pool of peacekeepers be expanded and under what circumstances should it include great power contributors?
- In order to utilize the comparative advantages of different troop contributing countries, should role specialisation be emphasized?
- In relation to the type of operation, what would constitute appropriate military equipment and rules concerning use of force?
- By what criteria should force commanders be chosen?
- How should the relationship between peacekeepers and local populations be regulated?

4. Conflict resolution: the relation between peacekeeping and peacemaking

- Should peacekeeping be necessarily linked to diplomatic efforts?

- Can new peacekeeping techniques be designed which would have a preventive or deterrent influence on the outbreak of conflict?
- Are there circumstances in which peacekeeping should serve for the enforcement of the international human rights regime?
- Should progress in conflict resolution be made a precondition for the continued presence of peacekeeping forces?

Part II: 4 case scenarios

The project will attempt to flesh out and test some of the ideas developed in the conceptual part by examining the possible use of new forms of peacekeeping in four areas marked by high levels of conflict and violence.

The Sudan: Peacekeeping and peacemaking

In relation to the Sudan the project will focus on options for using international observers to monitor disengagement and redeployment of troops in Southern Sudan as part of a negotiating scheme to end the war.

The Sudan is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state formation which over the last some 20 years has been devastated by civil war. NUPI together with the Research Institute of the Norwegian Trade Union Movement and the Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen are currently collaborating on a project designed to explore and assess options for peacemaking in the civil war in the Sudan. To date efforts undertaken by the former president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, and the former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, have been unsuccessful. These attempts at peacemaking have failed inter alia because they brought the most contentious issue, Shari'ya up front, thereby,

blocking progress towards consensus building.

Our concept is geared to the careful construction of a negotiating process proceeding from a minimum consensus (preservation of one state, a democratic order and the rule of law) toward a broader consensus concerning the constitutional structure and legal processes in a future Sudan. The approach involves postponing the most divisive issues while attempting to identify, consolidate and expand minimum consensus.

The NUPI peacekeeping project would focus on the role of international forces in the monitoring of disengagement as an element of consensus building and in possibly providing financial and humanitarian incentives in order to encourage the negotiation process.

In addition, the project will also explore the problems related to the establishment of humanitarian corridors and the provision of international protection for hostage civilian populations. Various operational and political issues are involved; but one issue of fundamental importance is the potential clash between respect for the principle of national sovereignty and international safeguards for minimal levels of human rights within states.

The Gaza Strip: A new UN mandate territory?

Currently, Dr. Marianne Heiberg is engaged in a cooperative project with the Research Institute of the Norwegian Trade Union Movement on a conditions of living survey in Israel's occupied territories, the West Bank and Gaza. This major project is well advanced and a comprehensive report is expected by July 1992.

However, from partial observations now available in relation to Gaza, it would appear that this area is rapidly heading toward large scale catastrophe unless radically changed policies are instituted. Already the Gaza Strip, frequently described as the world's forgotten corner, is one of the most densely populated

areas of the world. Moreover, particularly during the last two years, Gaza has had one of the world's highest birth rates. Some estimates place this as high as 6% per annum. Current projections indicate that by the year 2000 Gaza's population will have expanded from an estimated 650-750,000 individuals (1989) to over 1 million. It is predicted that Gaza's already inadequate infrastructure will collapse entirely under this population pressure. For instance, by the year 2000 the inhabitants of the Strip will probably have run out of potable water. The cost of providing fresh water, based, for example, on two desalination plants, to the Gaza population is currently estimated at well over \$1 billion. Estimates concerning the provision of even a rudimentary sewage system to the Strip are equally high. Therefore, in the course of only a few years Israel will be compelled to mobilize enormous economic resources in order to provide Gaza with even the most basic services required to sustain minimal living conditions. It seems unlikely that Israel is either able or willing to make such massive investments in Gaza. Equally, it would seem unlikely that the international community will make such enormous funds available as long as Israel insists on sole jurisdiction over the area.

These are some of the considerations which are leading many observers to believe that Israel will be forced to withdraw from Gaza regardless of progress on the Israeli - Arab conflict. Indeed, proposals to this effect have already been tabled by Israeli parliamentarians. Arguably, pressures are currently building up which will lead to the transfer of authority over Gaza from Israel to a 3rd party, most likely the UN.

The NUPI project will examine the types of political, economic and security arrangements which might be required to make such a transfer feasible and acceptable to the parties involved. Furthermore, we shall attempt to explore options for relating a new, major UN involvement in the area to peacemaking mechanisms in the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

The Lebanon: rethinking the role of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon²

UNIFIL has now been deployed in south Lebanon some 13 years. Very few, if any, outside observers would assert that UNIFIL has been one of the UN's more impressive peacekeeping operations. This is not surprising since the appropriate agreements and encouraging political symmetries, normally regarded as essential to successful peacekeeping, have never been present in the area. Lack of political progress and super power support, financial problems and casualties, among other factors, are causing several of the key troop contributing countries to reassess their participation in the Force. This reassessment is taking place within the wider context of a dramatically increased demand for UN peacekeeping in general and a relative depletion of the traditional resources for peacekeeping required to support such operations. For certain troop contributors as well as UN policy makers UNIFIL is often viewed as tying up valuable resources which could be put to more meaningful use elsewhere. One result of these considerations may be the decision to withdraw UNIFIL.

It should be noted that the issue of whether or not UNIFIL should have been deployed in 1978 - and many contend that it should not have been - is quite distinct from the issue as to whether UNIFIL should now be withdrawn. It could be argued that the results of a UNIFIL withdrawal would be three-fold.

1) Because of the endemic violence and economic collapse which would follow in the wake of a UNIFIL withdrawal, southern Lebanon up to the Litani River would be largely depopulated.

2) The dangers of a regional conflagration between Israel and Syria would be augmented.

3) The international attention and spot light UNIFIL

². This part of the project description is more elaborated than others because it builds on previous research on Lebanon. The section concerning the revision of UNIFIL's mandate is the work of Prof. Augustus Richard Norton.

represents would be turned off. The personal involvement of the international community in the fate of Lebanon would to a large extent cease.

In order to prevent a precipitous withdrawal, there is a clear need to improve and renovate UNIFIL. First, the increasing concerns and frustrations of those upon whose support UNIFIL is dependent must be addressed in a constructive and concrete manner. To this purpose, a Security Council resolution restating and even revising the UNIFIL mandate is probably timely. Of course, the crafting of such a resolution would, in itself, help to raise the salience of Lebanon as a focus of international attention. However, the motive for promoting a new enabling resolution is not simply to momentarily gain the limelight, but to reiterate the web of responsibilities which enmeshes all member states.

Second, and much more ambitiously, the possibility of reconfiguring UNIFIL politically and militarily in a manner which would induce full Israeli withdrawal should be explored seriously.

The contents of a new resolution

Issues to be addressed:

1) the obligations and responsibilities of UN member states, including financial obligations and responsibilities;

2) restatement of responsibilities of the parties of the conflict, including, but not limited to Israel, Lebanon and Syria

3) the inherent legitimacy of the Force as a peaceful instrument of the international community

4) role of the Force, especially with reference to future programmes of negotiation

5) and, conditions, which if not met, would jeopardize the continuing deployment of the Force.

Reconfiguring UNIFIL

A supplementary mandate seems critical in order to avert a steady erosion of UNIFIL's support in the UN Security Council and among troop contributors. However, realization of UNIFIL's fundamental objective - to oversee an Israeli withdrawal - also needs to be confronted. Such a withdrawal remains a crucial element in any overall settlement to the Lebanese conflict. Without it the likelihood of a Syrian withdrawal seems remote.

From this point of view it must be noted that Israel has no intention of withdrawing in the foreseeable future. In Israel the security zone is regarded as highly successful. It is non-controversial and can be maintained on a level of financial and, very importantly, human costs that are considered acceptable. The widespread consensus is that the security zone works and, thus, experimentation with alternative solutions - such as a UNIFIL deployment down to the international border - is seen as unnecessary as well as risky. Israel views UNIFIL militarily as weak and undependable, politically as disjointed and inconsequential. Therefore, Israel argues that it would be foolhardy to depend on the Force to take up a more ambitious role.

In order to alter this assessment, UNIFIL has to be transformed in a manner that satisfies Israel's security concerns along her northern border; in short, in a manner that would offer a convincing alternative to the security zone. This would require that UNIFIL be drastically reshaped both in terms of its military capabilities as well as its political composition and authority. The NUPI project will examine the feasibility of this proposition.

The implications for UNIFIL of a range of changes in the international arena, mentioned previously, will be critically and

carefully analyzed. Among them:

First, the momentous events in Europe open the possibility of political cooperation among nations which have been locked into antagonistic blocs for two generations. In particular, the possibility now exists for great power collaboration on resolving those regional conflicts which can intrude upon the improving relationship between the US and USSR. The Arab-Israeli conflict, into which Lebanon has been drawn, falls into this category.

Second, not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but many other countries are showing new interest in the potential of the United Nations as a force for peace in international affairs. The UN's potential role in enhancing collective security is perhaps greater now than at any time since the organization's establishment in San Francisco.

Third, given the prospective rising demand for peacekeeping, against a continuing evolution in international relations, and given the need for increased and more adequate sources of financing and military manpower, even such basic constraints as those inhibiting participation of the great powers' militaries in UN operations may no longer pertain.

Fourth, in the present political climate, pressures to reduce conventional levels of armaments and manpower will grow while simultaneously one can expect resistance from national militaries to such pressures. One option available for the great powers is an earmarking of sea and airlift units, logistic (including both new and old technologies) capacities and infantry units for UN duty.

It is within this framework of a potential new generation of UN peacekeeping that a military and political reconfiguration of UNIFIL is conceivable. One critical political pre-condition is a renewed involvement of the United States in the fate of Lebanon. Such an involvement would probably depend on an American

assessment as to whether the Israeli presence in Lebanon destabilises and, thereby, prejudices, progress on an Israeli-Arab settlement. In this context arrangements for the Middle East after the cessation of the Gulf War could be decisive.

Within this broad and in many ways uncertain context, it might be possible in the medium term to consider the renegotiation of UN resolution 425. Such a renegotiation would require a joint initiative of the US and USSR coupled to a commitment by them to assist, or perhaps participate, militarily in a new UN force in south Lebanon. The trade off would be a militarily strengthened and expanded force sufficient for Israel's security concerns, based primarily on western and eastern European units, actively backed by American involvement in return for a full Israeli withdrawal from the area.

Peacekeeping in the new Europe?

The potential challenges to security in Europe are in the process of shifting from large-scale invasions across clearly defined borders to ethnic and communal strife, particularly in South-Eastern Europe. The ethnic patchwork in that part of Europe is already creating new tensions and bloodshed. The passion and violence released by such conflicts could introduce a major element of uncertainty and unpredictability into the European order.

Ethnic nationalism has proven its potency as a mobilizing force in spite of its impossible imperative. History has not distributed the peoples of Europe into neat configurations. The systemic consequences of the break up of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires have not been fully absorbed and contained by the state system in Europe. They were in some sense put into deep freeze during the cold war. With the waning of the cold war and the attendant dissolution of the Russian empire, vestiges are coming to light of the old division between the lands where Western Christendom prevailed and those which developed under the wardship of the Orthodox Church. Both Yugoslavia and the

Soviet Union straddle that division. Tenuous federations could crumble and give rise to rivalry and tension. The rights of ethnic minorities - and ethnic minorities that reside in areas dominated by other ethnic minorities - could become an urgent matter on the European agenda.

The project intends to explore the fault-lines and potential conflicts produced by the ethnic and cultural complexity of Central and Eastern Europe. Particular emphasis will be devoted to exploring the potential relevance of peacekeeping and peace-monitoring operations to the containment and transformation of such conflicts. We shall focus on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE, as a possible mandating authority for peacekeeping operations. Planning for possible peacekeeping operations could provide a substantive basis for cooperation, including joint training and joint exercises, across the old divisions of formerly competing military alliances (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries). It could evolve from the reconstruction of the military formations of the great powers in the direction of small, mobile and multi-national forces. In the future we could see a new generation of peacekeeping operations, for instance in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and the Baltic states as the precursors of a genuine system of collective security in Europe. Although collective security might remain a distant goal, peacekeeping operations based on earmarked multi-national forces could come to constitute a preferred option to uncontrolled conflict and unilateral intervention, providing preparations have been made. NUPI will investigate options from an operational as well as an institutional perspective.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT

The project will be directed by Dr. Marianne Heiberg, a social anthropologist (Ph.D. London School of Economics) and senior research associate at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Dr. Heiberg's previous work includes research on peacekeeping and the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon and

Israel's occupied territories. She has also done extensive work on issues relating to ethnicity and ethnic conflict.

The initial phase of the project will concentrate on assembling individuals, both from Norway and abroad, with the expertise required to carry out the study successfully. We shall be looking for individuals with experience in the UN system, peacekeeping and general military expertise as well as in ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. In addition, the four case studies will be organized as separate sub-projects each of which will be led by a regional expert. Additional funds will be sought to enable these individuals to conduct the appropriate fieldwork. Together, these experts will constitute the project's professional advisory board. Advisory board members will be assembled in Norway at least once a year to assess and coordinate the project's progress.

Complementing the work of NUPI's staff, the project will also form a Norwegian study group which will meet on an average of once a month. This group will consist of Norwegian academics, journalists, public officials and military officers. In addition to lending their experience to the project, it is hoped that these individuals will also be able to transmit the insights gained by the project to Norwegian policy makers and the wider public.

NUPI also intends to use the project as a means of engaging other institutions in a collaborative effort. We intend to cooperate closely with both the Stimson Center in Washington DC and the International Peace Academy in New York. Both these institutions are currently conducting substantial work on UN peacekeeping. We also consider it very important that serious work on peacekeeping is undertaken in the United States and that a basis is provided for cooperation and interaction with European efforts.

Finally, NUPI plans to organize at least 2 international workshops - one on possible peacekeeping in Eastern Europe, the other on the role of the UN in the Middle East - during the

course of the project. Additionally, we would like to hold a major international conference toward the end of the period which will discuss the general conclusions and practical recommendations of the project.

The principle results of the project will be published as a book. In addition, the project will produce several specific reports as well as published proceedings from the international meetings held under its auspices.

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