

9 Conclusion

Military rapid response—from institutional investment to ad hoc solutions

John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers

- **Institutionalized rapid response mechanisms**
- **Rapid response in practice**
- **Institutional exploitation and ad hocism**
- **General conclusion and future research**

While there has been a mushrooming of institutional arrangements for military rapid response, the formal deployments of the rapid response mechanisms of the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are few and far between. Since the dissolution of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIR-BRIG), the United Nations (UN) does not even have an available rapid response capacity anymore. This edited volume started from the puzzling observation that despite this operational near-standstill, there have been few efforts undertaken to date to bring together insights on the obstacles to deployment and to compare between these organizations.¹ Neither has there been much scholarly attention to issues of inter-organizational cooperation and competition in the field in this increasingly institutionalized domain of military rapid response.

This is clearly a missed opportunity, both in terms of cross-learning for overcoming shared obstacles and for assessing the future of military rapid response. The growing awareness of the necessity of rapidly responding to emerging crises, for protecting the lives of vulnerable populations but equally for protecting borders, and subsequent efforts to generate rapid response capacities, has resulted in a dense web of inter-organizational practice and relations. This volume has offered one of the first comprehensive and comparative contributions on military rapid response mechanisms to date by providing an assessment of the institutionalized mechanisms for rapid response (in Chapters 1–4) and the inter-organizational relations that shape crisis responses in practice (Chapters 5–8).

We believe that the findings in this volume are of value to academics, students, and policymakers interested in the rapid response capacities of the AU, EU, NATO, and UN. Obstacles to deployment, such as voluntary standby frameworks, dysfunctional consensus arrangements, or unfair burden-sharing provisions, are common to each of these organizations. By means of this comprehensive effort, this volume has aimed to contribute to the knowledge gap on shared obstacles and mutual benefits of the existing and developing rapid response mechanisms, ultimately with the goal of contributing to inter-organizational learning in order to achieve credible, deployable, and effective rapid response mechanisms.

But this volume's relevance also goes beyond the niche of military rapid response. The institutional proliferation on rapid response that has emerged over the past few decades has inherently set in motion inter-organizational dynamics, though not necessarily to the benefit of rapid intervention in emerging or escalating crises. Moving beyond the binary divide between cooperation and competition that has guided much of the literature on inter-organizational relations, we have introduced a new typology composed of four categories, ranging from mutual cooperation and synergy at one end of the scale to dysfunctional competition at the other: (1) mutual enhancement, (2) fruitful cooperation, (3) mutual hampering, and (4) dysfunctional competition. While examples of each of these categories were noticeable in the inter-organizational responses to the conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the anti-piracy activities in the Indian Ocean, the case studies in this volume strikingly illustrate how international and (sub-)regional organizations manage to set up international interventions that often not only hamper an effective rapid response, but sometimes engage in dysfunctional competition in conflict settings.

Institutionalized rapid response mechanisms

Chapters 1–4 of this book brought together the rapid response mechanisms of the AU, EU, NATO, and UN. By doing so, the authors have offered unique insights in terms of identifying shared obstacles and mutual benefits, filling a critical knowledge gap.

Shared obstacles

Three key obstacles have hindered (nearly) all of the existing rapid response mechanisms to be deployed: a lack of political will to put

one's troops at risk, uneven funding provisions, and dysfunctional decision-making and command structures.

First, most of the discussed rapid response mechanisms have been built upon voluntary troop commitments by their member states. As voluntarism probably will prevail, actual deployment will continue to remain dependent upon the political will of the standby nations, not only to simply commit standby troops on paper but ultimately also to put their troops at risk when a crisis emerges. As a result, deployment of most of the discussed rapid response mechanisms depends on a rather unlikely match between the interests of the standby nations and the conflict at hand. The increasingly prominent fight against terrorism in Africa is in that sense considered a key obstacle for the future of the African Standby Force (ASF).

The high human and financial costs that come with addressing these new security challenges make responses all the more dependent upon those states that are under imminent threat or that see core interests at stake, as shown by Linda Darkwa in Chapter 1. Also the reluctance of EU Battlegroup standby nations to deploy their troops to Mali or the CAR were clear illustrations of this lack of political willingness. Moreover, both the EU and NATO have experienced great difficulties in getting member states to commit troops, resulting in gaps in the standby schemes. It is in that sense an interesting observation by Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning in Chapter 2 that the NATO Response Force has revived since the alliance refocused on one of its core tasks—providing deterrence against (potential) violent peers at its borders, a goal which most Eastern European NATO member states can more easily identify with themselves than with an expeditionary mindset focused on seemingly distant conflicts.

Overall, there is an increasing awareness of the problematic character of the voluntary basis upon which these mechanisms are built, as illustrated by the adoption of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreements in the EU, which imply a move away from this strictly voluntary nature towards more (legally) binding commitments. Despite these efforts, a gap will always remain between (publicly) committing troops and taking the political risk of actually putting one's troops at risk when necessary, as Joachim Koops and Alexandra Novosseloff stressed in Chapter 4, discussing a UN "Vanguard Force."

The second key obstacle is that the funding provisions of most of these rapid response mechanisms do not reflect a fair system of burden-sharing. The dominant "costs lie where they fall" principle, such as in the EU and NATO, inhibits rather than facilitates deployment. It implies that standby nations not only have to carry the burden

180 *John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers*

of the political costs of putting their troops at risk, but also have to cover most of the financial costs. Likewise, the AU's dependence upon funding from third actors is hardly sustainable, necessitating solutions for greater financial autonomy. Although these flawed funding provisions are a commonly recognized obstacle to deployment, proposals for alternative funding formulas have to date always been unsuccessful. Reflecting on the future of the ASF, Darkwa therefore made a case for a more predictable funding system of UN-assessed contributions as an acknowledgment of the contribution of AU missions to international peace and security, balanced by the weak commitment of increased self-funding by African member states, although self-funding is undergoing a slight increase.² Overall, the dependence upon scarce human, material, and financial resources raises the importance of the presence of lead nations. Strong states with considerable defense budgets and military capabilities, politically willing to carry the bulk of the costs, are indispensable for the deployment of each of these mechanisms.

Third, dysfunctional decision-making rules, bureaucratic red tape and incomplete command and control structures have repeatedly obstructed actual deployment. Decision-making built on consensus or unanimity voting arrangements, such as in NATO and the EU, give single member states the opportunity to slow down or even paralyze an organizational response. Deviant opinions or diverging strategic interests, even of marginal member states, can in that sense become a liability to any deployment decision. In addition, ambiguity about command and control structures is inherent to intergovernmental mechanisms. Problems of authority have arisen in each of these organizations, and delegating command and control authority to the multinational level remains a contentious issue. Ringsmose and Rynning have in that regard pointed at discussions on granting NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) deployment authority or upgrading the North Atlantic Council's ability to anticipate crises, while in Chapter 2 Yf Reykers highlighted the continuing disagreement among EU members on a European permanent command and control structure.

SHIRBRIG was a promising and thought-provoking exercise in that regard, as shown in Chapter 4. Serving as a rapidly deployable headquarters integrated into UN missions and command, it was in some sense even way ahead of where, for instance, the EU is at this point. Unfortunately, since SHIRBRIG's dissolution in 2009, progress in terms of the rapid provision of an effective command and control structure at the UN level has been slow. It should, however, be noted that inter-organizational relations can meanwhile also serve as a driver

to overcome institutional shortcomings like these, as illustrated by NATO making available its command and control structures to the EU through the Berlin Plus Agreement.

Mutual benefits

Despite these deficiencies and their lack of deployment, the authors in this volume agree that the AU Standby Force, the EU Battlegroups, the NATO Response Force, and the UN SHIRBRIG should not necessarily be treated as outright failures (the UN Vanguard Force is still an aspirational project). Institutional proliferation in the domain of rapid response has had several positive effects. The success of rapid response mechanisms should not only be measured against their actual deployment—their often underestimated and perhaps underappreciated function as windows for force modernization and regional integration tools should be taken into account as well.

The nature of conflicts and crises has been changing over the past decade, necessitating a different military approach. Expeditionary mind-sets and interoperability have become crucial assets to which the institutionalization of rapid response mechanisms has surely contributed. The NATO Response Force and the EU Battlegroups have proven their value as engines of force modernization in Europe in that direction. Disregarding some laggards, most of the European states have gradually transformed their armies towards more expeditionary forces, benefitting their readiness—at least on paper. Likewise, joint training and certification efforts in the context of these mechanisms enhance interoperability of military forces, doctrinal alignment, and the development of sub-regional, regional, and even global standards. The gradual development of sub-regional partnerships, within both the EU and the AU, further illustrates how these rapid response mechanisms also have a function as integration tools, building mutual trust among peers at regional and sub-regional levels.

Challenges for the future

In line with Daniel Drezner's assumption highlighted in the Introduction to this volume, institutional proliferation in the domain of military rapid response comes with opportunities for forum-shopping.³ Membership and mandate overlap, in principle, allow states to pick and choose the framework which is deemed most appropriate, or best matches the national interests of the initiators for action. The chapters in this volume have shown that institutional proliferation in rapid

182 *John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers*

response is in fact a two-edged sword, already at the standby stage, as it also puts pressure on the often already limited financial and material capabilities of these states. This is especially the case for the large majority of countries within the AU, EU, and NATO, which operate with only a single set of (expeditionary) forces and often rather modest defense budgets. Institutional proliferation hence raises questions of prioritization, forcing states with small or medium-sized military capacities to strategically decide about which multinational format they wish to commit their resources and earmark troops to. A risk of competition over scarce resources between these rapid response mechanisms is therefore permanently present. However, small and medium-power member states alike tend to commit, at least in principle, to overlapping mechanisms as this strategy enables access to various institutions, and also can increase the status of small and middle powers.⁴

Similarly, proliferation comes with the potential for contestation of legitimacy and competition for credibility, as illustrated by the political tug of war over different rapid deployment mechanisms on the African continent. While the development of rapid response capacities by the African regional economic communities can be positively interpreted as an indication of African defense integration, competition with the regional economic communities and their regional response mechanisms is a defining feature throughout the development of the ASF, as strikingly illustrated in Chapter 1. Although perhaps less contentious, the added value of having two rapid response mechanisms on the European continent has equally led to debate about duplication and credibility.

Ambiguity concerning potential deployment scenarios is another issue that poses a challenge for the future and which requires tackling in all these organizations. This implies better matching deployment scenarios and goals with the institutional characteristics of the rapid response mechanisms, including taking into account their limitations when defining the array of operations they should be able to cover. The EU Battlegroups' small size has in that sense repeatedly served as an obstacle, raising doubts about the credibility of the long list of operation types which they should be able to undertake. Likewise, as indicated in Chapter 1, the ASF framework also reflects this ambiguity, with six potential deployment scenarios.

Rapid response in practice

Despite frequent opportunities, the aforementioned rapid response mechanisms have to date seldom been deployed. As a result, it is difficult to establish consistent evidence of their effectiveness, let alone of

their capacity to rapidly deploy to an escalating crisis situation. Nonetheless, the African continent has been the focus of attention for many security institutions and arrangements, often in response to escalating crisis situations. Over the past decade, crises in Mali, the CAR, and the DRC, to mention a few, have been responded to via a series of multi-organizational interventions. As noted by Thomas Mandrup in Chapter 5 on the DRC, some of these deployments have indeed also been rapid, although this is not the general trend.

The multi-actor international response to conflicts in the CAR has been described elsewhere by Martin Welz, and reiterated in Chapter 6, as “patchwork interventionism,” a term which can in fact be applied to any of these conflicts. John Karlsrud, Natasja Rupesinghe, and Denis Tull in Chapter 7 similarly highlighted the “security traffic jam” that emerged in response to the Mali crises. All this to illustrate how the increasingly dense web of international institutions in international security and crisis management comes with growing pressures to ensure at least a fruitful inter-organizational cooperation, as we called it in the Introduction to this volume. This has become all the more important now that it is generally accepted that a rapid response to emerging or escalating crises not only can save lives, but equally serves as a crucial determinant for the success of parallel and successive peace efforts.

Although not necessarily rapid—often even slow—the parallel and sequenced multinational deployments analyzed in Chapters 5–8 of the book provide fertile ground for drawing lessons on rapid response. The case studies have provided striking insights into the responsiveness of the international community to mounting crises on the African continent and allow for drawing three key conclusions about how the institutional proliferation in security affairs often functions more as an obstacle rather than a catalyst of rapid response. First, geographical and functional inter-organizational overlap has been a key driver of competition between institutions. Second, international institutional responses have on multiple occasions moved beyond just mutual hampering, with dysfunctional competition seriously affecting responsiveness. Third, these dysfunctional inter-organizational dynamics have repeatedly created a security vacuum which was only filled on short notice by ad hoc initiatives, mostly from states or coalitions of states with a strategic interest at stake.

From overlap to dysfunctional competition

Institutional proliferation in responding to security challenges creates room for forum-shopping, but geographical and functional overlap

equally contain a risk of leading to inter-organizational rivalry over resources, leadership, and legitimacy. In that regard, the case studies contribute a great deal of empirical material to the literature on inter-organizational relations, which has to date suffered from a lack of case-based empirical evidence. In Chapter 8, Ruxandra-Laura Boşilcă and Marianne Riddervold highlighted how competition over resources between the EU and NATO have hampered political decision-making. Concerns about duplication over both organizations' planned anti-piracy activities in the Indian Ocean strikingly illustrate how overlap risks deployment decisions being hampered by normative and political calculations from member states with different institutional preferences.

Overlapping mandates between organizations, ambiguous division of labor, and subsequent rivalry over leadership have repeatedly even slowed down an international response to an escalating crisis. This has on several occasions been apparent through the competition between the AU and the sub-regional African organizations. Despite sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) not always having the required military capacity, nor the experience, to credibly and effectively deal with an emerging or escalating crisis, their mandate to maintain peace in the region overlaps with that of the AU, repeatedly leading to competition over leadership.

Welz strikingly illustrated how inter-organizational rivalry between ECCAS and the AU has had detrimental effects on the international community's response to the gradually escalating crisis in the CAR, where competition arose between ECCAS and the AU, and subsequently between the AU and the UN. The latter is a puzzling observation when placed against the background of repeated political messages from the UN about the added value of regional arrangements for maintaining international peace and security and even for guaranteeing a rapid response to escalating crises. Likewise, inter-organizational rivalries between ECOWAS and the AU, and later—again—between the AU and the UN have undermined many of the interventions in Mali, as shown by Karlsrud, Rupesinghe, and Tull in Chapter 7.

Linking back to the continuum proposed in the Introduction to this volume, the case studies have shown that competition and rivalry between several of the organizations involved in these crises did not stop at just mutual hampering. Instead, competition has repeatedly been dysfunctional, often leading to slower responses to escalating conflicts and mutual delegitimization between actors in theater. The rivalry over leadership in the international response to the CAR

between ECCAS and the AU is likely the most striking example thereof, as it even created a political vacuum which had worsened the crisis by the end of 2013.

Meanwhile, these findings should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that fruitful in-theater cooperation between institutions with overlapping mandates is simply impossible. In fact, the EU and NATO have shown themselves to be capable of rapidly deploying anti-piracy operations to the Indian Ocean, as well as effectively operating side by side at the level of command and control, information sharing, and even capacity building. EUNAVFOR Atalanta and NATO's Operation Ocean Shield can in that sense be considered unique examples of how fruitful cooperation has facilitated effective responsiveness. As noted by Boşilcă and Riddervold, these successful inter-organizational activities might even come with enhanced mutual trust between both organizations.

Overall, regional arrangements are increasingly important and prominent building blocks in the global peace and security architecture. The AU, EU, and NATO have all engaged in some form of cooperation and in sequenced deployments with the UN and often also with each other. As institutional arrangements strengthen cooperation channels that can be of use in times of crisis, the presence of regional rapid response mechanisms is a capacity that should hence not be left unused. Sequential deployments can go both ways, and transition is one area that is in desperate need of more work on organizational and member-state levels.

Lead nations as necessary drivers of rapid response

In the absence of deployment of the institutionalized rapid response mechanisms, and against the background of rivalry among regional security arrangements and even the UN, an actual rapid response to the conflicts addressed in this volume has nearly always only taken place upon the initiative of a lead nation, willing to take the political risk, carry the financial burden, and deploy the necessary troops at short notice.

In general, both for the deployment of the rapid response mechanisms of the AU, EU, and NATO, as well as for more ad hoc initiatives in response to a mounting conflict, the support of a lead nation which is willing to carry the bulk of the financial and political costs seems to be an indispensable condition. Lead nations can either offer the necessary push within a regional organization for taking action or they can undertake an ad hoc initiative themselves. This also implies that the absence of support from these influential member states is a near-insurmountable obstacle to a regional organization wishing to play an

active role and claim leadership, as illustrated by the delays in the AU's response to the CAR conflict shown by Welz.

In the addressed cases, the few interventions that can be classified as a genuine rapid response mostly took place on an ad hoc basis, outside the frameworks of an international or (sub-)regional organization. Crucially, these rapid interventions were dependent upon the initiative of a single state, backed up by (often logistical) international support from an ad hoc coalition and local support from a regional player. This has most strikingly been shown in the CAR and Mali conflicts, where France launched Operation Sangaris and Operation Serval in response to delayed African-led initiatives. But the EU's rapid responses to crises in the DRC in the 2000s also illustrate the importance of lead nations, with France either taking a lead role or putting pressure on other nations to take up this role. Interestingly, those lead nations were often primarily driven by specific national interests, such as historical links or a fear of spill-over effects, which provided strategic motivation for them to demonstrate the necessary political will to put their troops in harm's way.

Institutional exploitation and ad hocism

It is a puzzling observation that despite the significant investments that have been made in institutionalizing military rapid response mechanisms, a tendency exists to nonetheless operate through ad hoc initiatives and coalitions when faced with an emerging or escalating crisis that necessitates an international intervention. Also beyond the domain of rapid reaction are regional ad hoc coalitions—an increasingly frequent feature of security responses in Africa, often in bilateral or multilateral partnerships. We have seen the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC, Operation Serval and later Barkhane in Mali, Operation Sangaris in the CAR, and the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) in the Sahel region. A similar example in a conflict which has not been addressed in this volume is the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram, which is an ad hoc coalition of Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, operating with financial and material support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other donors.

This ad hoc tendency reflects the rational-institutionalist view that states only decide to work through international organizations if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs of operating alone or in an ad hoc coalition.⁵ Perhaps counterintuitively, the findings from this volume in that sense seem to indicate that institutional proliferation in military rapid response, and in international security more broadly, has

increased the opportunities for pragmatic ad hocism, leading to *institutional exploitation*. Instead of forum-shopping between the existing institutional arrangements for rapid response, the contributions to this volume have provided some striking illustrations of how states pragmatically use the institutional constructs of rapid response mechanisms. What these operations have in common is that they draw upon the investments that have been made in developing regional rapid response capabilities at continental and sub-regional levels, including interoperability, development of doctrine, and access to external partners. The advantages of this approach are, inter alia, flexible participation based on self-interest, eluding bureaucratic red tape, and avoiding path dependencies in terms of future deployments, both in terms of the potentially increased legitimacy of the tool, as well as costs.

The ad hoc coalitions and the member states supporting them are also seeking the support of bilateral and multilateral partners. The UN has repeatedly been asked by the AU, Mali, and the Group of Five Sahel to adjust the mandate of its peacekeeping operation UN Multi-dimensional Mission for Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA) to enable direct support to the FC-G5S counter-terrorism force, although this would be a clear violation of its peacekeeping principles and likely undermine its mediation and humanitarian work.⁶ Moreover, these ad hoc interventions have shown that any ad hoc response requires effective follow-up. The case studies illustrated in particular that not only small or medium-sized states are hampered by limited resources. The lead nations also have to be careful of financial, material, or political overstretch. France's active search for an exit strategy after Operation Sangaris in the CAR, Operation Serval in Mali, and Operation Barkhane in the wider region are clear illustrations of this. In that sense, prioritization is a reality for every actor involved in crisis management, necessitating sustainable follow-up.

General conclusion and future research

The increasingly “thick” nature of the overlapping networks of international regimes and formal and informal cooperation—all normally considered evidence of increasing cooperation in international relations—provide greater flexibility for member states when they decide when and how to pursue their national interest. As we finalize this volume, the policy and scholarly discourse is deeply engaged in debates about what are perceived as current challenges to the liberal world order—populism, protectionism, and a shift in focus from liberal statebuilding and peacebuilding to more limited security-oriented

ambitions in fragile and conflict-affected states.⁷ The move towards increased ad hocism is a perhaps counterintuitive but integral part of this development. In the domain of military rapid response, ad hoc coalitions can: draw on previous joint training, and efforts toward doctrinal coherence and interoperability; bring the benefits of burden-sharing, international political, military, and financial support; and avoid creating precedents for future deployments. In that sense, institutional proliferation in rapid response seems to have led to a situation in which a pick-and-choose approach prevails, and institutional constructs but not the end products are used.

On the negative side, the continued inactivity of the EU Battlegroups undermines their legitimacy, and unavoidably also that of the EU. The continued investment by Western donors in the ASF will also be questionable if it is never deployed, while ad hoc coalitions are deployed instead. In addition, ad hoc coalitions may also undermine efforts to create lasting political and military structures at the regional and global levels, leading to more short-termism in the long run. Lack of deployment and the prominence of ad hoc responses not only risk delegitimizing the institutionalized rapid response mechanisms, they also risk undermining the credibility of the organizations themselves. Questions about the EU's role as a crisis manager repeatedly arose after yet another slow response. And as shown throughout the case studies, sub-regional African organizations do not hesitate to publicly question the AU's leadership in maintaining peace and security.

We have introduced a novel framework for assessing inter-organizational cooperation and competition, which has a value that goes far beyond the analysis of the institutional dynamics of military rapid response that has been at the core of this volume. In fact, the continuum from mutual enhancement to dysfunctional competition can be used as a heuristic device for capturing inter-organizational relations in all stages of crisis management activities, from conflict prevention to statebuilding activities. In addition, the suggested framework explicitly draws attention to inter-organizational dynamics in the use of material, human, and financial resources, the impact thereof on goal attainment and, ultimately, the extent to which this legitimizes or delegitimizes the organizations concerned. On a more generic level, it can therefore be argued that the scholarship on inter-organizational relations could benefit greatly from moving beyond the dyadic status quo of cooperation and competition. Our conceptual framework allows for sketching a more nuanced and empirically rich picture of inter-organizational relations in the field of peace and security and beyond, ~~hence feeding~~ the expanding inter-organizational research agenda.

Returning to Drezner's line of thinking, this volume has shown that not only does institutional proliferation increase the chances of forum-shopping, it also prepares the ground for increasing ad hocism and *institutional exploitation* in international relations. Not seldom, this has proven to come with dysfunctional consequences, both in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. The field of military rapid response, in that regard, strikingly illustrates the pragmatism that is inherent in the institutional proliferation in international security, and more generally in international politics in the twenty-first century.

Notes

- 1 Yf Reykers and John Karlsrud, "Multinational Rapid Response Mechanisms: Past Promises and Future Prospects," *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no. 3 (2017): 420–426.
- 2 As of January 2018, 20 member states had started to implement the agreed 0.2 percent levy on imports (see Linda Darkwa, Chapter 1, this volume), and of these, 14 had started to deposit funds in an account dedicated to the AU in their respective national banks. See Republic of Rwanda, "Finance Ministers Meet to Discuss African Union Financing Progress," Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Finance, 11 January 2018, www.minecofin.gov.rw/index.php?id=12&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=649&cHash=5f3b34043739f5c746e172ea1c448cd0.
- 3 Daniel W. Drezner, "The Viscosity of Global Governance: When Is Forum-shopping Expensive?" unpublished conference paper, Princeton University, November 2006, www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/drezner_S1100_16.pdf.
- 4 Nina Græger, "From 'Forces for Good' to 'Forces for Status'? Small State Military Status Seeking," in *Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann (London: Routledge, 2016); John Karlsrud and Kari M. Osland, "Between Self-Interest and Solidarity: Norway's Return to UN Peacekeeping?" *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 5 (2016): 784–803; Rasmus B. Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" *International Peacekeeping* 25, no. 2 (2017): 217–241; and William Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B. Neumann, "Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking," *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2017): 1–21.
- 5 See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32.
- 6 John Karlsrud, *The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2018).
- 7 John Karlsrud, "From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counter-Terrorism," *International Peacekeeping* (forthcoming).