Introduction

Rapid response mechanisms—strengthening defense cooperation and saving strangers?

John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers

- **Background to military rapid response**
- **Rapid response and inter-organizationalism**
- **Aims and structure**
- **Conclusion**

Delays cost lives. Guided by this widely accepted premise, organizations such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have invested heavily in the development and operationalization of military rapid response mechanisms over the past two decades. Even at the United Nations (UN), the idea of creating a rapidly deployable standby force for peacekeeping gained momentum with the Chinese pledge of an 8,000-strong standby force during the UN General Assembly in 2015.[1] Moreover, maintaining international peace and security has become a matter of burden-sharing, increasing the relative importance of regional arrangements as complements to the UN.

Military rapid response mechanisms are generally understood as troops that are on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame.[2] Despite the institutional proliferation in the field of military rapid response, the overall track record of the existing multi-national mechanisms within the AU, EU, and NATO remains disappointing. While the EU Battlegroups have been operational for about a decade, they are still awkwardly awaiting their first deployment. Meanwhile, the African Standby Force (ASF) has struggled for years to reach full operational capability, and although the AU has deployed missions to a range of countries, this has been realized as a function of member-state political will rather than the African Standby Force itself. The revitalization of the NATO Response Force (NRF) with a spearhead capacity has somewhat disguised the alliance's difficulties in finding sufficient troops. While the Standby High Readiness

2   *John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers*

Brigade (SHIRBRIG) has been at the disposal of the UN for facilitating rapid deployment, it was dissolved more than a decade ago.

These failures to deliver have led to a situation in which ad hoc responses, on a national basis or through coalitions of the willing, seem to prevail in cases of imminent threats to peace and security. The French-led interventions in Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (CAR, 2014) are striking examples thereof. The Multi-national Joint Task Force confronting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (since 2015) and the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (since 2017), although not necessarily rapid response forces, are similar illustrations of this increased "ad hocism".

Nonetheless, calls for the further development of rapid response mechanisms are still being voiced politically. The 2016 EU Global Strategy and the subsequent agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) once again expressed a commitment to tackle the obstacles that have hindered EU Battlegroup deployment. NATO's deployment of multinational battalions on Europe's eastern borders in turn seems to enhance the alliance's readiness to respond quickly to any (Russian) threat. The revival of the NATO Response Force seems to go hand in hand with the alliance's return towards its original mandate, shifting the focus to deterrence of (near) peers from attacking its borders.

In addition, the African Standby Force was declared operational in January 2016 and continues to receive financial, equipment, training, and technical support from partnering organizations and member states, including, but not limited to, the EU and the UN. And in his September 2015 declaration, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon even welcomed "African Union efforts to fully operationalize the African Standby Force and the commitment by the European Union to engaging European Union Battlegroups, where appropriate, for crisis management."[3] Meanwhile, he expressed support for the idea of creating a UN Vanguard Force, an idea which was raised in the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) in June that year.[4] Does this mean that we are finally witnessing a breakthrough in the development of multinational rapid response mechanisms, or is this yet another chapter in their largely fictional existence?

This book offers one of the first comprehensive and comparative contributions on military rapid response mechanisms to date. Unfortunately, scholarly literature on rapid response mechanisms remains rather fragmented. Many of the obstacles faced by these organizations are largely similar, confronting them with the same difficulties in case

of urgent crises. In that sense, the lack of efforts to bring together academics working on these various response mechanisms has clearly been a missed opportunity.

Background to military rapid response

In 1996, drawing lessons from the Rwanda genocide, the late UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote in *The Peacekeeping Prescription*: "Rapid response is vital, particularly from a preventive perspective, because in cases like Rwanda, the conflict's worst effects are often felt in its earliest stages. A rapid response is thus essential if we are effectively to limit the range, extent and momentum of a conflict." He added that "a rapid response means more than simply examining or diagnosing the problem early. It means establishing an adequate presence on the ground as quickly as possible."[5] In 2000, the "Brahimi Report" echoed this concern by emphasizing the importance of "rapid and effective deployment."[6] Although the report's recommendation targeted peacekeeping operations and arguably considered a deployment within 60–90 days as rapid, its underlying logic about ensuring that "credibility and political momentum"[7] are not lost, applies to all sorts of crisis management operations. One and a half decades later, in June 2015, HIPPO still stressed similar concerns, stating in its report that "slow deployment is one of the greatest impediments to more effective peace operations."[8]

In addition, academics seem to agree that a rapid intervention is indispensable, both for saving lives in distant conflicts and for deterring (near) peers at a region's borders. However, to date few comparative efforts have been undertaken to understand the factors that can hamper or enable a multinational military rapid response. Speed of deployment of a military or comprehensive response is commonly treated as one of the key factors affecting operational effectiveness, legitimacy, and stability. The most notable attempt at providing a comparative assessment of rapid responses is Heidi Hardt's *Time to React*,[9] in which she measured and compared the response rates of several regional organizations (the AU, the EU, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) in the period 1991–2009. She highlights that the speed of an international organization's response to a request for intervention is not so much determined by "how much brute force and financing it has,"[10] but rather by the strength of personal relationships, social networks, and norms, which make information flow more efficiently within these organizations.

Although Hardt investigated the speed of negotiation in each of these organizations, focusing mainly on issues related to the bureaucratization of decision-making, her finding that, among the organizations studied, "the African Union has a track record of responding more quickly to crises than the European Union,"[11] triggers interest. Yet, she moved her focus beyond the formal, institutionalized mechanisms, in order to show the importance of informal negotiations and relationships. In addition, her study includes not only military, but also civilian and multidimensional interventions.

Despite the general recognition about the added-value of military rapid responses, there is still much debate about who should undertake such rapid reaction missions. For instance, in their analysis of regional responses to the 2000 coup in the Solomon Islands, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams argued that the Australian-led multinational coalition facilitated "a more rapid deployment than could have been organized by a formal institution lacking a standing or rapid deployment force," thereby referring to the UN.[12] Meanwhile, they equally stressed that these ad hoc non-UN arrangements come with risks of undermining international peace and security. In recent years, similar regional ad hoc coalitions have been deployed to respond to crises in the CAR, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mali, to mention just a few. Together with increased institutional proliferation in the field of military rapid response, these questions about who should undertake action become all the more pressing.

With this volume, we aim to add to this still scarce literature on rapid response to crises. In particular, we provide a comparative study of military rapid response mechanisms by combining an institutionalist analysis of the mechanisms in the AU, EU, NATO, and UN (in Chapters 1–4) with an assessment of multinational operations in practice (Chapters 5–8). Rapid response mechanisms, and multinational interventions in general, necessitate close military cooperation and interoperability between several countries. As such, the gradual institutionalization of rapid response mechanisms is an expression of elevated political cooperation and integration at the sub-regional, regional, and global levels. Meanwhile, the general lack of deployment of these mechanisms also shows the limits to the political will at these levels to deploy formal mechanisms.

Rapid response and inter-organizationalism

The increasingly dense web of international and regional organizations in international security has been one of the principal subjects of

inquiry in international relations, whereby a central assumption has been that institutional proliferation has led to increasing interdependence. The growing security and defense integration within each of the aforementioned organizations is a clear example thereof. The same goes for investments made in rapid response arrangements within these international and regional frameworks.

As the creation or further development of rapid response mechanisms is high on the agenda of the AU, EU, NATO, and UN, military rapid response has inherently become an inter-organizational matter, much like all other phases in the conflict management life cycle. Despite many authors having addressed inter-organizational relations in the area of security between the EU and NATO,[13] but also between the EU and the UN,[14] NATO and the UN,[15] or between the UN and the AU,[16] the inter-organizational aspects of military rapid response mechanisms remain largely unaddressed. To date, little effort has been made to bring these rapid response mechanisms together, leading to a knowledge gap in terms of shared problems and obstacles.[17]

Moreover, as their geographical or functional mandates often overlap, these organizations increasingly have to operate side-by-side in the conflict theater, leading to questions about effective coordination. While inter-organizational relations are present in the entire crisis management cycle, the institutional proliferation in rapid response mechanisms implies that questions of cooperation and competition between these organizations are an increasingly relevant concern in the phase of military rapid response. Effective cooperation and coordination are not only crucial for actual rapid deployment, but are also viable for guaranteeing the effectiveness of rapid responses. A systematic assessment is warranted in order to draw conclusions about the dynamics of resource dependence, duplication or overlap, and ultimately even about inter-organizational cooperation, competition, and rivalry in the domain of military rapid response.

For these reasons, this volume is situated within the literature on inter-organizationalism, which deals with "understanding the character, pattern, origins, rationale, and consequences of such relationships."[18] Inter-organizationalists not only devote considerable attention to explaining the formation of cooperation partnerships between organizations, they also address the potential for rivalry, by stressing the importance of geographical or functional overlap and forum-shopping. But inter-organizationalism is still in dire need of more systematic comparison and empirical enrichment, as highlighted by Rafael Biermann and Joachim Koops in their authoritative *Palgrave Handbook on Inter-Organizational Relations.*[19] Although a growing field of study,

6 *John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers*

there are relatively few empirical analyses available in the literature on inter-organizational relations, leaving us in the dark about the dynamics and consequences of inter-organizational overlap, resource dependence, and member state commitments. This is remarkable, as it is generally accepted that "the proliferation of international organizations entails increasing interplay and overlap."[20] As ~~the chapters in~~ Chapters 1–4 of this volume illustrate, the domain of military rapid response is one of those fields in which this proliferation has grown, given the many recent developments within the AU, EU, NATO, and UN.

Scarce resources

Much of the work in the field of inter-organizationalism has been driven by the assumption that international organizations "require resources for goal attainment, autonomy, and survival."[21] This expectation, which is at the core of Resource Dependence Theory, equally applies to the domain of military rapid response. Each international or regional organization that aspires to have a credible, deployable, and effective military rapid response capacity is in need of sufficient military personnel, doctrinal guidance, equipment, financial means, and command and control structures. Yet, for the organizations addressed in this volume, their dependence upon member states' voluntary commitments of (already scarce) defense resources inherently creates uncertainties. The effects of this uncertainty on these organizations' capacity to actually rapidly deploy troops, as well as on the inter-organizational dynamics of military rapid response in-theater, have to date hardly been studied.

In its purest form, resource dependence is assumed to serve as "one of the most frequent stimuli for cooperation," as organizations experience "the need to access material or immaterial resources other organizations hold."[22] The logic builds on Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik's work,[23] according to which international organizations can be expected to cooperate and coordinate in order to minimize uncertainty about resources. At the same time, resource dependence equally comes with a potential for a competition for scarce resources.[24]

With organizations operating in largely similar domains, such as military rapid response, and with overlapping memberships that might make them dependent upon the political and financial commitments of the same member states, competition over resources and credibility is unavoidable. This is a problem that is particularly pressing for rapid response, as most of these mechanisms require forces with a particular

expeditionary mindset. Although many authors have pointed to the problem of resource commitment in relation to each of the rapid response mechanisms discussed in this volume, the lack of effort to bring these insights together leaves us in the dark about the inter-organizational dynamics that come with the proliferation of rapid response mechanisms.

In addition, scholars within the field of resource dependence often tend to discard alternative explanations for cooperation or competition between organizations in the field of crisis management. One often rejected explanation is the presence of hegemonic interests and pressures.[25] The interests and decision-making hegemony of lead nations is, however, a potentially important explanation for the (non)deployment of military rapid response forces and the likelihood of cooperation (or competition) in the conflict theater. As most of the institutionalized rapid response mechanisms build upon unequal financial, material, and political burden-sharing principles, the presence or absence of lead or framework nations is likely to be a key explanatory factor for deployment.

In addition, a certain "volatile hegemony" might shape decision-making within the organizations addressed in this volume, as their rapid response mechanisms operate on the basis of standby rosters, whereby the decision to deploy is first and foremost dependent on the willingness of the standby nation to actually make its troops available for deployment. Institutional preferences and prioritization of resource commitments by large member states are furthermore crucial determinants of effective cooperation between organizations in the field. Comparison of the effects of these dynamics is warranted and will therefore also add to the state of the art in theorization about resource dependence in crisis management.

Many potential questions hence remain unanswered when it comes to the resources upon which each of these organizations have built their rapid response mechanisms. For instance, given that these mechanisms depend on member states' defense budgets and military means, is it advisable to construct an entirely new rapid response mechanism at the UN level?[26] Or should the UN rather consider outsourcing this to the AU, EU, and NATO? Does the revitalization of the NATO Response Force affect prioritization of resource commitment among European member states? Does the shared acknowledgment of the need for deployable rapid response mechanisms between these organizations also serve as a driver of resource exchange? Has the AU sufficient financial means to present the African Standby Force as a credible rapid response mechanism?

8   *John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers*

Institutional overlap

The presence of military rapid response ambitions in the AU, EU,
NATO, and UN not only raises questions about resource commitment.
One also wonders to what extent these mechanisms duplicate efforts, as
they all have ~~the same~~ purpose. The inter-organizational context in
which these rapid response mechanisms operate go beyond the pro-
blem of "domain similarity," which is a term used for organizations
that operate in a similar policy domain. Domain similarity, as it is
commonly called in management and sociology, mainly covers func-
tional and geographic overlap between organizations.[27] Scholarly lit-
erature on inter-organizational relations has therefore highlighted the
need to also study overlap in terms of membership and resources.[28]
Although many scholars have in recent years addressed the issue of
"overlap" in inter-organizational relations,[29] systematic empirical
assessment of its effects remains scarce.

   Given the shared concern about the need for credible and
deployable rapid response mechanisms between the aforementioned
organizations, overlap is likely to be present in several forms and it can
be assumed to affect the deployment of each of these mechanisms.
Throughout this volume, it will be shown that the current regional
rapid response mechanisms are characterized by overlap in policy
areas, general functions, mandates, membership and problem areas,
which again raises several questions. For instance, are the EU Battle-
groups and the NATO Response Force complementary mechanisms or
do they rather compete with each other? What are the consequences of
differences in scope and objectives? The NRF is primarily set up for
self-defense, while other mechanisms are explicitly tasked to save
strangers, such as the AU African Standby Force and the UN Van-
guard Force. Similar questions can be asked regarding the African
security arrangements. The increasing prevalence of ad hoc coalitions
may undermine the long-term commitment to the African Standby
Force. Can these mechanisms effectively operate side-by-side or do
they rather compete for resources and credibility? And as already
mentioned, on a global level, is there a need for a UN rapid response
capacity, given the existence of rapid response mechanisms in the AU,
EU, and NATO?

From mutual cooperation to dysfunctional competition

What ultimately connects much of the studies in the quickly expanding
field of inter-organizationalism is the debate over whether resource

dependence and overlap lead to inter-organizational cooperation or competition. On the one hand, inter-organizational cooperation is commonly understood as processes of policy coordination or the adjustment of policies with the aim of producing joint benefits.[30] On that understanding, it can serve as a driver of institution-building, sharing best practices, burden-sharing, and specialization. On the other hand, inter-organizational competition can be seen as a form of rivalry between organizations, which is most likely to occur "when organizations expand into other's domains and scenarios of institutional choice and forum shopping arise."[31] With the AU, EU, NATO and even the UN having repeatedly confirmed their commitment to (further) develop a capacity to rapidly intervene, the ultimate question is hence whether or not these mechanisms can effectively operate side by side. The UN HIPPO underscored the need for a "division of labour based on respective comparative advantage" between the AU and the UN,[32] and this mantra applies similarly to the relationship with the EU and NATO.

As demonstrated in the case studies in Chapters 5-8 of this volume, international organizations deploy international interventions that coordinate, cooperate, and compete in conflict settings. Instead of labeling these interventions as examples of either cooperation or competition, this volume aims to shift away from ~~this rather~~ binary approach. The reality of international interventions, and of providing military rapid responses in particular, is much more complex. In fact, these practices can be classified on a spectrum, ranging from mutual cooperation and synergy at one end of the scale to dysfunctional competition at the other. In order to capture this complex reality, we develop four categories: (1) *mutual enhancement*, (2) *fruitful cooperation*, (3) *mutual hampering*, and (4) *dysfunctional competition*. By doing so, it is possible to provide more systematic insights into many of the benefits and problems that occur in policy domains characterized by a proliferation of international actors. This includes forum-shopping and ad hocism as well as the inter-organizational dynamics before, during, and after the deployment of rapid response mechanisms and other conflict instruments maintained by these international organizations. While the literature on inter-organizational relations, and the resource dependence strand of theorization in particular, have hitherto strongly emphasized how cooperation is likely to increase the legitimacy of international organizations,[33] this new typology can serve as a heuristic device to also identify the delegitimizing or effectiveness consequences of inter-organizational competition.

We define these four categories as follows:

10   *John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers*

- *Mutual enhancement* is defined as inter-organizational cooperation according to the principle of comparative advantage, with flexible and dynamic burden-sharing between organizations, enabling effective use of material, human, and financial resources to reach stated objectives, contributing to intra- and inter-organizational learning and cooperation, positively affecting the legitimacy of the organizations involved.
- *Fruitful cooperation* is defined as inter-organizational cooperation with elements of inter-organizational dysfunction, competition and overlap, but where stated objectives are reached with an acceptable level of use of material, human, and financial resources, positively affecting the legitimacy of the organizations involved.
- *Mutual hampering* is defined as inter-organizational competition with significant evidence of ineffectiveness, intra- and inter-organizational dysfunction, competition and overlap, and where there is significant expense of material, human, and financial resources with limited or no impact on stated objectives, negatively affecting the legitimacy of the organizations involved.
- *Dysfunctional competition* is defined as competition with significant evidence of ineffectiveness, intra- and inter-organizational dysfunction, competition and overlap, and where the expense of material, human and financial resources has a negative impact on the stated objectives, negatively affecting the legitimacy of the organizations involved.

The case studies in Chapters 5-8 of this volume show that there may be a temporal element to the categories above. The period after the Cold War was marked by increased optimism as well as opportunity for member states to use multilateral organizations, in particular the UN, to engage in civil wars (and even NATO found a way to reorient itself). Richard Gowan and Stephen Stedman argue that the post-Cold War international order has promoted UN-led mediation and peace-keeping as the "standard treatment" of civil wars.[34] The relative success of this treatment has led other regional and sub-regional organizations to set up similar mechanisms, leading to a proliferation of tools in the international peace and security toolbox.

The proliferation of international organizations in the domain of rapid response inherently also comes with the possibility of forum-shopping, particularly when membership overlaps.[35] Forum-shopping is generally understood as "strategies where actors select the international venues based on where they are best able to promote specific policy preferences, with the goal of eliciting a decision that favors their

interests."[36] This can have both advantages and disadvantages. We argue that not only does institutional proliferation increase the chances of forum-shopping, it also prepares the ground for increasing ad hocism in international relations, using the institutional constructs of rapid response mechanisms without setting political or economic precedents. In that sense, the findings of this book can also be interpreted as a critical addition to the perhaps overly optimistic resource dependency assumption that "two IOs will cooperate well when both perceive that each other's resources are essential and non-substitutable and gauge their dependence to be similar."[37] The institutional proliferation in rapid response, and in crisis management more broadly, has led to a plethora of alternative frameworks which are substitutable. This sense of overlap might in fact contain more drivers of competition than of cooperation, as these mechanisms all depend upon the commitment of their member states to put their troops in harm's way or to carry the bulk of the political and financial costs. Ad hoc coalitions are, in that sense, an often-overlooked alternative in the literature on inter-organizational relations, as they can build upon the training efforts and doctrinal experience of the institutionalized alternatives. The case studies in this book will provide deeper empirical insights on the issues of resource dependence, forum-shopping, and ad hocism.

Aims and structure

This volume consists of two sections. In Chapters 1–4, we gather insights from four organizations: the AU, EU, NATO, and UN. In Chapter 1, Linda Darkwa discusses the ongoing development of the African Standby Force. She highlights the challenges ahead in terms of financial support and doctrinal development, while pointing to the need to better align political interests at the sub-regional and the AU Peace and Security Council level. In Chapter 2, Yf Reykers discusses the standstill of the EU Battlegroups, analyzing the key obstacles to deployment over the past decade. Although the history of the Battlegroups looks disappointing, he nonetheless identifies several benefits and assesses how the renewed drive towards EU defense integration and cooperation might reflect upon the Battlegroups in the near future. Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning review the NATO Response Force in Chapter 3. They posit that while the NRF was for many years a qualified failure, the alliance's rapid response mechanism is off to a fresh beginning. The renewed Russian threat and a recommitment of the Allies to contributing forces have reinvigorated NATO, although the authors equally acknowledge the need to further upgrade the NRF.

Finally, in Chapter 4 Joachim Koops and Alexandra Novosseloff reflect upon the challenges, failures, and partial successes of creating a UN Vanguard Force. In an attempt to draw lessons for the creation of a future UN rapid response capability, they look into the strengths and weaknesses of the Standby High Readiness Brigade. They conclude that a UN rapid response mechanism will only be successful if it is geared towards effective and mutually reinforcing partnerships with regional and sub-regional standby arrangements, thereby once again highlighting the importance of inter-organizational cooperation.

To foster comparison, Chapters 1–4 are structured around the same topics: origins of the rapid response mechanism, key features, obstacles, and future prospects. This includes a discussion of the genealogy of each of these mechanisms, as well as the changing contextual factors (political, financial, etc.) and doctrinal frameworks during their existence. By analyzing the rapid response mechanisms' main obstacles, demonstrated by some empirical or historical examples, each of these chapters provides a solid basis to peek into the future. The authors pay particular attention to dimensions of inter-organizational cooperation and competition, highlighting how this can benefit or hinder future development and deployment, ultimately attempting to set the expectations right for each organization's rapid response mechanism. In addition, throughout their chapters, the authors reflect on, amongst others, evolving threats such as terrorism and violent extremism and discuss how this will or has impacted the conceptualization of the mechanisms.

Although the multinational rapid response mechanisms discussed in Chapters 1–4 have hardly ever been put into practice, there is still much to learn from past or ongoing crisis management operations. Regional arrangements and mechanisms are increasingly important and prominent building blocks in the global peace and security architecture. The AU, EU, and NATO have all engaged in some form of cooperation and in sequenced deployments with the UN, and often also with each other.

In Chapters 5–8 of this volume, the contributors therefore look at multi-organizational interventions in four case studies situated on the African continent: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the CAR, Mali, and counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa. These cases are not necessarily examples of rapid responses per se; but lessons can be drawn from these cases for the further development and future deployment of rapid response mechanisms. To achieve this, the chapters drill further down into the experiences of rapid, sequenced, and parallel deployment. In doing so, they examine inter-organizational cooperation, coordination, and competition. Each of the four cases stands out for the multitude of international actors that have been, or

still are, present in the field, raising questions about inter-organizational relations and the effects on responsiveness.

In Chapter 5, Thomas Mandrup offers a case study of the DRC, sketching out the inter-institutional dynamics in perhaps the most heavily discussed African conflict area. He pays particular attention to the lessons that can be learned from the recent Force Intervention Brigade. In Chapter 6, Martin Welz moves the focus to the crisis in the CAR between 2013 and 2014, offering striking insights into an equally impressive number of international interventions. In Chapter 7, John Karlsrud, Natasja Rupesinghe, and Denis Tull edge their way through the plethora of international interventions in Mali since 2012, which is described as one of the most complex mission areas today. They assess the sequenced and parallel deployments to Mali of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU, the UN, and the EU, as well as those of neighboring states and France. In Chapter 8, Ruxandra Boşilcă and Marianne Riddervold provide insights into the impressive deployment of flotillas in the Indian Ocean, including by the EU and NATO, in the international fight against piracy off the Horn of Africa.

Again for reasons of comparison, the case studies in Chapters 5–8 focus on the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? It is not surprising that in general it has been difficult to find evidence of translating inter-organizational cooperation into practice, although there is no lack of cooperation agreements at the headquarters level and inter-organizational coordination arrangements in the field. However, the chapter authors apply our four categories as ideal types rather than marks on a scorecard. It is interesting to note that in all four cases there is evidence of all these ideal types: mutual enhancement, fruitful cooperation, mutual hampering, and dysfunctional competition. Chapter 9, the volume's conclusion, applies the topics and questions utilized by the authors in Chapters 1–8 to draw lessons from the cases for further development and future deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms, and to provide some prudent recommendations for strengthening inter-organizational cooperation.

Conclusion

The book describes the development of multilateral rapid response mechanisms, an important facet of the increasingly thick interlacing

web of global and regional institutions that have evolved since the end
of the Second World War, and in particular in the post-Cold War era.
The rich institutional analysis provided in Chapters 1–4, combined
with insights into how international organizations and their member
states in practice deploy international interventions that coordinate,
cooperate, and compete in conflict settings, provide fertile material
for analysis, conclusions, and recommendations that are relevant to
policy-makers and academic scholars alike.

The proliferation of security mechanisms has nurtured complex
interdependence between states.[38] However, as Chapters 5–8 of this
volume demonstrate, the increasing tendency to selectively draw upon
the capacities and capabilities built up by these rapid response
mechanisms may signal an era of increasing ad hocism in international
security, where the institutional constructs, but not end products are
used—interoperable forces, a common culture, mainstreamed training,
doctrine and guidelines, but not the formal deployment of, for example,
the EU Battlegroups.

We further develop each of the chapters' findings in the final chapter
of the book. In building our argument, we follow the rational-choice
institutionalist logic in which rational states are assumed to only use
international organizations "when the value of these functions out-
weighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action."[39]
We also draw upon on and further develop earlier work on forum-
shopping among international regimes,[40] highlighting that this may
signal a new era of *institutional exploitation* as it provides greater flex-
ibility for member states when they decide when and how to pursue
their national interest.

Notes

1 China announced the formal registration of the force with the UN in Sep-
   tember 2017. See Xinhuanet, "China Registers 8,000 Standby Peace-
   keepers at UN," 28 September 2017, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/
   28/c_136645953.htm. See also Joachim A. Koops and Alexandra Novos-
   seloff, "United Nations Rapid Reaction Mechanisms," Chapter 4 in this
   volume.
2 The exact length of the time frame naturally varies from organization to
   organization: e.g. the EU has no time limit on the planning phase, but the
   first troops should be on the ground within 10 days after the European
   Council has decided to deploy.
3 United Nations, *The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Imple-
   mentation of the Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on
   Peace Operations*, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/70/
   357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015, para. 31.

4 UN, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN document A/70/95–S/2015/446, 16 June 2015.

5 Kofi Annan, "The Peacekeeping Prescription," in *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start*, ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: The Center for International Health and Cooperation, 1996), 184.

6 UN, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, UN document A/55/305-S/2000/ 809, 21 August 2000, 14–16.

7 Ibid., 15.

8 UN, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, 50.

9 Heidi Hardt, *Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

10 Ibid., 198.

11 Ibid., 30.

12 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 189.

13 Nina Græger and Kristin M. Haugevik, "The EU's Performance with and within NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational Practices," *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 6 (2011): 743–757, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2011.606698; Jolyon Howorth, "EU–NATO Cooperation: The Key to Europe's Security Future, *European Security* 26, no. 3 (2017): 454–459, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352584; Joachim A. Koops, "Theorising Inter-Organisational Relations: The 'EU–NATO Relationship' as a Catalytic Case Study," *European Security* 26, no. 3 (2017): 315–339, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352583; Hanna Ojanen, "The EU and Nato: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 1 (2006): 57–76; Ingo Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the 'Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions': Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization," in *OSCE Yearbook 2003* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 381–402, https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/03/OSCE_Yearbook_2003.pdf; Caja Schleich, "NATO and EU in Conflict Regulation: Interlocking Institutions and Division of Labour," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 12, no. 2 (2014): 182–205, https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.900970; Simon J. Smith and Carmen Gebhard, "EU-NATO Relations: Running on the Fumes of Informed Deconfliction," *European Security* 26, no. 3 (2017): 303–314, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352581; and Johannes Varwick and Joachim A. Koops, "The European Union and NATO: 'Shrewd Interorganizationalism' in the Making?" in *The European Union and International Organizations*, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen (London: Routledge, 2009), 101–130.

14 Malte Brosig, "The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa," *International Peacekeeping* 17 (2010): 327–342, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2010.500142; Bruno Charbonneau, "What Is so Special about the European Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 4 (2009): 546–561, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903249110; Alexandra Novosseloff, "Options for Improving EU-UN Cooperation in the Field of Peacekeeping," in *The EU, the UN and Collective Security: Making Multilateralism Effective*, ed. Joachim

Krause and Natalino Ronzitti (London: Routledge, 2012), https://doi.org/1
0.4324/9780203115541; and Thierry Tardy, "Building Peace in Post-Conflict
Environments: Why and How the UN and the EU Interact," in *The EU,
the UN and Collective Security*, ed. Krause and Ronzitti, 197–220.

15 Rafael Biermann, "NATO's Troubled Relations with Partner Organiza-
tions: A Resource Dependence Explanation," in *NATO's Post-Cold War
Bureaucracy and the Changing Provision of Security*, ed. Sebastian Mayer
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 215–234; Michael F. Harsch, *The
Power of Dependence: NATO–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management*
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Michael Harsch and Johannes
Varwick, "NATO and the UN," *Survival* 51, no. 2 (2009): 5–12, https://doi.
org/10.1080/00396330902860744; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and
the UN: A Peculiar Relationship," *Contemporary European History* 7, no.
3 (1998): 329–342.

16 Brosig, "The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa"; and "Regime
Complexity and Resource Dependence Theory in International Peace-
keeping," in *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World
Politics*, ed. Rafael Biermann and Joaquim A. Koops (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017), 447–470; Thomas G. Weiss and Martin Welz, "The UN
and the African Union in Mali and Beyond: A Shotgun Wedding?" *Inter-
national Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2014): 889–905; Cedric de Coning, Linnea Gelot,
and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations* (London:
Zed Books, 2016);

  Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud, eds., *UN Peace-
keeping Doctrine in a New Era* (London: Routledge, 2017); and John
Karlsrud, *The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era* (Basingstoke,
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

17 Yf Reykers and John Karlsrud, "Multinational Rapid Response Mechan-
isms: Past Promises and Future Prospects," *Contemporary Security Policy*
38, no. 3 (2017): 420–426, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1348567.

18 Steve Cropper, Mark Ebers, Chris Huxham, and Peter Smith Ring,
"Introducing Inter-Organizational Relations," in *The Oxford Handbook of
Inter-Organizational Relations*, ed. Steve Cropper, Mark Ebers, Chris
Huxham, and Peter Smith Ring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4.

19 Rafael Biermann and Joachim A. Koops, "Studying Relations among
International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Chal-
lenges," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in
World Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 31.

20 Christer Jönsson, "IR Paradigms and Inter-Organizational Theory: Situat-
ing the Research Program within the Discipline," in *The Palgrave Hand-
book of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics*, ed. Biermann and
Koops, 49.

21 Rafael Biermann and Michael Harsch, "Resource Dependence Theory," in
The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics,
ed. Biermann and Koops, 135.

22 Biermann and Koops, "Studying Relations among International Organiza-
tions in World Politics," 21.

23 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organiza-
tions: A Resource Dependence Theory* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Business
Books, 2003).

24 Ephraim Yuchtman and Stanley E. Seashore, "A System Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness," *American Sociological Review* 32, no. 6 (1967): 891–903.

25 For example, Harsch, *The Power of Dependence.*

26 Note though that the UN core budget comes from assessed contributions that are not necessarily under the ministry of defense budgets of member states, thereby avoiding direct competition.

27 Biermann and Koops "Studying Relations among International Organizations in World Politics," 17.

28 See also Stephanie C. Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): 45–52, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709090070, and "Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 101–120.

29 Carmen Gebhard and David Galbreath, *Cooperation or Conflict? Problematizing Organizational Overlap in Europe* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010); Hofmann, "Why Institutional Overlap Matters"; Koops, "Theorising Inter-Organisational Relations"; and Peters, "The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the 'Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions.'"

30 Biermann and Koops, "Studying Relations among International Organizations in World Politics," 20; and Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

31 Biermann and Koops, "Studying Relations among International Organizations in World Politics," 23. See also Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal, *Institutional Choice and Global Commerce* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

32 UN, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, 63.

33 For example, Harsch, *The Power of Dependence.*

34 Richard Gowan and Stephen J. Stedman, "The International Regime for Treating Civil War, 1988–2017," *Daedalus* 147, no. 1 (2017): 171–184.

35 Hofmann, "Why Institutional Overlap Matters."

36 Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security," 46.

37 Harsch, *The Power of Dependence*, 4.

38 Keohane, *After Hegemony.*

39 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998): 5.

40 Daniel W. Drezner, "The Viscosity of Global Governance: When Is Forum-shopping Expensive?" unpublished conference paper, Princeton University, November 2006, www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/drezner_S1100_16.pdf.