• Forhandlingsmetodikk i WTO : Teoretiske resonnementer 

      Harstad, Bård Gjul (NUPI Working Paper;610, Working paper, 2000)
      Notatet klarlegger prinsipielle og praktiske forskjeller mellom de forhandlingsmetoder som har vært og kan komme til å bli brukt i WTO forhandlinger. Resonnementene baserer seg på økonomisk teori og forhandlingsteori. Selv ...
    • Integration and Regionalization - a political economic analysis 

      Harstad, Bård Gjul (NUPI Working Paper;609, Working paper, 2000)
      This paper examines the incentives for political integration in a situation with a non-excludable public good. The model emphasizes inter-regional differences in sizes and preferences for the public good. In such a two-country ...
    • Linking Issues : Should one bargain over two issues simultaineously or separately? 

      Harstad, Bård Gjul (NUPI Working Paper;616, Working paper, 2001)
      International negotiations on trade (e.g. GATT and TRIPS) have typically been of the packageform, and different issues have therefore been linked to each other. Trade issues have not been linked to e.g. environmental ...
    • Majority Rules and Incentives : International voting affects domestic policies 

      Harstad, Bård Gjul (NUPI Working Paper;662, Working paper, 2004)
      A "majority rule" defines the number of club-members that must approve a policy proposed to replace the status quo. Since the majority rule thus dictates the extent to which winners must compensate losers, it also determines ...
    • Uniform or Different Policies 

      Harstad, Bård Gjul (NUPI Working Paper;661, Working paper, 2004)
      I analyse the negotiation between two countries, or regions, that are trying to make an agreement in order to internalize externalities. Local preferences are local information, but reluctance to participate in the ...