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dc.contributor.authorJensenius, Francesca R.
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-29T15:45:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-22T09:52:29Z
dc.date.available2016-01-29T15:45:28Z
dc.date.available2016-02-22T09:52:29Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2015, 7(3):196-220nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1945-7790
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2379869
dc.description-nb_NO
dc.description.abstractThis paper estimates the constituency-level development effects of quotas for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) in India, using a unique dataset of development indicators for more than 3,100 state assembly constituencies in 15 Indian states in 1971 and 2001. Matching constituencies on pretreatment variables from 1971, I find that 30 years of quotas had no detectable constituency-level effect on overall development or redistribution to SCs. Interviews with politicians and civil servants in 2010 and 2011 suggest that these findings can be explained by the power of political parties and the electoral incentives created by the quota system.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationnb_NO
dc.relation.urihttp://www.francesca.no/wp-content/2015/12/Development_reservations_postprint.pdf
dc.titleDevelopment from representation? A study of quotas for the scheduled castes in Indianb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.date.updated2016-01-29T15:45:28Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/app.20140201
dc.identifier.cristin1251406
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 225905nb_NO


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