Oil Prices and International Conflict: Why Low Oil Revenue May Not Pacify Petrostates

Abstract

This article explores how declining oil revenue might shape the amount of international conflict initiated by major oil producers (petrostates). We analyze four potential mechanisms through which variation in oil prices could affect petrostate conflict initiation: emboldenment, battling over a smaller market, signaling strength, and diversionary conflict. The empirical findings suggest that higher oil prices are associated with lower rates of petrostate conflict initiation. From one standard deviation below the mean oil price to one standard deviation above it, the predicted number of militarized interstate disputes declines twofold, from .025 [95% CI: .016–.034] per petrostate per year to .012 [.007–.016]. Moreover, the evidence suggests that petrostates are more likely to target other petrostates when oil prices are low. This suggests that the energy transition may not be a boon for international peace among petrostates, and for a time, it may even prove to be the opposite.

Oil Prices and International Conflict: Why Low Oil Revenue May Not Pacify Petrostates