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dc.contributor.authorDeSombre, Winnona
dc.contributor.authorGjesvik, Lars
dc.contributor.authorWillers, Johann Ole
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-20T08:49:37Z
dc.date.available2022-06-20T08:49:37Z
dc.date.created2022-05-27T13:37:43Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2999484
dc.description.abstractState cyber capabilities are increasingly abiding by the “pay-to-play” model—both US/NATO allies and adversaries can purchase interception and intrusion technologies from private firms for intelligence and surveillance purposes. NSO Group has repeatedly made headlines in 2021 for targeting government entities in cyberspace, but there are many more companies selling similar products that are just as detrimental. These vendors are increasingly looking to foreign governments to hawk their wares, and policymakers have yet to sufficiently recognize or respond to this emerging problem. Any cyber capabilities sold to foreign governments carry a risk: these capabilities could be used against individuals and organizations in allied countries, or even in one’s home country. Because much of this industry operates in the shadows, research into the industry in aggregate is rare. This paper analyzes active providers of interception/intrusion capabilities within the international surveillance market, cataloguing firms that have attended both ISSWorld (i.e., the Wiretapper’s Ball) and international arms fairs over the last twenty years.1 This dataset mostly focuses on Western firms and includes little on Chinese firms, due to historical under-attendance of Chinese firms at ISSWorld. However, the overarching nature of this work will help policymakers better understand the market at large, as well as the primary arms fairs at which these players operate. This paper identifies companies explicitly marketing interception/intrusion technology at arms fairs, and answers a series of questions, including: what companies are marketing interception/intrusion capabilities outside their headquartered region; which arms fairs and countries host a majority of these firms; and what companies market interception/intrusion capabilities to US and NATO adversaries?
dc.description.abstractSurveillance Technology at the Fair: Proliferation of Cyber Capabilities in International Arms Markets
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherAtlantic Councilen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAtlantic Council Issue Brief;November 2021
dc.relation.urihttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/surveillance-technology-at-the-fair/
dc.subjectSikkerhetspolitikk
dc.subjectSecurity policies
dc.subjectCyber
dc.subjectCyber
dc.subjectNATO
dc.subjectNATO
dc.subjectEtterretning
dc.subjectIntelligence
dc.titleSurveillance Technology at the Fair: Proliferation of Cyber Capabilities in International Arms Marketsen_US
dc.title.alternativeSurveillance Technology at the Fair: Proliferation of Cyber Capabilities in International Arms Marketsen_US
dc.typeResearch reporten_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersion
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Internasjonal politikk: 243
dc.subject.nsiVDP::International politics: 243
dc.source.pagenumber21en_US
dc.identifier.cristin2027733
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal


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