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dc.contributor.authorJohnson, Trude
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-01T14:46:38Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-04T07:27:45Z
dc.date.available2016-07-01T14:46:38Z
dc.date.available2016-07-04T07:27:45Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.citationWorking Paper, NUPI nr706. NUPI, 2006nb_NO
dc.identifier.isbn82 7002 138 5
dc.identifier.issn0800 - 0018
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2395369
dc.description-nb_NO
dc.description.abstractIn December 1991, Russia started down the road of its post-Soviet existence. The re-emergence of Russia as a separate, independent entity compelled the state to come to terms with its revived national identity. Russia’s relationship with the West lay at the core of the challenge to define what Russia is and how it should relate to the outside world. Opinion divided over whether Russia should rapidly integrate with Europe and “return to the civilized community of nations” or whether it should seek “a strengthening of Russia’s positions in the East” and rather pursue its unique mission as a mediator between the East and West. Against this backdrop I have analysed Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe (CoE) and Russia’s partial compliance to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Protocol No. 6, which refer to the abolishment of the death penalty in peacetime. Employing constructivist insights, I argue that this partial compliance is explained by the lack of a coherent and widely accepted national identity. Due to different perceptions of Russia’s identity among various state actors, identities collide, and interests, and consequently action, will be in a competing and conflictual relationship to each other. Thus, norm compliance is challenged when identities overlap and their norms conflict. This, I argue, is evident in Russia’s relationship with the European ideational community and the country’s dealing with the death penalty issue. The more Russian state actors value the European identity of their state, the more they will seek to comply with “European” norms, such as the strong European abolitionist norm, and vice versa. In my analysis, I also discuss whether it is right to completely dismiss rational explanations to Russia’s partial compliance. In this way I bring my case into the midst of the rational–constructivist debate in International Relations theory. Contributing to this debate, I investigate whether an either-or approach is the most productive way of explaining Russia’s ideational behaviour or whether rational and constructivist assumptions combined may shed new light on how to understand Russian compliance with international human rights norms or the lack of such.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNUPInb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNUPI Working Paper;706
dc.rightsNavngivelse-Ikkekommersiell-DelPåSammeVilkår 3.0 Norge*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/no/*
dc.titleImplementing Human Rights Norms : A Case Study of Russia's Partial Compliance to ECHR Protocol No. 6nb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.date.updated2016-07-01T14:46:38Z
dc.source.pagenumber69 p.nb_NO
dc.identifier.cristin1365737
dc.subject.keywordHumanitære spørsmål / Humanitarian issues
dc.subject.keywordRussland og Eurasia / Russia and Eurasia


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Navngivelse-Ikkekommersiell-DelPåSammeVilkår 3.0 Norge
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