Who Buys Whom in International Oligopolies with FDI and Technology Transfer?
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Original versionWorking Paper, NUPI nr 727. NUPI, 2007
Under what conditions will a technology leader from a small country acquire a laggard from a large country, and vice versa? We answer this question with a two-firm two-country Cournot model, where firms enter new markets via greenfield FDI or acquisition. The model takes into account both technological and market size asymmetries, and allows for M&A transaction costs, like corporate finance and legal fees. We show that to be the acquirer, a firm from a small country needs not only a strong technological lead but also the ability to exploit it on a global scale, which requires low international technology transfer costs. Moreover, we find that a multilateral greenfield investment liberalization may actually increase the incentives for foreign acquisitions. The effect of such liberalization on the nationality of the acquirer depends largely on the extent of the technology gap.